Chinese Migration into Primorskii Krai: Economic Effects and Interethnic Hostility

Mikhail Alexseev

> I prefer this land to be a Russian desert rather than a Chinese oasis.
>
> Against our will, we resorted to employing Chinese labor, because it was very cheap, because the workers were sober, and because they had almost no holidays.
>
> —— *Pavel F. Untenberger, Governor General of Primorskii Oblast, 1888-1898*[1]

Since gaining sovereign power over the territories extending along the Amur River to the Pacific and down south to the Korean Peninsula, Russian observers saw these lands as a modern-day economic Eldorado in the making. From the 19th-century explorer and historian Mikhail Veniukov to the reformers of the Mikhail Gorbachev era in the late 20th century, the southern stretches of the Russian Far East (RFE) appeared poised to become a "California on the Amur" with Vladivostok turning into a "Hong Kong of the North." Implicitly, these dreams have always been dreams of globalization, straightforwardly inferred from the RFE's proximity to China, Japan, Korea, and the United States (Stephan, 1994).

The migration of ethnic Chinese into the area since the early 1990s, has been one development, however, that highlighted enormous social, political and economic challenges to the vision of the RFE as the "California of the Amur." Promising economies typically attract migrants and migrant labor is a major factor helping to translate promise into reality. But migration also typi-

1 Quoted, respectively, in *Orientir* (September 1, 2001), p. 12 and *Sovetskii Sakhalin* (October 21, 2000).

cally causes social frictions and contributes to interethnic hostility. Overcoming such frictions, therefore, would be a critical factor in the RFE's integration into regional and global systems of exchange as a dynamic, vibrant, and fast-growing economy and society.

This paper focuses on an important subset of this problem: How do the perceived economic effects of Chinese migration in the RFE relate to anti-Chinese hostility – understood as public support for exclusionist and "expulsionist" measures? In the context of the RFE's attempts at successful globalization, Russian attitudes toward the Chinese are an important litmus test of Russian society's acceptance of the free movement of people and multiculturalism that globalization begets. To begin with, it is also important to understand the distinctly peripheral role of the RFE in the global context of Chinese migration.

In the last quarter of the 20th century, Chinese migration emerged as a global phenomenon driven by demographics and political and economic incentives, attracting migrants to rich industrialized democracies, such as the United States, the European Union, Japan, and Australia. In the global context, the Russian Far East – including Primorskii krai[2] – is just one of several peripheral destinations for Chinese migrants–mostly from the poorer regions of China's northeastern "rust belt," few of whom can afford to pay tens of thousands of dollars to migration entrepreneurs (nicknamed "snakeheads") to be smuggled to the West. A recent

2 Primor'e's economic development indexed (with Kamchatka = 1.0) was estimated as the highest for the Russian Far East at 3.0, followed by Khabarovsk at 2.5, in Miller and Stephanopoulos (1997). Chinese migration levels, demographic and economic trends, cross-border trade in Primor'e, and perceptions of migration by local Russians are similar to Khabarovsk krai and the Amur *oblast,* as evidenced by reports presented at the round table, "Prospects of the Far East: The Chinese Factor," Vladivostok, Institute of History, Archeology, and Ethnography (IHAE) of the Far Eastern Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences, June 28, 1999. All three provinces have similar administrative offices (branches of the federal migration service, visa service, police, and border service) and all three have witnessed a "cossack revival" in the 1990s (although Primorskii krai Cossacks have been more active), see Ivanov and Sergeev (1999).

study of Chinese migration by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace concluded that in the Far East of Russia, the typical Chinese migrant is "poor, persevering, modest, hungry for earnings of any size, and brutally exploited by his own countrymen with the silent approval of the Russians" (Vikovskaia et al., 2000, p. 361). It is little surprise, then, that official Chinese sources reported that the number of Chinese migrants in all Soviet successor states in the mid-1990s was approximately only one percent of the worldwide Chinese diaspora (Czan, 1994).

1. The Scope and Nature of Chinese Migration in Primorskii Krai

The number of "settled" Chinese migrants in Primorskii krai – legal residents registered by the Migration Service – has been statistically insignificant as a proportion of the *krai's* 2.2 million population around 2001. In 2000, 574 such migrants arrived and 462 departed from Primorskii krai, leaving a migration surplus of 112 (Goskomstat Rossii, 2001a, p. 56). Most Chinese migrants have been coming to Primorskii on short-term visits, primarily as tourists, "shuttle" traders, entrepreneurs, laborers, poachers, smugglers, and students. The most reliable baseline data on the scope of this short-term migration are provided by the Visa and Registration Department (OVIR) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Primorskii krai, an agency whose officers count and register every Chinese national crossing the border into Russia. Interdepartmental OVIR data suggests that the total number of Chinese nationals visiting Primor'e increased from 35,000 in 1995 to over 100,000 by 2002 (Table 1).

Most visitors and migrants from the PRC in Primor'e and other border provinces (about half of PRC nationals observed in Vladivostok around 2000 were ethnic Koreans, reflecting the proximity of the PRC's ethnic Korean enclaves) come from the three neighboring provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning. More than half have high school or college education, and say they are driven by the opportunity to make a lot of money fast (which explains why more PRC migrants reside in Moscow than

in the entire Russian Far East) (Gel'bras, 1999, p. 34). Whereas 34 percent (or 27,530) of PRC visitors to Primor'e failed to return home in 1994 and 1995, the number of illegally overstaying visitors plummeted following the introduction by law enforcement agencies, starting in 1994, of tighter visa controls and spot checks in the streets, markets and workplace ("Operation Foreigner").

The data suggest that the flow of PRC nationals into Primorskii krai has been increasingly rule-based and controlled by the authorities. Visa-free travel – a putative cause of illegal and "gray market" economic migration in the region – increased almost four times from 1996 to 2002, with nearly three quarters of all visitors to Primor'e coming on tourist permits (standing in lieu of visas). At the same time, however, only 0.4 percent of registered visitors by 1999 remained illegally in the *krai*. The number of administrative penalties (mostly fines), deportation orders, and forced deportations dropped after a 1995 surge, stabilized in absolute numbers, and decreased more than twofold from 1996 through early 1999 relative to the total number of PRC visitors. By 2003, the administrative violations and deportation rates remained essentially the same, judging from press reports (e.g., Yegorchev, 2000; Chernov, 2003). According to Col.-General Alexander Golbakh, chief of the Pacific District Administration of the Russian Border Service (TORU), the situation on the Russian-Chinese border at the end of 2001 – despite occasional detention of individuals illegally crossing the border – remained "calm and under control" (*Orientir*, September 1, 2001, p. 13). This is the same assessment I received from TORU in May 1999 and it is generally consistent with the situation at the time of writing.

The estimated overall number of PRC nationals in Primorskii krai – including guest workers, traders, tourists, businessmen and traders entering as tourists, smugglers, poachers, students, and racketeers – was estimated by the chief of the Primorskii krai Migration Service, Sergei Pushkarev, at about 35,000 on any given day in 2000 (Interview, Vladivostok, August 15, 2000). This data and my field observations from 1999 to 2001 left little doubt that the Chinese remained a marginal ethnic segment in Primorskii

and in the Russian Far East generally, and their presence was a fraction of what one may find in Vancouver, Seattle, San Francisco, or New York. In May 2002, Russian scholars Karlusov and Kudin (2003: 81) estimated that the proportion of Chinese visitors (considering most of them return to China) did not exceed 3.3 percent of the Russian Far East population (based on the estimated 250,000 Chinese visitors among 7.2 million Russian population). Using the United Nations demographic data, these authors also showed that in the first half of the 1990s, Russia ranked low on rates of in-migration compared to other receiving states. Per 10,000 host population, Russia had 31.25 migrants whereas, for example, Canada had 259, Australia 178.5, and the United States and most of the European Union about 65 (Karlusov and Kudin, 2003, p. 81).

In an opinion poll of 430 Chinese migrants who made it all the way to Moscow, Vil'ia Gel'bras found that economic interest was the primary motivation to migrate (Table 2). Moreover, the data suggest that this interest is short-term – only 12 percent of respondents said they actually would like to work in Russia permanently. In the same poll – carried out in Moscow where living conditions are much higher than in the Russian Far East – only 1.6 percent of Chinese respondents said they would like to become Russian citizens in the future. Only 2.1 percent said they wanted to seek permanent residency status in Russia (Gel'bras, 1999, p. 35).[3]

In my own conversations with Chinese traders in Ussuriisk and Vladivostok in late 1999, most of them told me they came to

3 As economic conditions improve and the socioeconomic environment becomes more predictable, one would expect this number to rise, as evidenced by preliminary reports in a more recent survey by Gel'bras showing a substantially larger number of Chinese expressing willingness to stay in Russia (see the paper by Professor Otsu in this Proceedings volume). In general, however, Gel'bras surveys may only be taken as a very general indication of Chinese migrant perceptions due to the difficulty of polling a representative sample of these migrants. At the very least, this difficulty suggests that the surveys have a large and indeterminate margin of error.

Primorskii krai to make quick money. When asked about their long-term plans, they said they were saving money to move to Europe, Southern China, Canada, or the United States. None told me they would like to settle down in the Russian Far East. This explains a large number of Chinese currency changers in Chinese markets that I visited throughout the Russian Far Eat, from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, to Vladivostok, to Khabarovsk. If anything, these "gray market" currency dealers around the Chinese markets have been proliferating – on my trip to Vladivostok in late September 2000, I observed local young women hired by these dealers standing in the streets outside the markets and aggressively seeking people willing to sell dollars for rubles. On a visit in May 2001, these currency changers were soliciting the cars passing by the Chinese market in downtown Vladivostok. As one Chinese trader told me in Vladivostok: "As soon as I make any amount of rubles, I change them into dollars. I'm going to save the money and move my family to the United States." Proliferation of currency changers is a sign that Chinese migrants are not acquiring a taste for settling down in the Russian Far East, but that they are seeking to maximize the dollar takings from their businesses with a view to moving out of Russia faster.

Given this dynamic, the term "migrants" rather than "immigrants" is more appropriate to describe Chinese nationals coming to the Russian Far East. As migrants seeking predominantly economic opportunities, such as employment (mostly in construction and agriculture) and business (mostly in trade), the Chinese nationals concentrate in large cities and in the areas where construction projects or trading in natural resources, especially timber, are taking place. They usually live in hostels or factory barracks (officially misnamed "hotels", *gostinki*) with substandard amenities or in cargo containers hastily installed in street markets. Interpreting the Goskomstat data on Chinese migrant workers by city and county in Primorskii krai as a proxy for the "economic pull," one finds that most long-term migrants concentrate in Ussuriisk (28% of registered Chinese workers in the *krai* in 1999), Vladivostok (27%), Nakhodka (18%), and in Oktiabr'skii county (*raion)* (7%) (Goskomstat Rossii, 2000a). These data suggest that

proximity to the border, transportation routes, and the hospitality of local authorities play a part in attracting the migrants. For these reasons, most Chinese migrant workers and traders are found in Ussuriisk, the third largest city in Primorskii krai and the closest large city to the Chinese border located at a major highway and railroad juncture.

Economic migration is also constrained by the rent-seeking behavior of Russian government officials, imposing transaction costs in the form of "protection" payoffs. Whereas most common people in Primor'e accept it as an axiom that government officials regulating cross-border trade receive "additional revenues" (or bribes), systematic and specific information is lacking. However, a pilot survey of 100 Chinese migrant traders in Primor'e in the winter of 1999 provides circumstantial evidence supporting this popular axiom. In answer to the question, "Who do you pay for your security?" government officials were named by 62 percent, police by 80 percent, border guards by 55 percent, and transportation service providers by 60 percent of Chinese respondents. In other words, without payments for "security" to officials, police, and border guards most Chinese nationals will not be doing business in Primor'e. Despite fear of reprisals, eight percent of Chinese traders mentioned "bribes to the police" when responding to the question, "What other expenses do you have apart from the cost of merchandise?" When asked what government measures in Russia impede their trade, 65 percent of Chinese respondents named high import tariffs, 86 percent pointed to "strict control over Chinese immigration," 73 percent mentioned the ban on trading in the streets, 23 percent marked visa control and 17 percent mentioned fines (Institut Istorii, 1999).

Overall, Chinese migration patterns into Primorskii appear to be consistent with the local economy's "pull" factors such as consumer market capacity and labor demand. The number of legally employed PRC citizens in Primor'e, provided by the *krai* Goskomstat branch, was 7,895 in 1994, 8,349 in 1995, 8,292 in 1996, 6,968 in 1997, 7,179 in 1998, 6,374 in 1999, and 7,708 in 2000 – suggesting a stable and limited flow (Goskomstat Rossii, 1999; 2001b, p. 21). The proportion of Chinese nationals among

officially registered migrant workers from outside Russia employed in Primorskii krai also stayed about the same. It was 62% in 1996 and 1997, 70% in 1998, 63% in 1999, and 66% in 2000 (Goskomstat Rossii, 2000, p. 42; 2001b, p. 21). The upper limits of government quotas for guest workers – 15,000 for Primorskii and 4,000 for the city of Vladivostok – were never reached.

Between 63 and 69 percent of these Chinese migrant workers are concentrated in the Primor'e cities of Vladivostok, Ussuriisk, Nakhodka, Artem, Arsen'ev, and Partizansk. Approximately 30 percent are located in Primor'e's 13 borderline districts (*raions)*.[4] Since nearly 90 percent of these migrant laborers are employed in construction and agriculture, these migrant flows are seasonal with about one half of the total annual number present in Primor'e at any one time. In Ussuriisk, for example, I visited an enclosed area on the outskirts of the city where one is greeted by a sign, "China Town" (*Kitaiskii gorodok),* in Russian and Chinese on a pagoda-style gate with dragon heads. Designed to house some 1,300 Chinese laborers (Mikhail Vetrik, interview, Ussuriisk, May 26, 1999), the China Town was deserted during my visits in May and in October 1999. The gate was chained shut, with some mean-looking watchdogs, empty barracks in a variable state of dilapidation, and no human activity inside. Apparently, forecasts of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Chinese workers moving into the Russian Far East to develop its vast natural resources so far remain in the realm of fantasy.

2. Socioeconomic Effects of Chinese Migration in Primorskii and Their Public Perceptions

Chinese migration into Primorskii, and the RFE in general, has been part of what may be described as peripheral or provincial globalization. On the one hand, cross-border economic migration and economic exchanges have produced busy and noisy street markets dominated by colorful, yet shoddy, wares imported

4 Confirmed in Tarasenko (1999), pp. 1-2.

from China by "shuttle traders;" Chinese restaurants and karaoke bars; Korean food stands selling pickled vegetables and dough-coated burgers; advertisements for imported products from Coca-Cola to Samsung Electronics; and American movies (dubbed into Russian) in the ubiquitous media kiosks. On the other hand, life even in the Primorskii capital Vladivostok remains decidedly parochial. This is not a place bustling with international book fairs, touring theater companies and musicians, internationally renowned art exhibits, festivals, sports competitions, and diversified international cuisine. It has no mini Silicon Valleys or international telecommunication facilities that would allow transnational corporations to outsource their computer programming and customer services to Primorskii. By late 2001, the Pacific Sky Bar at the top floor of the Hotel Hyundai remained the only venue featuring food and live music entertainment that meet the standards of quality, service, and hygiene to which residents of most global cities from Paris to Seattle would be accustomed.[5]

The scale of Chinese migration and the scale of Chinese investment suggest that its economic effects have been necessarily modest, with sizeable impact limited to a few sectors.

Investment from China in Primorskii has been sporadic throughout the 1990s and into 2001 signaling low levels of commitment to engaging with the local economy (Table 6). The bulk of the investment has been in trade and construction, rather than in processing or manufacturing industries. This trend has been of particular concern to Yeltsin's former representative in the *krai,* Vladimir Ignatenko, who once hoped, while serving as the mayor of the town of Spassk-Dal'nii close to the Chinese border, that the opening of the borders would generate joint Chinese-Russian industrial projects (Interview, Vladivostok, August 15, 2000). Ignatenko says that the investment protocols that he signed, never materialized and by the mid-1990s the Chinese showed a lack of interest in developing a manufacturing base in Primor'e.

The most visible economic impact of Chinese migration has been on trade and its spin-offs, such as consumer prices, avail-

5 Author's observations.

ability and assortment of goods in the stores, and budget revenues. In 1999, China ranked as the number one trading partner of Primorskii krai. Of the $784 million of Primor'e's exports, China accounted for $233.6 million (Goskomstat Rossii, 2000a, p. 188), or 30 percent. In 2000, exports from Primorskii to China reached $284.8 million, again accounting for about 30 percent of Primorskii's total exports of $995.3 million. During that year, about a quarter of Primorskii's imports – $92.1 million out of $375.7 million – came from China, second only to South Korea that generated $127.2 million in imports (Goskomstat Rossii, 2001c, p. 7).

Data on Chinese business investment in Primorskii strongly suggest that trade remains as the prime economic engine of Chinese migration in the area. While accounting for the largest proportion (37%) of the total number of companies with foreign capital in Primorskii krai in 2000, the bulk of Chinese investment was in trade and related restaurant services. Most businesses with Chinese investment employed from three to five people and did not have sizeable capital. Most Chinese businesses with 30 or more employees were companies selling Chinese-made goods in Primorskii ("Korshun," "Priboi," "Para Drokonov," "Priboi," and "Orbita"). Others were a Russian-Chinese garment manufacturer ("Haizhi"); Chinese-operated hotels ("Yuan-Dong," "Viktoria," "Suan-Yuan," and "Chen Hua"); a timber processing company ("Kedr"); and a gambling business ("Enkai Brothers Bowling") (Goskomstat Rossii, 2001d, p. 3).

These companies filled an important niche, vacated by the collapse of the centrally-planned Soviet economy. In Vladivostok, Ussuriisk, Artem, and Arsen'ev, according to the *krai* statistics office, the decline of consumer goods production from 1990 to 1997 averaged 99 percent for shoes, garments, kitchenware, refrigerators, washing machines, and soap, thus increasing the economic incentives for cross-border trade and exchanges. The production of milk, meat, and eggs – Primor'e's key food staples – declined in all of the borderline *raions* and major cities except one, raising incentives for supply from Chinese traders and growers (Goskomstat Rossii, 1998, pp. 78, 80-81).

Similarly, a decline in real wages in Primor'e since 1990 has driven people to secure outside sources of income and find the lowest possible prices. Between 1993 and 1997, wages measured in constant 1991 prices decreased on average by 16 percent throughout Primor'e (Goskomstat Rossii, 1998, p. 26). By January 2000, wages in Primor'e amounted to 28% of wages paid in 1991, when measured in constant 1991 rubles (Goskomstat Rossii, 2000b, p. 28). Cross-border trade provides an escape for local Russians from deteriorating conditions in the old economic sectors. The number of Russians from Primor'e visiting China (with most of these travelers engaging in cross-border trade) exceeded the number of Chinese tourists visiting Primor'e by about ten times from 1992 to 1996 (Larin, 1998, p. 113). This trend largely persisted in late 2000 according to interviews I conducted in Vladivostok markets. The "Chinese markets" sprang up in most of Primor'e's cities. According to Yevgenii Plaksen of the Vladivostok Institute of History who conducts opinion surveys at these markets and regularly shops there, prices are on average one third to one half lower than those in most shops and department stores in Primor'e's cities (Interviews, Vladivostok, May 22, 1999 and August 13, 2000).

The city of Ussuriisk, where the Chinese trade center has become one of the three major contributors to the city budget – along with the sugar factory and the Ussuri Balsam (herb vodka) factory – is a telling example of a local government receiving significant economic benefits from cross-border migrant trade. Mikhail Vetrik, director of the Ussuriisk Chinese trade center spoke with pride about the expansion of his business from the mid-1990s:

> In 1996 there was a swamp here, and now we have a 20-hectare trading area in its place with five hostels, six halls of residence, loading-unloading facilities, a maintenance service, a passport registration service, a police station, an international telephone exchange, new public restrooms, a new septic system, and Chinese, Korean, and Russian restaurants. We generate 10-11 percent of tax revenues for the city of Ussuriisk (population 160,000), somewhere between $750,000 and $1,000,000 in 1998. We expect to generate

> at least the same amount of taxes for the city in 1999 and increase that amount in years to come (Interview, Ussuriisk, May 26, 1999).

Olga Proskuriakova, head of the foreign trade department at the committee for international and regional economic relations of the Primorskii krai government, estimated that cross-border "shuttle" trade by individuals (both Russian and Chinese nationals) is three times the volume of the officially reported trade between Primorskii krai and China (*Zolotoi Rog,* March 2, 1999, p. 1).

Hiring Chinese labor has also been associated with economic benefits in Primor'e. According to the chief of the Russian federal migration service for Primorskii krai, Sergei Pushkarev, Russian businesses hire Chinese migrant workers for three main reasons – quality, work discipline, and farming skills. PRC nationals are seen daily at main construction sites in Vladivostok. In May 1999, this author observed them working hard at around 7 p.m. in Vladivostok's central square, renovating the monument in honor of the fighters for Soviet power next to the *krai* administrative headquarters. (Few Russian construction workers are still sober and productive that late in the day).

Positive perceptions of the socioeconomic impact of cross-border exchanges with China are also reflected in the views of Primorskii krai's top government officials. According to Vladimir Ignatenko, who in September 2000 served as the chairman of the committee on regional policy and legality of the *krai* Duma (legislative assembly), the Chinese factor benefits Primorskii krai because "tourist business has grown, tourist services – from hotels to cafes and restaurants – have been generating more capital to the extent that it became not all that easy to find hotel vacancies in Vladivostok" (Interview, Vladivostok, August 15, 2000). Moreover, Ignatenko said that working in tourist services "forces our people [the Russians] to be more disciplined," improving local work ethic. "Construction business has also thrived, creating jobs and attracting workforce and we have seen distinct benefits for agriculture: the Chinese have great capacity to work especially when it comes to growing turnips, carrots, tomatoes and cucum-

bers. Russians cannot work like that" (Ibid.). Vladimir Stegnii, then vice-governor of Primorskii krai responsible for international economic relations, said that the increase in exchanges with China has led to growing demand for bus and railway services, as well as for shoes, cotton clothes, kitchen ware and souvenirs. "Our sanatoriums and tourist hotels are packed to capacity (the total capacity of these institutions is 30,000 people)," he said in August 2000 (Interview, Vladivostok, August 15, 2000).

But migration also has – or is associated with – negative socioeconomic effects in Primorskii krai. Government officials have frequently pointed out that despite the high trade volume, Chinese investment in the Primorskii economy has not only been inconsistent, but it has lagged behind investment from other states. For the year 2000, investment from China into Primorskii was only about 2.4 percent of the total amount of foreign investment (Goskomstat Rossii, 2001c, p. 21) – and that for the year when Chinese investment increased substantially in absolute terms. At $1.86 million, China was behind South Korea ($43.4 million), the United States ($12 million), Japan ($11.8 million), the Virgin Islands ($2.9 million), and Cyprus ($2.3 million) (Ibid.).

Comparing trade and investment statistics, Primorskii officials have complained that Chinese migration is not helping Primorskii integrate into the global economy, but rather reinforces the Primorskii's economic role as a raw-materials' periphery – except that it is becoming not so much a Russian periphery, but an East Asian periphery. This disbalance between trade and investment rankings underlies Vladimir Ignatenko's negative perception of the economic activities of Chinese migrants in Primor'e: "The crux of the matter is that they come here and export valuable raw materials, such as metals and timber, but they bring low quality consumer goods in exchange to trade at the local markets. As a result, they profit from our exports and they make money here from trade and we end up with their shoddy stuff. They get richer and we get weaker" (Interview, Vladivostok, June 2, 1999). According to the former Pacific Border Service chief, Lt.-General Pavel Tarasenko:

> [Chinese] tourists pose another threat – while on the territory of the Russian Federation, they are investing the proceeds of their commercial activities into real property, securities, and contraband (smuggling out sea cucumbers, ginseng roots, rare-earth metals, and classified weapon samples). As you realize, such activities of Chinese nationals affect the demographic, economic, military, and other aspects of Russia's national interest in this region. These activities are explicitly aimed at undermining Russia's security (Tarasenko, 1999, p. 5).

Survey data provides a general assessment of the economic effects of Chinese migration by sector. In my opinion survey of 1,010 Russian respondents in Primorskii krai in September 2000, the perceived economic impact of Chinese migrants and cross-border exchanges with China is predominantly positive in trade-related sectors and predominantly negative in all other sectors.[6] As shown in Table 4, respondents see Chinese migration as predominantly beneficial to agriculture, trade, availability of con-

6 The opinion survey was designed by this author and conducted in September 2000 by the Center for the Study of Public Opinion at the Vladivostok Institute of History, Ethnography and Archeology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, employing four Center contract interviewers and three contract interviewers of the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), Vladivostok branch. The sample was stratified by location (border vs. non-border), population change and population density, rural-urban population split, and economic indicators (average wage purchasing power and trade with China). The areas include the cities of Vladivostok and Artem and the counties of Ussuriisk (including the city of Ussuriisk), Dal'nerechensk, Khasan and Lazo. Voting districts served as primary sampling units (*psu*s). In cities the *psu*s were selected randomly (by drawing lots) and in rural areas where voting districts vary significantly in size, by random selection proportionate to estimated population size (a method which ensures random representation of small and large size *psu*s without skewing the sample toward either one or the other unit type). The number of dwellings in each *psu* was then counted and classified by type and proportions of residents in each *psu* by dwelling type were estimated. Interviewers then selected the dwellings and the respondents randomly by drawing lots. This procedure improves on ROMIR and VTsIOM sampling methods that are based on various types of quota sampling where interviewers are allowed to choose respondents themselves. More detailed information and the survey codebook are available from the author upon request.

sumer goods, and the budget. They also see the economic activities of Chinese migrants as helping to reduce prices. On the other hand, the same respondents associate the Chinese presence with more harm than good when it comes to local industry, job availability, the environment, and crime.

One general noteworthy pattern in these responses is that perceptions of Chinese economic effects were predominantly positive in sectors where Chinese migration actually had an effect. In sectors such as industry where the overall effects were minimal, economic effects were assessed as predominantly negative. In a sense, this suggests that part of the problem is not so much the nature of Chinese economic activities, but their scale.

The Primorskii 2000 survey suggests that Primorskii residents saw migrant trade activities as benefiting the Chinese more than the Russians. Since most migrants have engaged in trade or business, these responses indicated that Chinese migration was associated with increasing deprivation of Russians relative to the Chinese. A survey question asked: "How much income does cross-border trade generate for Russian and Chinese 'shuttle' traders (*chelnoki),* private companies, governments, and smugglers?" Summing up scores of 3 and 4 on a 0 to 4 scale, as percentage of the total, gives a measure of respondents' assessment of how much local Russians gain from cross-border migration by comparison with the Chinese. For "shuttle" traders (private citizens), 59 percent (with 15 percent "don't knows") of respondents said the Russians benefited a great deal versus 74 percent (15 percent) who said the Chinese gained a lot. Similarly, the score is 50 percent (26 percent "don't knows") for Russian businesses versus 56 percent (31 percent) for Chinese business; 24 percent (27 percent) for the Russian government versus 45 percent (35 percent) for the Chinese government; and 73 percent (19 percent) for the Russian smugglers versus 73 percent (22 percent) for the Chinese smugglers (N=1,010). In other words, most Russian respondents felt that the benefits of economic exchanges with China disproportionately benefited Chinese citizens and the Chinese government plus a small group of smugglers on both sides. The majority of the local Russian public had good reasons to feel deprived rela-

tive to these groups – although the intensity of these perceptions varied widely among respondents.

The tension between perceived economic costs and benefits of Chinese migration in Primorskii is embedded in responses to the 2000 survey question: "In your view, how many people in Primorskii krai benefit from cross-border trade with China now?" Most respondents (close to 37 percent, excluding the "don't knows")[7] said they believed about one third of Primorskii's population benefited from – predominantly migrant – trade with China. Approximately 30 percent of respondents stated that this trade benefited less than one quarter of the local Russian population – a cohort one expects to be the most prone to migration phobia. In other words, nearly 70 percent of the representative sample of Primorskii residents thought that two thirds of local Russians did not obtain gains from trade with China. Among the remaining respondents, 18 percent said about half of Primorskii residents gained from cross-border trade; 8 percent said two thirds; and 5 percent said more than three quarters. These perceptions reflected a general sense of the local public that, on the one hand, interactions with China did improve the lives of a sizeable proportion of the local population, but, on the other hand, a lot more local residents were yet to benefit.

3. The "Yellow Peril" Revisited: Exaggerated Fears and Interethnic Hostility

Statements by the late-19th century Governor-General Untenberger at the beginning of this article reflect Russia's long-term dilemma in the southern tier of the RFE – balancing between economic expediency and the security implications of Chinese presence. Former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev faced the same dilemma in the late 1950s when Chairman Mao offered to provide 10 million Chinese laborers who would develop the RFE and Siberia's resources. While initially welcoming Mao's proposal, the Soviet leader changed his mind having considered "the

7 About 12 percent of respondents chose the "don't know" answer.

simple truth – if we, Russians, are not developing Siberia and the Far East and the Chinese do, then the area becomes no longer ours, but Chinese" (Conversation with Sergei Khrushchev, March 5, 2003, John W. Kluge Center, Library of Congress).

An identical threat perception emerged early in the 1990s when the Russo-Chinese border was opened. Viktor Larin, director of the Vladivostok Institute of the History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East (IHAE) counted more than 150 articles in the Primorskii and Russian press from 1993 to 1995 that voiced these threats while providing no specific data on Chinese migration to substantiate them. The Russian national daily *Izvestiia,* for example, asked "The Chinese in the Far East: Guests or Masters?" Another Russian daily, *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* wondered, "Will Vladivostok Become a Suburb of Harbin?" A Vladivostok mass market tabloid, *Novosti,* warned "The Chinese Are Weaponless, But Very Dangerous" (Larin, 1998, p. 72).

Government officials from Moscow to Vladivostok consistently articulate the same kind of alarmist sentiments. The most brash and vociferous warnings – accompanied by staged public events such as visits to disputed border areas – came from Yevgenii Nazdratenko, the governor of Primorskii from 1993 to 2001. In a book published during the 1999 gubernatorial election campaign – provocatively entitled "And All of Russia Behind My Back" – Nazdratenko warned that Chinese migration would turn the Russian Far East into the "Asian Balkans" (Nazdratenko, 1999, pp. 8-29). "Chinese citizens have been traveling to our region as if it were a Chinese province," complained Nazdratenko in another interview (*Primorets,* July 26, 2000). Addressing officials in Blagoveshchensk, a city on the border with China across the Amur River in July 2000, Russian president, Vladimir Putin, said: "If you do not take practical steps to advance the Far East soon, after a few decades, the Russian population will be speaking Japanese, Chinese, and Korean."[8] When minister Vladimir

8 While the Kremlin forced Nazdratenko out of office in February 2001 for incompetence in dealing with the energy crisis, he was appointed chair-

Zorin released Russian census data in December 2002 showing that 390,000 Chinese had entered the country without proper visas (in itself a debatable number due to selection bias and irregularities during the 2002 Russian census), other estimates appeared putting the real number of such illegals at five to 30 times this number. The latter estimate suggested that by late 2002, there could have been as many as 11,700,000 Chinese nationals living in Russia, or 8 percent of the entire population.[9] Consistent with the spirit of these exaggerated assessments, in February 2003, the Khabarovsk governor, Viktor Ishaev again warned President Putin of ongoing "Chinese expansion into the Russian Far East" at the meeting of Russia's State Council (*Gossovet)* (Chernov, 2003).

Whereas the Primorskii 2000 survey showed that local Russians overestimated the scale of Chinese presence by the factor of 10 (see details in the next section), the intensity of general threat perception varied widely. This variation had a near-normal ("bell-shaped curve") distribution. When asked about the threat to Russia as a whole, most respondents (about 40 percent) said that Chinese migrants posed no or very little threat, although close to one third of respondents saw this migration as threatening. However, regarding the Far East and Primorskii krai, the largest proportion of respondents believed that Chinese migrants posed a strong or very strong threat (43 and 55 percent respectively). At the same time most respondents (42 percent) believed that despite a threat to Primorskii krai, Chinese migrants posed no threat whatsoever to them personally.

Primorskii residents also saw the threat of the Chinese takeover as increasing in the future. Most survey respondents believed that military clashes with China over border territories – such as the one over Damanskii Island in March 1969 – were

man of the State Committee on Fishing and in May 2003 became deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council, one of the top decision-making bodies.

9 This unsubstantiated and unbelievable estimate would also make the Chinese the largest non-Russian ethnic group in the Russian Federation and more than twice as numerous as the Tatars (who remain the largest non-Russian ethnic group according to the census data).

unlikely at the time of polling. Looking 5 to 10 and 10 to 20 years ahead, however, they saw such military conflicts as more likely than not. The shadow of the future was rather dark for Primorskii residents – the more they looked ahead, the more they anticipated hostile military actions by China amidst increasing uncertainty.

Support for aggressive hostile responses to Chinese migration also showed considerable variation but was on some dimensions several times higher than support for racist exclusionism in the Canadian surveys and for xenophobic policies in the EU surveys. In my Primorskii poll, respondents were given 17 policy options on how to respond to Chinese migration and asked to grade them on a scale of –3 (most hostile) to +3 (most accommodating), with a midpoint of "change nothing" or "do nothing" (at zero). For example, if someone felt the borders should be totally closed they would chose –3, but if they favored totally open borders they would chose +3. Those favoring some intermediate measures would choose scores in between.

Most respondents preferred hostile political and military measures against Chinese migration. About 65 percent of respondents said they favor closing the border with China to crossings, including 25 percent who favored complete border closure. Less than one percent favored opening the border completely. Approximately 57 percent of respondents said they would support the Cossacks or other voluntary paramilitary groups to stop Chinese migrants. Deportation of illegal Chinese migrants – which in the Primorskii context included the overwhelming majority of Chinese migrant traders and workers – had the support of 89 percent of respondents. A vast majority (78 percent) of those polled supported a ban on Russian residency rights to the Chinese.

Fear that the Chinese would settle in Primorskii came through also on economic issues. While showing less hostility on these issues,[10] 36 percent of respondents still said they favored a ban on Chinese citizens trading in Primorskii krai (to 29 percent

10 For example, only 27 percent of respondents favored raising taxes and duties on goods imported from China (to 36 percent who oppose such raises).

who opposed such a ban). On Chinese citizens' right to land ownership in Russia, 96 percent of respondents said they opposed it or strongly opposed it. Similarly, 60 percent of respondents wanted to ban Chinese migrant labor, the latter being associated with extended presence of Chinese citizens in Primorskii and hence, proclivity for permanent settlement in Russia.[11] A substantial proportion of respondents also opposed integration of Chinese migrants into Russian society: 48 percent of respondents wanted to ban or never allow Chinese language media, 42 percent preferred to ban or never allow Russian-Chinese intermarriages; and 76 percent wanted to ban or never allow Chinatowns in Primorskii krai.[12]

While showing the heightened sense of threat and hostility, the Primorskii 2000 poll also recorded a wide variation in the intensity of responses. This variation is characteristic of the tension between the fears and hopes in the broader political, socioeconomic, and cultural context of the Russian Far East

4. The Correlates of Threat and Hostility: A Statistical Analysis of the Primorskii 2000 Survey

What is the relationship between the perceived economic effects of Chinese migration in Primorskii and the sense that Chinese migration may pose a security threat to Russia and Primorskii krai; the sense that it may engender repetition of armed border clashes between Russia and China; and respondents' procliv-

11 At the same time, 64 percent of respondents favored increasing cross-border tourism. Even though statistically tourism is the largest source of Chinese illegal migration in the region, the notion of tourism as a temporary and regulated activity is not linked with long-term stay and migrant settlement.

12 At the same time, regulated cultural exchanges with China had the approval of most Primor'e residents in the survey (71 percent). About 56 percent of respondents supported the idea of setting up Chinese cultural centers in the area, and 62 percent of respondents favored increasing Chinese language instruction in the local schools.

ity for hostile responses to migration – as reflected in responses to the survey questions described above?

4-1. The Model and the Variables

To address this question, I conducted a multiple regression analysis of the Primorskii 2000 survey data. The dependent variable is the level of perceived threat, for which two measures are used. The first measure is general threat perception, based on factor analysis of responses to the question: "Do ethnic Chinese in the Russian Far East pose a threat to (a) Russia as a whole and (b) Primorskii krai?" Principal components analysis of these two items revealed a single component and operationalized it as a single variable.[13] The second measure pertains more specifically to the threat of violent interstate conflict, based on respondents' assessments of the possibility of Sino-Russian border battles – similar to the one over Damanskii Island in 1969 – erupting by 2010. In the context of the Russian Far East, policy analysts identified scenarios in which large-scale Chinese migration makes a threat of Chinese military intervention credible (Yergin and Gusthafson, 1993). The measure of hostility is obtained from the principal components analysis of two items reflecting survey participants' preferences for specific policy responses to Chinese migration. Previous studies found a significant connection between perceived threat and preference for hostile or incendiary policies (Watts, 1996; Schafer, 1999; Gordon and Arian, 2001). The first of our two items measured support for paramilitary anti-migrant groups (Cossacks) – who claimed to whip migrants illegally crossing the border. The second one measured support for anti-immigrant politicians and parties. Variable scores were computed from this principal component.

As the principal explanatory (independent) variables, I used Russian respondents' assessment of the impact of Chinese migration on income, jobs, and crime; perception of the scale of Chi-

13 A Methodological Appendix providing survey questions, coding methods, descriptive statistics, and principal components and factor analysis procedures is available from the author upon request.

nese gains from cross-border trade; and the perceived proportion of Primorskii's population obtaining net benefits from Chinese migration.[14] In an earlier study (Alexseev, 2003), it was established that such perceptions have stronger effects on threat and hostility than relevant macroeconomic indicators such as trade volumes, number of joint ventures, or real wages in counties and cities where the survey took place. To capture valuations of individuals' own economic circumstances, I included respondents' categorization of their personal income. These variables are entered as Block 4 in Tables 5-7 to illustrate their effects relative to the principal control variables.

I also control for non-economic factors that one may plausibly associate with threat and hostility. First, I accounted for respondents' prospective valuations of the ethnic balance in Primorskii – namely, their assessment of what proportion of the Primorskii population by 2010 would be ethnic Chinese. I further measure respondents' perceptions of the degree of Primorskii krai isolation from central Russia by 2010. Implicit in this measure was respondents' view of the extent to which the Russian government would be able to overcome the geographical remoteness of Primorskii from Moscow – primarily in political and economic terms. In this sense, the question is a proxy for strength of central government authority in Russia. To this measure, I added respondents' assessment of the Russian government's capacity to prevent ethnic conflict in Primorskii and perceptions of the Russia-China military balance by 2010. These variables were entered as one block, reflecting perceptions of "emergent anarchy."

Second, I included Russian views on whether the Chinese regard Primorskii krai as a historically Chinese territory and on whether Chinese migration represented "peaceful infiltration" potentially giving China control over Primorskii krai or parts of it (See Block 2, Tables 5-7).

14 The first variable is based on factor analysis of responses to the question described in Table 4 and combines perceptions of the effect of Chinese migration on jobs, incomes, and crime in Primorskii krai. The second and the third variables incorporate the distribution of responses on the two questions described earlier.

Third, I entered respondents' perception of ethnic group difference between the Chinese and the Russians; their attitude to their relatives marrying Chinese nationals; and their views on whether ethnic Chinese can assimilate into Russian society (See Block 3, Tables 5-7).[15]

Fourth, I control for respondents' sensitivity to the effects of migration on Russian sovereignty over Primorskii;[16] support for Russian political parties articulating varying degrees of xenophobia (the "parties of power" or "statists," the communists, and Zhirinovsky nationalists); support for territorial expansion of Russia, based on respondents' preferences for Russia's external border;[17] religion (Orthodox vs. non-Orthodox); and education (college vs. no college).[18] Using hierarchical OLS regression (with SPSS 6.1.3) I estimate the strength of association between the independent variables and (a) the two measures of threat per-

15 Both measure in-group – out-group distance and distinctiveness. Experimental tests of social categorization theory furnished evidence that "in-group – outgroup divisiveness elicits competitive tendencies: not merely through the need for positive distinctiveness, but more basically because social categorization directly influences individuals' perceptions of their goals" (Turner and Giles, 1981, pp. 97-98).

16 Based on the question: "What proportion of Primorskii population would have to be Chinese when local residents would no longer consider Primorskii krai to be part of Russia?"

17 Ideological preferences were coded as follows: LDPR as –2; KPRF as –1; "Unity" and "Fatherland" as 0; SPS as 1; and *Iabloko* as 2. Trust-no-party responses were coded as 0. Support for expansionism was measured by identifying respondents who wanted to see Russia remain within its current border; or to include the former Soviet Slavic republics; or to restore Russia within the USSR borders; or to restore Russia within the borders of the Russian Empire (including Alaska and Finland). One would expect sensitivity to territorial gains or losses to especially affect interethnic hostility in situations where borders have been recently established and/or disputed, as has been the case between Russia and China in the Far East. Given border symbolism, ideological valuations should capture respondents' susceptibility to symbolic politics that has been shown to serve as a powerful driver of interethnic security dilemmas (Kuafman, 2001).

18 College education proved to be a more robust predictor of immigrant attitudes in previous studies than overall education levels (Chandler and Tsai, 2001).

ception and (b) anti-migrant hostility. The direct effects of each predictor were estimated after other predictors were controlled by inspection of regression coefficients.[19]

4-2. The Results

The model used in this study explained approximately 24 percent of variation in general threat perception and in fear of Russia-China armed conflict. The model also explained about 18 percent variation in support for extreme anti-migrant parties and paramilitaries among Primorskii residents. These are significant proportions given the large number of respondents (N=1,010), diverse interpretations of the nature of the "Chinese threat" by local Russians, and high volume of "noise" and random measurement error in any survey data (see Asher, 1983, p. 39). Statistical probability that threat perception and anti-migrant hostility related to these perceptions by chance alone was less than .001 percent (See Tables 5-7). In short, the tests found that Primorskii residents who felt that migrants harbored territorial claims, provided economic benefits to few local residents, and threatened the security of Russia and Primorskii krai, as well as the majority position of their ethnic group, were systematically likely to support coercive, and potentially violent, responses to migration.

An examination of standardized regression coefficients[20] suggests that for both measures of threat, valuations of Russian-Chinese group difference were the strongest and most significant predictor. However, group differences were not a significant correlate of hostility, even when indirect effects through threat perception were taken into account. Two independent variables – assessment of Chinese territorial claims and of the proportion of Primorskii population benefiting from migrant trade – were the most robust correlates of the threat-hostility complex. Both

19 While using standard terms such as "effects" and "predictors", I am aware that regression analysis reveals association among variables and does not in and of itself prove causation.

20 Not reported in Tables 5-7. They can be estimated, however, from unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors reported in these tables.

measures significantly related to all three outcome variables. Assessment of migrants' impact on income opportunities and crime was the only other independent variable that related significantly to at least one measure of threat and to militant anti-Chinese hostility.

Sensitivity to group status reversal, ideology, and religion had no significant effect on general sense of threat and threat of armed conflict, even though all of these control measures had significant one-on-one correlation with threat.[21] Neither personal income assessment nor college education related significantly to threat and hostility.

4-3. Discussion and Policy Implications

One of the most popular explanations of anti-migrant hostility in sociology and political science has to do with competition between incumbent and newcomer groups for jobs, incomes, housing and other socioeconomic and even "symbolic" niches.[22] This study's findings suggest that socioeconomic competition is indeed an important correlate of interethnic fears and hostility.

---

21 For perceived threat to Russia and Primorskii, zero-order correlations were .127 ($p < .001$, one-tailed) for ethnic majority status sensitivity; .130 ($p < .001$) for party trust; .078 ($p < .01$) for support for Russian territorial expansion, and .081 ($p < .01$) for Orthodox believers.

22 Susan Olzak who developed the ethnic competition theory does argue that competition is not necessarily confined to economic issues, but could also revolve around symbolic valuables. However, in her research, Olzak (1992 and elsewhere) focuses predominantly on employment, income, and housing competition. While admittedly, the latter would have symbolic value in addition to material benefits, the exact role of symbolic factors is hard to isolate using these variables. An example of non-economic symbolic issues which could conceivably give rise to intergroup competition and conflict would be political attention, especially during election campaigns – given that the increasing presence of a newcomer ethnic group would make the incumbent group suspect that political leaders may shift their attention to the former outsiders and eventually promote them to more prominent and powerful positions in host states. The prevalence of salsa over ketchup in grocery stores could also contribute to anti-immigrant feelings through a sense of loss in the competition of lifestyle symbols.

However, the study also finds that the competitive logic reveals itself not so much through obsession with the economic gains of one's group relative to other groups, and not even so much through the sense of "realistic threats" to individual socioeconomic conditions, but through the sense of out-group socioeconomic impact on one's in-group. Perceptions of Chinese migrants' gains relative to local Russians; personal income valuation; and respondents' self-identification as unemployed had no significant relationship with most measures of threat and anti-migrant hostility in this study. In contrast, perception of the socioeconomic effects of migration – on jobs, income and crime in Primorskii – had a consistently strong and significant relationship with threat and hostility.

Looking more closely at the survey questions, the findings suggest that socioeconomic impact perceptions represent the combined effects of relative and absolute gain valuations. This is particularly evident regarding the estimated effects of migration on jobs and income opportunities. If these opportunities are perceived as worsening, it implies that competitive pressures are likely to rise – or at least respondents would be more sensitive to the prospect of competition with migrants in the future. Conversely, if job and income opportunities appear to the indigenous population as improving as a result of migration, competitive pressures would matter less. In general, the study suggests economic valuations are likely to affect threat perception not only through the sense of head-on competition between existing and newcomer groups, but largely through the overall sense of opportunity among groups. This study suggests that migration would be more threatening if it raised the sense of uncertainty about the economic opportunities of one's group.

This uncertainty – which in the tests outweighed the sociodemographic attributes of respondents – would increase vulnerability to competition, but it is not something that would necessarily arise out of actual competition for jobs. Thus, in Primorskii krai, stories about 4,000 Chinese migrant workers near Pogranichnyi raised fears of an imminent Chinese takeover, yet, when offered, few local Russians wanted to take those 4,000 jobs

(Nazdratenko, 1999, p. 21). Ironically, Nazdratenko's own political rhetoric emphasized not the absence of job competition, but long-term demographic and political uncertainties associated with migration. The survey shows that in the context of the Russian Far East this emphasis paid handsome political dividends, but it also stalled internationalization of the local economy.

The analysis indicates that policy solutions that "securitize" migration – such as Russian government funding in Primorskii krai in the 1990s of Cossack detachments armed with clubs and whips to patrol the entire length of the border with China on horseback – are likely to reify exaggerated fears, encourage illicit migration, and thus perpetuate mutually reinforcing anti-migrant sentiments and increasingly militarized responses. Using survey questions on preference for immigration levels as a policy guide will only contribute to the vicious circle of rising anti-migrant sentiments and the securitizing of immigration policy. In the meantime, with variation in labor prices across countries significantly exceeding variation in consumer prices, the global economy creates overriding incentives for labor migration. The increasing treatment of migration as a national security problem in Russia and in other states stands to impede economically productive, market-based approaches to international labor migration.

One story from Primorskii krai, however, illustrates a creative approach that combines government regulation with market incentives. In April 2002, construction finally began of the Cross-Border Trade and Industrial Complex (CBTIC) between the Chinese city of Suifenhe and the Russian town of Pogranichnyi. The center embodies the Primorskii-Heilongjiang provincial government agreement of June 2, 1999 that envisioned "a trans-border trade and economic area with shared territory and shared rules of conduct for the citizens of both countries." On the Russian side, the municipal government of Pogranichnyi allocated a 200 hectare area for the project. The first phase of the project – 60 hectares currently under development – provides for a business center, a customs warehouse, hotels, shops and other trade facilities. The second phase envisions the construction of year-round recreational campgrounds, restaurants, entertainment centers,

sporting facilities, sledding sites and ski runs. The third phase would see the arrival of food processing, consumer goods manufacturing, and timber processing facilities. Citizens of Russia and China will not require visas to enter the CBTIC, but they will be required to return to their respective countries.

The project designers estimate that CBTIC will legalize much of the current tourism-based shuttle trade, generating up to $5-7 billion annually in trade exchange volume when fully operational. On the Russian side, the project has been masterminded by Igor' Belchuk, former vice governor of Primorskii under Nazdratenko who morphed into the Darkin administration as chairman of the *krai* transportation committee. Under Nazdratenko, however, Bel'chuk did not get to implement the project, but now he is in charge of it as head of the "Primor'e" Information and Analytical Agency – a private corporation that will develop CBTIC. Construction costs were estimated at $120 million, with 64 percent of funding expected from direct private investment and 36 percent from credits (Zhunusov, 2002). This market-sensitive solution, according to Russian Border Service Chief, General Totskii, will improve the region's security situation by curtailing illegal immigration and illicit trade (*Krasnaia Zvezda,* November 30, 2002).

References

Alexseev, Mikhail A., "Economic Valuations and Interethnic Fears: Perceptions of Chinese Migration in the Russian Far East," *Journal of Peace Research,* 40, 1: 89-106, January 2003.

Asher, Herbert B., *Causal Modeling,* 2nd edition. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1983.

Baklanov, P. Ia., "Geograficheskie, sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie i geopoliticheskie faktory migratsii kitaiskogo naseleniia v raiony rossiiskogo Dal'nego Vostoka [Geographic, Socioeconomic and Geopolitical Factors of Chinese Migration in the Regions of the Russian Far East]," paper presented at the Roundtable, "Prospects for the Far East Region: The Chinese Factor," Institute of History, Archeology, and Ethnography of the Far Eastern Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences, Vladivostok, June 28, 1999.

Chandler, Ch. and Tsai, Yu, "Social Factors Influencing Immigration

Attitudes: An Analysis of Data from the General Social Survey," *Social Science Journal,* 38, 2: 177-188, 2001.

Chernov, Dmitrii, "Kitaiskaia bolezn' Dal'nego Vostoka. Diaspora zhivet po svoim zakonam [The Chinese Disease of the Russian Far East. The Diaspora Lives According to Its Own Laws]," *Vremia novostei,* February 19, 2003, 6 [http://dlib.eastview.com].

Czan, Tyan, "Kitaitsy v immigratsii," *Rossiia i ATR,* 2: 82-92, 1994.

Gel'bras, Vil'ia, "Kitaiskoe zemliachestvo v Moskve [The Chinese Community in Moscow]," *Aziia i Afrika Segodnia* 11: 34-39, 1999.

Gordon, C. and A. Arian, "Threat and Decision Making," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 45: 2: 196-215, 2001.

Goskomstat Rossii (Primorskii kraevoi komitet gosudarstvennoi statistiki), *Sotsial'naia sfera gorodov i raionov Primorskogo kraia [Social Sphere in Cities and Counties of Primorskii Krai]*. Vladivostok, 1998.

Goskomstat Rossii (Primorskii kraevoi komitet gosudarstvennoi statistiki), No. 19sv-39, May 28, 1999.

Goskomstat Rossii (Primorskii kraevoi komitet gosudarstvennoi statistiki), *Primorskii krai v 1999 godu (statisticheskii ezhegodnik) [Primorskii krai in 1999, a statistical yearbook]*. Vladivostok, 2000a.

Goskomstat Rossii (Primorskii kraevoi komitet gosudarstvennoi statistiki), *Sotsial'naia sfera gorodov i raionov Primorskogo kraia [Social Sphere in Cities and Counties of Primorskii Krai]*. Vladivostok, 2000b.

Goskomstat Rossii (Primorskii kraevoi komitet gosudarstvennoi statistiki), *Naselenie Primorskogo kraia v 2000 godu [Population of Primorskii Krai in 2000]*. Vladivostok, 2001a.

Goskomstat Rossii (Primorskii kraevoi komitet gosudarstvennoi statistiki), *Sotsial'naia sfera gorodov i raionov Primorskogo kraia [Social Sphere in Cities and Counties of Primorskii Krai]*. Vladivostok, 2001b.

Goskomstat Rossii (Primorskii kraevoi komitet gosudarstvennoi statistiki), *Vneshneekonomicheskaia deiatel'nost' v Primorskom krae v 2000 godu. Statisticheskii biulleten' [Foreign Economic Relations of Primorskii Krai in 2000. A Statistical Bulletin]*. Vladivostok, 2001c.

Goskomstat Rossii (Primorskii kraevoi komitet gosudarstvennoi statistiki), *Deiatel'nost' predpriiatii s inostrannymi investitsiiami v Primorskom krae. Analiticheskaia zapiska [Activities of Enterprises with Foreign Capital in Primorskii Krai. An Analytical Note]*. Vladivostok, 2001d.

Karlusov, V. and A. Kudin, "Kitaiskoe prisutstvie na rossiiskom

Dal'nem Vostoke: istoriko-ekonomicheskii analiz," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka,* 5: 76-87, 2002.

Kuafman, S. J., "Ethnic Violence, Symbolic Politics, and the Security Dilemma," paper given at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 2001.

Institut Istorii, Arkheologii i Etnografii Narodov Dal'nego Vostoka DVO RAN [Institute of History, Archeology, and Ethnography of the Far Eastern Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences], Migratsiia inostrantsev v Primorskom krae i vo Vladivostoke. Anketa dlia kitaiskikh torgovtsev [Migration of Foreign Nationals to Primorskii Krai and to Vladivostok. A Questionnaire for Chinese Traders]. Vladivostok, 1999.

Ivanov, V. D. and O. I. Sergeev, *Ussuriiskoe kazach'e voisko: istoriia i sovremennost' [The Ussuri Cossack Army: Past and Present]*. Vladivostok, 1999.

Larin, Viktor, *Kitai i Dal'nii Vostok Rossii v pervoi polovine 90-kh: problemy regional'nogo vzaimodeistviia.* Vladivostok: Dal'nauka, 1998.

Miller, Elisa and Soula Stephanopoulos, eds., *The Russian Far East: A Business Reference Guide.* Seattle, WA: Foundation for Russian-American Economic Cooperation, 1997.

Olzak, S., *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict.* Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992.

Nazdratenko, Yevgenii, *I vsia Rossiia za spinoi...* [And All of Russia Behind Our Back...]. Vladivostok: "Ussuri," 1999.

Schafer, Mark, "Cooperative and Conflictual Policy Preferences: The Effect of Identity, Security, and Image of the Other," *Political Psychology,* 20, 4: 829-844, 1999.

Stephan, John J., *The Russian Far East: A History.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Tarasenko, P. Lt.-Gen., "Migratsionnye protsessy, ikh vliianie ne kriminogennuiu obstanovku v krae i o dopolnitel'nykh merakh po uporiadocheniiu prebyvaniia i osedaniia inostrannykh grazhdan na territorii Primorskogo kraia [Migration Processes, Their Impact on Criminal Situation in the *Krai,* and Additional Measures for Regulating the Visits and Settlement of Foreign Nationals in Primorskii Krai]," report by the head of the Pacific District Administration of the Russian Border Service (TORU) presented at the Roundtable, "Prospects for the Far East Region: The Chinese Factor," Institute of History, Archeology, and Ethnography of the Far Eastern Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences, Vladivostok, June 28, 1999.

Turner, John C. and H. Giles, *Intergroup Behavior.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.

Vitkovskaia, Galina, Zhanna Zaionchkovskaia, and Kathleen Newland, "Chinese Migration into Russia," in Sherman W. Garnett, ed., *Rapprochement or Rivalry: Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000.

Watts, Meredith W., "Political Xenophobia in the Transition from Socialism: Threat, Racism, and Ideology Among East German Youth," *Political Psychology,* 17, 1: 97-126, 1996.

Yegorchev, I., "Nemnogo Istorii," *Sovetskii Sakhalin*, October 21, 2000 [http://dlib.eastview.com].

Yergin, Daniel and Thane Gusthafson, *Russia 2010: And What It Means for the World.* New York: Vintage Books, 1993.

Zhunusov, Oleg, "Kitaiskie razvlecheniia. V Primor'e sozdaetsia prigranichnyi torgovyi kompleks," *Izvestiia*, April 4, 2002, 6.

Table 1. Chinese Nationals in Primorskii Krai, 1994-2002

	The Chinese in Primorskii Krai			Sanctions Against Violators		
	Total Arrivals	Tourists ***	Failed to Return	Administrative Penalties	Deportation Orders	Forced Deportation
1994	40,000	18,500	14,400	9,500	2,700	1,500
1995	35,000	18,500	11,200	12,300	6,600	4,500
1996	35,500	21,000	1065	8,250	3,700	1,900
1997	52,000	39,000	468	8,250	4,000	2,100
1998	73,000	61,000	292	8,250	3,200	1,190
1999	80,287	No data*	400	n.d	n.d.	2,825[a]
2000	85,000**	n.d.	n.d	n.d	n.d	1850 [b]
2002	105,000	About 79,000	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible

Sources: Otdel viz i razreshenii Primorskogo kraia (OVIR), *Spravka,* Lt.-Col. Viktor M. Plotnikov, deputy head of the department, Vladivostok, June 2, 1999 and August 17, 2000. The data for 2002 is reported by Chernov (2003).

* Whereas no data was provided, Lt.-Col. Plotnikov indicated that migration trends remained the same as in 1998, showing approximately the same proportion of administrative penalties, deportation orders and forced deportation.

** Estimate by Lt.-Col. Plotnikov, based on the data for January-June, 2000.

*** The overwhelming majority of these visitors came as part of a visa-free tourist group exchange allowed by the Russian immigration law. After 2002, most were issued two-week tourist visas.

[a] Based on Yegorchev (2000), quoting chief of Primorskii krai's Migration Service, Sergei Pushkarev.

[b] Projection based on Yegorchev's (2000) data for the first half of the year 2000.

Table 2. Reasons Given by Chinese Migrants for Coming to Russia (Moscow)

Was sent to work, study, or do an internship in Russia	32.7%
Could not find work in China	5.1%
Saw this as an opportunity to make a profit	29%
Would like to work in Russia*	12.3%
Other reasons	18.8%
Don't know	2.1%

Source: Gel'bras, 1999, p. 36.

Table 3. Investment from PRC in Primorskii Krai

(USD and post-1998 denominated rubles)

YEAR	Total		Trade & food services		Construction and related services	
	USD (thousands)	Rb (millions)	USD (thousands)	Rb (millions)	USD (thousands)	Rb (millions)
1993	1397		1259.5		0	
1994	10.1		10.1		0	
1995	417	1433	22.7	127.3	350	0
1996	95	52	48.5	50.8	0	0.2
1997	48	2384	18.5	702.4	0	0
1998	15	643.7	15	328	0	0
1999	476.9	6.4	166.8	6.3	136.4	0
2000	1,857*	N/A	N.D.	N.D.	N/A	N/A

Sources: Goskomstat Rossii, Primorskii kraievoi komitet gosudarstvennoi statistiki, Request No. 19sv-39, August 22, 2000 (data available from the author upon request); Goskomstat Rossii, 2000a, p. 153; and Goskomstat Rossii, 2001c.

* Starting in 2000 Goskomstat calculates foreign investment only in U.S. dollars, converting the ruble investment value into the dollar value on the basis of the Russian Central Bank ruble-dollar exchange rates (Goskomstat Rossii, 2001c, p. 20).

Table 4. How Do Chinese People in Primorskii Krai Affect

	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	+3	Hard to say
	(Negative effect)			(No effect)		(Positive Effect)		
Industry	12.5	18.7	16.2	23.2	9.2	6.7	2.2	11
Agriculture	12.5	11.9	12.7	13	17.8	14.7	8.9	8.6
Trade	7.6	7.7	10.3	10.4	25.5	19.8	12.5	5.2
Prices	7.8	5.5	9.7	12	25	21	11.4	5.4
Job availability to Russian citizens	17.6	17.4	19.9	15.3	12.5	7.2	1.8	7.2
Opportunity to make money for Russian citizens	13.1	15.5	18.2	16	14.4	10.4	3.5	7.5
Assortment of available goods	3.3	1.8	6.4	8.4	26	27.3	22.3	3.4
The environment	23.4	17.9	21.9	26.8	1.7	1.2	0.3	5.6
Budget revenues	7.1	10	9.2	25	17.5	8.3	4.3	17
Crime levels	15.4	19	24.8	26	1.3	1.4	2.9	8.6

Source: Mikhail A. Alexseev, *Primorskii 2000 Opinion Survey*, 2001.

Table 5. Regression of Perceived Threat to Russia and Primorskii Krai (THRRUPK) on Select Predictors[a]

Variables (perception measures):	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Block 1: Emerging Anarchy:					
Ethnic balance 2010 (CH2010)	**.172 (.067)	**.150 (.067)	*.163 (.064)	**.164 (.063)	**.166 (.065)
Government capacity (FEDHLP)	-.030 (.051)	-.026 (.050)	.018 (.049)	.022 (.050)	.025 (.050)
Isolation of Primorskii 2010 (ISOL10)	**.149 (.053)	**.140 (.053)	**.118 (.050)	.078 (.053)	.076 (.052)
Military balance 2010 (MLBL10)	.109 (.082)	.102 (.081)	.095 (.077)	.083 (.077)	.078 (.078)
Constant	.759 (.240)				
Block 2: Offensive Intentions:					
Intent to settle permanently (INFILT)		-.000 (.130)	-.036 (.123)	-.012 (.121)	-.008 (.124)
Territorial claims (TERCLA)		**.406 (.164)	*.376 (.156)	**.372 (.153)	**.368 (.155)
Constant		1.014 (.271)			
Block 3: Group Distinctiveness:					
Support marriage Chinese (MARCHI)			-.148 (.107)	-.125 (.105)	-.114 (.106)
Chinese capacity assimilate (CHASSM)			-.052 (.043)	-.061 (.042)	-.058 (.043)
Ethnic group difference (DF_SOC)			***.263 (.059)	***.235 (.062)	***.233 (.064)
Constant			1.397 (.381)		
Block 4: Deprivation and Socioeconomic Impact:					
Personal income valuation (INCOME)				.093 (.109)	-.107 (.113)
Chinese gains migration (FGAINCHI)				-.061 (.066)	.071 (.067)
Income opportunities, crime (JOBSEC)				**.161 (.055)	**.150 (.057)
Scale benefits local population (BEN00)				*.090 (.055)	*.091 (.055)
Constant				.658 (.329)	
Block 5: Controls:					
Status reversal sensitivity (CHPROP)					.067 (.068)
Ideological/party preference (PARTY)					.013 (.081)
Sensitivity territorial losses (EXPAND)					.059 (.069)
College education (COLLEGE)					-.077 (.151)
Russian Orthodox believer (ORTHRU)					.019 (.132)
Constant					.768 (.341)
R^2	.064	.088	.186	.237	.244
F	4.06	3.75	5.83	5.39	3.96
(df)	(4,235)	(6,236)	(9,230)	(13,226)	(18,221)
P (R^2)	.0017	.0007	.0000	.0000	.0000
Change in R^2	–	.024	.098	.051	.007
Adjusted R^2	.048	.065	.154	.193	.182

a Significance: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 (one-tailed). Unstandardized coefficient (B) and its standard error (in parenthesis) reported. Multicollinearity diagnostics: Tolerance varied from .757 (DF_SOC) to .949 (MARCHI); VIF varied from 1.053 (MARCHI) to 1.320 (DF_SOC) in the complete model, suggesting acceptable low levels of multicollinearity.

Table 6. Regression of Perceived Threat of Russia-China Armed Conflict (ARMC10) on Select Predictors[b]

Variables (perception measures):	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Block 1: Emerging Anarchy:					
Ethnic balance 2010 (CH2010)	**.218 (.086)	*.171 (.084)	**.186 (.083)	**.190 (.081)	**.190 (.084)
Government capacity (FEDHLP)	*.113 (.065)	*.110 (.063)	*.152 (.064)	*.116 (.065)	*.112 (065)
Isolation of Primorskii 2010 (ISOL10)	**.202 (.068)	**.191 (.066)	**.170 (.065)	**.175 (.067)	**.176 (.068)
Military balance 2010 (MLBL10)	.100 (.104)	.104 (.102)	.099 (.100)	.107 (.100)	.105 (.101)
Constant	-1.243 (.307)				
Block 2: Offensive Intentions:					
Intent to settle permanently (INFILT)		**-.358 (.161)	**-.391 (.159)	*-.335 (.157)	*-.329 (.161)
Territorial claims (TERCLA)		***.664 (.204)	***.635 (.202)	**.615 (.198)	**.594 (.201)
Constant		-1.037 (.341)			
Block 3: Group Distinctiveness:					
Support marriage Chinese (MARCHI)			-.127 (.137)	-.107 (.136)	-.096 (.138)
Chinese capacity assimilate (CHASSM)			-.040 (.055)	-.052 (.054)	-.048 (.055)
Ethnic group difference (DF_SOC)			***.266 (.076)	***.302 (.080)	***.283 (.083)
Constant			-1.170 (.344)		
Block 4: Deprivation and Socioeconomic Impact:					
Personal income valuation (INCOME)				.128 (.142)	.098 (.147)
Chinese gains migration (FGAINCHI)				*-.182 (.085)	*-.174 (.087)
Income opportunities, crime (JOBSEC)				.024 (.072)	.027 (.057)
Scale benefits local population (BEN00)				*.141 (.071)	*.142 (.072)
Constant				-1.363 (.426)	
Block 5: Controls:					
Status reversal sensitivity (CHPROP)					.013 (.089)
Ideological/party preference (PARTY)					.096 (.105)
Sensitivity territorial losses (EXPAND)					.018 (.090)
College education (COLLEGE)					.085 (.196)
Russian Orthodox believer (ORTHRU)					-.112 (.172)
Constant					-1.32 (.442)
R^2	.079	.138	.194	.235	.240
F	5.06	6.22	6.14	5.39	3.88
(df)	(4,235)	(6,233)	(9,230)	(13,226)	(18,221)
P (R^2)	.0003	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
Change in R^2	–	.059	.056	.041	.005
Adjusted R^2	.064	.116	.162	.191	.178

b Significance: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 (one-tailed). Unstandardized coefficient (B) and its standard error (in parenthesis) reported. Multicollinearity diagnostics: Tolerance varied from .757 (DF_SOC) to .949 (MARCHI); VIF varied from 1.053 (MARCHI) to 1.320 (DF_SOC) in the complete model, suggesting acceptable low levels of multicollinearity.

Table 7. Regression of Militant Hostility (HSTMILIT) on Select Predictors[c]

Variables (perception measures):	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Block 1: Emerging Anarchy:						
Ethnic balance 2010 (CH2010)	*.123 (.067)	.101 (.067)	*.111 (.067)	*.113 (.067)	.103 (.066)	.083 (.072)
Government capacity (FEDHLP)	-.031 (.051)	-.026 (.051)	-.004 (.052)	-.000 (.053)	.007 (.053)	.004 (.055)
Isolation of Primorskii 2010 (ISOL10)	**.148(.053)	**.140 (.053)	**.126 (.053)	.087 (.055)	.083 (.055)	.072 (.056)
Military balance 2010 (MLBL10)	.022 (.081)	.017 (.082)	.014 (.081)	.022 (.082)	.013 (.082)	.000 (.085)
Constant	.685 (.240)					
Block 2: Offensive Intentions:						
Intent to settle permanently (INFILT)		-.006 (.131)	-.025 (.130)	-.008 (.129)	-.004 (.130)	-.007 (.135)
Territorial claims (TERCLA)		**.381 (.166)	*.360 (.165)	*.355 (.163)	*.329 (.163)	*.285 (.171)
Constant		.921 (.275)				
Block 3: Group Distinctiveness:						
Support marriage with Chinese (MARCHI)			-.100 (.112)	-.075 (.111)	-.041 (.111)	-.024 (.115)
Chinese capacity to assimilate (CHASSM)			-.017 (.044)	-.022 (.045)	-.011 (.045)	-.003 (.046)
Ethnic group difference (DF_SOC)			**.159 (.062)	**.124 (.065)	.093 (.067)	.061 (.070)
Constant			.823 (.281)			
Block 4: Deprivation and Socioeconomic Impact:						
Personal income valuation (INCOME)				.066 (.117)	.028 (.119)	.016 (.123)
Chinese gains migration (FGAINCHI)				.006 (.070)	.014 (.070)	.031 (.071)
Income opportunities, crime (JOBSEC)				*.118 (.059)	*.102 (.059)	.082 (.062)
Scale benefits local population (BEN00)				*.124 (.058)	*.120 (.058)	*.109 (.060)
Constant				.559 (.349)		
Block 5: Controls:						
Status reversal sensitivity (CHPROP)					*.131 (.071)	*.120 (.074)
Ideological/party preference (PARTY)					.130 (.085)	128 (.087)
Sensitivity territorial losses (EXPAND)					.063 (.073)	.052 (.076)
College education (COLLEGE)					.148 (.159)	.161 (.165)
Russian Orthodox believer (ORTHRU)					.077 (.139)	.073 (.144)
Constant					.753 (.357)	
Block 6: Threat:						
Threat to Russia, Primorskii (THRRUPK)						*.131 (.073)
Constant						.642 (.373)
R^2	.045	.066	.100	.138	.169	.182
F	2.784	2.766	2.84	2.785	2.498	2.384
(df)	(4,235)	(6,233)	(9,230)	(13,226)	(18,221)	(19,203)
P(R^2)	.0129	.0060	.0016	.0005	.0005	.0007
Change in R^2	--	.021	.034	.038	.031	.013
Adjusted R^2	.029	.042	.065	.089	.101s	.106

c Significance: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 (one-tailed). Unstandardized coefficient (B) and its standard error (in parenthesis) reported.Multicollinearity diagnostics: Tolerance varied from .728 (DF_SOC) to .942 (MARCHI); VIF varied from 1.062 (MARCHI) to 1.374 (DF_SOC) in the complete model, suggesting acceptable low levels of multicollinearity.