

# International Influences on Russian Regional Democratization

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In the first two waves of democratization, from 1818 to 1926 and from 1943 to 1962,<sup>1</sup> foreign governments promoted democracy by occupying or decolonizing territories. Since the onset of the third wave in 1974, foreign governments have adopted additional methods to encourage democratization, and foreign non-governmental actors have increasingly tried to advance democracy.<sup>2</sup> Today the list of possible international influences on democratization includes: military intervention, peacekeeping, political pressure, the promise of membership in international institutions, election monitoring, media, investment and aid, educational and religious exchanges, and governmental and nongovernmental programs to directly support components of democracy, such as a free press.<sup>3</sup>

Although foreign attempts to promote democratization have proliferated, their success is far from certain. Scholars have criticized governmental tactics for being inconsistent. Governments only advance democracy in other countries when it is in their own political interests. Both governmental and non-governmental programs that promote democracy directly have numerous problems, according to those who have studied them. These programs are often poorly managed, overly centralized, and fiscally wasteful. Moreover, they tend to value technical expertise over regional expertise, resulting in a mismatch between initiatives and locales.

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1 Huntington, 1991, p. 16.

2 On the first two waves, see: Dahl, 1971, pp. 44, 191, 201; Huntington, 1991, pp. 40, 77-78, 87, 89, 81; Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp. 73-74. On the third wave, see: Huntington, 1991, pp. 77-78, 87, 89, 91; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Lowenthal, 1991; Whitehead, 1991.

3 Akaha, 2002; Alexandrov & Makarychev, 2002; Hook, 2002; Joyner, 2002; Kurtz & Barnes, 2002; Pridham, 1999; White, 2000.

Some scholars have suggested that their overall impact is negative. These programs have funded local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that do not necessarily have the infrastructure to shape civil society. Instead, local nongovernmental organizations became dependent on foreign resources and thus more responsive to the foreign program officers than local citizens. The key skill these local groups develop is the ability to apply for grants, and competition for grants exacerbates divisions in the local community.<sup>4</sup>

This paper highlights another weakness of foreign democracy promotion. Namely, in large countries international democracy promoters target those subnational regions that are already more democratic, providing no assistance to the least democratic regions. The rationale behind this approach is to use limited resources wisely. However, the supporters of this approach implicitly assume that the “demonstration effect” travels from the most democratic regions to the least democratic regions. In other words, a democratic region will influence a non-democratic region instead of the reverse. Yet, this assumption is untested and unstudied.

Unsympathetic regional authorities in less democratic regions may preclude the establishment of programs in those locales. Consequently, in large countries foreign democracy promoters should continue to headquarter their projects in more democratic regions, but they should enable residents of less democratic neighboring regions to participate. In small countries, resources go farther, so international democracy promoters are able to work in both more and less democratic regions.

This argument is based on 252 interviews I conducted in Russia and Kyrgyzstan in 1997 and 1998 as part of a broader study of democratization in subnational regions. The investigation concentrated on Samara Oblast and Ul’ianovsk Oblast in Russia and Osh Oblast and Naryn Oblast in Kyrgyzstan. The focus of this paper is on Russia; however, comparison with Kyrgyzstan enables me to make my argument about larger and small

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4 Henderson, 2002; Olsen, 2002; Ottaway, 2001; Sakwa, 2000.

countries.<sup>5</sup> People I interviewed in each country included representatives of international organizations, local NGO leaders, local media representatives, business leaders, and regional and national governmental officials. Of the 252 interviews, 10 interviews in Russia and 20 interviews in Kyrgyzstan were with representatives of leading foreign nongovernmental and governmental organizations. I interviewed staff members of all international organizations that maintained permanent representatives in at least one of the regions. International groups have found that having permanent representatives in the regions is essential to the success of their programs. Thus, groups with permanent representatives are likely to have the greatest impact. In addition to interviewing staff, I also reviewed reports produced by the organizations.

## 1. Programs to Advance Democracy

Until Russia became an independent country, its provinces were off-limits to most foreign organizations. The Red Cross and Red Crescent had branches in the Soviet Union, but foreign development groups could not operate within the country. In the early 1990s, however, international organizations flooded the capital of Russia and over time began to work in outlying areas. Through assistance to local NGOs, training of journalists, and seminars for government officials, these organizations have tried to promote democracy throughout the country. Their choice of regions to work in has shaped the impact of their programs.

Foreign governmental and nongovernmental organizations working in Russia have introduced programs to promote different components of democracy. Robert Dahl's definition, which has become standard in political science, identifies eight components of democracy: 1) eligibility for public office, 2) right of political leaders to compete for support, 3) right to vote, 4) free and fair elections, 5) freedom of expression, 6) alternative sources of in-

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5 Russia is 17,075,200 square kilometers, has 144,978, 573 people, and has 89 administrative divisions. Kyrgyzstan is 198,500 square kilometers, has 4,822,166 people, and had seven administrative divisions, at the time of this research. *The World Factbook 2002*.

formation, 7) freedom to form and join organizations, and 8) institutions for making government policies depend on voters' preferences.<sup>6</sup> Foreign democracy promoters, with permanent representatives in Russia, have focused their efforts on strengthening the last four components of democracy.

Foreign groups have worked with independent journalists to promote alternative sources of information, assisted nongovernmental organizations to promote the freedom to form and join organizations, and trained government officials to help institutions for making government policies depend on voters' preferences. For example, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), an independent organization affiliated with the Democratic Party in the US, has held periodic seminars for media, NGO, and regional government leaders.

Working with local NGOs is one of the main activities of leading foreign democracy promoters. The British organizations the Know-How Fund and BEARR Trust published a directory of NGOs in Samara Oblast. The Open Society Institute (OSI), part of the Soros Foundation created by American financier George Soros, has worked with local NGOs to run education advising centers, textbook programs, and internet centers. OSI also administers a grant program, awarding NGOs funds for civil society projects. The Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), a European Union organization, and the United States Peace Corps have also supported local NGO activities. International democracy promoters have worked to improve the responsiveness of local governmental institutions as well. The Know-How Fund has run programs to expose local officials to policy issues, and TACIS provides advice to local officials about policymaking.<sup>7</sup>

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6 Dahl, 1971, pp. 2-3.

7 The information in this paragraph is drawn from interviews I conducted with foreign groups in each region, materials provided by the organizations, and, in a few cases, electronic mail communications with representatives in the regions. Interviews with local NGO leaders and government officials and conversations with citizens corroborated the foreign representatives' accounts. I focused on organizations that maintain a permanent representative in a region.

Foreign democracy promoters, with ongoing programs and permanent representatives in Russian regions, have focused little attention on the first four components of democracy, which deal with elections. These foreign organizations often consider work on elections to be too meddlesome and directly political for outsiders' engagement.

## 2. Patchwork of Democracy

When international democracy promoters expanded their programs from Moscow to outlying provinces, they faced a variety of conditions. Different economies, cultures, and natural environments distinguished Russia's provinces from one another. More importantly to those aiming to advance democracy, some of Russia's provinces were more democratic than others. This is evident from media headlines, such as "A Few Miles Apart, 2 Russias Contend for Nation's Future"... "Democratic Norms under Assault in Russian Far East."<sup>8</sup> Academic studies of subnational politics in Russia also hinted at the uneven development of democracy throughout the country.<sup>9</sup> Unlike other investigations, which examine democracy in only a few regions, a survey I conducted with Nikolai Petrov evaluated the degree of democracy in 57 regions. In Moscow in the early spring and summer of 1997, we asked experts to rate regions according to Dahl's definition of democracy. The respondents were academics, researchers, and political consultants who study regional politics. In Russia, experts rated provinces, specifically the 49 oblasts and 6 *krais* (large administrative divisions), as well as the two federal cities. Table 1 presents the results of the survey, and Appendix B describes the survey in greater detail.

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8 Specter, 1996; Lilley, 1994.

9 Single case studies of Russian regions and cities are too numerous to list here, but most have appeared in the journals *Europe-Asia Studies* and *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* and in edited volumes, including: Friedgut & Hahn, 1994; Colton & Hough, 1998; Orttung, 1995; Fish, 1995; Solnick, 1998. Ralph S. Clem and Peter R. Craumer published numerous analyses of subnational electoral outcomes in *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*. Stoner-Weiss, 1997. Studies that have examined multiple regions include: Moses, 1992; McAuley, 1992; Gelman, 1999; Gel'man et al., 2000.

**Table 1. Regional Ratings: Russia <sup>a</sup>**

Ranking	Region	Percent	Ranking	Region	Percent	Ranking	Region	Percent
1	Saint Petersburg	94	15	Tomsk	17	33	Rostov	-5
2	Sverdlovsk	73	21	Arkhangel'sk	12	33	Smolensk	-5
3	Nizhnii Novgorod	67	22	Kaluga	11	33	Stavropol'	-5
4	Samara	62	23	Kostroma	6	42	Amur	-11
5	Moscow (city)	56	24	Magadan	6	42	Ryazan'	-11
6	Irkutsk	39	25	Tver'	6	44	Tula	-15
6	Kaliningrad	39	26	Moscow (oblast)	2	45	Voronezh	-16
8	Perm'	33	27	Omsk	1	46	Kemerovo	-20
9	Iaroslavl'	28	28	Ivanovo	0	46	Orel	-20
9	Krasnoyarsk	28	28	Khabarovsk	0	46	Tambov	-20
9	Murmansk	28	28	Vladimir	0	49	Kurgan	-26
9	Novgorod	28	28	Volgograd	0	49	Lipetsk	-26
9	Sakhalin	28	28	Vologda	0	49	Saratov	-26
14	Novosibirsk	23	33	Altai	-5	52	Briansk	-32
15	Cheliabinsk	17	33	Astrakhan'	-5	52	Penza	-32
15	Kamchatka	17	33	Belgorod	-5	54	Krasnodar	-36
15	Leningrad	17	33	Chita	-5	55	Kursk	-68
15	Orenburg	17	33	Kirov	-5	56	Ul'ianovsk	-74
15	Tiumen'	17	33	Pskov	-5	57	Primor'e	-79

a The ranking of regions is based on the percentage of respondents who selected a region as most democratic minus the percentage who selected it as least democratic.

This patchwork of democracy in Russia is not surprising, considering that democracy has developed unevenly in other countries including Mexico, India, Spain, Chile, and Brazil.<sup>10</sup> Even in older democracies, democracy may be weaker in some regions – the American South, historically, and southern Italy, to this day, being prime examples.<sup>11</sup>

Although the unevenness of democracy in Russia is evident, scholars have not considered how it has affected or been affected by foreign efforts to promote democracy in the country. Do international groups take into account the degree of democracy in a region before deciding to work there? Are foreign democracy promoters the cause of the uneven development of democracy?

### 3. Selection of Regions

International groups that aim to advance democracy choose to work in the more democratic regions of Russia. For example, a staff member of TACIS in Moscow explained, “The idea is to work basically with reform-minded regions.”<sup>12</sup> TACIS began working in Russia in 1991. By 1992, the organization began to select focal regions, specifically St. Petersburg, Samara, Tiumen’, West Siberia, Urals, and Kaliningrad. In choosing locations, the organization considers how reform-oriented the region is, local interest in collaboration with the European Union, and the economic importance of the oblast to the country as a whole. The staff member further emphasized the importance of a democratic orientation, saying, “We had good contacts in the south but then the communists were elected and now it is harder [to work there].”<sup>13</sup> Likewise, the organization has avoided Ul’ianovsk, one of the cases in my larger study, because it is considered a very conservative region.

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10 Fox, 1994; Heller, 2000, pp. 486-501; Linz & de Miguel, 1966, p. 307; Kurtz, 1999, pp. 275-301. Odonnell, 1993, pp. 1358-1361; Rubin, 1997; Schwartzman, 1973, p. 226.

11 Key & Heard, 1984; Lamis, 1999; Putnam et al., 1993.

12 Author’s interview (251) with Boris Iarochevitch, First Secretary, Delegation of the European Commission in Russia, European Union, Moscow, March 11, 1998.

13 (251) Iarochevitch, March 11, 1998.

Similarly, a representative of Know-How in Moscow explained that his staff looks for signs of “some kind of forward-thinking, perhaps in the administration...[such as] the will to change and power to influence change.”<sup>14</sup> In addition, the organization looks for “readiness for Western influence and investment,” comparatively high levels of economic activity, and a small number of existing donors. Like TACIS, Know-How tries to avoid spreading its funds too thin.

In selecting regions, the NDI values a “developed democratic process.” The organization also prefers locations that have submitted a request for assistance and regions where its contacts with the administration, local NGOs, and political parties are good. Finally, the NDI tries to work in regions other than those covered by its Republican counterpart, the International Republican Institute, so as to avoid duplication of efforts.<sup>15</sup>

The US Peace Corps also looks for a good political climate, as well as favorable economic conditions, local interest, and potential Russian collaborators.<sup>16</sup> The locations of the four branches of the Soros Foundation, Saint Petersburg, Nizhnii Novgorod, Samara, and Novosibirsk,<sup>17</sup> suggest the importance of democracy to the organization’s selection decisions.

A greater level of democracy is a criterion in large countries like Russia because international groups have limited funds. For example, representatives of both TACIS and Know-How acknowledge that to avoid spreading their funds too thin they select a small number of regions. Staffs of international organizations believe that their work will be most successful in more democratic regions so this factor becomes important in the selection process.

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14 Author’s telephone interview (249) with Heather Christie, Project Assistant, Know How, Moscow, March 6, 1998.

15 Author’s interview (248) with Dmitrii Valentei, Program Coordinator, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Moscow, March 6, 1998.

16 Author’s interview (165) with Andrei Melnikov, Director, United States Peace Corps, Western Russia, Moscow, March 10, 1998.

17 Author’s interview (161) with Nikolai Kuznetsov, Director, Open Society Institute, Samara Oblast, Samara, February 10, 1998.



In small countries, like Kyrgyzstan, foreign democracy promoters can work in most or all regions of a country without diluting the impact of their resources. For example, the Foundation for International Community Assistance, an American organization that provides loans to groups of women to alleviate poverty, was working in three oblasts as of 1998. The organization had offices in Chui Oblast, where the capital Bishkek is located, in Osh Oblast, where the second largest city in the country is located, and in Issik-Kul' Oblast, a province neighboring Chui. At the time the organization also had plans to open branches in two of the three remaining oblasts, Naryn and Talas.<sup>18</sup> A typical pattern in Kyrgyzstan is for an international organization to open offices in Bishkek, Osh, and then in other provinces of the country.

#### 4. Impact on Democracy

My larger study of subnational democratization in the former Soviet Union indicates that foreign promotion of democracy is not the cause of the uneven development of democracy.<sup>19</sup> As part of this investigation, I compared a more democratic province and a less democratic province in two countries – Samara and Ul'ianovsk, respectively, in Russia and Osh and Naryn, respectively, in Kyrgyzstan. My designation of some provinces as more democratic than others was based on the results of the expert surveys I conducted in each country and on my own fieldwork. Both of these approaches measured democracy using Dahl's eight components. I found that, unlike their neighbors in Samara and Osh, residents of Ul'ianovsk and Naryn cannot freely operate independent media outlets, run political organizations, enter key electoral races, or campaign against important incumbents. Dahl's other four guarantees are comparable between Ul'ianovsk and Samara and between Naryn and Osh. However, in the larger study I demonstrate that these four guarantees mean little when the other four rights are difficult to exercise.

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18 Since I conducted this research, Osh Oblast was divided into Osh and Batken Oblasts.

19 McMann, 2002.

The work of foreign groups in the provinces cannot account for the relative strength of democracy in Samara and Osh.<sup>20</sup> (Appendix A describes the foreign organizations' activities in the provinces.) The international presence is strong in Samara as compared to Ul'ianovsk, but foreign organizations did not bring democracy to Samara. Instead, as indicated above, these groups chose to work in Samara because the region is more democratic.

None of the organizations active in Samara operates in Ul'ianovsk. In fact, there are no international groups in Ul'ianovsk.<sup>21</sup> The lack of international influence is not, however, the cause of weak democracy in the region, but a reaction to it. International organizations chose not to set up shop in Ul'ianovsk because it is considered less democratic.

Foreign organizations are also not the catalyst for greater democracy in Osh. This is evident because there are foreign democracy promoters in both Osh and Naryn. Moreover, international groups arrived earlier and are more numerous, per capita, in Naryn, relative to Osh. By the end of 1994, approximately 50 percent of the international groups that have had a presence in Naryn had already begun their projects versus only 15 percent in Osh. In both regions, international organizations have run similar programs, and the first projects to encourage democracy were initiated in 1994 in each oblast. In Naryn, TACIS began helping farmers organize unions. In Osh, the UN Educational, Scientific,

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20 The analysis in this section is based on interviews I conducted with foreign groups in each region, materials provided by the organizations, and, in a few cases, electronic mail communications with representatives in the regions. Interviews with local NGO leaders and government officials and conversations with citizens corroborated the foreign representatives' accounts. I focused on organizations that maintain a permanent representative in a region.

21 As in Samara, there are individual foreigners living in Ul'ianovsk. Approximately 100 students, mainly from South Asia and Africa, study at Ul'ianovsk State University, and a Lutheran church is home to foreign pastors. A deputy governor claimed that there was a foreign organization for the elderly and another charitable group in the region, but no one I spoke with was able to help me locate them. Moreover, no one else knew of them.

and Cultural Organization and the US Information Service established a resource center for journalists.

In addition, were international organizations the source of greater democracy in Osh, we would expect the foreign presence to be stronger in this region. Yet, based on the population of Osh Oblast, the region should have at least five times as many international groups as Naryn. Yet, Osh has less than twice as many foreign organizations. Basically, Naryn Oblast is saturated with foreign democracy promoters, yet it is more difficult to practice democracy. International influences cannot account for the differences between provinces in either country.

## 5. Policy Recommendations

Studies of international democracy promoters have revealed numerous weaknesses in their efforts. Yet, these scholars have not considered the territorial dimension of democracy promotion, beyond lamenting the concentration of international organizations in national capitals – a criticism that no longer holds. This paper suggests that democracy promoters' focus on more democratic regions in large countries contributes to their overall ineffectiveness. Their work is not necessarily helping to overcome the uneven development of democracy. Although these organizations may increase the degree of democracy in more democratic regions, there is no guarantee that this positive impact will spread to less democratic regions. Less democratic regions could just as easily serve as an encouraging example for more democratic regions, as the reverse. For example, to the extent that less democratic regions exhibit more political stability, in terms of continuity of leadership and fewer street protests, leaders and citizens of more democratic regions may support a decrease in democratic freedoms.

The solution to this problem may not be for democracy promoters to work directly in less democratic regions. After all, their rationale of working where they are welcomed and can be most effective is sound. Instead, foreign democracy promoters should include people from less democratic regions in their programs.

Government officials from these regions may not be eager to become involved, but potential and current NGO leaders and independent journalists may be interested. Residents of Ul'ianovsk could attend NGO and media training sessions in Samara, for example. A few international groups use this approach on a small scale; however, expanding its scope may significantly help democracy develop in these countries.

## Appendix A

The chart below provides examples of the activities of each of the foreign organizations operating in the four provinces through 1997. Many of the foreign groups run numerous programs, so only some are listed. I listed civic development programs over other types.

**Table A.1. International Organizations in the Provinces**

<b>Samara</b>	
The Know-How Fund	This British organization, along with the British group BEARR Trust, published a directory of NGOs in Samara in 1996. Since 1995, Know-How has also run programs to expose local officials to policy issues and support entrepreneurs.
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)	An independent organization affiliated with the Democratic Party in the US, NDI has held periodic seminars for government, media, and NGOs leaders in Samara since 1995.
Open Society Institute (OSI)	Created by American financier George Soros, this institute has worked in Samara since 1994. The organization works with local NGOs to run educational advising centers, textbook programs, and internet centers. OSI also administers a grant program for civil society projects.
Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS)	Since 1992, TACIS, a European Union organization, has advised local officials on policymaking and supported NGO activity. It has also helped create a business communications center, a wholesale agricultural market, and a medical service in Samara.
United States Peace Corps	Peace Corps volunteers have worked with local NGOs in Samara since 1993, and they have helped create a business center, an educational advising office, and an institute celebrating American culture.
<b>Osh</b>	
Aga Khan Educational Program	Since 1997, this program has built a private school in the region and supported Osh State University by providing training and technical equipment.

## INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES

Doctors Without Borders	This organization runs programs related to venereal diseases, mainly syphilis.
German Technical Agency	This German organization has run development programs in Osh oblast.
Foundation for International Community Assistance	This American organization provides loans to groups of women to help alleviate poverty. The women establish and run businesses. The organization began working in the oblast in 1995 and gave its first loan in 1996.
Mercy Corps International	Since 1995 this US group worked through local NGOs to provide rice and oil to individuals in return for work. The organization has also lent money to private farmers' organizations so that they can provide services to individual farmers. Mercy Corps provides assistance to local NGOs that focus on community development, and it runs a microcredit program for women.
Osh Institute for Western Education	Began in 1995 by an American couple, this school offers an English-based certification program in business and computers. The couple also established a medical clinic.
Pharmacists Without Borders	Beginning in 1996, this organization started providing medical assistance in Osh Oblast.
Soros Foundation Resource Center	The center opened in 1995, and it runs a grant program for youths to start clubs. It also works with schools and NGOs on educational and health programs. The center serves as an educational advising office as well.
Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS)	TACIS worked from 1995 to 1997 in Osh Oblast supporting live-stock breeding and providing credit for agricultural goods.
UNESCO/USIS Media Resource Center	Since the mid-1990s, the center has offered training seminars for media outlets, provided computer training, and made office equipment available to journalists.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	UNHCR opened an office in Osh in 1995. It works with local NGOs on community development programs, such as construction of a village center and distribution of roofing materials to refugees. The organization also helped the government establish a refugee office in the oblast.
United Nations Development Programme Poverty Alleviation Project	In 1995 the UNDP began a credit-lending program with local NGOs. The NGOs review business plans and administer loans to groups of people who grow crops, raise animals, or sew, for example.
United States Peace Corps	Since 1993 Peace Corps volunteers have assisted local NGOs, in addition to teaching English or business. Volunteers have worked with an NGO resource center, a community development group, a charity for children, and farmers' organizations.
<b>Naryn</b>	
Counterpart International	This US organization opened an office in Naryn in 1997, and it supports NGOs by training leaders, organizing round-table discussions, and providing access to office equipment.

Helvetas	Since the mid-1990s, this Swiss organization has established a business center that provides advice, credit, and marketing assistance. Helvetas also runs a program to encourage women to create businesses.
Pharmacists Without Borders	This organization distributes medicine to local hospitals and monitors its usage.
Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS)	Beginning in 1994, TACIS helped farmers establish associations, created an agricultural business center, and shared technical skills with farmers.
Turkish School	Nearly 200 male students study in this school from the seventh through the 11th grade. Turkish and Kyrgyz teachers instruct the students, and a Turkish firm funds the school.
United Nations Development Programme/ United Nations Volunteer Programme	Since the mid-1990s, these programs have trained local NGOs to create and run credit and savings banks
US Peace Corps	Since 1993 Peace Corps volunteers have taught English in the provinces and completed projects on the side. Projects have included working with a local NGO to support a kindergarten.

This chart provides a sample of the programs run by these organizations. Many of them have a large number of projects. Besides the organizations listed, other groups provide periodic humanitarian assistance to Kyrgyzstani regions but do not have permanent representatives in the provinces. For example, Mercy Corps International has donated goods to Osh and Naryn.

The information in this chart is drawn from interviews I conducted with foreign groups in each region, materials provided by the organizations, and, in a few cases, electronic mail communications with representatives in the regions. Interviews with local NGO leaders and government officials and conversations with citizens corroborated the foreign representatives' accounts. I focused on organizations that maintain a permanent representative in a region.

## Appendix B: Description of Surveys

This appendix describes the surveys I conducted in Russia and Kyrgyzstan in order to confirm the uneven development of democracy in each country and to select the four provinces. What was the selection process for the respondents, and what was the structure of the surveys? These are the questions I consider here.<sup>22</sup>

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22 For information about the reliability and validity of the results, see: McMann, 2002.

***Respondents***

Twenty-six experts in Russia completed the survey,<sup>23</sup> and 23 respondents filled out the questionnaire in Kyrgyzstan. The respondents from Russia included representatives of universities and research centers in Moscow, members of the Russian presidential administration and the Federation Council, and foreign scholars residing in Moscow at the time of the survey. The Kyrgyzstani experts were members of universities and research centers in Bishkek and staff in the administrations of the president and prime minister.

I selected respondents in each country using a snowball sample because there is no defined group of experts on regional politics and as a group experts are more difficult to reach than other populations, such as “the public.” The snowball sampled was generated as follows: I worked with a local scholar of regional politics in each country to create an initial list of regional experts, and in the questionnaires I then asked respondents to suggest additional experts. My colleagues and I distributed the survey to those recommended according to a number of conditions. We selected people who are knowledgeable about regional politics, as evidenced by their work, and we tried to maintain a balance between people in academic research and government positions. For example, as the proportion of respondents who were government workers grew in my survey in Bishkek, I sought out academics instead. We also had to be able to reach the suggested individual. This proved particularly difficult in Bishkek where telephone books are rare. Respondents would often suggest people they had heard of but did not know personally. I failed to find the individual in nine cases. We no longer sought out additional respondents once approximately 25 respondents had completed the survey in each country. None of the conditions we employed seems likely to have affected the ratings of democracy in the regions.

The small number of respondents in each country reflects the limited pool of regional experts. Not many people have in-depth

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23 For a more detailed consideration of the strengths, weaknesses and results of the Russian survey, see: McMann & Petrov, 2000.

knowledge of politics in all or most regions of their country. This is a problem in Russia, where there are many regions, and in Kyrgyzstan, where the expert community is small.

In each country a few experts declined to complete the survey. In Russia those who refused claimed they did not have knowledge of many regions or that they were not familiar with the particulars of their politics. Three people declined to complete the survey in Bishkek. One did not consider himself qualified to complete the survey, and two did not have time. It is unlikely that the few refusals in Moscow or Bishkek introduced bias into the survey. The reasons for refusal do not seem connected to evaluations of democracy in regions.

I limited the pool of respondents to residents of the capital cities of Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Moscow and Bishkek are centers of government and scholarship, thus enabling me to choose from a larger pool of potential respondents than any other city would. This is particularly true in Kyrgyzstan, where Bishkek is the only city with numerous universities and research centers. Concentrating on experts in one city enabled me to reduce the costs of the surveys.

### *Survey Structure*

The survey consisted of a written questionnaire. In part one of the survey experts in each country ranked the regions according to their own conceptualizations of democracy. No definition of democracy was provided. The respondents in Russia selected the ten most democratic regions of their country and the ten least democratic regions of their country and then rated these 20 from one to ten, with ten being the most democratic. The experts in Kyrgyzstan rated all the regions of their country using this scale.

In part two of the survey I asked the experts to rate the regions in the same manner but using Dahl's definition of democracy, which I provided.<sup>24</sup> I requested that experts first rate the re-

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24 Nikolai Petrov, who administered the survey in Russia, requested that respondents not look at part two of the survey before completing part one. I administered the survey in Bishkek, and I did not give respondents part two of the survey until they had completed part one.



gions based on their own understandings of democracy so that I could evaluate whether they actually used Dahl's definition in part two of the survey. It is this rating based on Dahl's definition that I used to investigate the unevenness of democracy and to select the four provinces.

### ***Results***

To calculate the aggregate ratings of the regions in Kyrgyzstan, I averaged the ratings the experts gave each region. These results appear in Table B.1. below.

**Table B.1. Regional Ratings: Kyrgyzstan <sup>a</sup>**

<b>Ranking</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>Rating</b>
1	Bishkek	8.85
2	Chui	7.85
3	Osh	6.60
4	Issik-Kul'	6.55
5	Talas	6.21
6	Dzhalal-Abad	6.05
7	Naryn	5.11

<sup>a</sup> Experts in Kyrgyzstan rated all the regions of their country on a scale of one to ten, with ten being most democratic. The rating represents an average of the responses.

For the Russian survey I subtracted the percentage of respondents ranking each region as less democratic from the percentage of respondents ranking each region as more democratic. The percentages of respondents in Russia who selected each region as more or less democratic appear in Table B.2.

The ten highlighted regions are cases which are highly disputed. A significant number of respondents considered the regions more democratic, while another portion of the experts regarded the regions as less democratic. I suspect that this is not a byproduct of the survey design, but an accurate reflection of the mixed nature of political systems in these regions. Take, for example, the city of Moscow. Most respondents selected it as more

democratic because of the strength of political pluralism and political freedoms; however, some respondents considered it less democratic because the mayor rules with a strong hand. He is not open to criticism of his own actions, according to the respondents.

It is interesting to note that the less democratic regions are not disputed. The less democratic regions are clearly less democratic, in the experts' minds, whereas the more democratic regions also exhibit some non-democratic characteristics. This anomaly emphasizes that even Russia's most democratic regions are not ideal democracies.

**Table B.2. Russian Survey: More and Less Democratic Rankings**

Percentage of Respondents Selecting Region as More Democratic or as Less Democratic

Ranking	Region	MORE	LESS	Ranking	Region	MORE	LESS	Ranking	Region	MORE	LESS
1	Saint Petersburg	94	0	18	Orenburg	17	0	39	Kemerovo	6	26
2	Sverdlovsk	78	5	18	Tomsk	17	0	39	Orel	6	26
3	<b>Nizhnii Novgorod</b>	78	11	22	Arkhangel'sk	17	5	39	Tambov	6	26
4	<b>Moscow (city)</b>	72	16	23	Kaluga	11	0	42	Krasnodar	6	42
5	Samara	67	5	24	Tver'	11	5	43	Ivanovo	0	0
6	Irkutsk	44	5	25	<b>Khabarovsk</b>	11	11	43	Vladimir	0	0
6	Kaliningrad	44	5	25	<b>Volgograd</b>	11	11	45	Altai	0	5
8	Perm'	33	0	25	<b>Vologda</b>	11	11	45	Kirov	0	5
9	Krasnoiar'sk	33	5	28	<b>Pskov</b>	11	16	45	Smolensk	0	5
10	Murmansk	28	0	28	<b>Rostov</b>	11	16	48	Amur	0	11
10	Novgorod	28	0	30	<b>Saratov</b>	11	37	48	Riazan'	0	11
10	Sakhalin	28	0	31	Kostroma	6	0	50	Voronezh	0	16
10	Iaroslavl'	28	0	31	Magadan	6	0	51	Kurgan	0	26
14	Novosibirsk	28	5	33	<b>Omsk</b>	6	5	51	Lipetsk	0	26
15	<b>Moscow (oblast)</b>	28	26	34	Astrakhan'	6	11	53	Briansk	0	32
16	Leningrad	22	5	34	Belgorod	6	11	53	Penza	0	32
16	Tiumen'	22	5	34	Chita	6	11	55	Kursk	0	68
18	Cheliabinsk	17	0	34	Stavropol'	6	11	56	Ul'ianovsk	0	74
18	Kamchatka	17	0	38	Tula	6	21	57	Primor'e	0	79

Ordered by more and then less democratic rankings, and if identical, by alphabetical order. The highlighted regions are cases that are highly disputed.

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