Introduction

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This volume is a collection of selected papers presented at the international symposium "Comparing Modern Empires: Imperial Rule and Decolonization in the Changing World Order," held at the Slavic Research Center (currently Slavic-Eurasian Research Center) of Hokkaido University on January 19–20, 2012. The organizer of this symposium was Group 4 of the project "Comparative Research on Major Regional Powers in Eurasia," which was conducted from December 2008 to March 2012, having received a grant-in-aid for scientific research on innovative areas (JP20101005) from the Japanese Ministry of Education and Science. The aim of the project was to make a comprehensive comparison of major regional powers in Eurasia, especially Russia, China, and India, the three countries that are rapidly enhancing their influence in today's world.

Group 4 studied history. China, India, and Russia are sometimes called new or rising powers, but they have a rich history, even more ancient than many other powers. Their modern history is related to empires, albeit in different ways. Russia in the nineteenth century was a militarily and politically powerful empire, though culturally and economically backward by European standards. In the next century, it was transformed into a multinational socialist country, sometimes called the "Soviet empire," which ultimately dissolved into fifteen countries. China was itself an old empire but suffered encroachment by foreign imperialist forces in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Its socialist successor still retains most of the territory of the Qing Empire. India was formerly ruled by the Mughal Empire, but its modern history was

framed by its status as a colony of the British Empire and the struggle for independence and decolonization. Naturally, these countries have not existed in isolation but have interacted with other empires, semi-empires, nation-states, and colonies in the worldwide international system; therefore, we did not limit ourselves to studying the three countries, but also studied the Ottoman Empire, Japan, Iran, and other countries. One of the crucial players in the modern and current international politics, the so-called "American empire," was another important research subject for Group 4.[1]

As empire is an ancient form of polity, one may wonder why we compared only modern empires. While not denying the necessity of studying the long history of each empire, we can point out features of modern empires that should be studied distinctively from premodern empires. First, unlike ancient empires, which were first and foremost supreme powers in a particular region and did not necessarily closely interact with other empires, modern empires have always contested or cooperated with each other. Second, empires and nation-states have coexisted, competed, and complemented each other as two state models in the modern world. Third, empire as a conservative form of polity has nonetheless been faced with the necessity of modernization and reform, and the combination of conservatism and modernism has often created situations unseen in premodern empires.

Historiography of each empire has its own tradition, but we can observe some conversion in recent studies of imperial history. The study of the British Empire is arguably the richest in methods and approaches, and in particular, has long paid attention to the interaction between metropolis and colony, especially the importance of non-European local actors in the formation of European empires (see Chapter 4). In the field of study of the Qing Empire, scholars have become increasingly

1 The core results of the research by Group 4 were published in Japanese: Uyama Tomohiko, ed., *Yūrashia kindai teikoku to gendai sekai* [Modern Eurasian empires and today's world] (Kyoto: Minerva shobō, 2016). Some preliminary results were earlier published in English: Uyama Tomohiko, ed., *Empire and After: Essays in Comparative Imperial and Decolonization Studies* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2012).

conscious that this empire was not simply a Chinese dynasty, but was based on a multifaceted legitimacy that combined traditions of the Chinese and Mongol Empires as well as Tibetan Buddhism.[2] The history of the Russian Empire was, until the early 1990s, written predominantly as the history of tsars and ethnic Russian society, but since then the study of the geographic structure of imperial administration and relationships between imperial power and non-Russian peoples has greatly progressed.[3] Overall, researchers of these empires have been elucidating the interaction between state and society, the intertwist of universalism and particularism, the combination of oppression and tolerance, and the correlation between imperial knowledge and prejudice. The focus of their interest is, in short, the "politics of difference"—defining, creating, governing, and manipulating differences among various ethnic, religious, and regional groups, with the intention of strengthening the state's power over a diverse population but sometimes leading to an opposite result.

This volume also shares the above-mentioned research interests, and in addition, attaches importance to international contexts of interactions among empires as well as between metropolis and periphery. It consists of eight chapters, each of which deals with at least two of the follow-

2 The research trend called the New Qing History, which puts emphasis on the Inner Asian (Central Eurasian) character of the Qing Empire relying on the analysis of Manchu and other non-Han language sources, has gained prominence in the United States since the mid-1990s. See James A. Millward et al., eds., *New Qing Imperial History: The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). The long tradition of Japanese scholarship in studying Manchu and Mongolian sources has constituted a part of the basis of this trend.

3 See, for example, Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini, eds., *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700–1917* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev, eds., *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007); Matsuzato Kimitaka, ed., *Imperiology: From Empirical Knowledge to Discussing the Russian Empire* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007); Uyama Tomohiko, ed., *Asiatic Russia: Imperial Power in Regional and International Contexts* (London: Routledge, 2012).

ing subjects: strengths and weaknesses of empire; boundaries between empire and other types of states; the various ways of governing different peoples and the roles of intermediaries, collaborators, and rebels; the impact of modernity on empires and their ambiguous roles in modernization; the center-periphery and metropolis-colony relationships, including the questions of autonomy, and its persistence in the postcolonial/neocolonial era; the process of decolonization, especially its interactions with the Cold War logic, related to the new imperialist rivalry between capitalist and socialist powers. Most of the chapters focus on a particular empire or region but place it in the broader contexts of world history, occasionally comparing it with other empires and regions.

In the first chapter, Jane Burbank, the coauthor of a fundamental general work on imperial history,[4] sheds light on the strengths and weaknesses of empire as a form of polity, tracing the trajectories of different imperial states. Empires are agents of transformation of the world, capable of adjusting themselves to changes, but they are also subject to fission, reconfiguration, and collapse. As one of the major challenges for them is exercising power from a distance and over diverse populations, they have developed varied repertoires of power to govern different people differently, often relying on intermediaries. Further, Burbank neatly explains the relationships between imperial rule and decolonization. The independence of some British colonies in the eighteenth century did not destroy the British Empire and may have made it more manageable. For much of the nineteenth century and beyond, empires helped to make nations on other empires' territories. Even after World War II, empires tried to modernize imperialism, but their attempts unexpectedly led to situations where they willingly or unwillingly divested themselves of colonies.

Rudi Matthee's Chapter 2 deals with Safavid Iran, a premodern state that some regard as an empire and others do not. Being a composite state of multiple identities with a central political power and a dominant (although not absolute) religion, language, and culture, Safavid Iran well fits the usual definition of an empire, but it was constantly faced

4 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

with centrifugal forces that made this empire vulnerable. Although the Safavids had a strong mobilizing power both ideologically and militarily, they could not, unlike the Ottomans and the Mughals, sever the connection between tribal power and military power, and were unable to exercise a monopoly of violence. Thus, Matthee argues, Safavid Iran was not a "gunpowder empire," as it is often labelled together with the Ottoman and Mughal Empires, but a patrimonial-bureaucratic state, where personal relationships and monetary inducement constituted the basis of power structure. Local rulers paid tribute to the Safavids to demonstrate their loyalty, while the central government gave rewards to tribal chiefs to ensure their collaboration. Such reciprocal relationships were sometimes formed also in relation to foreigners. Thus, Safavid Iran was a fragile but lively forum for perpetual negotiation and bargaining. These findings by Matthee indicate that although Safavid Iran as a tributary state was clearly a premodern empire, the dynamic interaction between its state and society and the difficulties it encountered in conducting the "politics of difference" had much in common with modern empires.

Maria Misra (Chapter 3) takes up the contentious question of the relationship between empire and modernity in the case of British India. She argues that after the British in India lost faith in optimistic liberalism as a result of the Rebellion of 1857–58, official policy adopted a strategy of "conservative modernization," combining a Romantic paternalism with an authoritarian liberalism. This policy change, which promoted aristocratic groups and values in the hope that they would act as agents of economic and technological development, took place in a broader context of international economic and geopolitical change that stimulated interest in elite-led conservative projects of modernization in Bismarckian Germany and Meiji Japan. In directly ruled British India, the conservative modernization strategy did not prove effective, due to the continuing conflict between liberals and conservatives over which Indian groups made the best collaborators and, moreover, because of a strong reliance on the white middle class. In contrast, it was more successful in princely India, where maharajas and other princes were willing to promote modern good governance, in which they saw no contradiction with the traditional idea of a king as a provider of welfare. The British incorporated these Indian aristocrats and "gentlemen" into an integrated

hierarchy with the Queen Empress at the top. The policy of conservative modernization succeeded in building a more stable relationship with collaborators than in Safavid Iran, but it also represented another example of the contradictory "politics of difference," which exacerbated the difference between directly ruled British India and numerous princely states.

Uyama Tomohiko's Chapter 4 focuses on Central Asia, a region famous for being the theater of the "Great Game," and tries to elucidate what imperial expansion, rule, and rivalry meant for the local people. The chapter analyses historical events that occurred in various places such as Kazakhstan, West and East Turkestan, Pamirs, Hunza, and Kashmir, and makes a number of findings on the dynamics of center-periphery and metropolis-colony relationships. First, in a situation of antagonism among local actors, the intention of one party to ally with a great power to defeat the adversary often led to imperial expansion. In the short run, local actors were able to use the empire and even to twist it around their little fingers, but in the long run, their intentions backfired, and they were subjugated by the empire. Second, when their independence was threatened by a larger country, small countries often tried to enlist the help of another large country or empire by exploiting rivalries among them. Empires used these small countries as pawns in certain situations, but could easily abandon them, giving priority to maintaining the international order of the great powers. Third, as long as imperial rule brought justice and stability, more people chose adaptation and collaboration rather than resistance, but the rulers' distrust and misgivings sometimes alienated them. Resistance and collaboration were interchangeable strategies for the local people. Fourth, colonized people's attitudes toward empires diverged in the course of modernization. The ability or inability of an empire to provide cultural and political models and opportunities could determine colonized people's attitudes toward the empire.

The early twentieth century saw the decline of many empires, but some of them regenerated as new states, and we can observe change and continuity between them. In Chapter 5, Ikeda Yoshiro tackles the often posed but difficult to solve question on the continuity between the Russian Empire and the USSR as a multinational state by examining various ideas of autonomy in the late tsarist and early Soviet periods. He

focuses, among others, on the prominent liberal jurist Fedor Kokoshkin, who studied under Georg Jellinek in Heidelberg. Kokoshkin strictly distinguished between autonomy and self-government and admitted cultural autonomy while approving the territorial autonomy only of Poland and Finland but opposing the federalization of Russia. His theory and view heavily influenced the nationalities policy of the Kadet party. Some other jurists regarded the British Empire as an ideal model of empire that tamed imperial diversity by giving autonomy to its Dominions and motivating them to help the metropolis. After the February Revolution in 1917, the development of national movements pursuing maximum autonomy and federalization quickly outmoded the idea of Kokoshkin and other mainstream Kadets, who still tried to hamper this trend. After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks coopted some parts of national movements, and established a standardized system of national republics. This standardization was effective for mobilization of the population in the era of total war, making a contrast with the particularistic approach of the tsarist authorities and the Kadets toward nationalities. However, the power of national republics was restricted and regulated by the metropolis, and the center-periphery relationship retained imperial features. Thus, Ikeda argues, the Soviet Union was an "empire of republics," an empire upgraded in accordance with the age of total war, revolution, and nationalism.

We proceed to the post-WWII period in the next two chapters. Kan Hideki (Chapter 6) analyzes the complex interactions of the three major trends in the early Cold War period, namely, colonialism, anti-colonial nationalism, and the US logic of the Cold War, in the context of the US attempt to construct an informal American empire. Examining US responses to decolonization in Malaya during the Emergency and in the Middle East during the Suez Crisis, he found that as long as old colonial powers, principally the British, could fulfill their responsibility to contain communism in their former colonies, the United States made them important collaborators. However, when the British influence declined and powerful anti-Western (and in some cases pro-Soviet) nationalism emerged, the United States took over the responsibility. This could sometimes result in US showing consideration for world opinion and nationalism and restraining British and French imperialism, as was the case with

the Suez Crisis. In other cases, however, the United States resorted to military force to protect strategically important regions against communism in a way no different from British imperialist behavior. Although the Washington policymakers sometimes used anti-colonial rhetoric, they prioritized the dictates of the Cold War.

Qiang Zhai in Chapter 7 examines the interaction between the Cold War and decolonization, featuring the opposite (socialist) camp of the Cold War, especially China. Right after coming to power in 1949, the Chinese Communists displayed enthusiasm in supporting communist rebellions in Southeast Asia and showed hostility toward neutralist governments of newly independent states, such as India and Burma. Stalin, however, considered armed revolutions in India and other countries premature, and restrained the Chinese Communists. In 1954, China and India declared the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which Mao Zedong intended to apply to China's relations with all countries. This Chinese policy harmonized with Khrushchev's active diplomacy in the Third World. The Bandung Conference of Asian and African states in 1955 was a culmination of the Sino-Soviet "peace offensive" and greatly improved China's international image, especially in the Third World. This state of affairs forced the United States and Great Britain to take more flexible attitudes toward decolonization, and the Soviet Union and China interpreted the British and French withdrawal from Egypt after the Suez Crisis in this light. However, Sino-Soviet joint efforts in showing solidarity with the Third World were short-lived, and Mao soon switched to a more radical and militant direction in his domestic and foreign policies.

Comparing Chapters 6 and 7, we find that many uncertainties accompanied the hegemonic transition and great power rivalry in the post-WWII world. The power transition from the British Empire to the United States proceeded step by step, depending on situations in regions, while the behavior of new socialist powers, the Soviet Union and communist China, was energetic but unpredictable, depending on the personality and will of their leaders. Nationalism in colonies and postcolonial countries was a crucial factor in the relations among all these powers.

After years of confusion that culminated in the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), China carried out reforms in the late twentieth century and emerged as a world great power in the twenty-first

century. In the final chapter, Tsai Tung-Chieh offers a review of Chinese history from ancient times to the present from the point of view of imperial history. In contrast to the tendency of traditional historians to treat Chinese history as a series of dynastic alternations, Tsai examines how China has switched among imperial policy, imperializing policy, and status quo policy, and distinguishes three periods of culmination of empire building. The First Empire (from Qin to Han) gradually developed imperial and cosmopolitan concepts, while the Second Empire (the Sui-Tang period), under the constant pressure of nomads, took a more accommodating stance to threatening forces. The Third Empire, Qing, successfully controlled different regions by adopting hybrid ethnic policies, but was confronted with the challenge of the European-led world enlargement, which eventually led to the collapse of the Qing. Even after the establishment of communist rule, China pursued a non-imperialist status quo policy for a long time, but after the 1990s, it entered another historic period of imperializing policy. Still, China preserves its eternal principle of "domestic politics first, then foreign policy," and according to Tsai's observation, remains a long way off from rebuilding an empire despite the occasional demonstration of aggressiveness.

The chapters of this volume show that empires constantly referred to experiences of other empires (including their own predecessors) and observed others' reactions to their own policy in constructing relations with smaller countries and colonies. As Ann Laura Stoler argues by using the phrase "politics of comparison,"[5] it is more fruitful to analyze political acts of comparison by empires themselves than to search for static differences among empires, which are often conceived as differences of a mythical "national character." Discovering the dynamics of mutual comparison and reaction is the core of comparative imperial studies, and it gives us many suggestions for analyzing relationships between larger states/nations and smaller ones both in history and today's world.

The editing of this volume was interrupted several times due to unforeseen circumstances, and a long time has passed since the sympo-

5 Ann Laura Stoler and Carole McGranahan, "Introduction: Refiguring Imperial Terrains," in Stoler, McGranahan, and Peter C. Perdue, eds., *Imperial Formations* (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2007), pp. 13–15.

sium was held. I sincerely apologize to the contributors and readers for the delay in publication, but believe that the chapters have not become outdated at all and continue to be useful for the further study of history and understanding of today's world. The delay has also brought at least one benefit. After the end of the above-mentioned project on major regional powers in Eurasia, I continued to study imperial history in a project called "Comparative Colonial History: Colonial Administration and Center-Periphery Interactions in Modern Empires" (JSPS grant-in-aid for scientific research A, JP 25244025, 2013–2018). The knowledge and views acquired from this project were useful to editing this volume and writing the introduction.

Chapter 1

Empire and Transformation: The Politics of Difference

Jane Burbank

Empires on the Mind of the Mid-20th Century

In a charged political moment in French Africa in the mid-1950s, one of French Africa's leading politicians, Mamadou Dia of Senegal, asserted, "It is necessary in the final analysis that the imperialist conception of the nation-state give way to the modern conception of the multinational state."[1] His insistence—perhaps counterintuitive—on the "nation-state" as an imperialist construct that should be replaced by "the modern conception of the multi-national state" draws attention to the problematic connection of "modern" to a particular form of the state. Conventional narratives put the "nation-state" at the core of the modern; history is presented as a grand sweep of transformation from "pre-modern empires" to 19th century colonization by western Europeans to 20th century decolonizations and the generalization of the nation-state. But in the mid-20th century, Dia was saying something different: he did not see the nation-state as progressive or inevitable. His goal was to turn empire into a complex form of sovereignty, in which some state functions would be exercised by individual African territories, others by an African feder-

1 "Il faut qu'en définitive, la conception impérialiste d'État-Nation fasse place à la conception moderne d'État-multi-national." *La Condition Humaine* (August 29, 1955).

ation, uniting French-speaking African territories, and still others by a Franco-African community, in which France and all its former colonies would participate as equals.[2]

Layered and interlaced sovereignty is often associated with "pre-modern" empires. But the idea of a multinational and composite polity was not only available in 1955, it was considered "modern" and desirable by Dia. To understand his position, which was widely shared at the time, we must cease to think of history as a series of epochs each characterized by its kind of state. In the 19th century, the most powerful states were European empires with overseas colonies. But these colonial powers—Great Britain, France, and the latecomer German empire—vied for space, people, and resources with much longer-lived empires on Europe's edges (the empires of the Ottomans, Romanovs, and Hapsburgs). In Asia, Europeans, Americans and Russians competed with the empires of the Qing and the Meiji. In the 20th century, some of these empires were disassembled, but some were put back together again, and new empires emerged. Decolonization, like colonization, took place in a world where the most powerful actors were empires, whose contestations were crucial to shifts in power and sovereignty.

It was not just "modern" empires that had the capacity to reshape connections, ideas, and power around the globe. Empires have been agents of transformation of the world's history for over two millennia. Compared to the long lives of empires, the nation-state is a short-term political phenomenon—a concept of recent origin and uncertain future. At the beginning of the 21st century, empire has not given way to a world comprised of nation-states alone. Other kinds of polities and other ideas of sovereignty are in play. Dia's idea of the "modern multi-national state" has taken on many forms, all of them inflected by the practices and contestations of empires.

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2 On the political imaginaries and processes of reconfiguration of the French Union in Africa from 1946 through the 1950s, see Frederick Cooper, "From Imperial Inclusion to Republican Exclusion? France's Ambiguous Post-War Trajectory," in Charles Tshimanga, Didier Gondola, and Peter J. Bloom, eds., *Frenchness and the African Diaspora* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 91–119.

In this article, I address four subjects. First, I propose reasons for why empires hold such significance for changes in the world order, both in the last two centuries and over the last two millennia. I next consider the different strategies that empires have employed to rule their populations, what Frederick Cooper and I have called "the politics of difference," before turning to the imperial context of political action and imagination in the 19th and 20th centuries. I conclude with a discussion of the dis-aggregation, destruction, creation, reconstruction, and transformation of imperial and other states in the second half of the 20th century.[3]

Empires as Agents of Transformation

Over a very long time, the practices and interactions of empire have configured the contexts in which people acted and thought. The study of empires helps us to think about what made possible particular connections across space and time, and what prevented other connections from happening. Empires were assertive shapers of production, communication, and culture in the world, but they had to deal with their own limitations, especially with the challenge of exercising power at a distance and over diverse populations, usually in the presence of other empires.

What gave empires their world-shaping force? For one thing, empires have been a durable form of polity. Large political units, expansionist or with a memory of expansion, empires maintain distinctions and hierarchy among people even as they incorporate them, forcefully or otherwise. The fiction of the nation-state is homogeneity—one people, one territory, one government—while empires recognize and have to manage diversity among their subjects. Empires govern different people differently. The multiple governing strategies used by empires gave them adaptability and the possibility to control resources over long distances and times.

As long as political leaders have ambitions to extend their control and as long as people live in distinct social and cultural arrangements,

3 For a development of my argument and for sources and citations, see Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

the temptation to make empire or expand it is present. But since empires maintain differences among people, their component parts can potentially break away. This tension explains why the empire form of state is so common in history, but also why empires are subject to fission, reconfiguration, and collapse. The empire form was contagious. People can imagine many forms of the state, but as long as empires are in the neighborhood—with their command over human and material resources beyond any single territory or "people"—putting political ideas into practice requires thinking about empires and possibly making one.

The concept of "trajectory" can help us analyze change over time, as empires modified their strategies of rule and competed with other empires. Empires' capacity for adjustment gave them the flexibility essential to maintaining their power. Clashes, competitions, rivalries *among* empires pushed them in different directions, stimulated technological and ideological invention, created new conditions and redefined ideas, even of what constituted the known "world."

Let us take a dramatic example of how empires and their competitions remade the world history. What is often called the "expansion of Europe," starting in the 15th century, was not the product of an aggrandizing instinct intrinsic to European peoples, but rather one effect of a particular conjuncture. In the 15th century, wealth created in the powerful Chinese empire and south east Asia offered tempting incentives to distant merchants, but at the time the Ottoman empire—bigger, stronger, and more securely ruled than the fragmented political units of western Europe—stood in between Europe and China. The kings of Spain and Portugal sought overseas connections to the east as a way around the Ottomans and their own dependence on local magnates. An unexpected outcome of these ventures was connecting people on two sides of the Atlantic, after Columbus sailed west to Asia and ran into what would become America.[4]

4 On the Ottoman empire, European empires, and the Americas, see J. H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Daniel Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Henry Kamen, *Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492–1763* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003).

Another critical conjuncture in world history looks different when seen in terms of relations among empires: the European and American revolutions of the 18th and early 19th centuries. The revolutions in French Saint Domingue, British North America, and Spanish South America were conflicts within empire—over the relative powers of home governments, overseas settlers, and subordinates—before they became efforts to get out of empire.[5]

The trajectories of empires have shaped today's most powerful states. Take China. China's eclipse from the early 19th to the late 20th centuries by then more dynamic imperial powers turns out to have been only the latest of several interregna, shorter than others in the more than 2000 years of Chinese imperial dynasties. During the Republican and Communist periods, aspirants for power took for granted the borders established earlier, by the Yuan (13th to 14th centuries) and Qing (17th to 20th centuries). The leaders of China today evoke these dynasties and their imperial traditions. After major disasters and adroit adjustments of its economic policies, China has turned the tables on the West, exporting industrial goods in addition to silks and porcelain, running an enormous trade balance, becoming the creditor of the United States and Europe. The desires of Tibetans for independence and secessionist politics in the largely Muslim region of Xinjiang pose classic problems for Chinese empire. As earlier, China's rulers must control economic barons and monitor diverse populations, but the polity can draw on its accumulated imperial statecraft to meet these challenges as it resumes a prominent place in a shifting geography of power.

5 On these revolutions and their imperial contexts, see Laurent Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787–1804* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Eliga Gould, *The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, *Constituting Empire: New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664–1830* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

The Politics of Difference

All empires faced some common problems: how to govern different groups of people, how to govern at a distance, how to control dispersed subordinates. Still, there was no single way to run an empire: empires operated with different repertoires of power.

Empires learned some of their strategies from predecessors or rivals. The Ottoman empire, for example, managed to blend Turkic, Byzantine, Arab, Mongol, and Persian traditions. To administer their multi-confessional realm, the Ottomans counted on the elites of each religious community without trying to assimilate or destroy them.[6] The British empire over time encompassed dominions, colonies, protectorates, India governed by a separate civil service, a disguised protectorate over Egypt, and "zones of influence" where the British engaged in what has been called the "imperialism of free trade." An empire with a varied repertoire of rule could shift its tactics selectively, without having to face the problem of assimilating and governing all parts according to a single model.

We can observe some basic and contrasting patterns in empires' management of their diverse populations. The "politics of difference" in some empires meant recognizing the multiplicity of peoples and their varied customs as an ordinary fact of life; in others it meant drawing a strict boundary between insiders and "barbarian" outsiders. For rulers of the Mongol empires of the 13th and 14th centuries, difference was both normal and useful. Mongol empires sheltered Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity, Daoism, and Islam and fostered arts and sciences produced by Arab, Persian, and Chinese civilizations.[7] The Roman empire tended

6 On the Ottoman empire, see from a rich historiography, Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Basic Books, 2005).

7 On the Mongols, see David Morgan, *The Mongols*, 2nd ed. (Malden: Blackwell, 2007); Thomas T. Allsen, *Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

toward homogenization, based on a syncretic but identifiably Roman culture, the enticing rights of Roman citizenship, and, eventually, Christianity as a state religion.[8]

Empires developed variants on these two ideal types; some like the Ottoman and the Russian, combined them. European empires in Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries hesitated between an assimilationist tendency—motivated by their confidence in the superiority of western civilization—and a tendency to indirect rule, to govern through the elites of conquered communities. "Civilizing missions" declared by European empires in the 19th century existed in tension with theories of racial difference.[9]

No matter how imperial rulers conceived of "other" people and their cultures, conquerors could not administer empires by themselves. They needed intermediaries. Often imperial rulers used skills, knowledge, and authority of people from a conquered society—elites who could gain from cooperation or people who had earlier been marginal and saw advantages in serving the victorious power. A different kind of intermediary was a person from the homeland—a settler or a functionary. Both strategies relied upon intermediaries' own social connections to insure effective collaboration. Another tactic was just the opposite: putting slaves or other people detached from their communities of origin and dependent for their welfare and survival solely on their imperial masters in positions of authority. This strategy was used effectively by the Abbassid caliphate and later by the Ottomans, whose highest admin-

8 On Roman cultural practices and their attractions, see Emma Dench, *Romulus' Asylum: Roman Identities from the Age of Alexander to the Age of Hadrian* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Greg Woolf, *Becoming Roman: The Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

9 On civilizing missions, see Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Lora Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire, 1884–1945* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001); Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830–1867* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

istrators and commanders had been extracted from their families as boys and brought up in the sultan's household.

In theory, 19th and 20th century European empires should have replaced such personal structures of intermediation by bureaucracies, but they did so more on paper than in reality. In the vast spaces of Africa, the administrator considered himself "le roi de la brousse." The local official needed chiefs, guards, translators, all of whom were trying to find an advantage for themselves. Throughout the history of empires, intermediaries were essential but dangerous. Settlers, indigenous elites, and groups of subordinate officials might all want to run their own operations, even while profiting from the protections offered by imperial sovereigns. A focus on intermediaries reveals vertical connections between rulers, their agents, and their subjects, a political relationship that is often overlooked at present, in favor of presumed horizontal affinities of class, race, or ethnicity.

Political imagination was critical to empires' practices and impact. Imperial leaders saw their possibilities and challenges in particular situations; their imaginations were neither limited to one idea nor infinite. Local elites and other imperial subjects had their imaginations too; we need to understand them in their contexts, not ours. Monotheism, for example, was adopted by the Roman emperor Constantine and later by Mohammad: the idea of one empire, one God, and one emperor was a powerful imperial tool. But the other face of monotheism was schism, the argument that the current emperor was not the proper guardian of the true faith.

Empires tried to associate themselves with ideas of justice and morality. But critics could turn those ideas against empire's practices—think of Bartolomé de las Casas's criticism in the 16th century of Spain's treatment of indigenous people in its American domains.[10] Or of the anti-slavery movement of the British empire in the early 19th century, or of Asians and Africans who turned European assertions of a "civilizing mission" into the claim that democracy could not be quarantined inside one continent.

10 Bartolomé de Las Casas, *History of the Indies*, trans. and ed. Andrée Collard (New York: Harper, 1971).

Empires and the Dynamics of Change in the 19th and 20th Centuries

Political Imagination in 19th Century Europe

Much of the recent burst of interest in empires has focused on a particular part of the imperial spectrum: the colonial empires of western European powers in the 19th and 20th centuries. Colonial studies and post-colonial theories have brought attention to fundamental aspects of recent history that narratives of global progress had obscured. But if we take a longer perspective on imperial power, we face a paradox: the empires with apparently the greatest technological advantage over other societies and imbued with a strong sense of their cultural superiority were among the shortest lived in history. Compare 70–80 years of British or French domination over Africa to the centuries-long histories of Russian, Habsburg, or Ottoman empires, or even the last of the succession of Chinese dynasties (Qing, 1644–1911).

A conventional explanation for decolonization was teleological: all empires were doomed to give way to the nation-state. However, as we have seen, Africans like Dia and others involved in politics in the mid-20th did not see the future as predetermined, nor the nation-state as their goal. The idea of nation, nonetheless, had a much older history, in most places tangled up with the ambitions of empires to control multiple groups. Empires needed knowledge of populations they claimed to manage; nations emerged into view as empires encountered, surveyed, and exploited various peoples. Efforts by leaders of ethnic groups to prey upon, join, or rebel against imperial rulers were frequent features of world history. From the late 18th century, political claims in the name of "the people," "the nation," and "popular sovereignty" led to both debates and warfare over which people—at home, in contiguous territory, or overseas—would belong within empires and on what terms. These questions were posed in the 18th century; they were not resolved in the 20th, or so far in the 21st.

The American, Haitian, and Latin American revolutions took place in a world configured by empires and their internal and external politics. The "freeborn Englishman" in North America claimed his English rights against the English parliament and sought to create an "Empire of Lib-

erty." Indians and slaves were not to have a place in the new polity. Recognition of living in a world of empires pushed American rebels to unite the former colonies into a single federated polity.[11] Britain's "decolonisation" in the 18th century did not destroy its empire, and may have made it more manageable. After 1783, Britain could still exercise its imperial might in its other settlement and plantation colonies, in Company-ruled India, and through economic and commercial hegemony.

During the French and Haitian revolutions of 1789–1804, the boundaries of the rights of man and of the citizen were contested: a national vision of citizenship was set against an imperial one. After 1789, in Saint Domingue first colonists, then free people of color, then slaves claimed citizenship. Faced with royalist reaction, the invasion of other empires, and slave revolt, the revolutionary government in Paris was driven by pragmatism and principle first to extend citizenship to free people of color, and then to emancipate and make citizens of slaves in the Carribean territories.[12]

The revolutions in Spanish America began in the shadow of Napoleon's conquests in European Spain and grew out of creole elites' efforts to be part of a monarchical order on both sides of the Atlantic. The inclusive vision of a Spanish polity fell victim to struggles over the distribution of power, representation, and commercial rights and to anxieties over the place of creole elites, Indian peasants, and African slaves in the political order. The nationalism of Latin American republics was the consequence rather than the cause of the breakup of empire, and none of the

11 See Armitage, *The Ideological Origins*; Hulsebosch, *Constituting Empire*; David C. Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003); Stuart Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Jeffrey Ostler, *The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Maria E. Montoya, *Translating Property: The Maxwell Land Grant and the Conflict over Land in the American West, 1840–1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

12 C. L. R. James, *The Black Jacobins* (1938, reprint New York: Vintage, 1963); Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens.*

new states was ethnically homogeneous. Brazil, where the Portuguese emperor had moved his capital after Napoleon's invasion, declared itself an empire in 1822.[13]

Inside Europe itself, the 18th century revolutions did not produce a divide between a layered and composite empires and nationally bounded states. Napoleon's empire was a differentiated polity: parts incorporated into a core structure, others ruled by his relatives, by old dynasties cooperating with the regime, by direct military authority, or by systems of alliances. Napoleonic armies, like those of earlier empires, were in their majority made up not of "French" citizens, but of foreigners recruited during expansion. Napoleon conferred titles of nobility on generals and allies. He was both an emperor—crowned as such—and a restorationist, most literally by restoring slavery, abolished by the revolutionary government, in French colonies in 1802.[14]

Napoleon was not defeated by a rising tide of national sentiment, but by other empires, notably Russia and Britain. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 did not produce a Europe of nations, but of a small number of empires, each a heterogeneous and differentiated polity, each with its ambitions. During the bellicose 19th century, a new empire was formed (Germany), an old empire continued to grow (Russia), an even older empire shrank but did not go away (the Ottomans), a third long-lived empire (the Habsburgs) reconfigured itself, while the dynamic western-edge empires of France and Britain used clientelism, free trade, war, and diplomacy against other powers both in Europe and overseas. Violent struggles broke out inside empires. Rebellions against Dutch, Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg sovereignty as well as attempted revolutions—three times in France alone—threatened the hold of rulers upon their polities and offered opportunities for imperial rivals to exploit.

European empires also elaborated their skills at diplomacy following the defeat of Napoleon. The Holy Alliance signaled that Europe would

13 Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution*.

14 On Napoleon's empire, see Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon, 1799–1815* (London: Arnold, 1996); Alan Forrest, *Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire* (London: Hambledon and London, 2002); Stuart Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration of Europe* (London: Routledge, 1991).

be a Christian place; the Quadruple Alliance morphed into the Congress System of consultation among the great powers. From the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to the Berlin conferences on the Balkans in 1878 and on Africa in 1884–85, small numbers of men conscious of themselves as a European imperial club remade borders, re-apportioned resources and people. Sovereignties were subordinated where convenient; territories were exchanged; kingdoms were merged or divvied up; inter-empire alliances formed and reformed.

Thus the story often told as "the rise of nationalism" in the 19th century is not about trajectories from one state form to another, but about the intersections of empire politics with changing ideas and practices of governance. Interest in "nations"—in the languages, histories, and cultures of distinctive national groups—was part of the political imaginary of 19th century Europe. Imperial rulers themselves sought serviceable Christian genealogies and links to a heroic past they tried to claim as their heritage. Both British and Russian empires, and later the French, saw advantages in undermining their common rival—the Ottomans—by supporting Greeks who rebelled in the 1820s. An independent "Greek" kingdom (1832) was a bi-product of imperial competition. For much of the 19th century and beyond, empires helped to make nations, usually on some other empire's territory.

Meanwhile, empires on Europe's unruly eastern edges did not hold still in archaism or sink in decline or suffer a hundred years of "crisis." Russians, Habsburgs, and Ottomans all took pains to revamp their ruling practices and their imperial economies over the century.

At the beginning of the century, Russia was the power that made other empires nervous. Alexander I, triumphant over Napoleon, saw himself as a leader of Christian Europe. It took the Crimean war to shock another Russian tsar, Alexander II, into a paroxysm of reforms—the emancipation of the enserfed peasantry; universal male military service; restructuring of the judicial system; representative institutions of local government. In the second half of the century, Russian rulers extended their empire into Central Asia and launched a major effort to expand industrial production and transportation networks. The first Trans-Siberian Railroad was completed in 1905. Oil from the Caspian region became a major export, along with grain.

Across Central Asia and Siberia, Russian rulers absorbed new populations and territories.[15]

The Ottomans, in response to threats and defeats, also transformed administrative, educational, and military institutions. Sultans opened new military and medical schools, abolished the Janissary corps, and vastly expanded both the army and the administration. Like the Russians, the Ottomans reformed their courts and drew up new legal codes. In 1869 a law declared all subjects Ottoman citizens, and in 1876, Sultan Abdulhamid II approved a constitution and convened a parliament. Although the parliament was closed when yet another war with Russia broke out, it brought Muslims, Christians, Jews, and together to discuss matters of governance.[16]

Modernizing Ottoman administrators tried to strengthen Islam against the inroads of Christian evangelicals, and at the same time to give people of many religions and ethnicities—Albanians, Macedonians, Greeks, Armenians, Arabs, Kurds, Jews, and Turks—roles in governance. In some places, like Yemen, the Ottoman empire tried to take a "colonial" stance like that of its French and British rivals, bringing unruly

15 On Russian empire, see from a huge historiography, Andreas Kappeler, *The Russian Empire: A Multi-Ethnic History*, trans. Alfred Clayton (Harlow, U.K.: Pearson Education, 2001); Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev, eds., *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007); Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Willard Sunderland, *Taming the Wild Field: Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Paul Werth, *At the Margins of Orthodoxy: Mission, Governance, and Confessional Politics in Russia's Volga-Kama Region, 1827–1905* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Daniel Brower, *Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003); Steven G. Marks, *Road to Power: The Trans-Siberian Railroad and Colonization of Asian Russia, 1850–1917* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

16 On the Ottoman empire in the 19th and 20th centuries, see Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909* (London: Tauris, 1999); Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

tribes into a more "civilized" structure. In the Levant, Istanbul continued to make pragmatic arrangements with Arabic-speaking elites. By the early 20th century, after significant losses in the Balkans, the empire's ideology and its populations became more Islamic, but its ruling ethos was still "Ottoman," and not specifically "Turkish."[17]

As the two empires on contestable edges of Europe struggled to match the strength of western armies and navies—the better to battle each other—they confronted and engaged a powerful rhetoric of "progress" and "civilization." By their rivals, Russians and Ottomans were seen as sometimes "exotic," often "despotic," and always "backward." This rhetoric entered into the self-conceptions of discontented elites.

In these contexts, we can use the term "modern" as people at the time used the idea. Russian reformists and Ottoman ones wanted their polity to be "with the times" or "up-to-date"—*sovremennyi* in Russian. Administrators used western European strategies to restructure institutions and practices. Russian and Ottoman elites drew upon an expanding repertoire of political ideas that included liberalism, ethnic or cultural solidarity, feminism, socialism, the march of progress, anarchism, natural rights. In the second half of the 19th century, intellectuals and activists could see themselves as members of trans-imperial movements for sovereignty based on equal rights, representative government, or class power. These ideas were not inconsistent with an empire that recognized the plurality of its population, even if some of them threatened autocratic political formations.

The Habsburg empire also reminds us that political innovation in the 19th century was not limited to a trend toward the unitary nation-state. The Habsburgs, from the 18th century, had sought to bring modulated enlightenment to empire, based on an educated and centralized bureaucracy empowered to stand up to local nobilities and the cultivation of ethnic and religious minorities. The weft of Habsburg politics was the

17 On Ottoman politics, see Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

imperial tradition—the ability of the royal family to recognize and rule a multiplicity of units and peoples by dynastic right. The close relationship between the Habsburgs and Catholicism did not prevent Franz Joseph from making himself visible at Jewish, Eastern Orthodox, Armenian, Greek, and Muslim ceremonies. But reaching out to people divided along class, confessional, or other lines would almost everywhere offend some of them.[18]

In 1861 and 1866, after disastrous empire wars, the Habsburg emperor established a bicameral legislature and made further constitutional changes. A single Austrian citizenship was created in 1867, guaranteeing the same civil rights to people of all religions. But the centralizing fiscal measures demanded by liberals and their insistence on German as the language of administration pushed Hungarian and Czech activists to demand more regional power. Federalism was proposed by some national elites as a better way of distributing sovereignty. In 1867, the Austrian empire was transformed into what became known as the Dual Monarchy: the dynasty presided over an empire of two unequal units, Austria and Hungary. This dual polity was administered by an emperor/king who convened two cabinets, sometimes separately, sometimes jointly.[19]

The reconfiguration of the Habsburg empires in 1867 reveals the multiple political imaginaries, tensions, and possibilities of the time. The constitutional transformations of the 1860s blended the aspirations of liberals for civil rights and representative democracy with the demands of activists in Austria's component parts for more autonomy. The compromise rewarded Germans and Hungarians, but did not satisfy other groups—Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Poles, Ukrainians, and Ruma-

18 On Habsburg imperial politics, see Daniel L. Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg Austria, 1848–1916* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2005).

19 On politics and ethnicity in the Habsburg empire, see Pieter M. Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries: Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the Austrian Empire, 1848–1914* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996) as well as his *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontier of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

nians. Many Slavic activists were attracted to an altogether different kind of politics. A Pan-Slav movement took shape, its first congress held in Moscow in 1867. Pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic movements appeared at about the same time, led by Muslim and Turkish modernizers. Socialists in Austria-Hungary would later become theorists of ways to accommodate different national groups within a socialist framework. These trans-empire political movements, born out of the experience of nineteenth-century empires at Europe's edges, opened the way for new kinds of political thinking.

One European empire managed to create itself in the 19th century and this was the German Reich. In the 1860s, Otto von Bismarck seized the initiative in the European inter-empire competition. After Prussia's victories in wars against Denmark, Austria, and France, and incorporations of German-, Danish-, and Polish-speaking areas, King Wilhelm I was proclaimed Kaiser (Caesar). The formation of Germany's empire in Europe—explicitly named as such—preceded its interest in colonies overseas.

Through their empire-building efforts overseas and nearby and their competition, alliance-building, and negotiation with each other, Germany, France, and Britain consolidated the conception of "Europe" as a singularly powerful agent of political and economic transformation. Ottomans, Russians, and Austrians each took measures to exploit, adopt, preempt, or combat the intrusions—cultural, economic, diplomatic—of the "Western" powers into their politics of empire. None of these empires held still, and all were drawn more tightly into the web of imperial connections and competitions.

Political Imagination in the 20th Century

The restructuring of imperial power is an essential theme of 20th century history, but one in which the nation-state was neither a given nor a telos. After World War I, three imperial actors tried to transform the world of imperial competition, and a fourth relatively young product of imperial expansion—the United States—took a dynamic new role in world politics.

The USSR explicitly offered an anti-capitalist variant of empire on the territories of imperial Russia, and later, after another round of world

war, beyond. The Bolshevik state was based on a new combination of political principles—communism; one-party rule; and empire, expressed in a federation of national republics each linked to the center by the single ruling party.[20] The Comintern, founded in 1919, exported revolutionary challenges to the peoples of other empires. In 1936, Stalin declared, "We now have a fully formed multinational socialist state, which has stood all tests, and whose stability might well be envied by any national state in any part of the world."[21]

Germany and Japan took empire in a more nationalizing direction. The postwar reconfiguration of Germany provided a place for ideologues to define Germanness in an exclusionary, racialized way, to search for non-German scapegoats for defeat, and to dream of an empire in which racial domination replaced the compromises of old empires. The weak states that had been carved out of Austria-Hungary had Germans inside, as well as other people whose resentments could be exploited. Nazi visions of empire were nourished in a European empire that had been stripped of its overseas colonies. The mixture of a German ideology of imperial entitlement with the reduced space of German sovereignty was conducive to the most noxious of fantasies of power over others.[22]

Japan projected nation over empire in China and Southeast Asia in a different way: leading other Asian races to their imperial destiny, against the European and American empires that threatened to control much of the resources of the region. In Manchuria, the Japanese installed the ex-Chinese emperor (a Manchu), encouraged Japanese migration to the mainland, promoted industrialization and agricultural development within a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."[23] Having defeated

20 On the formation of the USSR as an empire, see Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

21 Cited in Hirsch, *Empire of Nations*, p. 273.

22 On Nazi empire, see Mark Mazower, *Hitler's Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe* (London: Allen Lane, 2008).

23 On Manchuria, see Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

the Russian empire in 1905, Japan acted aggressively to get around the constraints imposed by other empires and to articulate an imperial vision for its own people and elites of areas it tried to dominate; it was defeated in the second world war by an American imperium built on continental conquest and island bases.

Germany and Japan's nationalized 20th century empires failed in the second world war, but the USSR with its multi-national population and continental resources and the acquiescence of its imperial allies, expanded its empire over what became known as "eastern Europe." Both in its internal and external spaces, Stalin's answer to imperial challenges was communist discipline—one-party rule in the new "people's democracies," imprisonment and execution of potential dissenters, and cutting off information about the other side. The traditional tool of moving people about was applied in many regions: ethnic Russians were relocated to the Baltic republics, from which many local groups were removed; Poles in western Ukraine were sent to formerly German territories allocated to Poland; Tatars in the Crimea were deported to Kazakhstan and Siberia.

At the same time, the USSR continued its long-standing practice of cultivating national difference as a core practice of imperial governance. The "friendship of nations," the mobilization of cadres from ethnic groups, supervised through the one-party system and police controls, the formal division of the state into nationalized units and sub-units—these offered models and challenges to empire leaders and their opponents around the world. Imperial power was being configured yet again in mid-20th century—by imperial powers interacting—aiding, challenging, obstructing—each other.

Decolonization, Transformation, New Forms of Sovereignty

And what of the stuttering history of modernizing in colonial empires? Shifts in policies and practices after World War II came about not because colonial empires had reached the end of a life cycle, but because the struggle among empires in the war had devastating effects on winners as well as losers, because racial ideologies, never stable, had led to such repugnant consequences, because key colonies (Indonesia and

Indochina) had to be recolonized after the Japanese occupation, and because France and Britain needed more efficient colonial production for economic recovery and adopted new—"developmental"—strategies intended to obtain it. At the same time, European leaders changed their core conceptions of what states are supposed to do in Europe itself, and it was not obvious that overseas parts of these empires could be neatly cut off from reforms "at home."

The implementation of the welfare state after the war increased the stakes of incorporation into a unit that could be labeled "French" or "British." Economic development—explicitly aimed at raising the standard of living and availability of social services—became the means by which France and Britain renewed their sense of imperial mission and recast their hopes for making colonies productive and stable. In the French case, colonial subjects were declared to be citizens in 1946 and their representatives—albeit not in proportion to population—took seats in the Paris legislature. Political activists and the leaders of social movements in Africa promptly tried to give social and economic substance to citizenship—demanding equal wages, social services, and political voice. These demands, expressed in the same language in which post-war empire defended its legitimacy and coming from colonies whose people had fought for France and Britain in the war, were hard to dismiss. Unable to maintain empire on the cheap, France and Britain now had to weigh the costs of maintaining their demanding empires in relation to alternative arrangements. Their willingness to divest themselves of colonies emerged from the unexpected effects of the post-war initiative to modernize imperialism.[24]

Both African political actors and the leaders of European France with whom they were engaged, had empire very much on the mind at the end of World War II. French leaders, determined to hold together a complex combination of metropole, old colonies, new colonies, protectorates, mandates, and the peculiar case of Algeria—whose territory

24 On decolonization in British and French Africa, see Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

was fully French but whose people were not—renamed the empire the "French Union." After 1946, when colonial subjects were made citizens of the union, the French administration tried to contain the implications of this fundamental legal reform in the face of assertive trade unions, veterans of the French army, student associations, and political movements, all making claims in the name of the equality of citizens. The French state became trapped between the danger that its new emphasis on imperial inclusion would not go far enough—leading to revolution, as in Algeria—or that it might succeed, leading to rising burdens on the budget coming from impoverished territories.

African leaders were also not secure in their positions or demands. They were hemmed in by their territorially based constituencies, their desire for African unity, their need for French resources and the benefits of French citizenship, and their disagreements among themselves over the creation of a unified African nation. It was out of the simultaneous claims for equality and diversity inside a complex French polity that Dia's appeal for multinational polities arose.

It was only in 1960, that both France and West African leaders backed away from the forms of federation and confederation—from the complex, layered ideas of sovereignty that they had advocated—and into a political form they had not sought: the nation-state. Both France and its former African colonies then rewrote their histories as if the independent nation had long been the aspiration of their peoples. By the 1970s, France was striving to keep out the children of the people it had once tried to keep in.

Elsewhere midway through the 20th century, the supposed transition from empire to nation-state was also not self-evident. The mixed populations in southern and central Europe that had lived under multiple empires, including the Ottoman and the Habsburg, and suffered waves of ethnic cleansing, each supposed to assure that every nation would have its state, in the Balkan wars of the 1870s and 1912–13, and after World War I, were once again subject to transfers of populations after World War II. Ethnic Germans were expelled from some places, Ukrainians and Poles from others. Even so, state did not correspond to nation, and a deadly burst of ethnic cleansing followed in the 1990s.

In Africa, the Rwandan genocide of 1994 was yet another post-imperial attempt to produce a singular people who would govern themselves. In the Middle East, the breakup of the Ottoman empire after 1918 has still not led to stable states: opposed nationalists claim the same territory in Israel-Palestine; different groups vie for power in Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere.

The collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and the breakup of the USSR can be understood in imperial terms. The Soviet Union's strategy of fostering national republics—led by communist intermediaries with native credentials—provided a road map for dis-aggregation as well as a common language for negotiating new sovereignties. The largest of the successor states, the Russian Federation, is explicitly multi-ethnic. The 1993 constitution offered Russia's constituent republics the right to establish their own official languages, while defining Russian as the "state language of the Russian Federation."[25] After an unruly interlude, Vladimir Putin revived the traditions of patrimonial empire. As he and his protégés attempt to define and control their version of "sovereign democracy," to compel loyalty from governors, mayors, and other critical intermediaries, to win the competition for Russia's borderlands, and to wield effectively wield Russia's prime weapon—energy—in the international arena, Russian empire has reappeared in yet another transmutation on its Eurasian space.

The most innovative of today's large powers is the European Union. Europe had been torn up from the 5th century to the 20th by the aspirations of some of its elites to produce a new Rome and the determination of others to prevent such an outcome. It was only after the mutual destruction of World War II and the consequent inability of Europeans to hold onto their overseas colonies that the deadly competition among European empires came to an end. Between the 1950s and 1990s European states put their freedom from empire to use in working out confederal arrangements among themselves.

The European Union that emerged from this restructuring has functioned most effectively when limiting its ambitions to administra-

25 *Constitution of the Russian Federation* (Lawrenceville and Moscow: Brunswick and Novosti, 1994), article 68, sections 1 and 2.

tion and regulation. Anyone who passes abandoned customs houses along frontiers where millions of people have died in repeated wars can appreciate the remarkable transformation attempted by the Schengen states. One of the most basic attributes of sovereignty—control of who crosses a border—has been pushed up to a European level. This decision became a matter of contention by 2015, reminding us that national conceptions of the state had only recently detached themselves from imperial ones. Europe's transit from conflicting empire-building projects to national states shorn of colonies to a confederation of nations underlines the complexity of sovereign arrangements over a long time.

After 2001, it became fashionable among pundits to anoint the United States an "empire," either to denounce the arrogance of its actions abroad or to celebrate its efforts to police and democratize the world. The "is it or isn't it?" question is less revealing than an examination of the American repertoire of power, based on selective use of imperial strategies. In the 20th century, the United States has repeatedly used force in violation of other states' sovereignty; it does occupations, but it has rarely sustained colonies.

But the USA's national sense of itself emerged from an imperial trajectory: Thomas Jefferson had proclaimed in 1776 that the rebellious provinces of the British empire would create an "Empire of Liberty." The new polity emerged on what we could call a Roman-style politics of difference: on the basis of equal rights and private property for people considered citizens and the exclusion of Native Americans and slaves. Extension over a continent eventually put great resources in the hands of Euro-Americans, and after nearly foundering on the rock of slavery, American leaders gained the strength to choose the time and terms of their interventions in the rest of the world.

Empire has existed in relation to and often in tension with other forms of connection over space; empires facilitated and obstructed movements of goods, capital, people, and ideas. Empire-building was almost always a violent process, and conquest was often followed by exploitation, if not forced acculturation and humiliation. Empires constructed powerful political formations; they also left trails of human suffering. But the national idea, itself developed in imperial contexts, has not proved to be an antidote to imperial arrogance.

We live with the consequences of these uneven paths out of empire, with the fiction of sovereign equivalence, and with the reality of inequality within and among states. Thinking about empire does not mean resurrecting the British, Ottoman, or Roman empire. It allows us to consider the multiplicity of forms in which power is exercised across space. If we can avoid thinking of history as an inexorable transition from empire to nation-state, perhaps we can think about the future more expansively. Can we imagine forms of sovereignty that are better able than either empires or nation-states to address both the inequality and diversity of the world's people?

Chapter 2

Zar-o Zur: Gold and Force: Safavid Iran as a Tributary Empire

Rudi Matthee

Introduction

The first decade of the twenty-first century saw a plethora of scholarly writings on the concept of empire and its historical manifestations. Propelled by the terrible events of 9/11 and the overseas wars the United States launched in their wake, this renewed attention to an old state structure introduced and sought to generalize the proposition that, despite its habitual denial-cum amnesia with regard to its status, America constitutes a latter-day global empire. Within half a decade, forced to keep pace with evolving events, the emerging discussion changed course to fasten onto the notion that, barely begun, the end of the American empire was already in sight, that America's imperial decline had set in as soon as its imperial status culminated.

Safavid Iran, with a lifespan of 221 years, might sound like a remote and unlikely homologue. Yet, with the caveat that time in the modern world is compressed, that developments playing out over a decade today might have taken a century or more in the past, the simile is, on second thought, perhaps not an unreasonable one: The Safavids, too, "declined" (and collapsed) soon after attaining their peak.

That, at least, is one of the arguments I advanced in an article published in 2010 in which I posed the question of whether the Safavids

presided over an empire at all.[1] The very question might seem strange, yet the reason for posing it was simple: In the traditional literature, following Marshall Hodgson's well-known classification, Safavid Iran was typically included in the "gunpowder empire" club, together with the contiguous Ottoman and Mughal states.[2] It continues to be examined as part of the same triad, even though it is now recognized that firearms in early modern times and especially in non-Western settings "were not necessarily drivers but rather indicators of change."[3] Consequently, the "gunpowder empire" moniker has now fallen out of favor (more about that later).[4] Yet, gunpowder state or not, in the broader and ever widening, theoretically grounded, and inherently comparative discourse that followed in the wake of 9/11, (Safavid) Iran has hardly played a role. From declaring America an empire, historical scholarship quickly and, perhaps inevitably, moved to the avatar of empires, ancient Rome. The link was easily made, for America's very founding fathers envisioned the state they forged as "Rome revived"—albeit as an incarnation of Republican, not Imperial Rome. The decline scenario, immortalized by Edward Gibbon, was similarly too obvious to be ignored once the "imperial presidency" reached new heights under George W. Bush, religion made ever deeper inroads into the American body politic, and the excesses of the country's corrupt corporate elite hit the headlines in the wake of the 2008 credit crisis.

Even earlier, scholars had embarked on the study of a wider comparative, historically grounded nexus, incorporating early mod-

1 Rudi Matthee, "Were the Safavids an Empire?" *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 53 (2010), pp. 233–265.

2 Marshall Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, vol. 3, *The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times* (Chicago, 1974), p. 18.

3 Emrys Chew, *Arming the Periphery: The Arms Trade in the Indian Ocean during the Age of Global Empire* (Basingstoke, 2012), p. 18.

4 See Stephen F. Dale, *The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals* (Cambridge, 2010); and, for a latter-day employment of the term, Douglas E. Streusand, *Islamic Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals* (Boulder, CO, 2011).

ern political entities that behaved like empires and that declined like empires—complex state structures encompassing large, ecologically variegated territories inhabited by a large number of people of diverse linguistic and ethnic identity—even if these didn't necessarily identify themselves as empires. They thus examined the Ottomans and the Spanish and Habsburg empires and, leaping across Iran, extended their ambit to the Indian Mughals, various South-east Asian states, and the Chinese Ming dynasty.[5] If Iran is mentioned at all in this discourse, it is usually as the land that spawned the first serious empire in history, that of the Achaemenids, who pioneered or refined many of the patterns and practices that became quintessentially attached to the form, with an occasional reference to the last of the Iranian regimes, that of the Sasanians (r.

5 Aside from the literature given in my 2010 article, Iran is also virtually absent from the two collections edited by P. F. Bang and C. A. Bayly, the special issue on empires in the *Medieval History Journal* 6:2 (2003); and *Tributary Empires in Global History* (Basingstoke, 2011). No Iranian empire receives any particular mention in the synthetic study edited by Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History:Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, 2010). In Victor Lieberman's magisterial *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 2003 and 2009), Iran mostly serves a source of migrant labor seeking employment in India. The comparative element in Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, 2008), is mostly limited to the Roman and Russian empires. Sanjay Subrahmaniyam, in a recent essay comparing the Mughals, the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, goes so far as to speak of "three early modern empires that covered an impressive swathe of more or less contiguous territory" only interrupted by a "small gap from east to west equivalent to the width of the Safavid Empire." See Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "The Fate of Empires: Rethinking Mughals, Ottomans and Habsburgs," in Huri Islamoğlu and Peter Perdue, eds., *Shared Histories of Modernity: China, India and the Ottomans Empire* (London, New York, New Delhi, 2009), p. 75. Geoffrey Parker, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven and London, 2013), pp. 417–420, treats Iran as an early modern anomaly and enigma for not conforming to the global pattern of mid-seventeenth-century war, rebellion and human misery.

250–644), before the lands between Mesopotamia and the Hindu Kush were absorbed into the Arab-Islamic dispensation.[6]

The Safavids: Gunpowder State, Patrimonial-Bureaucratic Empire or Tributary State?

This essay examines Safavid Iran, one of the stepchildren in the wider discourse about manifestations of early modern empires. Its angle is different from the one I took in my earlier essay. In its attempt to put the Safavids on the "imperial map," "Were the Safavids an Empire?" focused on the ideological and political underpinnings of the state and, to a lesser degree, on the extent to which their military capacity and resources allowed the Safavids to make good on their claim to oversee a political dispensation we call empire. Indeed, answering the question in the title, I tentatively embraced the Safavid dynasty as an empire, with the qualification that its centralizing capacity and thrust were relatively limited and that its status derived more from its dynastically and religiously underpinned ideological mobilizing power than from its actual military might.

For this reason alone the term "gunpowder empire" is indeed less than appropriate for the Safavid state. Gábor Ágoston, among others, has contested the gunpowder empire epithet as an all-encompassing term for the Ottomans with the argument that it places too much emphasis on one single factor to explain various exceedingly complex processes.[7] Stephen Dale concurs with regard to the Safavids. The term is, as Dale notes in his comparative study of the Ottomans, the Safavids and the Mughals, "particularly questionable for the Safavids, who never really warmed to the use of heavy artillery."[8] The Safavids demonstrably lagged behind

6 One scholar, struck by this absence of Iran from the discourse, in this case the discourse about non-Western "modernities," has aptly called the "'Turkey-India-China grouping' the 'Three Tenors' of non-Western Modernities." See Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, "Modernity: The Sphinx and the Historian," *American Historical Review* 116 (June 2011), p. 649.

7 See Gábor Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 191–192.

8 Dale, *The Muslim Empires*, p. 6.

the Ottomans in this regard, and there are reports that, at least in the sixteenth century, the Iranians disliked and were even afraid of artillery, perhaps because they were as yet relatively unfamiliar with this technology.[9] Like many contemporary states, the Safavid state sought to hold on to its initial monopoly on firearms by restricting their spread among the population. Yet, as everywhere else, this was a doomed effort.[10] It is also true that firearms helped the dynasty's most forceful monarch, the centralizing Shah `Abbas I (r. 1587–1629), reorganize his army. But the task was enormous and the effort remained half-hearted; the new technology, involving the introduction and use of firearms, would be a minor factor in the formation of new elites and thus was hardly decisive for the ultimate fate of the state. The Safavids used cannon to great effect in siege warfare yet firepower handled by a newly formed infantry consisting of *gholams*, Georgian and Armenian "slave" soldiers imported from the Caucasus, never replaced mounted archers as the mainstay of their army. The Afghan insurgents who brought down the Safavid state, moreover, proved as adept at using gunpowder—even in novel ways in the form of the camel-mounted *zamburak* cannon—as the Safavid armies whom they defeated.

Having "shelved" the gunpowder rubric, the present essay, following Stephen Dale and Stephen Blake in their respective approach to the Mughals, proposes that the most appropriate overarching term for the seventeenth-century Iranian state—as forged by Shah `Abbas I—is that of the patrimonial-bureaucratic variety as originally proposed by Weber, in that its apparatus was organized and functioned as an extension of

9 Giovanni Tommaso Minadoi, *The History of the Warres between the Turkes and the Persians*, trans. Abraham Hartwell (London, 1595; repr. Tehran, 1976), pp. 73–74; and the report offered to the Venetian Senate on May 1, 1580, in Gugliemo Berchet, ed., *La repubblica di Venezia et la Persia* (Turin, 1865; repr. Tehran, 1976), p. 189.

10 For this, see Rudi Matthee, "Unwalled Cities and Restless Nomads: Gunpowder and Artillery in Safavid Iran," in Charles Melville, ed., *Safavid Persia: The History and Politics of an Islamic Society* (London: 1996), pp. 389–416; and Idem, *Persia in Crisis: Safavid Decline and the Fall of Isfahan* (London, 2012), pp. 111–112, 217–218.

the royal household, that its administrative offices knew little functional division, and that private and public spheres overlapped in distinctly premodern ways. Coercive power, in sum, continued to be the ruler's personal property.[11] This does not say anything about the *effectiveness* of the ruler's power—which was absolute in the sense that his power over his subjects' life and death was unbounded yet factually limited beyond his immediate orbit.[12] It does, however, point to the fact that, if the term "empire" is to have any meaning at all, it would have to be by linking it to the dynasty that oversaw it. Imperial power, in other words, was above all dynastic power.

In addition to the charge that it is teleological in nature, a common criticism of Weber's theory is that it presupposes static, even immutable structures, and that it envisions a state that not only claims to hold a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence but that actually has the means to enforce this right. Weber was explicit about the fragility of patrimonial rule, yet he formulated state and society as a unitary system and, in his nineteenth-century (German) tendency to overrate the ability of the state to control, manage, and arbitrate, he paid insufficient attention to societal challenges to its power. Michael Mann's reformulation of Weber's ideas, taking this into account, rejects a simple antithesis between the all-powerful state, and society, the populace, the objects of its coercion. Mann sees a dialectic relationship between the two, a relationship in which a "range of infrastructural techniques are pioneered by despotic states, then appropriated by civil societies (or vice versa); then further opportunities for centralized coordination present themselves, and the process begins anew."[13]

11 For the features of the patrimonial state, see Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, 2 vols., ed. Geunter Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley, 1978), vol. 1, pp. 1006–1010. For Blake's use of the term, see Stephen P. Blake, "The Patrimonial-Bureaucratic Empire of the Mughals," *Journal of Asian Studies* 39 (1979), pp. 77–94.

12 Philip S. Gorski, *The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Revolution* (Chicago, 2003), p. 29.

13 See Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 25 (1984), p. 4.

He also views society less as a structure than as a series of "multiple overlapping and intersecting sociopolitical networks of power."[14] This paper follows these propositions, including Mann's distinction between "despotic" (immediate) and "infrastructural" (logistical) power.

We might gain more insight into the actual working of Safavid Iran as a patrimonial state by highlighting the tributary dimension of its relationships. Like all premodern empires, the Safavid state was based on the "conquest of wide agrarian domains and the taxation of peasant surplus production."[15] Tribute, the extraction of wealth as a token of respect and submission or allegiance or, in the words of Shmul Eisenstadt, the "collection of free-floating resources," was crucial for the working, success and ultimately the survival of the prevailing power structure; it suffused not just economic relations but operated at the heart of the dynamic interaction between the central state and the society that was formally subjected to it.[16] The tributary mode as originally presented by Samir Amin and Eric Wolf aims to dissolve the traditional Marxian distinction between the Asiatic mode of production and the feudal mode of production by subsuming all precapitalist systems under one model. In keeping with the Marxist paradigm, tribute in their writings is primarily economic in nature, yet to the extent that economic conditions are intertwined with political and social relations, the notion will here be used not just as a mechanism of economic import but as essential tool for the production and reproduction of political and social power in Safavid Iran.

Forms of Tribute

The payment of tribute as a manifestation of deference to power has a long history, going back to the first world empire, that of the Achae-

14 Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 1, *The History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760* (Cambridge, 1986), p. 80.

15 Bang and Bayly, eds., *Tributary Empires*, p. 6.

16 Samir Amin, *Unequal Development* (Hassocks, 1976); Eric Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley, 1984), pp. 79–82; and S. M. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York, 1963), pp. 23–28.

menids (c. 550–330 BCE).[17] Throughout Eurasia, states in the next two millennia operated on the principle of extracting tribute.[18] Safavid Iran is no exception to this. Indigenous, Persian-language sources make various ideological and religious objectives appear as the main drivers behind the rise and the maintenance of the Safavid state, yet underneath these one detects two principal motivating forces. One is *zur*, force, the lust for power and glory, and the manly urge to conquer and subdue.[19] The other one is *zar*, gold, monetary inducement, which stirred at the heart of a web of personal relationships based on patronage radiating from the shah—the ultimate source of power and patronage. Even if *zur* was often the first and always the last mechanism the state employed, *zar* appropriately appears first in the expression "*zar-o zur*." Political domination was ultimately predicated on military control, but daily practice was a matter of surplus extraction in myriad forms and varieties, ranging from regular taxation to rent and confiscation, from state monopolies on commodities to forced partnerships, from diplomatic gift-giving to obligatory donations offered by provincial rulers to the shah. The terms of these arrangements were the outcome of bargaining processes pitting central power in its quest for domination against local or peripheral resistance and subterfuge. Tributary relations were primarily extractive, applied to state centralization. But, following ancient patterns among nomadic states, they also knew a reciprocal, redistributive element.[20] This would take the form of a distribution of the spoils of war among the warriors; as

17 See Amélie Kuhrt, "The Achaemenid Persian Empire (c. 550–c. 330 BCE): Continuities, Adaptations, Transformations," in Susan E. Alcock et al., eds., *Empires, Perspectives from Archeology and History* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 93–124.

18 See John Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode of Production* (London, 1993), who follows a neo-Marxist approach (and who leaves out Iran altogether from his discussion of early modern states).

19 See Walther Hinz, *Irans Aufstieg zum Nationalstaat im fünfzehnten Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1936).

20 For the Mongol manifestation of this, see H. F. Schurmann, "Mongolian Tributary Practices of the Thirteenth Century," *Harvard Journal of Asian Studies* 19 (1956), pp. 320–322.

well as of largesse expressed by way of banquets.[21] Extraction only had a chance of being considered legitimate if it was balanced by the spread of resources and power among the members of the ruling clans. Only thus could (temporary and instrumental) loyalty and cooperation be acquired and made to work.[22]

Even though Safavid rulers did not incorporate the notion that their state was an overarching, sovereign state into their rhetoric vis-à-vis subject peoples as much as their Ottoman peers, examples of tribute giving and taking abound in Safavid Iran.[23] Tribute could be a token of deference to power, an "insurance" mechanism involving protection, or a symbol of mutual dependence. At the onset of Safavid rule we have an excellent example of the first in the term, *moqarrariya*, which we may actually translate as tribute.[24] Before the rise of the Safavids as a political power, the rulers of Hormuz paid *moqarrariya* to the governor of mainland Lar.[25] After 1501, the ruler of Hormuz, Salghur, paid this impost to Shah Isma`il, both in deference to the new ruler on the mainland and in order to maintain control over the shipping lanes of the Persian Gulf. Before Shah `Abbas I extended his dominion to the Persian Gulf in the early 1600s, the Safavids were mainly interested in receiving a share of

21 See Jürgen Paul, "The State and the Military: A Nomadic Perspective," *Orientwissenschaftliche Hefte* 12, *Militär und Staatlichkeit* (2003), pp. 35–36.

22 Farhat Hasan, *State and Locality in Mughal India: Power Relations in Western India, c. 1572–1730* (Cambridge, 2004), Introduction.

23 For the use of the term by the Ottomans, who, at least rhetorically, considered rulers as far apart as those of Poland and Yemen tributary to themselves, see Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "What Is Inside and What Is Outside? Tributary States in Ottoman Politics," in Gábor Kármán and Lovro Kunevic, eds., *The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Leiden and Boston, 2012), pp. 421–432.

24 Vladimir Minorsky translates "muqarrari" as "regular subvention," whereas Willem Floor has "regular emolument." See V. Minorsky, tr. and ed., *Tadhkirat al-Mulūk. A Manual of Safavid Administration* (Cambridge, 1943; repr. 1980), p. 183; and Willem Floor, *A Fiscal History of Iran in the Safavid and Qajar Periods* (New York, 1998), p. 34.

25 For this, see Jean Aubin, "La politique iranienne d'Ormuz (1515–1540)," *Studia* (1994), pp. 27–28.

this tribute. Indeed, the contacts between the Safavids and the Europeans who came to their country after the Portuguese similarly revolved around tribute. In return for the assistance the English gave to the Iranians in ousting the Portuguese from Hormuz in 1622 the former received the right to collect the moiety of the toll income from the Persian Gulf port city of Bandar `Abbas in perpetuity. And the agreement that the Safavids made with the Dutch in 1623 stipulated the annual exchange of a fixed amount of 600 bales of silk for cash.[26]

Here, as in other relationships, the actual balance of power determined the direction as well as the amount. Thus, the Iranians rarely paid the English even a fraction of the toll income they owed them, in part because the local authorities in Bandar `Abbas found excuses not to pay but ultimately because the English East India Company depended on the Safavids more than the Safavids depended on the English. On the other hand, when the Portuguese regained their naval strength in the second half of the seventeenth century, they managed to reverse the roles in their relationship with the Safavids, forcing the Iranians to cede to them the moiety of tolls in the port of Kong—and enforced compliance with a threat of violence.

The ability of religious "minorities" to operate in a Muslim-dominated environment similarly involved the payment of tribute. As was true of other Muslim states, the *jez'ya*, the poll tax extracted from non-Muslims, and more particularly the so-called People of the Book, Jews and Christians, was really nothing but a form of tribute, a token of deference to the hierarchy of the Islamic ruling order. But forced payments exceeding the *jez'ya* representing insurance against mistreatment were not unheard of either. In 1700, for instance, the Banyan, Hindu-Indian residents of Bandar `Abbas paid the local khan an annual sum of 100 tumans to have their temples protected.[27]

The notion of tribute, finally, was inherent in the highly ritualized custom of gift-giving, which more often than was in effect a form of

26 For this, see Rudolph P. Matthee, *The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver, 1600–1730* (Cambridge, 1999).

27 Frantz Caspar Schillinger, *Persianische und Ost-Indianische Reis* (Nuremberg, 1707), p. 277.

taxation. Gifts and donations came in multiple forms and were offered on many occasions. One common form was the exchange of presents on the diplomatic level. Diplomatic missions representing non-Muslim powers embodied the tributary idea since they were typically not reciprocated. Foreign embassies were expected to bring rich gifts with them and to present these during their first official audience, when they were carried around the royal square in Isfahan in a procession. Foreign envoys also routinely offered sums of money, usually in the form of gold ducats, to the shah and his grandees.[28] There was nothing spontaneous about such offerings. Examples of *pishkash* offered or taken after conquest suggest a levy rather than a "spontaneous" gift: after Shah Esma`il's conquest of Gilan the region's inhabitants hastened to offer *pishkash* to the shah, and *pishkash* and *savari* were taken from the people of Baku after the town was occupied by Shah Esma`il in 1501–02.[29] Other good examples of arranged offerings are the tributary annual "gift" of 300 to 400 bales of silk that Shah `Abbas I agreed to send to the Ottoman Sultan Ahmad I as part of the Ottoman-Safavid Peace of Sarab of 1612, the annual presents through which Isfahan prevented the tribes of Daghestan from conducting raids into Safavid territory, and the monetary allowances the Safavids sent to Georgian rulers to keep them from switching their loyalty to the Ottomans.[30]

28 Jean Chardin, *Voyages du chevalier Chardin, en Perse, et autres lieux de l'Orient*, ed. L. Langlès, 10 vols. and map (Paris, 1810–11), vol. 3, p. 493; François Valentijn, *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indiën*. 5 vols. Vol. 5, *Keurlyke beschryving van Choromandel, Pegu, Arrakan, Bengale, Mocha, van 't Nederlandsch comptoir in Persien en zaken overblyvzlen; een net beschryving van Malacca . . . Sumatra . . . Malabar . . . Japan . . . Kaap der goede hoope . . . Mauritius* (Dordrecht-Amsterdam, 1726), p. 276.

29 Amir Mahmud b. Kvandamir, *Iran dar ruzgar-e Shah Esma`il va Shah Tahmasb-e Safavi*, ed. Gholamreza Tabataba'i (Tehran, 1370/1991), pp. 109, 113.

30 Pietro Della Valle, *Viaggi di Pietro della Valle. Il pellegrino descritti da lui medesimo in lettere familiari all-erudito suo amico Mario Schipano divisi in tre parti cioè: la Turchia, la Persia e l'India*, 2 vols., ed. G. Gancia (Brighton, 1843), vol. 1, p. 651; Nicolaas Witsen, *Noord en oost Tartarye* (Amsterdam, 1705), p. 565; Jean Pitton de Tournefort, *Relation d'un voyage du Levant, fait par ordre du Roy*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1717), vol. 3, p. 173.

Officials of all ranks, both those stationed in the provinces and those attached to the royal court, were expected to offer a *pishkash* to the shah upon being appointed, and each time they were reappointed. No one who wished to remain in esteem (and office), moreover, was free from the obligation to offer a *nowruzi* to the shah on the occasion of the New Year, and an *`eydi* on (religious) holidays. Whenever a new high-ranking public official took up his post, a welcoming present, *salami,* was expected from his subordinates. The agents of the Dutch and English East Asia Companies were required annually to send their *nowruzi*, a sum of money in gold, in addition to cloth and spices, to the shah, but also to the various central and provincial officials with whom they had dealings. They paid *salami*, a "greeting" or "welcoming" gift, whenever a new grand vizier was appointed in Isfahan, or when a new governor or harbor master, *shahbandar*, arrived in Bandar `Abbas. In late Safavid times, the English and the Dutch annually paid 50 *tuman*s each to the *shahbandar* and the khan of Bandar `Abbas.[31] Messengers who announced the pending visit of the shah to a province counted on a gift, and when the shah actually traveled through a region, the local authorities were expected to offer him *pishkash*. When the shah honored an official with a personal visit, the latter was also supposed to give a present, usually in cash.[32] Auspicious events such as the shah's birthday, his recovery from an illness or the removal of a rebellious official were cause for gift-giving and accompanied by *tasaddoq*, the distribution of gifts to the poor.[33]

Reciprocity was built into the institution of gift-giving. According to the Italian traveler Pietro della Valle, it was customary for the recipient of a gift to offer one of greater value to the donor. Yet the same author elsewhere claims that inferiors tried to give little or nothing back, that people of similar ranks exchanged gifts on par, and that only superiors were expected to be more generous with their gifts than their underlings.[34]

31 British Library, London, India Office Records, E/3/60/7515, 24 March 1701.

32 Chardin, *Voyages*, vol. 9, p. 359; Francis Richard, *Raphaël du Mans, missionnaire en Perse au XVIIe s*., 2 vols. (Paris, 1995), vol. 1, p. 23.

33 Giovanni Gemelli-Careri, *Giro del mondo*, 6 vols. (Naples, 1699), vol. 2, pp. 123–124; NA, VOC 1152, fols. 248–249.

34 Valle, *Viaggi*, vol. 1, pp. 442, 651.

Subordinates presented gifts to their superiors to express their fealty or to propitiate them, acknowledging past favors and anticipating future ones. The gift-giving of superiors, by contrast, symbolized the munificence and magnanimity of the donor but was also designed to secure his subordinates' continued loyalty. The shah thus lavishly bestowed robes of honor, *khel`at*, on many occasions, to the envoy representing a foreign ruler, to a newly appointed official or after receiving the Nowruz *pishkash*.[35] The significance of the *khel`at* was highly symbolic, since by granting it the shah declared the recipient his subject and incorporated him into his realm. By accepting it the recipient acknowledged subordination, and refusing it was tantamount to rebelliousness.

Gift-giving was a form of regular (*moqarrari*) or occasional (*hokmi*) "taxation" and as such highly regulated and institutionalized.[36] Yet the amount and value were flexible, as is suggested in the Persian chronicles, where the term *pishkash* is often accompanied by the terms *layeq,* appropriate, *shayesta*, suitable, or *sazavar*, worthy. "Gifts" indeed were often open to negotiation, and instances are known of recipients complaining about their value or even rejecting presents offered to them as being unworthy. A combination of the presumed importance of the country, the weight of the issue to be negotiated, and the value of gifts previously received, determined the richness and value of the presents proffered at diplomatic exchanges. When the Iranian ambassador Mohammad Reza Beg in 1709 presented gifts to Louis XIV that were deemed below standard, some speculated that their meager value was in response to the even less worthy presents that a previous French envoy had brought for the shah.[37]

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35 V. S. Puturidze, ed., *Persidskie istoricheskie dokumenty v knigokhranilishchakh Gruzii*, kniga 1, vyp. 2 (Tbilisi, 1962), p. 28, *hokm*, decree, from 1082/1671. According to Chardin, *Voyages*, vol. 7, p. 375, the shah each year offered more than 8,000 *khel`ats* at a total cost of nearly 70,000 tumans—a huge sum indeed given an estimated 600,000 tumans in total state revenue.

36 A. K. S. Lambton, "Pishkash: Present or Tribute?" *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 57 (1994), pp. 145–158 (147–148).

37 Maurice Herbette, *Une ambassade persane sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 1907), pp. 182–183.

Strong State v. Weak State

Guided by a "presentist" perspective and perforce relying on sources originating from the center—in many cases the only ones that have survived—one would be tempted to regard Safavid Iran at its height as marked by a strong, coherent and articulate center in opposition to a weak, inexpressive periphery inhabited by people with a dim self-awareness and a poorly developed sense of identity. The state and the "capital," consisting of the shah and his entourage—wherever they happened to be—appear to have controlled the "country," if not in equal measure all the way to its formal borders, at least along a sliding scale, maintaining a grip that became less tight yet never fully dissolved with distance.

In reality, however, the Safavid state was both strong and weak. It was strong in the mobilizing power of its ideology—originally by way of charismatic leadership representing a messianic creed and forging a bond between faith and territory. The Safavids suffered military defeat and thus lost some of their charismatic aura soon after their establishment of a state, and Weberian "routinization" set in after the death of the founder of the state, Shah Esma`il, in 1524. Yet the original mystique that surrounded the shah persisted until the last days of the dynasty, and even resonated long after its demise to the point where the immediate successors of the Safavids all invoked their name to legitimize themselves.[38] Meanwhile, irrespective of political capacity and economic vitality, Iran commanded respect among its neighbors because of its cultural cachet as the fount of Persianate culture articulated in the Persian language and suffused with Persian cultural symbols and motives.

Over time, the state also became more centrally organized, in a process that culminated during the reign of Shah `Abbas II (1642–66). Yet not even under the most celebrated of all Safavid rulers, Shah `Abbas I, was the state ever able to overcome the political, social, and economic fragmentation of society. Its leaders naturally pursued maximal administrative and fiscal control. Shah `Abbas I's policies, most notably his

38 For this, see John Perry, "The Last Safavids," *Iran: Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies* 9 (1971), pp. 59–71.

efforts to replace tribal power with a new military and bureaucratic elite and his choice of Isfahan as the realm's administrative and economic center, represented a major step on the road from a tribal nomadic to an urban sedentary order. Despite all efforts, however, the Turcoman Qezelbash warrior, the mainstay of the Safavid army, never became fully subordinated to the Tajik (ethnically Persian) urban scribe, the pillar of bureaucratic management and order. The ancient "Turco-Mongol" tribal tradition, decentralized, exploitative, redistributive, and built on corporate legitimacy, continued to challenge its urban-based, agrarian Tajik or "Iranian" counterpart, with its tendency toward accumulating revenue and concentrating power in the hands of a single supreme ruler.[39] This means that the connection between tribal power and military power, which the Safavids inherited from previous regimes, was never fully severed.[40] Unlike the Ottomans and Mughals who, with far greater resources at their disposal, in time broke the military monopoly of the refractory tribes that had brought them to power, Iranian dynasties never achieved the same autonomy despite periodic attempts at introducing sources of non-tribal military power.[41]

All this means that, even at the height of their power, Iran's rulers were unable to exercise their (theoretically unrestricted) monopoly of violence. Ruling over an heterogeneous territory to which access was often difficult, they were forced to accommodate difference and deviance, and often had no choice but to leave policing to local forces. Severely

39 For the contrast between these two notions and the Central Asian antecedents of the former (in the case of the Ottoman state), see Isenbike Togan, "Ottoman History by Inner Asian Norms," in Halil Bektay and Suraiya Faroqhi, eds., *New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History* (London, 1992), pp. 109–184.

40 For this, see Michael Axworthy, *A History of Iran: Empire of the Mind* (London and New York, 2008), p. 161.

41 For this argument, see Bert G. Fragner, "Historische Wurzeln neuzeitlicher iranischer Identität. Zur Geschichte des politischen Begriffs 'Iran' im späten Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit," in Maria Macuch et al., eds., *Studia Semitica Necnou Iranica Rudolpho Macuch Septuagenario ab amicis et discipulis dedicata* (Wiesbaden, 1989), pp. 79–100.

limited infrastructural capabilities and fragile institutions gave the state weak effective control over all but the capital, the main provincial cities, and the arteries that connected them.

Well into the twentieth century concentrated power in Iran faced other formidable obstacles. A harsh natural environment, causing communication to be slow and difficult, was the first and most consequential of these. Iran's heartland, a saucer-shaped plateau, is made up of vast stretches of semi-desert and piedmont terrain flanked by formidable mountain ranges. Urban centers, irrigated agriculture, and the traffic of people and goods have always clustered on its rims. Regular caravan trade linked the main towns, but the vast stretches of the country in between remained unaffected by such communication. This resulted in scattered villages, economic isolation, and affinities and loyalties that were intensely local and regional, giving Iranian villages and towns a large measure of self-sufficiency and political autonomy, with officials chosen by the local population regulating most of their own affairs.[42]

Economic realities arising from geopolitical conditions were a major cause of weak "infrastructural" state control. As a productive and consumer market, Safavid Iran was of modest size. Overwhelmingly arid, the country was poorly endowed with arable land and low in population density. According to the most plausible estimate, its population in the early to mid-seventeenth century did not exceed eight million.[43] About a third of those, moreover, were pastoralists, people who, living at the near-subsistence level, made only a modest contribution to the country's economy.

Agriculture, heavily dependent on irrigation in most parts of the country, required intensive initial investment as well as high maintenance expenditure. Some of the empire's richest agricultural regions defied central control. Fertile plains around major cities such as Tabriz, Qazvin, Isfahan, and Kerman ordinarily produced enough to feed the urban areas and their surroundings. But some of the most productive areas, among

42 A. K. S. Lambton, "Islamic Society in Persia," in Eadem, *Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government* (London, 1980), pp. 3–32.

43 Willem Floor, *The Economy of Safavid Persia* (Wiesbaden, 2000), p. 2.

them Shirvan, Azerbaijan and the Caspian provinces, were situated on the periphery of the country and thus dangerously exposed to unrest and outside attack. The entire northwest faced Ottoman and, ultimately, Russian aggression. The inaccessible interior of heavily forested, rain-soaked Gilan and Mazandaran had repelled land-based invaders since the seventh-century Arab conquest, but the Caspian littoral, the center of Iran's sericulture, was open to seaborne Cossack raids.

Iran's low production of goods for which foreign demand existed combined with its scarce precious metal deposits gave it a perennial trade deficit, especially with the Indian subcontinent, from which it received many consumer goods and to which it exported substantial sums of bullion in return. Safavid authorities naturally did all they could to regulate precious metal exports through bans and taxation, but a policing system riddled with corruption doomed most of these efforts. The problems Shah `Abbas I faced in enforcing his silk export monopoly epitomizes the limitations of the state's ability to harness economic resources.[44]

Forms of Alliance Building

These circumstances made it impossible for the Safavids to rely on military power alone or even mostly. To be sure, for all of the sixteenth and part of the seventeenth century, the shah was first and foremost a warrior-in-chief, the head of a band of fighters. Violence, or the threat of violence, was what made his opponents retreat or submit, and it was always the means of last resort for the state. Yet it never could be the only or even the principal form of control. The Safavids used what today we call "soft" power much more widely and, arguably, more effectively to keep their underlings and provinces in check. This came in different forms, ranging from the appointment of shadow officials to alliance building by way of marriage and various tributary arrangements. The ultimate purpose of all of this was, in Burbank and Cooper's terminology, "loyalty, not likeness."[45] As such, the premodern state did

44 For this, see Matthee, *The Politics of Trade*, pp. 99–105.
45 Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, p. 12.

not inspire any loyalty.[46] Yet managing a state was predicated on at least some form of (temporary) loyalty. To achieve this was to engage in perpetual negotiation and bargaining.[47]

Tributary relations were most conspicuously visible in relations between the center and the frontier provinces, the so-called *velayat*s. *Velayat*s were located in border regions beyond the mountain ranges that framed the central plateau. These mostly mountainous areas, located on the edge of Safavid jurisdiction and mostly inhabited by fiercely independent tribally organized people, might, in the relationship with the Safavids, be best described as protectorates, a "convenient state between annexation and mere alliance."[48] The five *velayat*s in late Safavid times were `Arabistan (modern Khuzistan), Luristan, Georgia, Kurdistan, and Bakhtiyari territory, in that order of rank and status.[49] *Vali*s were all but independent governors. Hailing from leading local families, they usually ruled in hereditary fashion even if it was the shah who officially appointed them. In a concession to regional autonomy, the latter almost always chose a candidate from the region. Appointing someone from outside the resident tribe might create more problems than it solved, as is shown by the example of Kurdistan, where in the 1680s a non-Kurdish governor dispatched by Shah Soleyman was run out of town by the local population.[50] Good behavior by chieftains was enforced by means of keeping a family member, typically a son, in Isfahan as a hostage.

46 Patricia Crone, *Pre-Industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-Modern World* (Oxford, 2nd ed., 2003), p. 38ff.

47 As was true for the Ottoman Empire and the Mughal state; see Barkey, *Empire of Difference*, passim; and Hasan, *State and Locality*, passim, respectively.

48 W. G. Runciman, "Empire as a Topic in Comparative Sociology," in Bang and Bayly, *Tributary Empires*, p. 99, quoting Lord Halsbury. For the distribution and organization of velayats, see Willem Floor, *Safavid Government Institutions* (Costa Mesa, 2001), pp. 81–90.

49 Mohammad Rafi` al-Din Ansari, *Dastur al-Moluk: A Safavid State Manual*, trans. and ed. Willem Floor and Mohammad H. Faghfoory (Costa Mesa, 2007), pp. 11–15.

50 Ayatollah Sheykh Mohammad Mardukh Kordestani, *Tarikh-e Mardukh* (Tehran, 3rd ed., 1359/1980), p. 111.

*Vali*s formally expressed allegiance to Isfahan and had coins struck in the shah's name. Unlike regular governors, however, *vali*s oversaw their regions' administrative apparatus, controlled their own budgets, maintained their own militia, and managed their own vassal relations, in all of which the shah rarely intervened.[51]

One way in which *velayat*s showed their subordinate status was by sending annual donations to the capital and the royal court, typically on the occasion of *Nowruz*. *Vali*s were obligated to send the royal court *enfaz*, specific amounts of goods, the first fruits of the region, or the specialty of the area.[52] The rulers of Kartli and Kakheti in Georgia sent hawks, wine and slaves to the Safavid court.[53] The Bakhtiyari tribe sent mares and mules, in addition to falcons and saltpeter, rice and lemons, while the ruler of `Arabistan was held to send stallions and mares of Arab blood to Isfahan as a New Year's gift, a *nowruzi*.[54] The tributary strategy the Safavids employed vis-à-vis *velayat*s varied with circumstances. Ordinarily, the exactions were light. Georgia in the early days of Safavid rule, having just been subjugated by Shah Tahmasb, is said to have paid 2,000 ducats in annual tribute to the shah.[55] The region also sent (female) slaves. Shirvan, located in the southern Caucasus as well, in early Safavid times offered silver, silk, camels, mules, horses and young slaves as tribute to the court of Shah Esma`il.[56] Luristan in late Safavid times annually supplied only twenty Arabian horses in addition to 200

51 T. S. Kuteliia, *Gruziia i sefevidskii Iran (po dannym numizmatiki)* (Tbilisi, 1979), p. 30.

52 Minorsky, ed. and trans., *Tadkirat al-Mulūk*, p. 156; Ansari, *Dastur al-Moluk*, vol. 2, p. 74; Chardin, *Voyages*, vol. 5, pp. 380, 394; John A. Fryer, *A New Account of East India and Persia, Being 9 Years' Travels, 1672–1681*, ed. W. Crooke, 3 vols. (London, 1909–15), vol. 3, p. 23.

53 Ansari, *Dastur al-Moluk*, vol. 2, p. 73; Pitton de Tournefort, *Relation d'un voyage du Levant*, vol. 3, p. 167.

54 Ansari, *Dastur al-Moluk*, vol. 2, pp. 71, 74.

55 Michele Membré, *Mission to the Lord Sophy of Persia (1539–1542)*, trans. and introd. A. H. Morton (London, 1993), p. 17.

56 Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins* (Istanbul, 1987), pp. 322–323.

mules and a quantity of valuables. In time of war, however, the Lurs were held to provide up to 12,000 cavalrymen and the same number of foot soldiers.[57]

Naturally, the most autonomous tribes lived on the margins of Safavid jurisdiction, on the edge of the *velayat*s, in the Ottoman, Mughal, and Uzbek borderlands, on the frontiers of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the barren deserts of Sistan and Makran, all of which were exposed to tribal incursions. The fertile Georgian lowlands invited attack by Lezghi mountaineers; Uzbeks and Turkmen often raided deep into the interior of Khorasan, and Baluchi and Afghan tribesmen constantly threatened the vast eastern regions as far as Kerman and Yazd. At times these depredations inflicted heavy damage on local and regional economies. In an effort to neutralize them and even make them safeguard the frontier zones, the Safavids made various arrangements with the tribal peoples living on their frontiers. All of these involved monetary payments. Most often, money changed hands in the form of straightforward tribute. Before the Caspian provinces were subjugated by Shah `Abbas I, for instance, their ruler paid an annual sum of 7,000 tumans in tribute to the Safavids.[58] A tribe formally subordinated to Isfahan would continue to pay an annual sum as a token of submission, and Isfahan often held an important relative of the chief, typically a son, hostage as a guarantee for good behavior.

But in cases where the central government lacked military deterrence or needed their services to gather intelligence or facilitate the passing of troops, the Safavids were forced to accommodate the forces on their fringe and might *pay* tribal chiefs for peace and cooperation.[59]

57 Mirza Mohammad Hoseyn Mostowfi, "Amar-e mali va nezami-ye Iran dar 1128," *Farhang-e Iran Zamin* 20 (1353/1975), p. 406.

58 Yukako Goto, *Die südkaspischen Provinzen des Iran* (Berlin, 2011), p. 131.

59 For a good overview of these arrangements, see Rhoads Murphey, "The Ottoman-Safavid Border Conflict, 1603–1638." *Orientwissenschaftliche Hefte* 12 (2003), pp. 151–170; and Idem, "The Resumption of Ottoman-Safavid Border Conflict, 1603–1638: Effects of Border Destabilization on the Evolution of State-Tribe Relations," in Stefan Leder and Bernard Streck, eds., *Shifts and Drifts on Nomad-Sedentary Relations* (Wiesbaden, 2005), pp. 307–332. Also see Rudi Matthee, "Between Arabs, Turks and Iranians: The Town of Basra, 1600–1700," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 69 (2006), pp. 53–78.

Following a great deal of unrest in `Arabistan, culminating in a conflict between Sayyid Mubarak and his son Amir Badr al-Din, who had been appointed governor of Dezful, Shah `Abbas in 1594–95 sent an army headed by his grand vizier, Hatem Beg Ordubadi, and the governor of Fars, Farhad Khan, to the province. Sayyid Mubarak was thus forced formally to submit to Safavid authority, but the Iranians, fearing Ottoman interference if they treated him too harshly, allowed him to hold on to his previous conquests, including the Jazira region.[60]

Mubarak Khan of Huwayza never dispatched any of the proceeds of the income generated by `Arabistan to Isfahan. He merely sent a small number of horses to the capital each year as a formal gift (*pishkash*), and in return received lavish presents and precious robes of honor from the shah.[61] He did keep the peace in return. Such collaboration was never assured, though. The Kurds and Arabs in the borderlands between Iran and the Ottoman Empire, especially, could always defect to the other side, and often did. As long as Shah Esma`il was alive, the Kurdish leader Teymur Khan was content to be his protégé. Upon the shah's death, fearing instability in Iran, the khan threw in his lot with the Ottomans—in exchange for an annual stipend of 100,000 *akçe*s.[62] An envoy from the Arab Musha`sha` expressed it best in his admonishing remarks to Shah Esma`il I: "Each year we send taxes and tolls to the shah's court. Do not make claims on our territory, for if you apply force, we will flee and

60 Eskandar Beg Torkaman, *Tarikh-e `Alam-ara-ye `Abbasi*, 2 vols. paginated as one, ed. Iraj Afshar (Tehran, 2nd ed., 1350/1971), pp. 675–677; Mahmud b. Hedayat Allah Afushta'i Natanzi, *Nuqavat al-asar fi zekr al-akhyar*, ed. Ehsan Eshraqi (Tehran, 2nd ed., 1373/1994), p. 546ff.; Mirza Mohammad Taher Vahid Qazvini, *Tarikh-e jahan-ara-ye `Abbasi*, ed. Sayyed Sa`id Mohammad Sadeq (Tehran, 1383/2004), p. 130.

61 Mohammad `Ali Ranjbar, *Tarikh-e Mosha`shashi`yan. Mahiyat-e fekri, ejtema`i va farayand-e tahavollat-e tarikhi* (Tehran, 1382/2003), p. 58. According to this source, the number of horses was fifteen; according to a different source, it was nine. See Ibid., p. 323.

62 See Mirza Shokr Allah Sanandaji, *Tohfa-ye Naseri dar tarikh va jografi-ye Kordestan*, ed. Heshmat Allah Tabibi (Tehran, 1366/1987), pp. 99–100. This equaled some 30,000 tumans.

retreat. You will not stay in these borderlands forever. When you put the region under someone else's control, we will return once you are gone to overthrow your appointee. If, on the other hand, you treat us with kindness and justice, we will remain your tributaries."[63]

In these circumstances, loyalty was thus often literally bought in an ad-hoc manner, either with cash or by way of lucrative concessions.[64] When Emam Qoli Khan, the governor of Fars, marched against Basra in 1628, he got the Arab tribes en route to render him a variety of services by handing out "cash grants, robes of honor, and other gifts in profusion."[65] The Afghan warlord Mir Weys in the early eighteenth century served as *qafila-salar*, supervisor of the caravan trade between Iran and India.[66] The Safavids also made more institutionalized arrangements with various tribal peoples.[67] Shah `Abbas II coopted the Lezghis through a mutually beneficial tributary arrangement: They sent gifts to Isfahan as a token of fealty, and in turn received 1,700 tumans per annum from the shah to ensure stability and the protection of the border against other marauders. This arrangement included the resettling of large numbers of tribesmen from the mountains of Darband and Qobba.[68] The same ruler

63 Anon., *Tarikh-e`Alam-ara-ye Safavi*, ed. Yad Allah Shokri (Tehran, 1363/1984). Written in the 1670s as a popular history of the Safavids, this is not a primary source for the events.

64 N. Sanson, *Estat présent du royaume de Perse* (Paris, 1694), p. 176.

65 Eskandar Beg Monshi, *History of Shah `Abbas the Great*, trans. and ed. Roger Savory, 3 vols., paginated as one (Boulder, CO, 1978), p. 1299.

66 Mollah Mohammad Mo'men Kermani, *Sahifat al-ershad (Tarikh-e Afshar-e Kerman—payan-e kar-e Safaviya)*, ed. Mohammad Ebrahim Bastani-Parizi (Tehran, 1384/2005), p. 361.

67 Chardin, *Voyages*, vol. 9, pp. 205–206.

68 "Mémoire de la province de Sirvan," in Père Fleuriau d'Armenonville, ed., *Letters édifiantes et curieuses écrites des missions étrangères* (Toulouse, new ed., 1810), vol. 4, p. 28; Judasz Thadeusz Krusinski, *The History of the Revolutions of Persia*, 2 vols. (London, 1733), vol. 1, p. 243; Ahmad Dourry Efendy, *Relation de Dourry Efendy, ambassadeur de la Porte Othomane auprès du roi de Perse*, trans. M. de Fiennes, ed. L. Langlès (Paris, 1810), p. 33; Mostowfi, "Amar-e mali va nezami-ye Iran dar 1128," p. 405; and Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800* (Bloomington,

paid the Kharazmian ruler Abu'l Ghazi Khan an annual allowance of 1,500 tumans during a decade of gilded captivity in Isfahan, and kept disbursing this sum even after Abu'l Ghazi Khan had escaped and regained power in Central Asia, simply to keep him from turning against Iran.[69] After the shah had conducted several campaigns against the Uzbeks, he struck a deal whereby they received an annual stipend in exchange for a promise to desist from raiding—a promise they promptly broke following the shah's death in 1666.[70]

Disengagement and Retreat

The health and longevity of the tributary order in traditional empires—which was based on revenue extraction rather than commercial development—presupposes a balance between the level of state exactions and the ability of the tributary subjects to deliver. It also presupposes alertness on the part of the state by way of a realistic assessment of evolving power relationships, a modicum of sensitivity to local, cultural and religious customs and habits of formally subordinate peoples and, ultimately, flexibility and pragmatism.

The Safavids may be said to have preempted continuation along these lines by choosing premature disengagement. The crucial date here is 1639, the year when, following a confrontation over Iraq that ended with the Ottoman seizure of Baghdad, they concluded the Peace of (Pol-e) Zohab, ending almost a century and a half of warfare with their archenemies. As such this bid for peace was a rational decision, based on sound military considerations—the clear-eyed realization that the Ottomans would always be stronger militarily and a calculation that the advantage of making peace with their long-standing enemies at the

2002), pp. 68–69. The payment of an annuity to subordinates was common practice for the Russians as well; see ibid., pp. 55, 63.

69 Chardin, *Voyages*, vol. 10, pp. 58, 64.

70 Krusinski, *The History of the Revolutions of Persia*, vol. 1, p. 243; Evliya Efendi, *Narrative of Travels in Europe, Asia and Africa in the Seventeenth Century*, trans. Joseph von Hammer, 2 vols. (London, 1834; repr. 1968), vol. 1, p. 33; Chardin, *Voyages*, vol. 10, pp. 58, 64ff.

cost of far-reaching territorial concessions outweighed the expense of continued aggression. Yet it was emblematic of a wider disposition at the Safavid elite at this point—a choice to forego war as a natural state of being for comfort and tranquility—a move that was in part induced by monetary concerns, in part by pacific sentiments harbored by the women and eunuchs who increasingly came to dominate the court.[71]

The result was that, from 1639 onward the Iranians enjoyed relative peace, even outward prosperity, a happy state that at least one Safavid chronicler ascribes to the Accord of Zohab and that caused many a foreign observer to exult in the apparent stability of Iran in mid-century.[72] The political elite henceforth counted on strategic territorial depth as a defense mechanism. Urban Iranians felt safe behind the mountains and deserts that surrounded the central plateau on three sides, viewing the same sparsely populated desert expanses that made life difficult for their own soldiers as a shield protecting the heartland against enemy attack.[73]

This attitude was related to several other developments. One was that the last few Safavid rulers ceased to be roving warriors leading their troops into war and patrolling their realm. Instead, Shah Soleyman (r. 1666–94) and Shah Soltan Hoseyn (r. 1694–1722) became sedentary, insular rulers, ensconced in their palaces, only accessible to the most intimate of courtiers and the increasingly powerful members of the high clergy. In sum, they lost touch with conditions in their realm and gave up their "punishing" power, inviting provincial officials to fleece the population with impunity, and allowing hardline clerics a free hand

71 For this, see Matthee, *Persia in Crisis*, chaps. 7 and 8.

72 Mohammad Vala Qazvini Esfahani, *Khold-e barin (Iran dar ruzgar-e Safaviyan)* (Tehran, 1372/1993), pp. 531, 585. Nicolao Manucci, *Storia do Mogor or Mugul India 1653–1708*, trans. William Irvine, 4 vols. (London 1907), vol. 1, p. 40. Manucci called Iran in the 1640s "very well governed, having no rebellions or treasons, neither robbers nor highwaymen on the roads . . . "

73 Gabriel de Chinon, *Relations nouvelles du Levant, ou traités de la religion, du gouvernement et des coûtumes des Perses, des Arméniens, et des Gaures* (Lyon, 1671), p. 69; Jean-Baptiste de la Maze, Isfahan, to Baron, Aleppo, Nov. 7, 1667, in Archives des Affaires des Missions Etrangères, Paris, vol. 350, fols. 259–262; and Sanson, *Estat*, p. 162.

in increasing pressure on Iran's non-Shi`i inhabitants. Another was a woeful financial and organizational neglect of the military, which lost its capacity and readiness to fight.

The consequences for the tributary order were catastrophic, especially in the tribal frontier lands, bordering on the Sunni Ottoman, Uzbek, and Mughal states. These were mostly populated by Sunnis, estimated to number one-third of the population, who refused to bow to Safavid pressure to convert and whose loyalty could not be taken for granted.[74]

A few examples should suffice to illustrate this point. The first comes from the northern frontier, Daghestan, where, as noted, the Safavid maintained a precarious tributary relationship with the troublesome Lezghis—whom they paid to patrol the borderlands. In the 1710s, the latter took advantage of the growing weakness of the central state by staging a revolt. In 1719 Georgian troops were enlisted to confront the Lezghi threat to the region. Their commander was Khosrow Khan's half-brother Vakhtang VI, the *vali* of Georgia's central district of Kartli, who, after a long period of resisting, in 1716 had finally agreed to convert to Islam. Appointed commander-in-chief, *sepahsalar*, he was sent back to Georgia with the task of taking on the Lezghis, who appear to have been moved to a new uprising against the Safavids following the blinding of Fath `Ali Khan Daghestani, the grand vizier of Lezghi origin who owed his falling part to a slander campaign about his Sunni proclivities.[75] Moving to Daghestan and assisted by the *beglerbeg*, governor, of Shirvan and the king of Kakhet'i, Georgia's eastern half, he managed to inflict heavy losses on the Daghestani rebels. Yet at the height of the campaign, in the winter of 1721, the shah recalled him. The order was issued at the instigation of a eunuch faction at the court whose members apparently had persuaded the shah that a victory for Vakhtang over the Lezghis would

74 The Ottoman ambassador Dürri Ahmad Efendi in 1720 estimated that no less than one-third of Iran's population consisted of Sunnis. See Dourry Efendy, *Relation*, p. 54.

75 For this, see Rudi Matthee, "Blinded by Power: The Rise and Fall of Fatḥ 'Alī Khān Dāghestānī, Grand Vizier under Shāh Solṭān Ḥoseyn Ṣafavī (1127/1715–1133/1720)," *Studia Iranica* 33 (2004), pp. 179–219.

harm the country since it would enable the vali to form an alliance with the Russians with the aim of conquering Iran.[76]

In 1721, as Kurds staged raids into Iran from the Erzurum area and roamed close to Isfahan, the chaos in the north peaked with the Lezghi occupation of Shamakhi.[77] Suggesting how inflamed ethno-religious sentiments had become at this point, between 4,000 and 5,000 of the town's Shi`ite inhabitants were put to the sword.[78] Especially suggestive are the words of Dürri Ahmad Efendi, the Ottoman envoy who traveled to Iran in early 1721, to the effect that the Lezghi aggression could have been avoided. He relates how in a private conversation, grand vizier Mohammad Qoli Khan had implied that the Lezghis—as well as the Afghans—might have been bought off. Their raiding activities, Mohammad Qoli Khan claimed, were really meant to force the shah to acknowledge their vassal status with a robe of honor and the payment of their agreed-upon annuity. Only the ruler's obstinate refusal to do so had stood in the way of a solution.[79]

The second example is the case of the Kurds living in the western borderlands with the Ottoman Empire. The Baba Soleyman rebellion that wreaked havoc in the Mosul area and as far as Shahrezur was in

76 Tardy, "Georgische Teilnahme an den persisch-Afghanischen Kriegen 111–1725 im Spiegel eines Missionsberichtes," *Bedi Kartlisa*/*Revue de Kartvélogie* 40 (1982), pp. 325–326. It seems that Hoseyn Qoli Khan resented the Iranians on account of his forcible conversion. We also know that he secretly expressed pro-Russian feelings to Volynskii. See D. M. Lang, "Georgia and the Fall of the Safavi Dynasty," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 14 (1952), pp. 534, 536; idem, *The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy 1658–1832* (New York, 1957), pp. 109–110; Laurence Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia* (Cambridge, 1958), p. 118.

77 Dourry Efendy, *Relation*, p. 69.

78 P. P. Bushev, *Posol'stvo Artemiia Volynskogo v Iran v 1715–1718 gg.* (Moscow, 1976), pp. 215–216, 219–220; Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Perse 5, Padery, Shamakhi, to Paris, 5 Jan. 1720, fols. 258–260; V. P. Lystsov, *Persidskii pokhod Petra I 1722–1723* (Moscow, 1951), p. 103; Père Bachoud, "Lettre de Chamakié," in Fleuriau, ed., *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses*, vol. 4, pp. 98–99.

79 Dourry Efendy, *Relation*, pp. 41–42.

part incited by anti-Sunni sentiments and policies coming out of Isfahan. Jean Otter who, traveling between Baghdad and Isfahan in 1738, visited Hamadan, insisted that the town had been pillaged and destroyed by the Sunni Dergezin tribe as revenge for the (religious) persecution its members had suffered under the late Safavids, prompting them to seek refuge with the Ottoman sultan.[80]

The third, even more telling example, comes from the east, the vast arid region between the city of Kerman and Qandahar inhabited by mostly unpacified Baluchi and Afghan tribesmen. These, too, became restive in the last years of the seventeenth century, driven to despair by prolonged drought and famine and frustrated that the central government no longer honored long-standing arrangements involving monetary compensation for peaceful behavior. In the 1690s, Isfahan appointed Gorgin Khan, an erstwhile Georgian prince, governor of Kerman and a huge area stretching east all the way to Kabul, tasking him to take on the Baluchis, whose raids now ravaged the country as far as Yazd.[81] Gorgin Khan soon thereafter faced off against Mir Samandar, a Baluchi chieftain whose incursions threatened Qandahar. Appointed *beglerbeg* of Qandahar in 1704 and aided by the Afshar, who had reemerged as a formidable force in Kerman, Gorgin Khan routed the numerically stronger Baluchis in several confrontations, forcing Mir Samandar to submit to him.[82]

Gorgin Khan would meet his match in Mir Weys b. Shah `Alam, a chief of the Hotaki clan of the Afghan Ghelza'i tribe who held the post of *kalantar*, mayor, of Qandahar. Mir Weys, who had long served the Safavids by patrolling the caravan traffic between Iran and India, at first cooperated with the Georgians, but soon became alienated from Isfahan.

80 Jean Otter, *Voyage en Perse* (Paris, 1748), vol. 1, pp. 180–181.

81 Mohammad Ebrahim b. Zeyn al-`Abedin Naseri, *Dastur-e shahriyaran*, ed. Mohammad Nader Naseri Moqaddam (Tehran, 1373/1994), p. 277; M.-F. Brosset, trans. and ed., *Histoire de la Géorgie depuis l'antiquité jusqu'au XIXe siècle*, 2 vols. (St Petersburg, 1856–57), vol. 2, part 2, p. 16; Krusinski, *History of the Revolutions*, vol. 1, pp. 150–151; Tardy, "Georgische Teilnahme," p. 321.

82 Kermani, *Sahifat al-ershad*, pp. 14, 298–301, 337, 346–347; Brosset, *Histoire de la Géorgie*, vol. 2, part 2, pp. 16–20; Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty*, pp. 46–47, 84–85.

He must have been greatly disturbed when in 1706 his lucrative post was taken away from him, to be offered to a rival, `Alam Shah Afghan.[83] Gorgin Khan's oppressive rule in Qandahar meanwhile quickly strained relations with the Afghans. The Georgians sequestered goods, commandeered Afghan girls and women, and raised taxes. Gorgin Khan even demanded Mir Weys's own daughter and partied on the anniversary of the murder of the Caliph `Umar (by a Persian slave).[84] His (nominally Shi`ite) Georgian soldiers also misbehaved toward the local population, violating a guarantee of religious freedom that the Sunni Afghans had obtained as a condition for submitting to the Safavids.[85] They reportedly desecrated Sunni mosques by bringing pigs and drinking wine inside, and are said to have abused underage girls and nine- to ten-year-old boys to the point of killing them, after which they dumped their bodies at their parents' homes. The resentful Afghans sent complaints to Isfahan but these were intercepted by Gorgin Khan's men at court and thus never reached the shah. Eventually, the outrages prompted Mir Ways to rebel against his Georgian masters. But before he could engage in a full-scale rebellion, Gorgin Khan, suspicious of Mir Weys's ambitions, had him arrested and escorted to Isfahan, urging Shah Soltan Hoseyn to get rid of him, or at least never to allow him to return to Qandahar.[86]

The scene of the final example is the siege of Isfahan in 1722, which preceded the fall of the Safavids in October of that same year. It suggests that the Afghans who brought down the city and with that, the state, might have been willing to remain in their region of origin, Qandahar province, a thousand miles from Isfahan, if the Safavid shah had agreed to make meaningful concessions to them. Shortly after he had laid siege to the

83 Kermani, *Sahifat al-ershad*, pp. 351–354, 363–369.

84 Ibid., 368–369. The date given in this text, Rabi` al-thani 1121/17 June 1709 must be incorrect, both because it does not correspond to the anniversary of `Omar's assassination and because Gorgin Khan was killed in April 1709.

85 Krusinski, *History of the Revolutions*, vol. 1, p. 162.

86 Ibid., p. 154; Mohammad Mirza Tehrani, *Mer'at-e varedat. Tarikh-e soqut-e Safaviyan*, ed. Mansur Sefatgol (Tehran, 1373/2004), pp. 108–109; Brosset, ed., *Histoire de la Géorgie*, vol. 2, part 2, p. 26; Lockhart, *Fall of the Safavi Dynasty*, p. 85.

Iranian capital, Mahmud the leader of the Ghelza'i Afghans, reached out to Shah Soltan Hoseyn, proposing to withdraw with his troops in return for being granted control over Khorasan and Kerman. Eventually the shah agreed to the proposal, but by that time the Afghans felt confident enough about their coming victory to reject the offer.[87]

Conclusion

Upon close inspection, the Safavid state appears less as a Leviathan than as a forum for never-ending negotiation. Safavid shahs wielded tremendous power, to be sure, including the power over their subjects' life and death. Their rise and initial expansion involved violent conquest, and their ultimate weapon remained ruthless retribution. Yet their infrastructural reach was rather circumscribed. Governing a land of scarce resources populated by mostly tribal folks led by seditious chieftains, even the strongest ruler needed to forge and maintain alliances. What really held an "empire" such as Safavid Iran together beyond the appropriate and timely use of overwhelming force was the ability of its governing elite to negotiate arrangements of mutual benefit with various constituencies—ensuring collaboration through cooptation by way of intra-elite marriage and tributary agreements. Tribute was intrinsic to intra-elite interaction, beginning with the relationship between the shah and his courtiers; it was embedded in foreign diplomacy and official trade relations with the outside world; and it was especially crucial to the balance of power between central authority and the provinces and in particular the tribal periphery of the empire.

Such relations had always been at the heart of the Safavid polity—as they had been at the heart of all polities holding sway over the Iranian plateau since time immemorial. Iran, in the words of Dick Davis, has always been a society "that has an extremely porous rather than simply oppositional relationship with surrounding cultures, incorporating

87 Petros di Sarkis Gilanentz, *The Chronicle of Petros di Sarkis Gilanentz concerning the Afghan Invasion of Persia in 1722*, trans. and ed. Caro Owen Minasian (Lisbon, 1959), pp. 13–18.

as much as it excludes; and that is vitalized by the edge, even by the demonic and nonhuman edge, never mind by the non-Iranian edge, as much as by the imperial center."[88] This lack of unitary identity or, rather, this unity in diversity—which persists today—made a healthy relationship with the fringe imperative and potentially a productive one.

At bottom, power relations in Safavid Iran were fueled by *zar-o zur*, gold and force, monetary inducement coupled with coercion including (the threat of) violence. This is not to deny or underplay a regular fiscal system or the market-driven nature of economic exchange, and various other "rational," intentional and forward-looking aspects of Safavid state policy. The economic capacity of Safavid Iran included a flourishing private market, albeit not a national market, as well as periodic state efforts to solicit and stimulate trade; witness Shah `Abbas's resettlement of a large contingent of Armenians to his newly founded capital, and his subsequent granting of a silk-export monopoly to these, as exceptional and even unique manifestations of such dynamism. Nor is it to overlook the sophistication of the Safavid bureaucracy, about which we know less than we would like for a lack of surviving documentation but which is exemplified in the various administrative manuals that have come to us from the early eighteenth century, drafted to instruct the new masters of the realm, the Afghans, in the intricacies of Iranian statecraft.

A complex phenomenon, the dramatic and sudden demise of the Safavids is attributable to many factors. Surely one is the weakening of tributary arrangements, either by way of neglect, impotence, or a growing intolerance of diversity. In Safavid Iran, finally, the tributary periphery did not become self-sustaining, as it did in parts of the Ottoman Empire and Mughal India in the face of a weakening central state; it dissolved into chaos, dragging the core with it into the maelstrom.

88 Dick Davis, "Iran and Aniran: The Shaping of a Legend," in Abbas Amanat and Farzin Vejdani, eds., *Iran Facing Others: Identity Boundaries in a Historical Perspective* (New York, 2012), pp. 44–45.

Chapter 3

Indian Aristocrats, British Imperialists and "Conservative Modernization" after the Great Rebellion

Maria Misra

On the 22nd of September 1892, the tiny princely of state of Ramnad, in Tamil Nadu, began the customary *Mahanavratni* [nine nights] festival. The core of this nine-day ritual dated back to the sixteenth century and was, in essence, both a symbolic celebration and renewal of Hindu kingship. During the festival the king (known as Setupati), H. H. Raja Bhaskarasamy Avargal, ritually re-enacted his conquest of the state by shooting a ceremonial arrow, demonstrated his virtue as a "dharmic" [Hindu moral] ruler by feeding thousands of Brahmins, and demonstrated his potency as pivot of the universe by symbolically slaughtering the demon goddess.[1] All the while "many Vedic [Hindu] scholars, dancers and musicians, artists, artisans and other deserving persons were liberally presented with shawls, Benaras cloth, jewels, money gifts and so forth."[2]

1 "Celebration of the Navaratri at Ramnad in 1892," *The Miniature Hindi Excelsior Series,* vol. 4, Adyar Philosophical Society, Madras, originally serialized in the *Madras Times* throughout October 1892 and cited by Carol. A. Breckenridge, "From Protector to Litigant: Changing Relations between Hindu Temples and the Raja of Ramnad," *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 14 (1977), pp. 75–106.

2 "Celebration of the Navaratri" in Breckenridge, "From Protector to Litigant," p. 79.

As usual the principal venue was the main hall of the old palace—the Ramalinga Vilas—which for these purposes was draped with various heraldic artefacts including prominently displayed portraits of various British dignitaries. For most of the ritual the king sat on his *gaddi* (ceremonial throne-cushion) facing a life-size portrait of Queen Victoria, Queen-Empress of India. Of more interest to attendees in 1892, however, was the recently completed Bhaskara Vilas—an extraordinary baroque confection of British gothic and Hindu architectural style built especially for this festival in 1892. Octagonal in shape with pillars adorned with images of various gods and goddesses, at its center stood a wrought-iron bandstand over which a British-imported cut-glass chandelier glittered.

The first ten days of the Mahanavratani followed their traditional course—a highly complex set of rituals enacting notions of victory, kinship and authority, sacrifice and honor. But this particular year an additional five days were added in honor of the opening of a new wing of the Setupati's palace. And on days eleven and twelve a grand *durbar* [assembly] took place. The king now moved from his *gaddi* to a western-style high-backed chair to observe gymnastic displays, fireworks, and feasting.

The thirteenth, and last day, took the form of a dinner party for British officials and leading Indian notables from the state. But the British imperial presence was not confined to the thirteenth day: it had been there all the time in the style of the new palace, the heraldic devices in the halls, the prominently-displayed scientific instruments, the photographers and the military band. Thus the British and their culture were guests at the ceremony—almost as important as the state's tutelary goddess and other visiting gods.

In the official court report of the festival later that month, the *Madras Times* soberly recorded that the "major portion" of the exceptional expenditure incurred had been "for the encouragement of science and learning, as well as for various acts of piety and devotion." Here, at the heart of centuries' old rituals of Hindu kingship was a very clear acknowledgment of the concerns of the Setupati's British imperial overlords.

So how should we interpret this artfully choreographed event? There are two plausible responses: that the trappings of western culture

and the extra days of celebration suggest that the Setupati's interest in the "modern" was largely superficial. Or that the pursuit of modernization had been profoundly internalized by the Setupati and his advisers, as demonstrated by this striking remodeling of both the environment and content of the ritual.

Tradition, Modernity and "Conservative Modernization"

The question of the relationship between the British Empire in India and modernity remains highly contentious, and in some ways has become even more so in recent years. An older intellectual history approach tried to deal with the question by focusing on the conflicting and changing political projects of the British at the highest levels. It argued that the British were divided between liberal modernizers and conservatives, and the nineteenth century saw a fundamental change in British policy: between the 1820s and the 1850s, the British, inspired by utilitarian and evangelical political thought, promoted a confident liberal modernization—involving, among other things, the Anglicization of elite education, the introduction of liberal legal codes, and the annexation of the remaining Indian princely states; however, after the Rebellion of 1857–58 the British reversed many of these policies to a substantial degree, and increasingly relied on "traditional" modes of rule—that is through elites at the top of old status hierarchies, such as aristocrats, and by means of paternalistic methods.[3]

However, this approach has been much less popular in recent years. From the 1970s, the "Cambridge School" argued that British ideological projects—whether of modernization or support for traditional rule—had very little impact on local society and politics, which was largely deter-

3 Eric Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India* (Oxford, 1959); Ainslee Embree, *Charles Grant and British Rule in India* (New York, 1962); Ranajit Guha, *A Rule of Property for Bengal* (Paris, 1963); Burton Stein, *Thomas Munro: The Origins of the Colonial State and His Vision of Empire* (Delhi, 1986); Louis Dumont, "The 'Village Community' from Munro to Maine," *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 9 (1966), pp. 68–89. These approaches have been helpfully summarized in Thomas R. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge, 1994).

mined by local factional conflicts. For some, there was no real developmental project underpinning British imperialism in India, over and above what was necessary to secure certain "imperial interests"—markets for British goods, access to cheap military manpower in the form of the Indian Army and prompt and predictable payment of Indian financial liabilities to both the British state and the private financial sector; British policy was largely pragmatic and relatively unaffected by ideology or party-political divisions in either London or Calcutta-Delhi.[4] Others argue that while the raj may have undertaken some kind of liberal ideological project (the universalization and codification of law, the imposition of a free market and liberal individual property rights), it soon ran into the sands of collaborator machinations and resistance.[5]

In more recent writings, however, some members of the Cambridge School have argued that the British did have more of an impact on India, but by accident rather than design. Chris Bayly and others argue that the effect, if not necessarily the intention, of raj policy and administration was the traditionalization of Indian culture, economy and society, while the deliberate demilitarization of Indian society between c. 1790 and 1840 had the effect of deurbanizing and deindustrializing India.[6] Meanwhile for Washbrook, traditionalization was the inevitable consequence of "collaborator" strategy, for under British rule certain groups such as high-caste Brahmins and dominant peasants, and certain practices, such as customary personal law, attained greater purchase over Indian society than they had previously enjoyed.[7]

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4 John Gallagher, *The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 1982); Brian R. Tomlinson, "India and the British Empire Between the Wars, 1880–1935," *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 12 (October-December, 1975), pp. 338–377.

5 David Washbrook, "Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India," *Modern Asian Studies* 15:3 (1981), pp. 649–721.

6 Christopher A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 1989), chap. 4.

7 David Washbrook, "Economic Depression and the Making of 'Traditional' Society in Colonial India, 1830–1855," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, *S*ixth Series 3 (1993), pp. 237–263.

In complete contrast to this approach, however, is a recent literature that stresses the powerful transformational effects of the British in India through their use of new ideas and techniques of colonial "governmentality." These historians argue that the British sought to know, order and control Indian society through such modern technologies as the census, ethnography, cartography, western medicine and education. However, there is some controversy amongst these historians as to both the intentions of governmentality and its consequences. Some see these new methods as producing a colonial form of modernity through the racial, caste and medical categorization of populations. They also argue that these new ideologies and technologies of government promoted cultural homogenization through the codification of regional languages or the imposition of English, and, to some extent, economic transformation and capitalist integration.[8] Yet other historians who stress the

8 For an overview of these approaches see Harald Fischer-Tine and Michael Mann, eds., *Colonialism as Civilizing Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India* (London, 2004). For the impact of modern cartography see Matthew Edney, *Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765–1843* (Chicago, 1997); Ian J. Barrow, *Making History, Drawing Territory: British Mapping in India, c. 1756–1905* (New Dehli, 2003); Sumathi Ramaswamy, *The Goddess and the Nation: Mapping Mother India* (Durham, 2010). For the impact of British on shaping a modern developmental imaginary see Manu Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* (New York, 2004). For the census, categorization and ethnography see Arjun Appadurai, "Number in the Colonial Imagination" in Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer, *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament* (Philadelphia, 1993). For medicine see David Arnold, *Colonizing the Body: State, Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth Century India* (Cambridge, 1993). For language see Gauri Vishwanathan, *Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India* (Columbia, 1989); Bernard Cohn, "Command of Language and the Language of Command," *Subaltern Studies IV: Writings on South Asian History and Society* (Delhi, 1985), pp. 276–329; Sumathi Ramaswamy, *Passions of the Tongue: Language Devotion in Tamil India, 1891–1970* (Berkeley, 1997). For the role of liberal ideology in these projects, see, Udhay Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago, 1999).

importance of colonial governmentality argue that the British were using these "scientific" techniques to promote not a modern but a new form of traditional, or "neo-traditional" India.[9] From the 1870s and 1880s, scholars such as Dirks argue, many raj policy-makers began to demand the preservation and even recreation of a pre-modern India, in accordance with notions of Indian history and social structure prevalent among late nineteenth-century European constitutional historians, political theorists and anthropologists.[10]

In this chapter, I will argue that the intellectual history, Cambridge and "Governmentality" schools all fail adequately to capture the nature of the British imperial influence in India in the post-Mutiny era. The intellectual historians exaggerate the dichotomy between liberal modernizing and traditionalizing strategies, and the disjuncture marked by 1857–58. Meanwhile the Cambridge school goes to the other extreme: while undoubtedly right in stressing the importance of collaborator networks as crucial to the nature of the British raj, it neglects the role of competing British ideological projects and internal debates over what kind of society and economy India should be. These controversies can be seen not only in the rhetoric of politicians in Britain and India, but, perhaps more importantly, in the actions of many of the administrators, district officers and other "men-on-the-spot" who actually manned the civil bureaucracy of the raj. It is also impossible to ignore the links between these ideological debates and often quite drastic shifts in policy—for example, in attitudes to land distribution and shifting alliances with particular collaborator groups.

However, I shall also take issue with the Governmentality school for their tendency to exaggerate the coherence of British ideas and

9 For the concept of neo-traditionalism see Michael David-Fox, "Multiple Modernities vs Neo-Traditionalism: On Recent Debates in Russian and Soviet History," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 54:4 (2006), pp. 535–555.

10 Nicholas B. Dirks, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India* (New Jersey, 2001); Ronald Inden, *Imagining India* (Cambridge, MA, 1992); Karuna Mantena, *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and Liberal Imperialism* (New Jersey, 2010); Clive Dewey, "Images of the Village Community: A Study in Anglo-Indian Ideology," *Modern Asian Studies* 7 (1972), pp. 291–328.

their effects. It is difficult to see British policy and the political culture it engendered as one driven by a project of Enlightenment modernity. Equally unconvincing are Dirks and others, who argue that the later Raj promoted a cogently conservative anthropological vision of village, caste and community.[11]

Rather, I shall argue that central to British post-Mutiny ideas and political projects was a highly contradictory strategy of "conservative modernization." This term was originally used by the historical sociologist Barrington Moore to describe a political strategy which aims to promote "modern" aspects of society and the economy—through the promotion of some achievement-oriented bureaucratic and/or capitalist social relations—while preserving elements of the "traditional" social order, such as aristocracies and status-based hierarchies founded on paternalism or coercion.[12] Moore used the term to describe elite strategies in nineteenth-century Germany and Japan, and scholars of Meiji Japan still use this approach.[13] It has also used by scholars of other countries to analyze similar strategies elsewhere, but it has rarely been employed in the case of British India.[14] However, this concept captures several aspects

11 So, for instance, in 1920, the Government of India called for the census to de-emphasize caste and other ethnological data and give more attention to the categories of industry and occupation. Richard B. Martin, "Bibliographic Notes on the Indian Census" in N. Gerald Barrier, *The Census In British India: New Perspectives* (New Delhi, 1981), p. 63.

12 Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1993), chap. 8.

13 Takashi Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

14 See, for instance, Miguel Cabo and Antonio Miguez, "El Maurismo en Galicia. Un Modelo de Modernización Conservadora en el Marco de la Restauración," *Hispania. Revista Espanola de Historia* lxix (2009), pp. 87–116; Fernando Filgueira, Luis Reygadas, Juan Pablo Luna, and Pablo Alegre, "Shallow States, Deep Inequalities, and the Limits of Conservative Modernization: The Politics and Policies of Incorporation in Latin America," in Merike Blofield, ed., *The Great Gap: Inequality of the Politics of Redistribution in Latin America* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), chap. 8.

of British policy well, and especially its promotion of aristocratic groups and values among both colonial officials and Indian rulers in the hope that they would act as agents of economic, technological and capitalist development. The concept also draws attention to the internal contradictions of British policy, which was simultaneously promoting two very different value systems—aristocratic and technocratic.

Conservative modernization was not the only British strategy, and some liberals remained opposed to it; nor was it systematic or coherent. Indeed there were endless differences among its advocates as to which elite groups (Indian kings, landed aristocrats, "native gentlemen" or a gentrified English bureaucracy) were best suited to be the principal agents of development, as to how they themselves should be "improved," and what precisely should be their relationship with the raj itself. However, much British policy after the Mutiny makes more sense if seen through this prism.

This strategy, of course, did not transform Indian society as a whole, but it did have an important effect on two important spheres which the chapter will focus on—the methods of rule employed by British administrative officials, and by India's "princes." And while the policy was more successful in princely-ruled than in directly-ruled India, its internal contradictions ultimately rendered it unsustainable in both cases.

The "Modernization" of Indian Aristocratic Elites

Historians are agreed that the early to mid-nineteenth century saw the development among British administrators in India of two broad approaches to governing their new dominions—the Romantic and the Liberal.[15] Romantics such as Thomas Munro, John Malcolm, Colin Mackenzie and Charles Metcalf (all of whom were senior regional administrators in India between 1790–1830) were influenced by Burkean notions of organic conservatism and saw it as their role to revive Indian

15 Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj*, pp. 25–51; Stein, *Thomas Munro*, pp. 352–353; Stokes, *The English Utilitarians*, pp. 1–25; David Washbrook, "India 1816–1869: The Two Faces of Colonialism," in Andrew Porter, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 3, *The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, 1999).

laws, customs and practices as most suited to the good government of the people. Though sympathetic to old aristocracies they did not believe that the British should govern through them, believing rather that the paternalistic British district collector should be the chief agent of this renovation.[16]

Opposing them were the Liberals, influenced by British Utilitarian legal philosophy and economic development driven by the spread of free markets and free trade. They included William Bentinck (Governor-General, 1828–35) and Lord Dalhousie (Governor-General, 1848–56). Also influential were John Stuart Mill (Examiner at the India Office between 1823–58), and Thomas Macaulay, first Law Member of the Governor-General's Council, who strongly influenced India policy and sought to develop a codified and universalist legal system, to challenge aristocratic privilege and caste discrimination, and to promote education in English for what they hoped would be a new Indian middle class state bureaucracy.[17] However, as a number of recent writers have pointed out, this kind of liberal project was often combined with a pessimistic attitude to India's cultural suitability for liberal institutions and self-government—except in the very long term—and hence often embraced an authoritarian politics.[18]

The Rebellion of 1857–58 saw a major change in policy, as the British decided that liberal attacks on traditional elites and paternalistic forms of government had alienated many Indians and precipitated popular unrest. As Metcalf has argued, the result was a loss of faith in a more optimistic liberalism, and by the late 1860s there was broad agreement among liberals and conservatives that radical social and cultural change in India was both dangerous and inappropriate. However, he exaggerates the extent to which the British reverted to a Burkean conservatism.[19] Rather, official policy increasingly adopted a conservative

16 Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj*, pp. 25–27.

17 Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj*, pp. 28–39.

18 Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire*, p. 2.

19 For this view, see Thomas R. Metcalf, *The Aftermath of Revolt: India 1857–1870* (Princeton, 1964); Bernard Cohn, "Representing Authority in Victorian India," in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 165–209. However, in disagreeing with Met-

modernizing approach—in effect combining a Romantic paternalism with an authoritarian liberalism. This, in turn, was legitimized by intellectual and scholarly writings, which queried conventional assumptions that India (especially its village social structures) was some kind of analogue of Western Europe's medieval past, and that India might simply follow the same path of British economic and political development.[20] The Rebellion, therefore, was crucial in driving these developments, but they also took place in a broader context of international economic and geopolitical change, and the increasing interest in conservative projects of modernization stimulated by the example of Bismarckian Germany and Meiji Japan.[21]

The Rebellion had a particularly dramatic effect on British policy towards Indian aristocratic elites. It was read by many Tories as a revolt against liberal policies—the "destruction of native authority" and "disturbance of property rights" as Disraeli put it. And several British liberals agreed with the conservatives that Indians were demanding a more conciliatory approach to aristocrats and princes.[22] The result was the abandonment of the policy of annexing India's remaining semi-autonomous "princely" states, and of breaking-up the large landed estates of aristocrats in British India. However, at the same time, the British insisted

calf, I am not agreeing with those who emphasize continuities and assume a dominant authoritarian liberalism. See Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire*; Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton, 2005). For a critique of this view of liberalism, see Andrew Sartori, "The British Empire and its Liberal Mission," *Journal of Modern History* 78:3 (2006).

20 John W. Burrow, "The Village Community and the Uses of History in Late Nineteenth-Century England," in Neil McKendrick, ed., *Historical Perspectives: Studies in English Thought and Society* (London, 1974); Clive Dewey, "The Influence of Henry Maine on Agrarian Policy in India," in Alan Diamond, ed., *The Victorian Achievement of Sir Henry Maine: A Centennial Reappraisal* (Cambridge, 1995).

21 See Christopher A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford, 2004), pp. 395–431; Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy*, p. 27.

22 See Metcalf, *The Aftermath of the Revolt*, pp. 72–79.

that earlier policies of "improvement" should continue, promoted by the aristocrats themselves.

Some of the first efforts to transform aristocrats into developmental leaders took place in the parts of the raj under direct British rule, and the taluqdars [landowners] of Oudh were typical examples of the type of "little king" seen as promising material.[23] Restored to the land they had been stripped of just before the Rebellion, this group became cherished allies of the raj and recipients of manifold privileges, including forgiveness of their debts and over-representation on the raj's late nineteenth-century consultative councils. Numerous officials celebrated these aristocrats, from C. A. Elliot in his *Chronicles of Oonao*, in 1862, to W. C. Benett's in his famous introduction to the 1877 *Oudh Gazetteer*, to Harcourt Butler in his *Oudh Policy: The Policy of Sympathy* (1906).[24] Though these writers initially took a deeply pessimistic view of Indian society—Benett, for example, insisted that Hindu society was "equally incapable of development and impervious to decay"[25]—they were soon encouraging the taluqdars to emulate the supposedly reformist English gentry, and take an interest in agricultural improvement, education, charitable works and local justice. And though the taluqdars themselves proved rather resistant to modern education, this did not stop the British from trying to persuade them.

In 1892 the British opened the Colvin School and efforts were made to force the sons of taluqdars to attend.[26] While much of the curriculum at these schools involved inculcation of the manners of an English gen-

23 For comparable examples from the Deccan and South India see, Margaret Franz and Georg Berkemer, "Colleges and Kings: Higher Education under Direct and Indirect Rule," *Economic and Political Weekly* 41:13 (April 1–7, 2006), pp. 1261–1268.

24 Thomas R. Metcalf, *Land, Landlords, and the British Raj: Northern India in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 191, 197–199.

25 *Oudh Gazetteer* 1 (1877), pp. xxv–xxvii, cited in Metcalf, *Land, Landlords*, pp. 191–192.

26 The examples from this paragraph have been drawn from Metcalf, *Land, Landlords*, pp. 306–319.

tleman, M. J. While, the head of Canning College, argued that practical rather than purely academic subjects were more appropriate, in order to ensure "quick and accurate calculation of interest rates." He also suggested that they should eschew standard academic exams and concentrate on subjects "specially adapted to their circumstances." In 1893 the government announced that plans were mooted to open an agricultural college attached to the school.[27]

While it would be difficult to see the Oudh taluqdars as ideal developmental leaders from the British point of view, but, there is some evidence that they felt the need to pay obeisance to British exhortations that they should be "improving." In the 1890s the Maharaja of Balrampur would take the opportunity, during his hunting trips, to "educate" his tenants on the benefits of crop rotation, the proper matching of seed to soil and new techniques of manuring, ploughing and irrigation. Meanwhile the Raja of Deotaha claimed (though this was disputed) that he had cleared jungle, and built wells and houses on his estate. The most conspicuous improver was Raja Rampal Singh of Kalakankar who opened schools and dispensaries for his tenants and experimented with cattle breeding, and in 1881 the *Oudh Akbar* newspaper praised the taluqdars for organizing a state-wide agricultural exhibition which it fulsomely described as "a successful beginning of the great task of developing the country." In education too, it seems that British calls for them to assume the cloak of enlightened aristocracy did not fall on entirely deaf ears. The Maharaja of Balrampur opened ten schools for the children of his estates in the 1860s—though they did not last long. A number of the taluqdars acted as patrons to the Anglo-Vernacular school movement, often built near their palaces. They also sponsored a number of English language schools and Canning College, which subsequently became the University of Lucknow. Its principal sponsor, Maharaja Man Singh declared to an assembly of fellow taluqdars that such a college would "so educate our children as to enable them to develop the material resources of our country, to eradicate the baneful effects of error, to excel in political wisdom and learning and to . . . walk in the paths of virtue."[28]

27 Metcalf, *Land, Landlords*, p. 326.
28 Metcalf, *Land, Landlords,* pp. 308–319.

But perhaps the principal objects and beneficiaries of the aristocratic turn in colonial policy were the Indian so-called "princes." Under the British raj nearly two-fifths of India's landmass and nearly 20 percent of its population was not "British" at all, but comprised nearly 600 individual states governed by hereditary aristocrats of various kinds. Of these only 28 were of significant size—with populations of over 500,000; 8 of which counted for 50 percent of all revenue and population in these 28. The largest, Hyderabad, was the size of Italy and stretched across the central Deccan. Other very sizeable states in the south included Travancore and Kochin (now Kerala), and Mysore (now incorporated into the state of Karnataka). Meanwhile in the north there was a cluster of nineteen substantial states in Rajputana (now Rajasthan), and another cluster lay in the west, of which the greatest was Baroda (now incorporated into Gujarat). Most of these states were governed according to Mughal practice: their lands were divided into those centrally administered by the ruling king or Maharaja, the rest allocated to martial nobility or Jagirdars who possessed judicial, police and revenue gathering powers.[29]

Theoretically, at least, these states enjoyed some degree of internal autonomy from the raj. Thirty nine of them had entered into treaty arrangements with the British in the early nineteenth century. But during the Liberal-Utilitarian years before the Great Rebellion several of these states had been absorbed into British India supposedly on grounds of poor government or lack of legitimate heirs. After 1860, though, the policy was reversed and a number of princes were "restored" and permitted to adopt heirs if none had issued naturally. By the turn of the twentieth century 20 of them had assurances from the British of absolute power over their subjects, and the British themselves understood this to mean not absolute autonomy but only that princely power should not be encroached upon without good reason.[30]

Even so, the princes were not left alone: after the 1857 Rebellion they found themselves the objects of British "improvement." Most notable in this respect was the initiative of Viceroy Lord Mayo who in 1870

29 For further details see Stephen R. Ashton, *British Policy towards the Indian States, 1905–1939* (London, 1982), pp. 1–4.

30 Ibid., p. 4.

established the first of several "Chiefs" Colleges. Modeled in some, but by no means all ways, on British public schools, the intention was to train young princes and sons of gentry in the principles of sound administration, to induce a sense of developmental duty and create a new kind of Indian "gentleman."

For Alfred Lyall, the Governor-General's agent in Rajputana 1874–78, the ideal was the Rajput warrior-king. Rajputs, he argued, followed a clan rather than feudal social structure, and thus, while not likely to develop from a medieval aristocracy into a parliamentary gentry, as their British counterparts had done, they were nevertheless by no means oriental despots. Lyall himself ridiculed liberal solutions to development—"ardent ideologists," he called them, who "avoided the extremely difficult business of discovering exactly what suited the very special circumstances of modern India."[31] "Rajput societies," he wrote, "held together by cumbrous bonds and stays of a primitive organism, present far more promising elements of future development than powerful and well-ordered despotisms of the normal Asiatic type . . ."[32] Lyall was, however, also insistent that these Rajput societies should not be altered too extensively by an English education which would simply breed middle-class "native ideologists"; for Lyall westernizing "natives" would become too alienated from the rest of society and have little moral legitimacy or developmental agency.[33] This was, of course, a very sharp departure from the liberal ideas of Macaulay and Mill, who in the 1830s, 1840s and 1850s had seen the western-educated middle-class Indian as the chief amanuenses of the British in the project of improvement.

As Lyall had understood, before the arrival of the British, Rajput kings had shared their sovereignty with their clan nobles, and in the early to mid-nineteenth century the British residents had tended to uphold clannish limits on kingly power. After the Rebellion, however, while

31 Alfred C. Lyall, "Life and Speeches of Sir Henry Maine," *Quarterly Review* 176 (April 1893), p. 290, cited in Mantena, *Alibis of Empire*, p. 166.

32 Alfred C. Lyall, *Asiatic Studies: Religious and Social* (London, 1882), p. 224, cited in Mantena, *Alibis of Empire*, p. 167.

33 Alfred C. Lyall, "Government of the Indian Empire," in *The Edinburgh Review* 325 (1884), pp. 15–16, cited in Mantena, *Alibis of Empire*, pp. 167–168.

claiming to defend clan power, the British political officers in the Rajput states generally encouraged greater centralization and integration in pursuit of efficient administration and fiscal systems. As he noted, "the inclination of an English government was naturally toward the support of central administration in the Rajput states" which meant that Rajput princes who had originally been merely clan chiefs "had modernized their status towards the likeness of territorial kings."[34] So, for example, the princely state of Kotah reduced the independent territorial power of the nobility by making them dependent on the crown. Princes were pressed to convert their courts into more public institutions—that is to orient their rule toward state rather than personal and familial benefits. The differentiation of the princes' privy purse from the public revenue, and reports on administration that provided a rudimentary accounting of how government had discharged its task were the chief manifestations of this shift. The same influences affected the bureaucracy, which was urged to reform itself into a professional service, not a body of private retainers.[35]

By the mid-1870s this set of ideas about aristocrats and modernization was beginning to crystallize into a more coherent policy of conservative modernization. An early proponent was Viceroy Lytton (1876–80), appointed by the Conservative Prime Minister Disraeli, who united a romantic love of India's old aristocracy, with a strong commitment to liberal markets and the creation of efficient bureaucracies to promote economic development.[36]

34 Alfred C. Lyall, "Introduction," *Gazetteer of Rajputana*, 1879, cited in R. W. Stern, "An Approach to the Politics of the Princely States," in Robin Jeffrey, ed., *People, Princes and Paramount Power: Society and Politics in Indian Princely States* (Delhi, 1978), pp. 361–362.

35 Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "Rajputana under British Paramountcy: The Failure of Indirect Rule," *Journal of Modern History* 38:2 (1966), p. 143.

36 Lytton to Marquis of Salisbury, May 11, 1876, cited in Betty Balfour, *The History of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration, 1876–1880* (London, 1899), p. 109.

Lytton is most famous for the inauguration of the Great Assemblage of 1877 to mark the visit of the Prince of Wales to India, and, belatedly, the installation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India in 1872. In explaining the idea behind this British version of a Mughal Durbar, Lytton observed:

> I am convinced that the fundamental political mistake of able and experienced officials is the belief that we can hold India securely by what they call good government; that is to say, by improving the condition of the ryot [peasant], strictly administering justice, spending immense sums on irrigation works etc. Politically speaking, the Indian peasantry is an inert mass. If it ever moves at all, it will move in obedience, not to its British benefactors, but to its native chiefs and princes, however tyrannical they may be . . . They are a powerful aristocracy. To secure completely and efficiently utilize the Indian aristocracy is, I am convinced, the most important problem now before us.[37]

Lytton's solution was to incorporate the Indian aristocracy into an integrated hierarchy with the Queen Empress at the top. This unified rank order, connected through a system of rituals, honors and ceremonies mirroring that of England, would counsel and advise the Queen Empress (though in practice Lytton had to settle for a rather less prestigious association of leading princes who would be "councilors of the Empress").[38] Lytton also hoped to create an entirely autonomous "Native" Civil Service which would be the equal of the Indian Civil Service (ICS), recruited from among India's "gentlemanly" rather than middling classes and trained in a very similar way to its British counterpart.[39] It would therefore be very different to the existing "uncovenanted" service, which was largely composed of middle-class Indians and lower in prestige to the British-manned ICS.

But the high point of this British strategy of conservative, aristocrat-led modernization was reached under the vice-regency of George

37 Balfour, *The History of Lord Lytton*, p. 109.

38 Balfour, *The History of Lord Lytton*, p. 111.

39 Bradford Spangenberg, *British Bureaucracy in India*: *Status, Policy and the I.C.S., in the Late 19th Century* (New Delhi, 1976), p. 44.

Curzon (1899–1905). Curzon, a minor aristocrat himself, was also convinced of the need to use old elites to establish centralized and efficient administrative structures, who had travelled twice to Japan in 1880s and 1890s and been impressed with its example of elite-led development.[40] Disheartened by what he saw as the inertia and lack of creativity in the ICS, castigating its "torpor . . . crassness . . . absence of initiative and worship of the status quo . . ." and observing that, "the wants of India seem to have outgrown and over-weighted the administrative machine we have set up for government."[41] He saw the reanimation of princely India as an important part of his project of executive-driven reform. He enjoyed his tours round the princely states and claimed to find there signs of positive British moral influence along with the picturesque: "I was delighted with Kathiawar. There is a flavor about it of an old-time semi-feudal society, which has crystalized into a new shape under British protection."[42]

In particular, Curzon sought to spread the example of the Maharaja of Gwalior, calling him: "much the most remarkable and promising of all native chiefs . . . he practically runs the whole state himself . . . In his remorseless propensity for looking into everything, and probing it to the bottom, rather reminds me of your humble servant."[43] And it was in Gwalior that he made a notable policy speech to the assembled princes:

> The Native Chief has become, by our policy, an integral factor in the Imperial Organization of India. He is concerned not less than the Viceroy or the Lieutenant-Governor in the administration of the country. I claim him as my colleague and my partner. He cannot remain . . . a frivolous and irresponsible despot. He must justify and not abuse the authority committed to him; he must be the servant as well as the master

40 David Dilks, *Curzon in India*, vol. 1, *Achievement* (London, 1969), pp. 28, 36; David Gilmour, *Curzon* (London, 1994), pp. 89–90.

41 Quoted in Spangenberg, *British Bureaucracy*, pp. 2–3.

42 George Curzon to Mary Curzon, November 4, 1899, Mary Curzon Papers, cited in Nayana Goradia, *Lord Curzon and the Last of the British Moghuls* (Delhi, 1993), p. 150.

43 George Curzon to George Hamilton, November 26, 1899, Curzon Papers, vol. 158, cited in Goradia, *Lord Curzon*, p. 153.

> of his people . . . his *gaddi* is not intended to be a divan of indulgence, but the stern seat of duty. His figure should not merely be known on the polo-ground, or on the race-course, or in the European hotel.[44]

For Curzon, it was therefore essential that the princes needed be "improved" for, as he observed to Hamilton, Secretary of State for India: "What they want more than anything else is to be schooled by a firm, but not unkindly, hand . . . We do so not so much in the interests of the princes themselves, . . . as in the interests of the people, who are supposed to like the old traditions and dynasties and rule."[45]

As one might expect, Curzon was also keen to promote Indian aristocratic presence in the army and joined debates on establishing the rank of Indian King's Commissioned officer which had been on-going since the 1880s.[46] In 1901 he founded an Indian Cadet Corps (ICC) with a view to the "modernization" of the princes themselves, a group he saw as generally dissolute and indolent. The ICC seems primarily to have been a residential camp devoted to inculcating British notions of modern self-discipline with much emphasis placed on the development of good physical bearing and the formation of "character."[47] Curzon's ICC was to consist of 20 to 30 young men aged between 17 and 20 who would be selected according to family pedigree, personal conduct and command of the English language. Each cohort would be brought to Calcutta and placed under the tutelage of a prince of exemplary character and military attainment. They would be taught to dress, ride and perform other physical activities and would then go on to Delhi for basic military drill. They

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44 November 29, 1899, *Indian Speeches of Lord Curzon*, 4 vols. (Calcutta, 1900–1906), vol. 1, p. 168, cited in Goradia, *Lord Curzon*, p. 155.

45 Curzon to Hamilton, August 29, 1900, Curzon Papers, vol. 159, cited in Goradia, *Lord Curzon*, p. 156.

46 For these debates see Pradeep P. Barua, *Gentleman of the Raj: The Indian Army Officer Corps 1817–1949* (London, 2003).

47 For an account of this training see Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph, and Mohan S. Kanota, eds., *Reversing the Gaze: Amar Singh's Diary: A Colonial Subject's Narrative of Imperial Rule* (Boulder, 2002), pp. 468–473.

would then go back to their states or estates for the summer and, if still keen, would return for a more formal course of military training.[48]

Curzon's commitment to this strategy of conservative modernization was reaffirmed when he opposed the introduction of liberal representative reform. In 1908 he argued that what was more important was "purging the government of its many abuses . . . carrying out an exhaustive program of reforms in . . . every branch of administration [and] stimulating the loyalty of the chiefs."[49] In 1917, on the eve of limited democratization in India, he advocated establishing an advisory council of princes, and in his book, *British Government in India* he argued that India's stability depended largely upon the continued existence of the Native States as "connecting links with the past, and as representing a standard of life and government which is in harmony with the traditions and the tastes of the people," calling for "the adaptation of western experience to the genius of the eastern mind." He prided himself on being the first to describe the princes as "partners in the British administration of India," noting that the major princes were now ruling with "creditable efficiency" while directly-ruled British India was "seething with the commotion produced by the attempt to introduce parliamentary institutions and modified forms of self-government into the archaic fabric of the Indian Commonwealth."[50]

Meritocracy and Aristocracy in the ICS

Curzon and the conservative modernizers, however, were not satisfied with renovating princely rule. They were also determined to aristocratism the predominantly British covenanted (elite) ICS. From the middle of the nineteenth century, liberals had made successful efforts to turn the ICS into an examination-based meritocratic organization. In 1855 an examination system had finally replaced patronage as the means of recruit-

48 Ibid., p. 11.

49 Curzon to Arthur Balfour, December 11, 1908, cited in Robin J. Moore, "Curzon and Indian Reform," *Modern Asian Studies* 27:4 (1993), p. 725.

50 George N. Curzon, *British Government in India: The Story of the Viceroys and Government Houses*, 2 vols. (London, 1925), vol. 2, p. 112.

ing candidates into the ICS, with the examination created by the great reforming liberal Macaulay. In fact, aristocrats had never constituted a large proportion of ICS recruits, even at the height of the patronage system, but their numbers had fallen from around 27 percent immediately preceding the 1855 reforms, to only 10 percent by the 1870s.[51] Liberals like Fitz James Stephen and John Strachey shared Lytton's and Curzon's preference for authoritarian development, but their favored agents of such development were not Indian or British aristocrats but middle-class professionals.

Even so, this apparent liberal victory proved short-lived, as the battle commenced for the soul of the ICS officer: would he be a middle-class "examination-wallah," or would he be a paternalistic gentleman? From the 1870s onwards the ICS came under constant criticism from conservatives, who insisted that there had been a loss of caliber under the examination system owing to the paucity of aristocratic recruits. So, for instance, Secretary of State Hamilton wrote to Viceroy Elgin that "giants are nowadays not easily to be found in the ICS . . . You get fewer bad bargains and fewer geniuses." Hamilton thought that the real problem was that "class" recruitment had been degraded by competition.[52]

This criticism of the consequences of non-aristocratic recruitment was most clearly expressed in an anonymous article published in the April 1874 edition of the *Edinburgh Review*. The author, who many believed was the Tory leader Lord Salisbury, argued that men of inferior social origins were "degrading the ICS." Their lack of an Oxbridge education, and their training for the exam at special "crammers" was "not the way in which rulers of the nation should be prepared for their great duties as men who govern as much by force of the implacable qualities which make up the English gentleman . . . as by mere ability."[53] He argued that some effort should be made to imbue recruits with the values, attitudes

51 Spangenberg, *British Bureaucracy*, p. 19.

52 Hamilton to Elgin, April 1, 1898. Cited in Spangenberg, *British Bureaucracy*, p. 36.

53 *Edinburgh Review*, April 1874, p. 337. Cited in Spangenberg, *British Bureaucracy*, p. 24.

and attributes of the aristocracy through short-term courses at Oxford and Cambridge—the traditional finishing schools of upper-middle class and aristocratic British males.[54]

The supposedly déclassé ICS was blamed for various ills thought to be afflicting the British raj. Racism was allegedly one of the consequences of recruiting the wrong kind of civil servant. Lytton spoke of "the crystallized official formality towards natives of the highest class," which led him to the idea that "it really is a wonder our rule is not more unpopular than it is."[55] He continued: "I fear the danger to British rule is aggravated by the results of the present covenanted system."

Another alleged drawback was careerism: Lytton noted that "competition-wallahs appear to regard work in India as a disagreeable condition of emoluments attached to them, and to deem the interests of the empire altogether secondary to their own. I am told by the older generation that formerly this was not the pervading spirit of the Indian public services."[56] Curzon also argued that men with 'a high sense of duty and an interest in the people are declining in the service'.[57] Finally, ICS officials were charged with a fundamental lack of *élan* and creativity—the qualities allegedly needed to transform India. Hamilton mused that officials had lost "that vigour and originality which alone can produce change."[58]

Even the Liberal Secretary of State John Morley denounced the "wooden-headedness of the mere bureaucrat."[59] And several other liberals echoed the conservative line. Fitz James Stephen, for instance, wrote

54 *Edinburgh Review*, April 1874, p. 336. Cited in Spangenberg, *British Bureaucracy*, p. 18.

55 Lytton to Salisbury, September 28, 1876. Cited in Spangenberg, *British Bureaucracy*, p. 39.

56 Ibid.

57 Curzon to Hamilton, May 2, 1902. Cited in Spangenberg, *British Bureaucracy*, p. 40.

58 Hamilton to Curzon, August 27, 1902. Cited in Spangenberg, *British Bureaucracy*, p. 40.

59 Morley to Minto, September 10, 1908. Cited in Spangenberg, *British Bureaucracy*, p. 44.

to Lytton that the new Viceroy's greatest challenge was having to do "first rate work with second, third, fourth and even fifth-rate tools."[60]

These complaints brought twenty years of tinkering with the recruitment, examination and training of the ICS. They culminated in 1895 with the merging of the ICS exam with the Home Civil Service exam, which was thought to attract more prestigious Oxbridge candidates. A number of other changes were also made to gentrify recruitment into the service—including the weighting of Oxbridge-taught subjects in the exam; increased marks for interview performance; a very low age limit; and a horse-riding test.[61] ICS exams now tested explicitly for gentlemanly qualities. The following question, from an 1870 exam paper, became typical:

> Fortitude, Courage, Endurance, Valour, Virtue. Show by the help of sentences in which these words occur, how they differ in meaning.[62]

Political leaders' insistence that ICS officers should have aristocratic attitudes and a gentlemanly bearing (if not origin) seems to have been embraced by aspirant recruits from the middle-middle-classes. An entire sub-set of schools developed largely to cater to this class who could not afford an education at elite institutions like Eton and Harrow, but craved the ethos and valued a curriculum tailored to prepare them for the Indian Civil Service exam.[63] A worrying interruption in the flow of good candidates immediately following World War I was eased by a large salary rise in mid 1920s; a young member of the Service "could afford to keep

60 Lytton to Fitzjames Stephen, March 15, 1876; Fitzjames Stephen to Lytton, May 29, 1877. Cited in Spangenberg, *British Bureaucracy*, p. 35.

61 The amalgamation of the ICS with the Home Civil Service tests was only partially successful as those who passed highest almost always chose the Home over the Indian service. Bradford Spangenberg, "The Problem of Recruitment for the Indian Civil Service during the Late Nineteenth Century," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 30, no. 2 (1971), pp. 347–350; C. J. Dewey, "The Education of a Ruling Caste: The Indian Civil Service in the Era of Competitive Examination," *The English Historical Review* 88, no. 347 (1973), pp. 268–274, 279–280.

62 A. C. Ewald, *The Guide to the Indian Civil Service* (London, 1870), p. 116.

63 Elizabeth Buettner, *Empire Families: Britons and Late Imperialism* (Oxford, 2004), pp. 163–180.

two polo ponies, a car and six servants," while the salaries of collectors provided for a "way of living not only comfortable but impressive."[64]

This form of recruitment continued throughout the inter-war period, and Oxbridge training ensured at least a patina of gentlemanliness. In 1928, 32 of 36 recruits had attended Oxbridge, and of these, 19 read Classics and 12 History. And at the end of their probationary year, they were still obliged to take a riding test.[65]

Given this aristocratic training, it is no surprise that most of the recruits absorbed the gentlemanly ethos. Many overwhelmingly preferred appointments in those provinces seen as the most paternalistic and aristocratic in administrative style—the Punjab and the United Provinces (in 1928, for example, 18 of 36 recruits put the Punjab as their first choice and 9 put it second; 8 put U.P. first, and 16 second).[66] Bengal, alleged home of the hated educated Indian middle-class "baboo," was the least popular.

This carefully-crafted system of recruitment unsurprisingly did not generally produce ICS officers interested in modern "governmentality." Rather, it engendered, as was intended, a highly personalistic and unsystematic attitude to government, captured by the concept of *noblesse oblige*. This is well-illustrated in Robert Carstairs's memoir *The Little World of an Indian District Officer*. He saw himself as a beleaguered paternalist with an innovative and individualistic mind thwarted by bureaucratic interference from above, as bitterly sketched in his chapter "The Departmental Mind."[67] Carstairs's self-perception was not so much that of a bureaucratic quantifier and categorizer but that of an all-powerful improving Whig landlord.

This distinctly paternalistic but nevertheless self-consciously "improving" and developmental approach to government is strikingly illustrated in the Chenab colony in the early twentieth-century Punjab.

64 Thomas Beaglehole, "From Ruler to Servants: The ICS and the British Demission of Power in India," *Modern Asian Studies* 11:2 (1977), pp. 239–241.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid., p. 248.

67 Robert Carstairs, *The Little World of an Indian District Officer* (London, 1912), p. 74ff.

Chenab was seen by its creators as a model for the rest of the province. Peasants were granted land on the condition that they paid rent and fulfilled strict conditions, including maintaining a clean compound, and arrangements for sanitary disposal of night soil.[68] The Colonization Officer and his staff supervised all the details of colony life, and his word was final in all disputes over revenue or conditions, not civil courts which had been expressly barred from interfering with executive orders. Curzon and his Council strongly backed the project, and the India Council in London grudgingly accepted it.[69] The peasants themselves soon rebelled, and the revolt was both unexpected and poorly handled by the Punjab administration, which heavily relied on prominent Muslim or Hindu aristocrats in the district for information.[70]

New Model Princes

By 1914, therefore, under both Conservative and Liberal administrations a highly aristocratic form of rule had emerged which included both Indian princes, British aristocrats at the top, and an ICS recruited from the middle class, but carefully gentrified. Serious efforts were made to exclude middle-class Indians and professional, bureaucratic cultures. In part, such moves reflected anxiety about the emerging political challenge from middle-class western-educated Indians. But it was also the consequence of a conservative modernizing ruling ethos.

In directly-ruled British India, this conservative modernization strategy may have been at the center of British ideas of rule, but it was not very effective. The failure can be traced to a number of causes: lack of funds; continuing conflict between liberals and conservatives over which Indian groups made the best collaborators; and disagreements over the relative power of center and localities. But the central flaw was a reliance on white middle-class, albeit gentrified, administrators as the principal agents of this policy. It was implausible that alien officials could have

68 N. Gerald Barrier, "The Punjab Disturbances of 1907," *Modern Asian Studies* 1:4 (1967), p. 357.
69 Ibid., p. 60.
70 Ibid., p. 369.

sufficient insight into Indian society, or enough support among Indians, to promote a serious program of modernization.

The policy, however, was less of a failure where the British were not in direct control—in princely India. There, the approach had some genuine affinity with traditional ideas of moral kingship—*rajdharma*—which saw the king as provider of welfare, warrior-protector and manager of social equilibrium.[71] And crucially, Hindu political thought, in which there was much interest in the early twentieth century (with the rediscovery of the Arthashastra, an early manual of Hindu statesmanship) stressed the partnership of warrior-aristocrat (Ksatriya) and bureaucrat-sage (Brahmin).[72] This was very different from the British denigration of bureaucracy and more exclusive reliance on aristocratic models.

This strategy enjoyed a certain limited success where the British were able to control the education of princes during their so-called "minority"—that is where the prince became ruler before the age of eighteen and was effectively given over to the British resident, Political Agent or specially chosen Indian reforming regent for his upbringing (such cases were remarkably frequent).[73] The results of such anglicizing education were soon evident. Travancore, which had a series of English-educated rulers after 1860 underwent the centralization and professionalization of administration, land and legislative reforms for tenant farmers, and a program of road-building—though all under the auspices of the monarch and his court.[74]

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71 For more details see Jan Gonda, *Ancient Kingship from the Religious Point of View* (Leiden, 1969) and Ronald Inden, "Ritual Authority and Cyclical Time in Hindu Kingship," in John F. Richards, ed., *Kingship and Authority in South Asia* (Madison, 1978), pp. 28–73.

72 Thomas R. Trautmann, *Kautilya and the Arthasastra: A Statistical Investigation of the Authorship and Evolution of the Text* (Leiden, 1971).

73 See David Hardiman, "Baroda: The Structure of a 'Progressive' State," in Jeffrey, *People, Princes*, pp. 113–114; Terence Creagh Coen, *The Indian Political Service* (London, 1971), pp. 69–70.

74 Robin Jeffrey, "Introduction" and "Travancore: Status, Class and the Growth of Radical Politics, 1860–1940," in Jeffrey, *People, Princes*, pp. 20, 140.

Neighboring Mysore, where the British effectively restored kingly powers in 1881, was ruled by another English educated maharaja whose son came to the *gaddi* [throne] at the age of ten.[75] By the late 1890s it had acquired a reputation as "the best administered native state in India."[76] It boasted a Representative Assembly, founded in 1881 as the first of its kind in India; and after 1900 it successfully developed hydro-electric projects that brought electrification to Bangalore before Bombay and Calcutta and fueled various innovative public and private sector industries. In 1914 Mysore secured its status as a progressive modernizing princely state with introduction of compulsory mass education—again a first in India.[77]

In North India, Baroda held the laurel as most "progressive" state. Here the British effectively imposed a minor, Sayajirao III, as prince in 1871 and took charge of his education until his accession in 1875. His reign (1875–1939) brought land reform, the introduction of a semi-bureaucratic form of administration, an advisory legislative council and free primary education introduced in 1907. By 1931 literacy rates in Baroda outstripped those of neighboring British-governed Gujarat. Efforts were also made to stimulate economic development: in the 1870s tax-farming was abolished to encourage investment in industry; in the 1880s the state itself became a pioneer of a new sugar mill; in the 1890s it made loans to industrialists wishing to establish new factories; and in 1909 import and export duties within Baroda state were abolished in a further effort to promote industrial growth. In the 1930s this bore fruit with the success of industrialization, encouraged by tax concessions, subsidized access to natural resources and state-funded technical assistance, and such policies finally began to attract big Indian industrialists such as Tatas and

75 Made Gowda, *Modern Mysore State 1881–1902: A Study of the Elite, Polity and Society* (Mysore, 1997), pp. 13–19, 31.

76 William Lee-Warner to *The Times*, August 18, 1897, Lee-Warner papers, file 31 Mss. Eur. F. 92, India Office Library, London [IOL], cited in James Manor, "Princely Mysore before the Storm: The State-Level Political System of India's Model State 1920–36," *Modern Asian Studies* 9:1 (1975), pp. 31–58, esp. 35.

77 Manor, "Princely Mysore," p. 36.

the Sarabhais into the state.[78] Similarly, in Bangalore, capital of Mysore, state-led industrial development was heavily promoted, and by 1947 had outgrown Bombay as the second-largest industrial center in India; it was also regarded as having the best universities in India and was home to the first Indian Institute of Science.[79]

It is clear that for many maharajas there was no contradiction between their traditional role as promoters of *rajdharma* and British understandings of "good governance" and "improvement." So, for example, such indubitably "modern" tasks as holding a population census to gather information on the caste composition of a state could be seen as simply a continuation of the old kingly task of managing caste relations. Similarly, the planning, reorganizing and rebuilding royal cities in accordance with modern ideas of sanitation, but which also re-sited groups by caste (as was done in Mysore), could also be presented as part of a traditional kingly duty of fostering social harmony and caste equilibrium.[80]

Meanwhile in Travancore the maharaja could appear both the ideal "westernizing" reformer, bringer of "good government" and "sound administration," while presenting the same policies to his people as simply the continuation of traditions of kingly management. Thus old notions of *rajdharma* could also be invoked to justify efforts to create more integrative "national" identities intended to transcend sectarian divisions as a furtherance of orthodox kingly protection and patronage to all religions.[81] In 1922 the Hindu Maharaja Krishna Wodeyar IV of Mysore made this connection explicit in a speech for the opening of a mosque:

> It will give me great pleasure if the Musalman community makes full use of the mosque and if they constantly resort to it for prayer and meditation. This mosque is situated on one side of the lines; the Hindu temple

78 Hardiman, "Baroda," pp. 114–122.

79 Bjorn Hettne, *The Political Economy of Indirect Rule: Mysore 1881–1947* (London, 1978), pp. 233–234.

80 Aya Ikegame, "Royalty in Colonial and Post-Colonial India: A Historical Anthropology of Mysore from 1799 to the Present" (unpublished Ph.D., University of Edinburgh, 2007), pp. 255–257, 264.

81 Frenz and Berkemer, "Colleges and Kings," p. 1266.

> is on the other side . . . Each is symbolic of that unity in diversity, which will, I hope, become in an increasing measure a pleasing characteristic of the motherland, with all its diverse castes and creeds. *To a devout Hindu they represent but one of the paths leading to the same goal* . . . I hope that you will bear mind the fact that you are Mysoreans first and all the rest next, owing a duty to the state, and that you will always work together for the common benefit and for the prosperity and the advancement of the state in all possible ways.[82] [My italics]

Such a synthesis of integrative and traditional kingly practice also influenced Baskara Setupati, the Raja of the state of Ramnad. In 1895 in a speech to announce his endowment of school for untouchables he explicitly referred to this as fulfilment of his kingly dharmic duties. He noted that some would consider such an endowment "adharma" [i.e., contrary to dharma], but insisted that for a modern king this was actually a dharmic act for:

> Her most gracious majesty looks on subjects equally and makes no distinction in governing them. So also I, being blessed with a large estate, feel it a duty to treat all the subjects of this Samasthanam (state) also alike and without distinction.[83]

Baskara went on to bankrupt himself and his state in pursuit of the Rajdharmic duty of benevolence donating tens of thousands of rupees to American Mission hospitals, Masonic lodges and various modern colleges.[84] This extreme generosity to improving causes was part of a strategy to regain the "name and fame" of the "ancient" dynasties—the acquisition of renown being another duty of traditional kingship.[85] This motivation was also clear in Jaipur, where Maharaja Ram Singh's patronage of modern schools, colleges and libraries was not interpreted as westernizing, but as an acknowledged obligation of a Hindu king. As

82 Speech by Krishna Wodeyar IV, originally given in Urdu, cited in Ikegame, "Royalty," pp. 265–266.

83 Pamela Price, *Kingship and Political Practice in Colonial India* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 171–172.

84 Ibid., pp. 168–169.

85 Ibid., p. 171.

the contemporary historian Hanuman Sharma of Chomu noted in 1919, "Whatever progress is seen in Jaipur today was established by Ram Singh . . . he took care of his people and was very famous, like [the ancient Hindu king] Vikramaditya."[86]

Though "improvements" were made under the guise of traditional *rajdharma*, the main agents of such change were often not the maharajas themselves, but of their diwans [chief ministers]. In many cases these reformist diwans were actually imposed by the British as part of the machinery of minority government, and in the early days, at least, could be seen as a "fifth column" of westernized, anglophile administrators, who had been educated in the raj's new universities in Bombay and Madras, but found it difficult to get jobs in the ICS in British India. Many, though not all, were Brahmins.[87] In the 1860s and 1870s these British-imposed diwans pursued policies of Benthamite or Gladstonian improvement, confining themselves to regularizing and, if possible, reducing the states' revenue demands on their populations and modernizing their administrations. This latter task involved reducing the influence of the aristocracy (Jagirdars) over administration, revenue and judicial functions and replacing it with that of professional, westernized bureaucracies supposedly legitimized by the presence of the princely head of state.[88] Many of these early modernizing diwans also fostered projects intended to develop agricultural "improvement" and industrial advancement—though very much within the limits of late nineteenth century laissez-faire economic orthodoxies.

86 Cited in Giles Tillotson, *Jaipur Nama: Tales from the Pink City* (New Delhi, 2006), pp. 124–125.

87 See Coen, *The Indian Political Service*, p. 69; D. A. Low, "*Laissez-Faire* and Traditional Rulership in Princely India," in Jeffrey, *People, Princes*, p. 378; Ikegame, "Royalty," p. 211.

88 See Edward Haynes, "Alwar: Bureaucracy versus Traditional Rulership: Raja, *Jagirdars* and New Administrators, 1892–1910," in Jeffrey, *People, Princes*, pp. 35–39; Robin Jeffrey, "The Politics of 'Indirect Rule': Types of Relationships among Rulers, Ministers and Residents in a 'Native State'," in *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 28:3 (1969), pp. 261–281.

So, for instance, in Jaipur the Babu Kanti Chander Mukherji, a western-educated Bengali Brahmin had come to the state in 1865 to head the newly established Maharaja's College, and in 1881, one year after the accession of a very young maharaja, he became diwan.[89] With the assistance of the British Residency surgeon, he built the state's famous Economic and Industrial Museum, which, as the maharaja explained in a speech written by Mukherji, was intended to further the education of youth and "to promote trade and lead to the increase in manufacture of rare and beautiful objects."[90] Similarly in Mysore the diwan, C. V. Rangacharlu, launched a project of industrial development in 1881; under his successor, K. Seshadri Iyer, spending on education was increased and in 1892 a number of industrial schools were founded.[91]

However, in the 1900s and 1910s this relatively passive, British-influenced interest in economic development through exhibitions and education, began to give way to a more ambitious, activist and state-led projects of development, influenced by the example of Japan. In 1908 the Gaekwad (maharaja), influenced by his sometime diwan, the western-educated economist R. C. Dutt, authorized the establishment of the Bank of Baroda Ltd. At its opening ceremony the Gaekwad observed that the adoption of such "western" institutions reflected "the obvious moral . . . that India, after the noble model of Japan, must set herself diligently to the mastery of western science and western industries in all that concerns finance and industries."[92] The most famous example

89 Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, Lloyd I. Rudolph, and Mohan Singh, "A Bureaucratic Lineage in Princely India: Elite Formation and Conflict in a Patrimonial System," *Journal of Asian Studies* 34:3 (1975), pp. 730–732.

90 Cited in Tillotson, *Jaipur Nama*, pp. 154–155.

91 M. Shama Rao, *Modern Mysore: From the Coronation of Chamarajya Wodeyar X in 1868 to Present Times* (Bangalore, 1936), pp. 128, 135, 138.

92 On Dutt's influence see Anand Chandavarkar, "Modern India's Pioneer Economic Advisor," *Economic and Political Weekly* 42:51 (December 22–28, 2007), p. 66; Gaekwad Sayaji Rao III, address at opening ceremony of Bank of Baroda, *Speeches and Addresses of His Highness Sayaji Rao III, Maharaja of Baroda,* vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1927), pp. 222–224, cited in Manu Bhagavan, "Demystifying the 'Ideal Progressive': Resistance through Mimicked Modernity in Princely Baroda, 1900–1913," *Modern Asian Studies* 35:2 (2001), p. 393.

of the more activist type of diwan was Mokshagundam Visvesvaraya, who became senior minister of Mysore in 1912. A Telugu Brahmin, he had gained a BA degree from Madras University, and a further degree in Civil Engineering from the College of Engineering, Pune. In 1900 he retired from the Public Works Department, Bombay, after he was passed over for the post of Chief-Engineer.[93] Initially brought to Mysore as an advisor on the state's dam projects and made diwan in 1912, he began to develop and implement a project of state-backed industrialization strongly influenced by Japan, where he had been on a three-month study tour in 1898.[94] In his book *Reconstructing India*, published in 1920, he drew heavily on Japan's example as one that India as a whole, not just princely states, should follow.[95] In 1923 Syed Ross Masood, who had been sent to Japan by the state of Hyderabad wrote a highly appreciative report of its educational system.[96]

Such innovation inevitably attracted the attention of Congress nationalists. The Chairman of the Congress Reception Committee at the Madras Provincial Conference of 1906 suggested that more attention should be paid to the princely states as "object lessons of efficient administration."[97] After World War I some of the diwans became overt supporters of Congress and Pattani, the diwan of the small state of Bhavnagar, made no secret of his support for Gandhi, visiting him on the eve of the Dandi march.[98] Meanwhile Gandhi himself famously described the state of Mysore under its Hindu king and Muslim diwan (Mirza Ismail) as Ram Rajya (the mythical utopia of king Ram).[99]

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93 Dhru Raina, *Visvesvaraya as Engineer-Sociologist and the Evolution of His Techno-Vision* (Bangalore, 2001), pp. 14–15.

94 Arvind P. Srinivasamuthy, *Sir M Visvesvaraya: A Brief Review of His Services* (Bangalore, 1984), pp. 10–11.

95 Mokshagundam Vivesvaraya, *Reconstructing India* (London, 1920), pp. 3, 51.

96 Syed Ross Masood, *Japan and Its Educational System: Being a Report Compiled for His Exalted Highness the Nizam* (Hyderabad, 1923).

97 Cited in Price, *Kingship*, p. 171.

98 John McLeod, *Sovereignty, Power, Control: Politics in the States of Western India, 1916–47* (Leiden, 1999), pp. 199–200.

99 Rao, *Modern Mysore*, p. 460.

But in truth the "progressive" princely states presented a vision of modernity radically at odds with that associated with the mainstream of Congress nationalism. Despite the creation of representative assemblies in a few of them, and even the introduction of a limited franchise, few were in any sense democratic. They had been, to a limited degree, bureaucratized, but not democratized.[100] Moreover even reformist diwans such as Baroda's Manubhai Mehta, was increasingly associated with the highly conservative social and religious ideas of the Hindu Mahasabha.[101] And while education—especially higher education—was a great strength of the reforming states and their diwans, reform was often accompanied by religious revival and interest in Vedic learning, of which many nationalists would not have approved.[102]

By the eve of World War I the British policy of pushing conservative modernization through reforming diwans was in retreat. In part this was because the British became mistrustful of the nationalist leanings of some of the diwans.[103] They were also concerned that in centralizing and bureaucratizing the states they had succeeded too well in drawing the princes away, politically, culturally and even spatially, from their subjects and thus reduced their efficacy as imperial "collaborators." Curzon considered some of the princes "thoroughly anglicized in tastes and habit, almost too much so for my conception of what a Native Chief should be."[104] Fears that the princes had been too "modernized" to be useful were confirmed in 1915 when Madhao Rao Scindia, Maharaja of Gwalior, told Viceroy Hardinge that the practice of using periods of

100 Jeffrey, "Introduction," in Jeffrey, *People, Princes,* pp. 21–22.
101 Ian Copland, *State, Community and Neighbourhood in Princely North India, c. 1900–1950* (New York, 2005), p. 110.
102 Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights and the History of Kashmir* (Delhi, 2004), pp. 80–127; Manu Bhagavan, "Princely States and the Hindu Imaginary: Exploring the Cartography of Hindu Nationalism in Colonial India," *Journal of Asian Studies* 67:3 (2008), pp. 892–893.
103 Gaekwad Sayaji Rao of Baroda was almost deposed on suspicion of sedition. See Bhagavan, "Demystifying," pp. 395–408.
104 Curzon to Hamilton, May 10, 1899, Curzon Collection, No. 158, cited in Ashton, *British Policy*, p. 46.

minority to introduce reforms had "shaken the adherence of the people to their traditional customs and ways."[105] Hardinge was sufficiently concerned to establish a committee of inquiry composed of three princes and three British Political Officers, and from 1916 the British adopted a tacit policy of permitting princes to revoke any measure passed during their minorities.[106]

Many of the princes were pleased to finally be free of external pressure, not least because there was increasing opposition to the staffing of state bureaucracies by "outsiders" among newly educated indigenous groups.[107] But others were rueful about the ultimate consequences of the removal of British pressure on them to "modernize." In an interview with Viceroy Linlithgow in 1938, Krishnaraja Wodeyar of Mysore observed that the Princes had no chance of survival alongside the democratizing provinces of British India unless they were "compelled to learn and apply the principles of good government" as he had been during his minority.[108]

* * *

The British project of conservative modernization then was therefore ultimately limited by its own internal contradictions, which both undermined its efficacy as a British tool of rule through influential "collaborators," and also began to generate destabilizing intra-elite tensions within those states which had relied on "outsiders" to staff their new bureaucracies. It may, however, have had long-term consequences. It is now widely accepted that the economic reforms of the post-1991 era have flourished most in the southern and central parts of India, of which

105 GOI, FPD, Letter no. 15 to Secretary of State, cited in Ashton, *British Policy*, p. 48.
106 Ashton, *British Policy*, pp. 48–49.
107 For accounts of these tensions see Manor, "Princely Mysore," pp. 31–58 and K. Leonard, "Hyderabad: The Mulki – Non-Mulki Conflict," in Jeffrey, *People, Princes*, pp. 65–106.
108 Cited in James Manor, "The Demise of the Princely Order: A Reassessment," in Jeffrey, *People, Princes*, p. 309.

large parts were former princely states.[109] It is surely no coincidence that Bangalore, the capital of the former state of Mysore, has a tradition of high-tech and modern industrial development dating back to the early twentieth century. There are many complex reasons for this, but part of the explanation may lie in the policy of conservative modernization pursued there in the high colonial era.

109 David Washbrook, "Intimations of Modernity in South India," *South Asia History and Culture* 1:1 (2009), pp. 125–148, esp. 126.

Chapter 4

Invitation, Adaptation, and Resistance to Empires: Cases of Central Asia

Uyama Tomohiko

International relations in Central Asia and its neighboring regions during the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century have been described as a "Great Game" of empires. Rivalries between powers for influence over Central Asia and the Caucasus after the fall of the Soviet Union have been called the "New Great Game." However, most accounts of the old Great Game are journalistic and stereotyped, focusing on adventurous secret agents and military men of the British and the Russian Empires.[1] The new Great Game is likewise regarded as a competition between Russia, the United States, and China for oil, gas, and military footholds. There is almost no research elucidating what these rivalries between empires and great powers have meant for Central Asia in terms of the long historical perspective.

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1 Examples of well-informed, but still stereotyped works are Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia* (London: Murray, 1990); Karl E. Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, *Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Counterpoint, 1999).

An especially problematic aspect of the old Great Game narrative is the treatment of local people as passive or irrational actors.[2] Their cooperation with or hostile actions against empires are described episodically, and their motives and backgrounds are rarely analyzed in detail. As we shall see in this paper, local actors were, in most cases, not at all passive, but had their own strategies and tactics.

Recent imperial and colonial studies have been addressing interactions between imperial powers and local peoples—in particular, the latter's interests in engagement with empires. In the field of study of the British Empire, Ronald Robinson presented a theory of "collaboration" as early as 1972, arguing that non-European elites' collaboration (or resistance) constituted a central mechanism of European imperialism, a view that has had much resonance and influence on subsequent studies.[3] In recent years, students of the history of the Russian Empire have also acquired rich knowledge of mutual relationships between imperial power and non-Russian, especially Muslim, societies, based both on Russian archival sources on local governance that became accessible after the fall of the Soviet Union and on sources in non-Russian languages.[4] There

2 Even in Sergeev's recent book, which provides an excellent account of British-Russian relations, local people appear as only minor actors. E. Yu. Sergeev, *Bol'shaia igra, 1856–1907: mify i realii rossiisko-britanskikh otnoshenii v Tsentral'noi i Vostochnoi Azii* (Moscow: KMK, 2012).

3 Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration," in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, eds., *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (London: Longman, 1972), pp. 117–142; Wm. Roger Louis, ed., *Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976).

4 Researchers have found close interactions between the Russian state and Muslim society in, above all, the Volga-Ural region. Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Naganawa Norihiro, "Molding the Muslim Community through the Tsarist Administration: *Maḥalla* under the Jurisdiction of Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly after 1905," *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 23 (2006), pp. 101–123. It should be noted that the interactions between state and society through such institutions as the Muslim Spiritual Assembly, *zemstvo*s, and military conscription, were characteristic to the Volga-Urals, but not to many other Muslim regions of the Russian Empire, including Central Asia.

are also attempts at comparing these kinds of interactions in different empires, most notably Alexander Morrison's work on Russian Central Asia and British India.[5]

In considering local factors in imperial expansion and inter-imperial rivalry, Sean Pollock's use of the concept of "empire by invitation" is highly suggestive. He demonstrates that Russian empire-building in the Caucasus was a negotiated process: Sometimes Caucasian leaders attempted to drag Russia into local affairs even when the latter preferred the status quo, and other times Russia forced them to request its protection, while ignoring them at its peril.[6] However, like most students of empire, Pollock is mainly interested in imperial policy. He uses documents of the imperial administration and does not analyze local situations and local actors' strategies in a sufficiently systematic manner.

This chapter aims at analyzing mutual relationships between empires (Russian, British, and Chinese) and local actors in Central Asia and its neighboring regions (including India) during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, occasionally referring to earlier and later periods. I focus on the strategies and logic of local actors, rather than on those of empires, and try to elucidate what imperial expansion, rule, and rivalry meant for this region. Needless to say, this is an extremely difficult task, as documents written by local actors are much fewer than those written by representatives of imperial institutions, and they are recorded in various languages. To cover regions in sufficient diversity to deduce different patterns of interaction, I am compelled to rely more on secondary sources than on primary ones.

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5 A. S. Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand 1868–1910: A Comparison with British India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

6 Sean Pollock, "Empire by Invitation? Russian Empire-Building in the Caucasus in the Reign of Catherine II" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2006). The term "empire by invitation" seems to have been first used by Geir Lundestad, although Pollock does not mention him. Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952," *Journal of Peace Research* 23:3 (1986), pp. 263–277. While Lundestad holds a one-sided view that the rising influence of the United States was requested and welcomed in Western Europe and other areas of the world after World War II, Pollock's view is more balanced, taking into account not only Caucasian people's "invitation" but also their resistance to Russia and contacts with other empires.

Roles of Local Actors in Russian and Qing Expansion into Central Asia

The concept of "empire by invitation" is largely applicable to Central Asia. Russian expansion into Central Asia was a long and complicated process, and its first step was taken in 1730 when Abul Khayr Khan, the ruler of the western part of Kazakhstan, asked the Russian Empress Anna to make peace between the Kazakhs and the Bashkirs, expressing his loyalty to her. The Kazakhs then frequently waged war with the Zunghars and had sought alliance with or protection from Russia since 1717. But Russia was reluctant, probably because the Zunghars could become an important card for Russia in its relations with the Qing Empire of China. The Zunghars fought also with the Qing, but when the Qing army temporarily withdrew after Emperor Kangxi died in 1721, the Zunghars launched an all-out attack on the Kazakhs. The large-scale Kazakh refugee flows led to devastation in a large part of Central Asia and to conflicts with Bashkirs, Kalmyks, and Cossacks in Russia. This situation heightened Russia's interest in expanding its influence on the Kazakhs to stabilize the frontier and the trade with Central Asia. Negotiations between Russian and Kazakh representatives resulted in the mutual decision to make the Kazakhs Russian subjects in 1731.

Abul Khayr Khan used his position as a vassal of the Russian tsar not only to stabilize relations with the Zunghars and the Bashkirs, but also to strengthen his power inside the Kazakh Khanate and to expand his influence on Khiva and other adjacent areas. He sometimes raided caravans of Russo-Central Asian trade to pressure Russia into giving more help. For him, Russian subjecthood was not total obedience, but an alliance that gave him privilege and that he could manipulate. Soon, however, his intention backfired. From the 1740s onward, Russia interfered in the affairs of the Kazakh Khanate by building fortress lines, instigating conflicts in the ruling families, and assuming the power to approve the title of khan.[7]

7 Irina Erofeeva, *Khan Abulkhair: polkovodets, pravitel' i politik* (Almaty: Sanat, 1999).

The Qing conquest of Zungharia was closely connected to the internal strife of the Oyirats (the Zunghars were an Oyirat tribe). After the demise of the powerful chief of the Zunghars, Galdan Tsering, in 1745, there occurred a succession struggle and killings. Some members of Oyirat ruling families, including Amursanaa, an active participant in the struggle, appealed to the Qing for help. The Qing army, appointing Amursanaa as a commander, easily defeated the Zunghars. Soon, dissatisfied with his treatment, Amursanaa declared himself leader of all the Oyirats and rose against the Qing Empire to regain independence, but the Qing were determined to completely subjugate Zungharia. Amursanaa fled first to Kazakhstan and then to Siberia, where he died.[8]

The conquest of Zungharia made the Tarim Basin, which had been ruled by the Zunghars, easy prey for the Qing Empire. Initially, the Qing supported the Aqtaghliq branch of Kashgar *khwaja*s to control the Tarim Basin, and Aqtaghliq *khwaja*s used this support to attack rival Qaratagh-liq *kwaja*s. Soon, however, Khwaja Jahan and other Aqtaghliq leaders rebelled against the Qing, and the Qing army invaded and occupied the Tarim Basin in 1758–59. Muslims of the Tarim Basin, where each oasis had a distinct history and identity, were divided, and there were a number of local leaders who cooperated with the Qing in opposing Khwaja Jahan. It should be added that people in Hami and Turfan, located to the east of the Tarim Basin, had already surrendered to the Qing Empire by the 1720s to escape Zunghar rule.[9]

The Russian conquest of Central Asia in the nineteenth century was also entangled with rivalries between local actors. By mid-century, groups of Kazakhs and Kyrgyz in Semirechie swore allegiance to Russia one after another to escape the tyranny of the Kokand Khanate,[10] although

8 Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 256–289.

9 Saguchi Tōru, *18–19 seiki Higashi Torukisutan shakaishi kenkyū* [Social history of East Turkestan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1963), pp. 45–66.

10 *Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v XVIII–XIX vekakh (1771–1867 gody): sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Alma-Ata: Nauka KazSSR, 1964); *Khrestomatiia po istorii Kyrgyzstana*, 2nd ed. (Bishkek: Raritet Info, 2004).

there were also Kazakhs and Kyrgyz who cooperated with the Kokandis. A Kokand chronicle states that, when the Russian army began to occupy Kokandian fortresses along Syr-Darya in 1864, Kazakhs around the city of Turkistan, resenting the greedy Kokandian governor, urged the Russians to quickly seize Tashkent, the largest city in the region.[11] When the Russian army occupied Tashkent the next year, it met strong resistance from citizens who had hoped for help from the Bukharan Amirate, although some Tashkent merchants cooperated with the Russians in expectation of an end to the disorder under Kokandian rule and a revival of trade.[12] The Bukharan army chose to seize another city, Khujand, by taking advantage of the Kokandian crisis, rather than to fight the Russians to rescue Tashkent.

Interestingly, there were a number of people who (or whose family members) once resisted Russia but later contributed to Russia's warfare or political deals. Akhmet Kenisarin, the son of Kenesary Qasymov, the leader of a major Kazakh rebellion in 1837–47, served in the Kokandian army after his father's death but became a Russian subject in 1861 and greatly helped Russia's war with the Kokand Khanate.[13] Jurabek and Bababek, the *bek*s of Shahrisabz who continued to resist Russia for two years after the Bukharan Amirate practically became a vassal state of Russia in 1868, later participated in the Russian army's operations to suppress revolts in the Kokand Khanate and, ultimately, to liquidate the khanate.[14] Makhtum Quli Khan, one of the Turkmen leaders in the fierce

11 T. K. Beisembiev, *"Ta'rikh-i Shakhrukhi" kak istoricheskii istochnik* (Alma-Ata: Nauka KazSSR, 1987), pp. 126–127.

12 M. A. Terent'ev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia Srednei Azii*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Tipo-litografiia V. V. Komarova, 1906), pp. 306–321; Edward Allworth, ed., *Central Asia: 120 Years of Russian Rule* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), p. 19.

13 TsGA RUz (Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Uzbekistan), f. 1, op. 2, d. 56.

14 Valerii Germanov, "Politika formirovaniia v Turkestanskom krae loial'noi Rossii natsional'noi elity," in *Rossiia–Uzbekistan: istoriia i sovremennost'*, vol. 4 [Zhurnal *EvroAziia*, no. 7] (Moscow: Istoricheskii fakul'tet MGU, 2008), pp. 85–89.

battle against the Russian army in Gokdepe in 1880–81, soon pledged allegiance to Russia and persuaded his co-ethnics in Merv to become Russian subjects.[15] All these people were given officer ranks in the Russian army, and some of them also worked as administrators. Even Shamil, the leader of the Islamic state and of the fiercest anti-Russian resistance in the North Caucasus for a quarter-century, was welcomed by the Russian emperor and public after his surrender in 1859 and was given the status of an aristocrat. He appealed to his compatriots to stop fighting and to be loyal to the tsar.[16] George N. Curzon, the prominent British participant and observer of the Great Game, noted that Russia enjoyed popularity in Central Asia because of its fraternal and laissez-faire attitude toward the locals and, unlike the British practice, its employment of former enemies.[17] For a number of local actors, resistance and collaboration were interchangeable strategies they could adopt depending on circumstances.

The above-mentioned cases show some patterns in common. In a situation of antagonism among local actors, the intention of one party to ally with a great power to defeat the adversary often led to imperial expansion, with the empire in some cases enthusiastic about expansion from the beginning, and in other cases not. In the short run, local actors were able to use the empire and even to twist it around their little fingers, but in the long run, their intentions backfired and they were subjugated by the empire. In some cases, the empire employed local elites, including those that had resisted it, for the purpose of local administration or the conquest of new lands.

How Local Actors Tried to Exploit Imperial Rivalries

The previous section observed relations between one empire and Central Asian elites. This section examines the attitudes of local political leaders who engaged two or more empires.

15 TsGA RUz, f. 1, op. 2, d. 1215, ll. 1–2ob.; M. N. Tikhomirov, *Prisoedinenie Merva k Rossii* (Moscow: Izd-vo vostochnoi literatury, 1960).

16 M. N. Chichagova, *Shamil' na Kavkaze i v Rossii* (St. Petersburg: S. Muller and I. Bogel'man, 1889).

17 George N. Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question* (London: Longmans, 1889), pp. 388–391.

The most spectacular example of engagement with empires was the policy of Ya'qub Beg, a military commander from Kokand who established a de facto independent state in 1867 in East Turkestan, where the Qing Empire had lost control because of Muslim revolts. As the British Empire hoped to have a pro-British government in this region and the Ya'qub Beg regime was interested in the possibility of restraining Russia with the help of Britain and of purchasing arms from British India, the two sides opened diplomatic relations. Later, however, the British were disillusioned with the commercial capacity and strategic importance of East Turkestan. Ya'qub Beg also appealed to the authority of the Ottoman sultan as the leader of the Muslim world by acknowledging his suzerainty, and he received arms and military instructors from his empire. The relations between the Ya'qub Beg regime and Russia were strained, as Ya'qub Beg negated trade privileges in East Turkestan that Russia had gained from the Qing government, and Russia occupied the Ili (Kulja) region to prevent his regime's northern expansion and sought to incite the Kokand khan to subjugate East Turkestan. Nevertheless, the Ya'qub Beg regime succeeded in making Russia recognize its de facto independence by concluding a commercial agreement. Neither of these three empires, however, had precise information or a clear strategy on East Turkestan, and they were unable to prevent the Qing reconquest of this region in 1877.[18]

The mountainous regions from the Pamirs to Kashmir, being situated between the Russian Empire and British India, provide various examples of local actors' attitudes to imperial rivalries. The first maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Gulab Singh, who had been the raja of Jammu, which was subordinated to the Sikh kingdom of Punjab, was given Kashmir and the status of maharaja by the British after he went over to them during the First Anglo-Sikh War (1845–46). His indebtedness to Britain notwithstanding, he was anxious to keep his territory free from British influence and to maintain direct relations with Central Asian khanates. His son Ranbir Singh, the next maharaja, sought to establish friendly

18 Kim Hodong, *Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864–1877* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 138–158.

ties with Russia, which had just conquered core parts of Central Asia, and even sent a mission to Tashkent (Turkestan governor-generalship) in 1870, according to some sources, to offer help for a possible Russian invasion of India. Russia showed interest in the trade of Kashmir shawls, but to avoid provoking Britain, it did not make political deals. Still, Kashmir's contact with Russia heightened the caution of the British and resulted in a tighter British grip over Jammu and Kashmir.[19]

Hunza, a principality on the Karakoram that had sometimes conflicted with and other times approached Kashmir was in deep confrontation with it in the 1880s and was wary of the British Empire's attempts to expand its influence on Hunza through Kashmir. Just then, in 1888, an ethnic Polish captain in the Russian army, Bronislav Grombchevsky, went there for geographic exploration. This is a favorite episode in the Great Game narrative that allegedly indicated Russia's ambitions for this region, but although he probably performed intelligence tasks, he was not given any rights to conduct political negotiations. Nevertheless, the ruler of Hunza, Safdar Ali, lavishly welcomed him as a Russian ambassador and requested that Russia make Safdar Ali and his country subject to it. Grombchevsky answered that he had no authority and suggested that Safdar Ali consult with the Russian consul in Kashgar. Safdar Ali dispatched a mission to Kashgar and Tashkent, but the Russian side did not allow it to reach Tashkent and gave only non-committal answers to letters from Hunza. After all, Grombchevsky's visit heightened Britain's caution against Russian expansion and hastened the British conquest of Hunza, which occurred in 1891. Safdar Ali continued to seek Russian protection even after he exiled himself to East Turkestan in China.[20]

The Western Pamirs were a focus of the Russo-British delimitation of spheres of influence. Here local leaders' internal strife and relations with Afghanistan and Bukhara often created situations unintended by

19 K. Warikoo, *Central Asia and Kashmir: A Study in the Context of Anglo-Russian Rivalry* (New Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1989), pp. 13–45.

20 B. L. Grombchevskii, *Nashi interesy na Pamire* (Novyi Margelan, 1891) <http://militera.lib.ru/research/grombchevsky/01.html>; N. L. Luzhetskaia, *Ocherki istorii Vostochnogo Gindukusha vo vtoroi polovine XIX v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), pp. 46–58; Warikoo, *Central Asia and Kashmir*, pp. 45–54.

the Russians and the British. The two empires agreed in 1873 to make the Panj River the northern border of Afghanistan, but in the same year, Afghanistan imposed tribute on the principality of Shughnan, which straddled the river, and established direct rule with its troops stationed there in 1883. The Afghans dispatched the troops primarily out of territorial ambition, but the ostensible reason was a letter from Sayyid Farrukh Shah and other influential Ismaili religious leaders asking the Afghan amir to remove Shughnan's despotic and unpopular ruler, Yusuf Ali Khan (a Sunni). Russia protested, and at its request, Britain half-heartedly demanded that Afghanistan withdraw from the right bank of the Panj. The Afghan amir ignored this demand, and the two imperial governments took no further measures for a while.

The Afghan occupation proved disastrous to the Shughnanis, including to Sayyid Farrukh Shah. They repeatedly rose against the Afghans and expressed their wish to become Russian subjects. After long hesitation, Russia began to send troops in 1891. Russia and Britain agreed on a final demarcation of the Afghan northern border in 1895, and the Afghans finally withdrew from the right bank of the Panj. But Russia gave Shughnan and its northern neighbor, Rushan, to the Bukharan Amirate in 1896, in compensation for the latter's relinquishment of the part of Darvaz on the left bank of the Panj. People in Shughnan and Rushan strongly resisted Bukharan rule, and they persuaded Russia to establish de facto rule in 1905.[21]

The Eastern Pamirs, sparsely populated by Kyrgyz, were more vulnerable to external intervention, and it was difficult for the people there to take independent actions like the Shughnanis had done. This area enjoyed relative stability under the Kokand Khanate in the mid-nineteenth century, but from the 1870s it was devastated by successive invasions of troops from Ya'qub Beg, Qing China, and Afghanistan. As a

21 A. V. Postnikov, *Skhvatka na "Kryshe Mira": politiki, razvedchiki i geografy v bor'be za Pamir v XIX veke* (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 2001), pp. 183–188; *Istoriia Gorno-Badakhshanskoi avtonomnoi oblasti*, vol. 1 (Dushanbe: Paivand, 2005), pp. 332–340, 351–371; D. Ivanov, "Shugnan: Afganistanskie ocherki," *Vestnik Evropy* 3 (1885), pp. 638–643.

result of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1895, people in the Eastern Pamirs accepted Russian rule without resistance.[22]

As the above-mentioned examples show that, when their independence was threatened by a larger country, small countries often tried to enlist the help of another large country or an empire by exploiting rivalries among them. Empires that received calls for help reacted in various ways, but they were often cautious to avoid provoking another empire. They even respected its interests when it already dominated the small country in question, as the Russian attitude to Kashmir showed. The halfhearted involvement of empires without clear strategies was counterproductive to tiny countries like Hunza, and it could not ultimately rescue even shrewd players like Ya'qub Beg. Empires used small countries as pawns in certain situations, but in the final analysis, empires were interested in maintaining the international order of the great powers. One may recall in this connection that the British Empire, deeply engaged in Tibetan affairs in fear that Tibet might fall into the sphere of Russian influence, never recognized its independence from China even when it was de facto independent. However, in some cases, like that of Shughnan, determined local leaders did persuade imperial authorities and changed the situation in their favor.

Adaptation to Empire: How Muslims Justified Infidel Rule

For Muslims, the majority population of Central Asia, all the empires that engaged this region were infidel. As long as relations remained diplomatic, almost no one seemed to have explained or criticized their rightfulness in religious terms. Once imperial rule began, however, Muslims often discussed whether it was acceptable from an Islamic point of view. According to Islamic—particularly Hanafi—jurisprudence, the world is divided into *Dār al-Islām* (the House of Islam), where Islamic law

22 B. L. Tageev, "Pamirskie kirgizy," *Niva* 38 (1897) <http://zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-halle.de/t1056.html>; *Istoriia Gorno-Badakhshanskoi*, vol. 1, pp. 348–350; E. Maanaev and V. Ploskikh, *Na "Kryshe mira": Istoricheskie ocherki o pamiro-alaiskikh kirgizakh* (Frunze: Mektep, 1983), pp. 61–67.

prevails, and *Dār al-Harb* (the House of War), which antagonizes Islam and where Islamic law is not in force. Muslims who find themselves in *Dār al-Harb* should, in theory, declare war (Jihad) against infidel rulers or migrate to *Dār al-Islām*. In practice, however, the way of determining whether Islamic law is in force has been open to discussion.

In Russian Turkestan, not a few Muslims justified Russian rule by saying it was better to be ruled by just infidels than by Muslim tyrants. Mainstream Islamic scholars argued that Russian Turkestan was *Dār al-Islām*, because Muslim judges enforced Islamic law (only at the local level, to be precise), and *volost'* (canton) and village administrators were also Muslims. A part of the Muslims, in contrast, denounced infidel rule and the corruption of Muslim judges and administrators, and some of them participated in the Andijan Uprising of 1898. But many Islamic intellectuals condemned the uprising, which they thought was doomed to failure and only brought death and suffering to Muslims.[23] This opposition to the uprising may have been related to conflicts between different strata of Muslim society, as the leader of the uprising, Dukchi Ishan, a man of low birth and without proper education, was popular among the common people but was despised by intellectuals and administrators.[24]

In India, Anglo-Mohammedan law, a civil law system based on Islamic law as interpreted and modified by the British, was applied to Muslims. But some Muslims called for Jihad and/or migration, deeming British India *Dār al-Harb*, a notable example being that of the Mujahideen Movement in the mid-nineteenth century. Around 1870, Islamic scholars debated whether British India was *Dār al-Islām* or *Dār al-Harb*, and many of them, using subtle arguments based on Islamic jurisprudence and avoiding a clear answer to the question, concluded that the British were just rulers who protected Muslims' rights and that there was

23 Komatsu Hisao, "*Dār al-Islām* under Russian Rule As Understood by Turkestani Muslim Intellectuals," in Uyama Tomohiko, ed., *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007), pp. 3–21.

24 Aftandil S. Erkinov, *The Andijan Uprising of 1898 and Its Leader Dukchi-Ishan Described by Contemporary Poets* (Tokyo: Department of Islamic Area Studies, The University of Tokyo, 2009).

no reason to rebel against them.[25] Behind this conformist attitude, we may discern Islamic scholars' regret over the large number of victims in the Indian Rebellion of 1857.

In East Turkestan, there were calls for Jihad during repeated rebellions. Objectively, there was reason to call East Turkestan under Qing rule *Dār al-Islām*, as Islamic courts continued to function without much change because of the lack of clear Islamic policy in the empire, but we have found no sources indicating that Muslims in this region actually supported such an argument. There were, however, other ways for Muslims to justify Qing rule. For example, *Tārīkh-i amniyya*, a chronicle completed by Mulla Musa in 1903, cited the following arguments: the justice and fairness of the Qing emperor; the "obligation of salt," a concept of ancient Turkic origin, according to which one has to be loyal to gracious rulers who give salt and bread; and the idea that every reality, including infidel rule over Muslims, was the result of divine providence.[26]

Thus, many Muslim intellectuals in Russian and Chinese Central Asia, as well as in British India, accepted infidel rule, using various rationales, including in particular the important Islamic concept of justice (*'adl*). This attitude may have reflected the realism of the people in these regions, which have historically experienced the reigns of various foreign rulers.

Tacit Resistance, or Miscommunication between Colonizers and Colonized

Needless to say, adaptation to imperial rule was not necessarily sincere, and it could be two-faced, although tacit resistance usually appears in historical sources in a subtle manner that requires delicate reading. Using Mulla Musa's *Tārīkh-i amniyya*, the same source we cited as an example of Muslim justification of Qing rule, Shinmen Yasushi points out that the author called only Ya'qub Beg, and not the Qing emperor, "His Majesty

25 P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 107–115.

26 Hamada Masami, "'Shio no gimu' to 'seisen' to no aida de" [Between the "obligation of salt" and "holy war"], *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 52:2 (1993), pp. 122–148.

(*janāb ʻālī*)," and that he wrote, "this dark cloud shadowed the brilliance of noble Islam," in relation to the fall of the Ya'qub Beg regime and the Qing reconquest.[27] Apparently, for Musa, Qing rule was a reality he accepted but did not welcome.

Another type of subversion,[28] intentional or unintentional, was more commonly observed: Colonized people appropriated colonial institutions for their profit in manners unexpected by the empire. After Russia eliminated the post of chief Muslim judge (*qāḍī kalān*) in Tashkent in 1867, a post whose holder had only occasionally accepted appeals for revision of judgments issued by ordinary judges, Muslims began to lodge numerous appeals with tsarist administrators and to obtain favorable revisions of judgments, taking advantage of the Russians' insufficient knowledge of Islamic law and their distrust of Muslim judges.[29] When Russia promoted the sedentarization of nomads in Semirechie around the turn of the twentieth century, some Kyrgyz petitioned for the formation of a settled *volost'* with the aim of separating from a nomadic *volost'* dominated by a rival group, even though the petitioners had no intention of actually being settled.[30]

27 Shinmen Yasushi, "'Henkyō' no tami to Chūgoku: Higashi Torukisutan kara kangaeru" [Peripheral people and China: A view from East Turkestan], in Mizoguchi Yūzō et al., eds., *Ajia kara kangaeru*, vol. 3, *Shūen kara no rekishi* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994), pp. 117–119.

28 In analyzing imperial rule other than its earlier stages, Paul Werth considers the concept of "subversion" more useful than "resistance," because when the imperial and the indigenous become ever more thoroughly intertwined and entangled, smaller manifestations of opposition may complicate significantly the exercise of power even as they themselves are engendered and structured by that power. Paul W. Werth, "From Resistance to Subversion: Imperial Power, Indigenous Opposition, and Their Entanglement," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 1:1 (2000), pp. 21–43, esp. 22.

29 Paolo Sartori, "Behind a Petition: Why Muslims' Appeals Increased in Turkestan under Russian Rule," *Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asiatiques* 63:2 (2009), pp. 401–434.

30 Akiyama Tetsu, "Roshia teikoku shihaika no Kuruguzu shakai: Seigansho ni utsushi dasareta shakaiteki shokankei to sono henbō" [Kyrgyz society under the rule of the Russian Empire: Transformation of social relations reflected in petitions], *Nairiku Ajiashi kenkyū* 18 (2003), pp. 39–62.

An even more widespread phenomenon was corruption related to the elections of local native administrators and judges, a system introduced by Russia into Central Asia from the 1860s. Elections became a venue for factional strife, and they cost candidates large sums for buying votes and offering bribes to Russian officials. Once elected, the candidates levied unlawful taxes on the population in order to recoup expenses. Such corruption strengthened Russian officials' resentment toward intermediaries, a common trope of imperial polemics in many colonies,[31] and some Russians called native administrators an "impermeable curtain" or "living wall" that obstructed the former's knowledge of Muslim life.[32] The lack of trust and miscommunication between Russian and native administrators made Russian officials' grasp of local situations shaky.

When open resistance occurred, the imperial administration was shocked by the injury to imperial prestige. Not only did the administration often launch violent repression, but it also made major policy changes, sometimes in an excessive manner. The Qing Empire treated Hui Muslims (including Salars) as equal to Han Chinese until the mid-eighteenth century, but the revolts of followers of the Jahriyya Sufi order in 1781 and 1784 in Gansu abruptly strengthened the government's misgivings about them. Repression of Huis spread to Xinjiang (East Turkestan), nurturing a discontent that ultimately led to long and repeated revolts in the second half of the nineteenth century.[33] The British revised their policy in India after the rebellion of 1857, putting even more emphasis on the role of maharajas and other local elites who were believed to serve as their collaborators by maintaining the traditional social order, while slowing modernization projects such as mass education.

31 Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand*, pp. 149–150.

32 Uyama Tomohiko, "A Particularist Empire: The Russian Policies of Christianization and Military Conscription in Central Asia," in Uyama, ed., *Empire, Islam, and Politics*, pp. 47–48; V. P. Nalivkin, *Tuzemtsy ran'she i teper'* (orig. pub. 1913), in *Musul'manskaia Sredniaia Aziia: Traditsionalizm i XX vek* (Moscow, 2004), pp. 63–64, 76–77.

33 Ka Ritsu [Hua Li], "Kenryū ki no Shinkyō Kaimin dan'atsu to Shinkyō he no hakyū" [Oppression of Jahriyya Muslims during the Qianlong era and its spread to Xinjiang], *Higashi Ajia kenkyū* 45 (Osaka University of Economics and Law, 2006), pp. 79–92.

The Andijan Uprising tempted Russian high officials to introduce a more rigid system of religious administration. Although their attempts led to almost no systematic changes of policy, the Russian administrators' distrust of Central Asian Muslims increased after this event, despite the fact that, as already mentioned, many Muslims, including Islamic scholars, condemned the uprising. Even the peaceful resistance of Tatars who had earlier been (forcibly) baptized but who reconverted to Islam in the mid-nineteenth century,[34] combined with other factors such as the exodus of Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire, made the Russian government hostile to Islam and caused it to restrict Muslim Tatars' activities outside their own community. Thus, miscommunication between colonizers and colonized, and the former's overreaction to resistance, led not only to the latter's misfortune but also to the instability of imperial rule.

Imperial Rule and Modernization Movements

We have seen that, while the people of Central Asia and its neighboring regions held diverse attitudes toward empires, there were no fundamental differences among regions, in the sense that people were quite flexible in forming relationships with empires and were able to switch between resistance and collaboration. In the long run, however, people's destinies greatly diverged depending on which empire they belonged to. While former British India achieved independence in 1947 with partition into India and Pakistan, and the five countries of the former Russian/Soviet Central Asia rather unexpectedly became independent in 1991, East Turkestan and Tibet remain in China, despite the people's strong aspirations for independence. We will not discuss why one or another region has or has not been able to achieve independence, but we will shed light on the divergence of the colonized people's attitudes toward empires in the course of modernization.

34 Paul Werth warns researchers against exaggerating the scale of "apostasy" of baptized Tatars, noting that while tens of thousands of them repudiated Orthodoxy in favor of Islam, a much larger number—about 120,000—remained formally Christian. Werth, "From Resistance to Subversion," pp. 37–38.

We have mentioned that Islamic intellectuals in Russian Turkestan regarded this region as *Dār al-Islām* because Islamic law was still in force to some extent; in fact, this concerned only sedentary areas. Nomadic people, to whom the Russian authorities did not allow the application of Islamic law, were in a different situation. The famous Kazakh poet Abay (1845–1904) clearly wrote that they lived in *Dār al-Harb*. But he wrote this not to call for Jihad or migration, but simply to demonstrate the difficulty of learning Arabic there. He wrote that the Russians had knowledge, wealth, art, and science, and that it was necessary to learn their language and receive their education.[35]

Kazakh intellectuals were discontented with the Russian policy to alienate the Kazakhs from Islam, but ultimately it was more important for many of them to learn Russian and acquire European culture and technology, in order to improve their rights and cultural level. They struggled to achieve autonomy within Russia in cooperation with both Russians (liberals and socialists) and fellow Muslims.[36] In sedentary areas of Turkestan, intellectuals were more Islamic-oriented, but the cultural environments created under Russian rule were essential for their mental development and movements for reform and autonomy.[37] During the tsarist and the Soviet periods, people in Central Asia, adapting themselves to Russian/Soviet rule, acquired administrative skills and established national culture. These proved to be favorable preconditions for independence.

35 Abay, "Jiirma besínshí söz" [The twenty-fifth word], in his *Shïgharmalarïnïng ekí tomdïq tolïq jinaghï*, vol. 2 (Almaty: Jazushï, 1995), p. 176.

36 Uyama Tomohiko, "Two Attempts at Building a Qazaq State: The Revolt of 1916 and the Alash Movement," in Stéphane A. Dudoignon and Komatsu Hisao, eds., *Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia* (London: Kegan Paul, 2001), pp. 77–98; idem, "The Changing Religious Orientation of Qazaq Intellectuals in the Tsarist Period: *Sharī'a*, Secularism, and Ethics," in Niccolò Pianciola and Paolo Sartori, eds., *Islam, Society and States across the Qazaq Steppe (18th – Early 20th Centuries)* (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2013), pp. 95–118.

37 Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

In British India, elites were eager both to preserve classical culture based on Sanskrit and Persian and to learn European culture. Even when the British were negative about expanding English education, Indians learned English on their own initiative.[38] Unlike Russia, Britain had established democracy in the metropolis, and Indians could easily refer to democracy as a criterion for criticizing British policy in India and for demanding more political rights. Indian elites also eagerly sought to be employed as high officials and to be elected to assemblies.[39] This created preconditions for a vibrant independence movement and relatively smooth decolonization.

East Turkestan's cultural relationship with China was radically different from that of Central Asia with Russia and that of India with Britain. From the 1880s onward, the Qing Empire promoted Chinese education among the Muslims in this region, without much success. In the early twentieth century, Muslim intellectuals in East Turkestan launched cultural and reformist movements, following the examples of Russian and Ottoman Muslims, not of Chinese.[40] Some of these turned into independence movements in the 1930s and 1940s. In 1933, rebels in Turfan asked the British consul-general in Kashgar for help, claiming that the Chinese were holding them back from developing in a civilized way: "The Chinese deprived us of civil rights. They have kept us away from science, technology, industry, and trade . . . The world-famous tyranny of the Chinese placed us in an uncultured and uncivilized state, and subjected us to misfortune."[41] An

38 Lynn Zastoupil and Martin Moir, eds., *The Great Indian Education Debate: Documents Relating to the Orientalist-Anglicist Controversy, 1781–1843* (Richmond: Curzon, 1999), pp. 25–31.

39 A prominent example of active participation in British politics and criticism of British policy in India was that of Dadabhai Naoroji, the first Indian to be a British Member of Parliament (1892–95) and the author of *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India* (1901).

40 Ōishi Shin'ichirō, "Uiguru jin no kindai: Jadīdo undō no kōyō to zasetsu" [Modernity of the Uyghurs: Rise and fall of the Jadid movement], *Ajia yūgaku* 1 (1999), pp. 24–39.

41 Shinmen Yasushi, "Shinkyō Musurimu hanran (1931–34 nen) to himitsu soshiki" [The Muslim rebellion in Xinjiang (1931–34) and secret organizations], *Shigaku zasshi* 99:12 (1990), pp. 1–42, esp. 12.

organization that played a central role in the establishment of the East Turkestan Republic in 1944 issued a political declaration emphasizing China's backwardness and its distance from East Turkestan: "The Chinese invaded our East Turkestan from faraway China across the Gobi Desert, and established their domination by arms and whips, taking advantage of our yearning for peace and sincerity . . . Being the most backward nation in the world, they could not give us bright life, could not advance our culture and education, and could not improve living conditions of the people."[42]

Tibetans in the first half of the twentieth century also were not favorably disposed to China, nor even to the West, as they were deeply confident of the value of Tibetan/Indian Buddhist culture. The influence of Chinese culture remained superficial, and attempts at modernization were feeble. The English school that opened in 1924 was closed after two years under pressure from the monks.[43]

Meanwhile, under the threat of imperialist encroachment by the West and Japan, China from the late Qing period became increasingly tenacious in claiming sovereignty over its peripheries. Outside powers intervened haphazardly, using independence movements as bargaining chips with China: The Soviet Union, initially a principal patron of the East Turkestan Republic, abandoned it in mid-1945 and supported the Republic of China in return for the latter's agreement on the joint use of railways and ports in Northeast China and readiness to recognize Outer Mongolia's independence.[44] Up to now, people in East Turkestan and Tibet have had difficulty in cooperating with movements of other ethnic groups in the country (unlike Central Asians in the late tsarist and late Soviet periods), and they have been unable to refer to democracy in the

42 Ō Ka [Wang Ke], *Higashi Torukisutan Kyōwakoku kenkyū: Chūgoku no Isuramu to minzoku mondai* [A study of the East Turkestan Republic: Muslims and the national question in China] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1995), p. 102.

43 David Snellgrove and Hugh Richardson, *A Cultural History of Tibet*, rev. ed. (Boulder: Prajñā Press, 1980).

44 Sergey Radchenko, "Choibalsan's Great Mongolia Dream," *Inner Asia* 11:2 (2009), pp. 231–258, esp. 242–250.

metropolis to justify their causes (unlike Indians in the British Empire). Ironically enough, the Central Asians in the former Russian/Soviet Empire and the Indians, who had adapted to imperial rule to a considerable degree, gained independence, whereas people in East Turkestan and Tibet, many of whom chafe under Chinese rule, have not yet been able to gain independence.

In conclusion, we can observe that great powers are not simply self-creating, but owe much to relationships with other powers and actors. They compete and coexist with other great powers, and attract or subjugate small countries and regions. This chapter has demonstrated that actors in small countries and regions have played important roles in imperial expansions and rivalries, and have sometimes even outplayed empires. In the long run, however, their initiatives often led to subjugation by empires. As long as imperial rule brought justice and stability, more people chose adaptation and collaboration than chose resistance, but rulers' distrust and misgivings sometimes alienated them. The same people were able to change between collaboration and resistance, and the same ideology, such as Islam, could justify both. In the period of modernization, the ability or inability of an empire to provide cultural and political models and opportunities could determine colonized people's attitudes to the empire.

Chapter 5

Toward an Empire of Republics: Transformation of Russia in the Age of Total War, Revolution, and Nationalism

Ikeda Yoshiro

Today, the term "Soviet Empire" has almost ceased to function as a pejorative of the Cold War brand, at least in the academic world. Owing to the blossoming of empire studies, especially to a number of volumes dedicated to the Soviet Union, the understanding of the USSR as an empire has become common during the last two decades. The "imperial" approach to the Soviet Union is helpful in turning our attention to the multiethnic features of the USSR, structured not simply as "the prison of nations," but as the newest type of composite state, where the political identities of various nationalities were constantly in the making, interacting with the Communist Party at the core as an agent of social engineering.[1]

However, Soviet imperial studies are just beginning, with many questions awaiting further study. An especially important question concerns the problem of imperial heritage: what continuity, if it existed,

1 See Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, eds., *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

was there between the Russian Empire and the USSR as a multinational state? I will try to tackle this problem, rethinking modern Russian history across the revolutionary border of 1917, from the First Russian Revolution of 1905 to the formation of the USSR in 1922.[2] If I present here the conclusion of this chapter, it is as follows: the Soviet Union was a product of the revolutionary transformation of the old empire, a process reflecting global trends at the beginning of the twentieth century, that is, democratism, nationalism and mass mobilization. Magnified by total war and revolution, these trends brought about a unique type of composite state in Russia—the Soviet Union as an "empire of republics." Founded on republicanism and composed of many levels of "republics," the Soviet Union was geared to the age of mass mobilization. But, in reality, all these republics were of "autonomous" status, regardless of their official name, entitling us to call the USSR an empire.[3]

The structure of this chapter is as follows: in the first section, I will examine an administrative reform plan, offered during the First Russian Revolution, by a prominent liberal, F. F. Kokoshkin (1871–1918), who had a "particularist" view of the nationality problem, preferring to grant autonomy from above, only to some selected nationalities. Kokoshkin had been influenced by German state theory, which, by the rigorous cat-

2 On the intellectual history of federalism in the nineteenth-century Russian Empire, see, Mark von Hagen, "Federalisms and Pan-movements: Re-imagining Empire," in Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev, eds., *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007).

3 Using the term "empire," I do not oppose the argument of Joshua Sanborn that the Bolsheviks had promoted civic nation building in the former Russian Empire. Joshua A. Sanborn, *Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics, 1905–1925* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003). Understanding the USSR as an "empire of republics," I mean to build a bridge between Sanborn's argument and Soviet imperial studies. On my view on civic nation building in Bolshevik Russia, see my article on the collectivist labor mobilization during the civil war as a way of nation building. E. Ikeda, "Trud kak sposob formirovaniia «sovetskikh grazhdan»: proizvodstvennaia propaganda, 1920–21 gg." in *Padenie imperii: Revoliutsiia i grazhdanskaia voina v Rossii* (M.: Sotsial'no-politicheskaia MYSL', 2010).

egorization of various levels of statehood, made his viewpoint a criterion for evaluating the attitude of various political forces toward the nationality problem of Imperial Russia. In the second section, I will analyze two studies on federation, published in the Russian Empire in 1912, which criticized Kokoshkin from a unitarist point of view. In the third section, discussion of the "British Empire model" shortly before and during the First World War will be examined as an alternative to Kokoshkin's plan. Then, we will inquire into the transformation of Russian society during the First World War and the 1917 Revolution, during which Kokoshkin's plan had been defeated. In an epilogue, the formation of the USSR as an "empire of republics" will be analyzed.

All dates before February 1918 are expressed according to the Julian (Russian) calendar, which, in the twentieth century, was thirteen days behind the Gregorian (Western) calendar.

Kokoshkin's Particularist View of Autonomy

In 1897 and 1898, a young Russian jurist took an academic trip to France and Germany. His name was Fedor Kokoshkin, descended from a noble Muscovite family. Having graduated with high marks from the Faculty of Law of Moscow University in 1893, he was dispatched abroad for further studies on constitutional law. In Heidelberg, he had an opportunity to receive guidance from Georg Jellinek (1851–1911), one of the most influential theorists of state in Europe in those days.[4] Jellinek's academic style was characterized by understanding the state in historical development and denying its absolutization, as was demonstrated in *The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens: A Contribution*

4 A. Kizevetter, "Fedor Fedorovich Kokoshkin," in *Pamiati pogibshikh* (Paris: Société Nouvelle d'Editions Franco-Slaves, 1929), pp. 12, 14–15; A. N. Medushevskii, "Fedor Fedorovich Kokoshkin," in *Fedor Fedorovich Kokoshkin. Izbrannoe* (M.: ROSSPEN, 2010), pp. 8, 18. The international influence of German state theory is a prospective subject in comparative history. For example, see Nicholas Aroney, "The Influence of German State-Theory on the Design of the Australian Constitution," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 59:3 (2010).

to Modern Constitutional History (1895), in which Jellinek maintained that the liberty of the individual was not created by the state, but only recognized by it, and recognized in "the self-limitation of the state."[5] Jellinek had not only influenced his Russian pupils' view of the state, but changed the latter's attitude to society. Once a student with rightist leanings and captivated by the "formal beauty of theoretical structures," Kokoshkin in Heidelberg began to "stand face to face with new problems throwing light on the deep connections of jurisprudence with the real interests of life." After returning to Russia, he committed himself to the Liberation Movement, which was gathering momentum at the beginning of the twentieth century.[6]

The most important subject in Jellinek's works that affected Kokoshkin's political activities related to the problem of statehood. By the end of the nineteenth century, Jellinek and his German colleagues had elaborated a categorization of various ranks of statehood, including sovereign states, non-sovereign states, and "state-fragments." The sovereign state was a traditional concept in state theory, while the concept of the non-sovereign state was closely connected with the works of Jellinek and another German scholar Paul Laband. What fell under this category were constituent states of a federation, such as Württemberg in the German Empire, Bern in Switzerland, and Pennsylvania in the USA.[7] Then, Jellinek coined another rank of statehood, "state-fragments" (*Staatsfragmente*). In *Über Staatsfragmente* (1896), Jellinek defined state-fragments as "neither wholly states, nor wholly divisions of a state, nor yet banded municipalities subject to the state," classifying into this category Alsace-Lorraine, Canada, Croatia, Finland and so on.[8] Generally speaking, "state-fragments" corresponded to autonomous regions,

5 Georg Jellinek, *The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens: A Contribution to Modern Constitutional History*, trans. Max Farrand (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1901), pp. 96–97.

6 Kizevetter, "Fedor Fedorovich Kokoshkin," pp. 14–15.

7 Georg Jellinek, *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, 3rd ed. (Berlin: O. Höring, 1914), pp. 493–494.

8 Georg Jellinek, *Über Staatsfragmente* (Heidelberg: Gustav Koester, 1896), pp. 10–11, 13, 40, 43–44.

as Kokoshkin later translated this concept into Russian as *avtonomnye kraia* or *avtonomnye oblasti*.[9]

Jellinek devised the concept of the "state-fragment" in order to explain the special status of Finland in the Russian Empire. In his earlier work, *Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen* (1882), Jellinek did not yet have a suitable notion for the intermediate stages between state and province, so he defined Finland as "a province of the Russian Empire."[10] This definition was abused in the Russian Empire as a weapon for eliminating the autonomous rights of Finland. This fact prompted Jellinek to seek a concept able to comprehend the special status of Finland and other similar cases lying between state and province.[11]

This categorization of statehood was used by Kokoshkin in his confrontation with nationalist movements during the 1905 Revolution. With the beginning of the revolution, mass mobilization became an unignorable factor in politics for the first time in the modern history of Russia. In the empire's peripheries this situation led to a rise of various nationalist movements, because social cleavage overlapped there with ethnic cleavage more often than not. Many nationalities began to make their presence known, with a claim for the rights of nationality and a cry of protest against the centralizing policy of the government. This sudden emergence of nationalist movements took by surprise not only the Imperial government, but also leaders of the Liberation Movement. They had striven for a democratization of the autocratic regime, but, mostly composed of the Great Russians, had paid little attention to the nationality problem.[12]

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9 See Kokoshkin's *Lektsii po obshchemu gosudarstvennomu pravu* (1912) in *Fedor Fedorovich Kokoshkin. Izbrannoe*, pp. 245, 334.

10 Georg Jellinek, *Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen* (Wien: Alfred Hölder, 1882), p. 71.

11 Boris Minzès, *Russia's Treatment of Finland and Its Bearing on Present World Politics*, trans. Montague Donner (New York: Finnish-American Publishing Co, 1900), pp. 17–19.

12 On the criticism of the Great Russian liberals by a prominent Ukrainian nationalist, see, M. S. Grushevskii, *Natsional'nyi vorpos i avtonomiia* (SPb.: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1907), pp. 5, 12.

When an All-Russian Congress of Zemstvo (local self-government) and Municipal Deputies was held in September 1905 in Moscow, Kokoshkin gave a report on "the rights of nationalities and administrative and legislative decentralization." To gain a clear sense of his argument, we need to understand how Kokoshkin distinguished between autonomy (*avtonomiia*) and self-government (*samoupravlenie*). For Kokoshkin, autonomy meant the competence to promulgate local laws with the establishment of a local parliament (*sejm*), whereas self-government meant only to issue ordinances within the limits of state laws. Kokoshkin argued for the development of self-government, not autonomy, all over the empire with the strengthening of zemstvos. He admitted the necessity of "cultural" autonomy for nationalities, which meant the right to use one's own language and to develop one's own culture. However, he was quite careful to introduce regional autonomy, because of the "sharp differences of local conditions." "It may be promoted *gradually, in each case, by promulgating a special all-imperial law on the establishment of this or that autonomous region*." Only Poland might immediately enjoy the status of an autonomous region (*avtonomnyi krai*) thanks to the homogeneity of the area.[13]

In essence, this was a particularist approach to the problem of autonomy, typical of the politicians of an imperial metropolis. For them, autonomy is to be given to one or another region selectively, from above, because of the diversity of local conditions.[14] The Congress approved a resolution on the basis of Kokoshkin's report, with an important opposing voice by A. I. Guchkov against the regional autonomy of Poland and for the preservation of the unitary feature of the empire. One month later, the arguments of Kokoshkin were incor-

13 Kokoshkin's italics. *Natsional'nyi vopros v programmnykh dokumentakh politicheskikh partii, organizatsii i dvizhenii Rossii. Nachalo XX v. Dokumenty i materialy* (Tomsk: Izd-vo NTL, 1998), pp. 15–35, citation from p. 33.

14 On the particularist feature of imperial rule, see Tomohiko Uyama, "A Particularist Empire: The Russian Policies of Christianization and Military Conscription in Central Asia," in Tomohiko Uyama, ed., *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007).

porated into the program of the newly born Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets).[15]

After the Congress Kokoshkin's report received criticism from some prominent public figures as leading to federalization and, then, the dismantling of Russia. This induced him to write a brochure entitled *Regional Autonomy and the Unity of Russia* (*Oblastnaia avtonomiia i edinstvo Rossii*) (1906), in which Kokoshkin the jurist gave a genuine lecture on the concepts of federation, autonomy, and self-government. He warned his readers in particular "not to confuse the notion of autonomy with federation." Relying on Jellinek, Kokoshkin explained that a constituent state (non-sovereign state) of a federation had its own government, independent of the federal authorities, whereas an autonomous province (for example, Croatia in the Austrian Empire) was not able to have one. The latter's legislative competence originated not in itself, but was only delegated by the government, and was always put under its strict control. So, the unitary feature of the Russian Empire would not be harmed in any way by the introduction of political autonomy for some regions (Poland and, surmising from the Kadet program, Finland).[16] Kokoshkin thus emphasized his restricted understanding of autonomy positioned in contraposition to federation.

Kokoshkin had to underscore this dichotomy all the more, because, in addition to the conservative criticism of autonomy as a road to the federalization of Russia, the nationalist movements also tended to demand both autonomy and federation together. Moreover, the Socialists-Revolutionaries (the SRs) and even some left Kadets likewise sympathized with this demand (by contrast, the Social-Democrats, both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, upheld the idea of the unitary state).[17]

From Kokoshkin's writings we may say that Jellinek's scheme of statehood offered a convenient theoretical framework for the Russian lib-

15 *Liberal'noe dvizhenie v Rossii 1902–1905 gg.* (M.: ROSSPEN, 2001), pp. 394–396; *Pervyi shturm* (M.: Molodaia gvardiia, 1990), pp. 466–469.

16 *Fedor Fedorovich Kokoshkin. Izbrannoe*, pp. 464–471; *Pervyi shturm*, p. 469.

17 *Natsional'nyi vopros*, pp. 56–57, 59–61, 63–66, 80–84; *Pervyi shturm*, pp. 433, 448; V. P. Obninskii, *Novyi stroi*, chast' 2 (M.: Tip. Russkogo Tovarishchestva, 1911), pp. 339–340.

erals, irrespective of Jellinek's intention. The concept of the "state-fragment" was especially serviceable: clearly distinguished from both the non-sovereign state and the province, it duly conformed to their particularist nationality policy, justifying the bestowing of political autonomy only on Poland and Finland as autonomous regions.[18]

It is no coincidence that Jellinek and other German scholars had produced such an elaborate scheme of statehood. We are too much accustomed to seeing the German Empire simply as a nation state.[19] Indeed it was, but at the same time, the German Empire was a federation with a disproportionate composition of constituent states.[20] This specificity made German legal scholars especially keen on the discrepancy between currently existing states and the principle of nationalism. They tried to define as precisely as possible the various types of statehood, regarding at the same time the unity of the state as a crucial factor for the modern state.

Consequently, it is understandable that German state theory was accepted by Russian liberals, since their empire was also lying under the threat of nationalism (though the force of nationalism affected each empire in a diametrically opposite way: in Germany, nationalism had thwarted existing dynasties to consolidate an empire, whereas in Russia, the integrity of the currently existing empire was seen to be threatened by the centrifugal forces of nationalism). Kokoshkin was not alone in this regard. His comrade V. M. Gessen edited a commentary for the Kadet

18 On the Kadets' attitude toward Ukraine, see, S. Breiiar, "Partiia Kadetov i ukrainskii vopros (1905–1917)," *Issledovaniia po istorii Ukrainy i Belorussii*, vypusk 1 (M.: TsUB MGU, 1995).

19 On a criticism against the traditional view of the German Empire as a nation state, see, Philipp Ther, "Imperial instead of National History: Positioning Modern German History on the Map of European Empires," in Alexei Miller and Alfred J. Rieber, eds., *Imperial Rule* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004).

20 The Russians at the beginning of the twentieth century were much more aware than us of the federated nature of the German Empire. See, for example, P. G. Mizhuev, *Glavnye federatsii sovremennogo mira* (SPb.: Russkaia skoropechatnia, 1907).

nationality policy, quoting Jellinek.[21] Another jurist, N. I. Lazarevskii, also depended on the works of Laband and Jellinek in his *Autonomy* (*Avtonomiia*) (1906) in defining key notions, though he was more radical than Kokoshkin in demanding a wide-ranging introduction of regional autonomy to the Russian Empire immediately with the establishment of a constitution.[22]

An Option for a Unitary State

Jellinek's scheme of statehood, and especially the concept of the "state-fragment," was suitable for Kokoshkin to manage the ethnic and regional diversity of the Russian Empire, arguing for a particularist approach to each region. But recognition of imperial diversity did not necessarily lead to the particularist option of imperial rule. One might oppose this option exactly because of imperial diversity.

After the Coup of June 3, 1907 by P. A. Stolypin, the revolution and the nationalist movements were oppressed. Five years later, in 1912, two monographs dedicated to the problem of federation were published: A. A. Zhilin's *Theory of Federated State* (*Teoriia soiuznogo gosudarstva*) and A. S. Iashchenko's *Theory of Federalism* (*Teoriia federalizma*).[23] Both were published in the empire's peripheries, Kiev and Iur'ev (Tartu), and, in a sense, constituted a reply to the centrifugal forces of the nationalist

21 Vl. M. Gessen, ed., *Avtonomiia, federatsiia i natsional'nyi vopros* (SPb.: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1906), pp. 21, 24, 32.

22 N. I. Lazarevksii, *Avtonomiia* (SPb.: Tip. A. G. Rozena, 1906). A Ukrainian with close connections with Saint Petersburg University, Lazarevskii was rather unbiased in his attitude to the nationality problem. He was a Kadet and would be shot by the Bolsheviks in 1921. See, Sergei Zavadskii, "Pamiati N. I. Lazarevskogo," in *Pamiati pogibshikh*, p. 188, 190.

23 A. A. Zhilin, *Teoriia soiuznogo gosudarstva. Razbor glavneishikh napravlenii v uchenii o soiuznom gosudarstve i opyt postroeniia ego iuridicheskoi konstruktsii* (Kiev: Tip. I. I. Chokolova, 1912); A. S. Iashchenko, *Teoriia federalizma. Opyt sinteticheskoi teorii prava i gosudarstva* (Iur'ev: Tip. K. Mattisena, 1912).

movements during the revolution.[24] Having carried out a comprehensive analysis of theories and historical cases of federation, both authors gave a negative answer to the applicability of federal arrangements to the Russian Empire.

In *Theory of Federated State*, Zhilin recognized that federations as well as unitary states were playing an important role in the modern world. However, he wrote, a federated state might be stable only when the constituent states were similar to each other in size and cultural level, like the USA and Switzerland, or composed of a homogeneous nation, like Germany. Both conditions were absent in the Russian Empire, so its federalization would mean "a ruin of the state."[25]

Accordingly, Zhilin refused to endorse Jellinek's concept of the "state-fragment," calling it "extremely unsuccessful." These regions (*kraia*) "are situated quite independently and living their own lives, but are parts of a state, and should be subjected principally to its supreme interest. And a wise policy would consist of assimilating, to the extent possible, this heterogeneous (*inorodnoe*) body, and in binding it more firmly to the state organism one way or another."[26]

Iashchenko, the author of *Theory of Federalism*, was still more critical of Jellinek and federation in general. He negated the possibility of federation as a stable form of the state, considering that currently existing federations were just "intermediates developing toward the establishment of unitary states." Correspondingly, Iashchenko did not support German state theory's concept of the "non-sovereign state." The "state-fragment" concept to him was also "completely unsuccessful," being just about as useful as defining a living form as "being not unlike

24 Indeed, Iashchenko's connections with Iur'ev were temporary. Having graduated from Moscow University in 1900, he held an appointment at Iur'ev University from 1909 to 1913, and then moved to St. Petersburg University. A. S. Iashchenko, *Filosofiia prava Vladimira Solov'eva. Teoriia federalizma* (SPb.: Aleteiia, 1999), p. 5. This volume includes only the theoretical part of the original edition of *Teoriia federalizma*.

25 Zhilin, *Teoriia soiuznogo gosudarstva*, pp. 318–319, 348–349, 352.

26 Zhilin, *Teoriia soiuznogo gosudarstva*, pp. 297, 353.

human." For Iashchenko, the appropriate denomination for such regions was "incorporated provinces."[27]

Iashchenko then attacked the centrifugal nationalist movements during the revolution. "Federalism has quite often been envisioned (by anarchists, syndicalists, and provincial nationalists) as a political goal for decentralizing and breaking up a unitary state. But such a political program does not match in any way the lessons of history. Centralized states often proceed toward decentralization, but there is no example of the federalization of a unitary state." He did not oppose the administrative decentralization of Russia, but had some reservations: "The allegation that every individual political unit per se should enjoy autonomy is wrong." It would transform a state to "a number of small tyrannies with economic, national, or confessional features." He was especially cautious about national-territorial autonomy. "National autonomy isolates from the whole state its parts. . . . Nationalism should be accepted insofar as . . . it joins and unites those peoples hitherto disunited [as in the German Empire]. But nationalism should be rejected insofar as . . . it is particularistic."[28] Iashchenko's apology for the unitary state was thus firmly backed by his fear of disintegration of the empire.

In 1912, Kokoshkin also published (supposedly, sometime between the two monographs on federation) his magnum opus, *Lectures on General Theory of the State* (*Lektsii po obshchemu gosudarstvennomu pravu*). He remained loyal to his particularist view of autonomy. In *Lectures*, he referred to his mentor's concept of the "state-fragment" quite approvingly, remarking that Jellinek ascribed to this category Finland, "whose juridical status is generally quite debatable."[29]

The British Empire as an Alternative?

Both Zhilin and Iashchenko denied the applicability of federalism to the Russian Empire, fearing that imperial diversity might cause its disintegration. However, many of their contemporaries thought that there was

27 Iashchenko, *Teoriia federalizma*, pp. 227, 342, 357.
28 Iashchenko, *Teoriia federalizma*, pp. 364, 384, 396.
29 *Fedor Fedorovich Kokoshkin. Izbrannoe*, p. 334.

an ideal model of empire, where tolerance of diversity had been duly coordinated with integrality. It was the British Empire.[30] Followers of the British model shared political liberalism with Kokoshkin, but their views of autonomy and federation were not wholly identical, since the former tended to prefer federalization to decentralization, while the latter, the other way around.

A monumental Russian work on the British Empire was completed in February 1914, shortly before the outbreak of the First World War. It was *The Autonomous Colonies of Great Britain* (*Avtonomnye kolonii Velikobritanii*), written by Baron S. A. Korf, professor of Aleksandr University of Helsinki, again from the empire's periphery.[31] The monograph was composed of five chapters on the British Dominions—Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and Newfoundland, and a chapter comprising theoretical reflections on the structure of the British Empire. In the last chapter, Korf criticized German state theory for the fact that it recognized a canton of Switzerland or a state of the USA as a genuine, though non-sovereign, state, but did not recognized the British colonies in the same way. "This theory of federation was worked out to save the independence of, and to satisfy the self-respect of, the southern German states and the southern states of the USA."[32]

30 See, for example, P. G. Mizhuev, *Istoriia kolonial'noi imperii i kolonial'noi politiki Anglii*, 2nd ed. (SPb.: Brokgauz-Efron, 1909).

31 After graduating from the Imperial School of Jurisprudence, Korf was assigned to the Ministry of Finance from 1899 to 1906. In the summer of 1900, he had a chance to stay at Heidelberg University, writing a report on the juridical status of the governors of the Russian Empire for Jellinek. Then, in 1902, S. Iu. Witte's Ministry of Finance dispatched Korf to the Far East to research, among others, financial and juridical problems in Manchuria. There he became acquainted with the Chinese Eastern Railway Zone under Russian rule. This experiment would contribute to his study on state theory. Despite P. A. Stolypin's anxiety about his liberalism, in 1907, Korf was appointed professor at Aleksandr University of Helsinki, where he would hold a position till 1918. A. B. Pavlov, "Nauchno-pedagogicheskaia i politicheskaia deiatel'nost' S. A. Korfa (1876–1924 gg.) v Rossii i emigratsii" (Dissertatsiia na soiskanie uchenoi stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk, SPb., 2006), pp. 14–24.

32 S. A. Korf, *Avtonomnye kolonii Velikobritanii* (SPb.: Trenke i Fiusno, 1914), p. 433.

His criticism of German state theory did not mean that Korf argued for the centralization of the Russian Empire. On the contrary, Korf was a staunch supporter of decentralization. For him, the problem of German state theory lay in the fact that it was too rigorous and static. Indeed, Korf admitted, Jellinek was right when he tried to grasp the intermediate stages by coining the concept of the "state-fragment." But Korf wanted to go one step further, to comprehend the nature of contemporary statehood in its dynamics. According to Korf, boundaries between each stage of statehood were becoming increasingly subtle. He had in mind various cases of intermediate statehood from the Principality of Bulgaria and Egypt under a de facto British protectorate to the Kwantung Leased Territory under Japanese rule and a British colony, Weihaiwei. In particular, the British colonial policy was characterized at the beginning of the twentieth century by "the recognition of statehood (*gosudarstvennost'*) of the autonomous colonies."

So, contrary to Jellinek, Korf maintained that the British colonies were not "state-fragments," but (non-sovereign) states. Logically, the British Empire was becoming a federation. It was true that England had occupied a privileged status in this federation, like Prussia in the German Empire. But Korf was convinced that "in future, we may see the formation of several new, general, imperial organs, which would stand above all the parts [of the federation], including, consequently, England itself."[33]

Obviously, Korf described the evolution of the British Empire as an ideal model for the Russian Empire. His argument was welcomed by those who had been repressed by the centralizing policies of the government. In *Nations and Regions* (*Narody i oblasti*), a magazine of the Society for the Unity of Nationalities in Russia, a reviewer, a certain "V. O.," highly evaluated Korf's book. "We may trace step by step how the boundary had been obliterated between the two notions of 'metropolis' and 'colony.'"[34]

33 Korf, *Avtonomnye kolonii*, pp. 433–434, 447–449.

34 *Narody i oblasti* 1 (May 1, 1914), p. 32. "V. O." was probably V. P. Obninskii, editor-in-chief of the magazine. A left Kadet, he was a member of the Autonomists in the first Duma. *Gosudarstvennaia Duma Rossiiskoi Imperii: 1906–1917. Entsiklopediia* (M.: ROSSPEN, 2008), pp. 6–7.

The outbreak of the First World War strengthened the Russian public's impression that the British Empire had successfully constructed an ideal relationship between the center and the peripheries, as the colonies were hastening to offer help to the metropolis upon hearing the declaration of war. *Nations and Regions* enthusiastically reported that "when we reviewed the book by Baron S. A. Korf about the regime of Great Britain in the first number of the magazine, we did not expect, of course, that all the findings of the author would become real so soon and so remarkably in the life of this country."[35] So, it seemed as if the British Empire would have admirably tamed imperial diversity by giving maximum autonomy to its Dominions.

The Kadets also highly evaluated the relationship between Britain and its Dominions. For example, the leader of the party P. N. Miliukov called the English "a nation believing in political liberty and national autonomy."[36] But the Kadets, and Kokoshkin in particular, aimed to incorporate into the Russian Empire's administration not the practices in the Dominions, but those in Ireland. In September 1914, the British parliament passed the Third Home Rule Bill, promising Ireland self-government (whose implementation was postponed with the outbreak of the First World War). But the extent of autonomy promised to Ireland was not as large as that enjoyed by the Dominions.[37] Kokoshkin took this restricted status of Irish autonomy as a model for an autonomous Poland. On July 8, 1915, Kokoshkin made a report at a Kadet conference on a bill on "the organization of the Polish Kingdom," in which he said: "[The Bill] intends to establish autonomy for Poland. The notion of autonomy in the narrow sense, in line with the Kadet program, means such a regime under which a certain part of the state has its own administration and legislation implemented by the local parliament, but obeys the whole in national (*obshchegosudarstvennyi*) problems. Such autonomy has been

35 *Narody i oblasti* 3-4-5 (September 1, 1914), p. 23.

36 P. N. Miliukov, "Diplomaticheskaia istoriia voiny," in *Ezhegodnik gazety Rech' na 1915 god* (Pg.: Trud, n. d.), p. 85.

37 The Russian public had a great interest in the problem of Irish autonomy. See, for example, A. M. Kulisher, *Avtonomiia Irlandii* (M.: Tip. G. Lissnera i D. Sovko, 1915).

enjoyed by Galicia and Croatia in Austria; Irish Home Rule was equally based on this type [of autonomy], which has not yet been enacted."[38] In this way, Kokoshkin again demonstrated his particularist views of the governance of empire.

Kokoshkin viewed the British Empire first of all as an "empire" in which the metropolis might unilaterally decide the status of this or that part of the state. This authoritarian feature of the British Empire stood out especially in relation to non-white settler colonies such as India. Characteristically enough, Kokoshkin wholly approved of colonial rule in India in the beliief that its ethnic diversity justified British dominance. On 16 October, 1916, Kokoshkin gave a lecture at an open meeting of the Society for Rapprochement with Britain, held in Moscow, under the title "Germany, Britain and the Fate of Europe." Contrasting the German rush to world hegemony with British liberalism expressed in the integration of a global empire, Kokoshkin added: "Undoubtedly, there is no equality for all parts of the British Empire. Such equality would be impossible with the great diversity of the cultures of its inhabitants." He especially referred to India. "Critics of Britain like to reproach it for India. But I can't help pointing out that their reproaches are based on incorrect representations of this country. Many people imagine India as a homogeneous whole, a homogeneous nation, mature for political independence and aiming for this. In reality, India is an enormous heterogeneous conglomerate of nationalities, among which are barbarians, half-cultured peoples, and peoples with a highly developed and elaborate, but unique culture. India does not have a united national self-consciousness. Hostile to each other, many races, creeds, and religions collide among themselves there. Let them have their own way, and India would inevitably be turned into an arena of bloody fratricide."[39] Perhaps this patronizing view toward the Indian peoples revealed Kokoshkin's prejudice about most of the non-Russian nations in his own empire.

38 *S"ezdy i konferentsii konstitutsionno-demokraticheskoi partii*, tom 3, kniga 1, *1915–1917 gg.* (M.: ROSSPEN, 2000), p. 178.

39 F. F. Kokoshkin, *Angliia, Germaniia i sud'by Evropy* (M.: T-vo I. N. Kushnerev, 1918), pp. 31–32.

Condescending and particularist, Kokoshkin however grasped British imperial rule more realistically than Korf, who had idealized the British Empire as a federation of equal constituencies. Representing the ruler's view, Kokoshkin realized that the governance of imperial diversity might necessitate dominance by force.

The Great War, Revolution, and the Defeat of Kokoshkin

The Great War changed the way in which the category "nationality" was understood in the Russian Empire. At the moment of the beginning of the war, this category more or less overlapped with that of estate (*soslovie*). As the war proceeded, however, the substance of the nation came to be considered even more in socio-economic terms, since total mobilization had affected the space of everyday life, transforming the socio-economic relations of the inhabitants.[40]

The strengthening of the socio-economic dimension of the nationality problem influenced, in turn, the strategy of nationalist activists. They began to strive more than ever to depict nationality in the form of homogeneous mass in socio-economic terms. For example, a Belorussian writer, M. Bogdanovich wrote in the summer of 1915 that "the Belorussian nation (like its intellectuals) belongs entirely to the working classes of the whole population [of the region]. Therefore, defending and emphasizing the nationality rights of the Belorussian nation means defending and emphasizing the rights of the working strata of the region. In this case, the notions of 'nation' (*natsiia*) and 'democracy' precisely coincide with each other."[41] In this way, under conditions of total war, one

40 For example, in the spring of 1915 Russian-occupied territories of the Ottoman Empire had experienced fierce conflicts between the Armenian refugees returning there from Russia and the Kurds who had deprived them of their land. "Nationalistic antagonism is . . . merging with economic struggle," reported economist N. Oganovskii. N. Oganovskii, "Armiano-kurdskie otnosheniia," *Natsional'nye problemy* 2 (July 20, 1915), pp. 6–9. For more on this topic, see, Peter Holquist, *Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914–1921* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002).

41 M. Bogdanovich, "Belorussy," *Natsional'nye problemy* 2 (July 20, 1915), p. 19.

of the key factors of 1917 politics was already beginning to be formed, that is, mass mobilization by means of nationalism and democratism.

After the February Revolution, all sorts of nationalist movements swiftly gained momentum in the empire's non-Russian regions, demanding the federalization of Russia. The two republican federations commanded considerable attention: the 1874 Constitution of Switzerland was translated with commentaries, while the political system of the USA was popularized through cheap pamphlets.[42] In many cases, as in the 1905 Revolution, the demand for the federalization of Russia was inseparable from a requirement for autonomy.[43] Give us autonomy and a federation. This cry for the radical reconstruction of the empire utterly upstaged Kokoshkin's rigorous contraposition of federation with autonomy.

Regional autonomy was sometimes demanded; cultural autonomy was at other times put on the agenda. However, it is not productive to categorize too rigidly these two types of autonomy.[44] Participants of the nationalist movements did not often draw a sharp line between them, demanding both simultaneously. The core of the problem for them was to realize autonomy in one or another way to become a political subject. "Those who were slaves become men," as was written in a note presented by the Ukrainian Central Rada (the revolutionary parliament of Ukraine) to the Provisional Government and leaders of the Soviet movement.[45] This view of autonomy demonstrated by the nationalist movements made a sharp contrast with that of Kokoshkin, who saw autonomy above all as a matter of (colonial) governance.

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42 *Soiuznaia konstitutsiia Shveitsarskoi federatsii 29 maia 1874 g. s izmeneniiami, posledovavshimi po 1905 g.*, trans. L. M. Magaziner (Pg.: Muravei, 1917); N. Kazmin, *Chto takoe soiuznoe gosudarstvo (Federativnoe gosudarstvo)* (Pg.: Muravei, 1917).

43 For example, see S. M. Dimanshtein, ed., *Revoliutsiia i natsional'nyi vopros. Dokumenty i materialy po istorii natsional'nogo voprosa v Rossii i SSSR v XX veke* (M.: Izd. Kommunisticheskoi Akademii, 1930), p. 229.

44 See S. M. Iskhakov, *Rossiiskie musul'mane i revoliutsiia (vesna 1917 g. – leto 1918 g.)*, 2nd ed. (M.: Sotsial'no-politicheskaia MYSL', 2004), p. 174.

45 Dimanshtein, *Revoliutsiia i natsional'nyi vopros*, p. 147.

Among the major Russian parties, the SRs, as in the 1905 Revolution, prominently committed themselves to the cause of the nationalist movement. But this commitment was characterized by eclecticism, demand for a federation, regional autonomy and cultural autonomy all together.[46] As concerns the Bolsheviks, while V. I. Lenin exploited the nationality problem first of all as a weapon for shattering the Provisional Government on the one hand, underestimation of the significance of the nationality problem was widely observed within the party on the other hand.[47] It is remarkable that, in a survey of the nationality program of the major parties, E. S. Lur'e simply omitted the Bolsheviks.[48]

The mounting demand for autonomy with a federation affected the mood of the Kadets, which had become the ruling party after the February Revolution, and maintained their influence in the first coalition established on May 5, with the SRs and the Mensheviks. The difficult task of framing the party course for the nationality problem was undertaken, as expected, by Kokoshkin. He gave a report under the title "Autonomy and Federation" to the Eighth Kadet Congress (May 9–12), which was a compilation of all his works on federation and autonomy. In the first place, he looked back on the 1905 Revolution. "In the report of the Zemstvo Bureau, and in the discussion at the Congress [of Zemstvo and Municipal Deputies], we definitely emphasized that the two problems [decentralization and nationalities] had to be distinguished from each other if we wanted to settle them correctly. But the characteristic feature of the present moment consists of the fact that these problems are merged and equated with each other in the imagination of the wider public." However, continued Kokoshkin, "no one federation in the world

46 See V. P. Buldakov, "Natsional'nye programmy praviashshikh partii Rossii v 1917 godu (problemy vzaimodeistviia)," in *Neproletarskie partii i organizatsii natsional'nykh raionov Rossii v Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii i grazhdanskoi voine. Materialy konferentsii* (M.: Kalininskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1980), pp. 13–16.

47 On the underestimation of the nationality problem in the party, see Dimanshtein, *Revoliutsiia i natsional'nyi vopros*, p. XXXVII.

48 E. S. Lur'e, *Natsional'nyi vopros v Rossii* (M.: Kooperat. Tovarishchestvo, 1917). Do not confuse this author with Menshevik Internationalist M. Z. Lur'e (Iu. Larin).

is constructed on the basis of the national principle." It was impossible especially in Russia, because of "the extreme unevenness of the populations of all the nationalities composing Russia, and the inequality of the territories occupied by them." So, the point was once again the imperial diversity of Russia.[49]

As an alternative, Kokoshkin proposed the non-national decentralization of Russia. He admitted that it would be desirable to redefine territories taking economic and ethnographic conditions into account. But, he warned, it would be quite risky to undertake territorial delineation at the same time as the establishment of the constitution. So, he proposed being satisfied for the time being with granting local autonomy to existing, non-ethnic territorial units. Moreover, the competence of these units had to be one of the "purely provincial type," managing "local matters only." "Is this a federation?" asked Kokoshkin, and answered, "my project is not a project of federation." Though "a federated Russian republic is my ideal, . . . immediate transition to a federation would hugely complicate the realization of a republican constitution itself."[50]

Kokoshkin's report perfectly accorded with the Kadet party program, which supported the idea of non-ethnic decentralization and permitted exceptions only for Poland and Finland (though Kokoshkin avoided mentioning these two regions in his report). However, many deputies found his theoretical consistency outmoded by a revolutionary reality. M. M. Mogilianskii from Chernigov (Ukraine) hit back against Kokoshkin's pedantism. "Construction of a federated state along the scheme and ideal of Kokoshkin is utterly right in theory, in a vacuum, but we must accept life as it is." He demanded that Ukraine be treated in the same way as Poland. A delegate of a Moscow Lithuanian group, P. S. Leminas, remarked that Lithuania "has the right to count on the recognition of special [status]." A delegate of the Kiev Regional Committee, P. E. Butenko, pointed out the influence of war on the nationality problem: "The revolution was accomplished not by the nation of Russia, but by the nations of Russia, whose national sentiment had been aroused by the war waged under the slogan of 'liberation of small nationalities.'" He did

49 *S"ezdy*, tom 3, kniga 1, pp. 552–553, 802.
50 *S"ezdy*, tom 3, kniga 1, pp. 561–566.

not support the federalization of Russia, but Kokoshkin's report seemed to him quite scholastic. "Kokoshkin does not know on which dogmas he may construct an answer to the nationality problem, but people are not seeking such dogmas in textbooks on constitutional law." In the end, the congress approved Kokoshkin's report, but at the same time decided "to charge the Central Committee with preparing additions to the party program on the nationality problem for the next party congress."[51]

On July 2, on the initiative of A. F. Kerenskii (SR), I. G. Tsereteli (Menshevik), and M. I. Tereshchenko (non-party), an agreement was reached between the Provisional Government and the Ukrainian Central Rada to grant to the General Secretariat of the Rada the status of "supreme organ of governance on regional matters in Ukraine." Kadet ministers and Kadet jurists such as Kokoshkin and Baron B. E. Nol'de in the Juridical Commission of the government fiercely protested against this agreement. Since, by Nol'de, it "legalized notions of 'Ukraine' and 'Rada,' which have not existed to date in law, the legal meaning of these terms remains utterly uncertain." The Kadet ministers left the cabinet, bringing about the collapse of the first coalition. However, the July crisis caused by a pro-Bolshevik demonstration in Petrograd led to a strengthening of the Kadets' influence over the cabinet. The second coalition was organized, now with Kokoshkin nominated state controller. "The best expert on various forms of composite states (*gosudarstvennye ob"edineniia*)," recollected Miliukov, "Kokoshkin set himself the task of weakening, as much as possible, that harm caused by the Agreement of July 2." As a result, the Provisional Government on August 4 issued a "Provisional Instruction" to the General Secretariat of Ukraine, the first paragraph of which read as follows: "Pending solution to the problem of local governance (*mestnoe upravlenie*) to be decided by the Constituent Assembly, the supreme organ of the Provisional Government on local government matters of Ukraine is the General Secretariat, appointed by the Provisional Government on submission by the Central Rada." This restricted competence of the General Secretariat reminds us of Irish Home Rule, which was highly valued by Kokoshkin. Miliukov later boasted that, in this way "solution to the Ukrainian problem has been

51 *S"ezdy*, tom 3, kniga 1, pp. 582–586, 594–595, 601–602.

brought into the scope of the general problem of the arrangement of local governance in the future constitution of a free and united Russia."[52]

During these July days of crisis, the Ninth Kadet Congress was convened (July 23–28), with a report on the promised addition to the party program by Nol'de. His report included a proposal of a seemingly radical change to the party program on the nationality problem, introducing the "personal principle," that is, charging non-territorial, personal unions of given nationality with administration of national-cultural matters. In reality, the main aim of this proposal was to forestall the demand for national-territorial autonomy. Nol'de opposed it, since "a dominant nationality in a territory will inevitably stream to self-assertion at the expense of numerically weak nationalities." In spite of criticism by a delegate from Kiev that the report would be understood as "the party . . . utterly abolishing and denying the autonomy of Ukraine," the congress approved it.[53]

However, there was no time left for the Kadets to take any significant measure to deal with the situation. Having committed themselves to the abortive coup d'état by General Kornilov at the end of August, Kokoshkin and other Kadet ministers fatally compromised their reputation before the masses. The Tenth Kadet Congress (October 14–16) finished with no meaningful decisions on the nationality problem.[54] Ten days later the Bolsheviks seized power. Prominent Kadets were all arrested. After being detained in Petropavlovsk Fortress, Kokoshkin became ill, and was then transferred to Mariinskaia Hospital together with his comrade A. I. Shingarev on January 6, 1918. That night, sailors broke into their rooms and murdered both Kokoshkin and Shingarev.[55]

52 P. N. Miliukov, *Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii* (M.: ROSSPEN, 2001), pp. 187–192, 269–272, 709; Dimanshtein, *Revoliutsiia i natsional'nyi vopros*, pp. 62–64. On a similar conflict between the Provisional Government and Finland, see Irina Novikova, "The Provisional Government and Finland: Russian Democracy and Finnish Nationalism in Search of Peaceful Coexistence," in Burbank et al., *Russian Empire*.

53 *S"ezdy*, tom 3, kniga 1, pp. 676–681, 723–724, citation from pp. 676, 681.

54 See *S"ezdy*, tom 3, kniga 1, pp. 729, 746.

55 *Kak eto bylo. Dnevnik A. I. Shingareva. Petropavlovskaia krepost', 27. XI. 17 – 5. I. 18* (Khar'kov: Novoe Slovo, 1918), pp. 59–66.

Epilogue: Toward an Empire of Republics

By the end of 1922, the Bolsheviks had formed a unique composite state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), composed of various ranks of national-territorial unit. These units were categorized into three ranks: the union republics (*soiuznye respubliki*), the autonomous republics (*avtonomnye respubliki*), and the autonomous regions (*avtonomnye oblasti*). This categorization should not be taken as an indication of a particularist approach to the diverse nationalities populating the USSR. Rather, it revealed the Bolshevik understanding of the time line, escalating from the lower stage to the higher stage, along which each nationality was placed depending on the degree of its political, economic and cultural development. Consequently, the grouping was not unchanging, with the possibility of "upgrading" the status left open.[56]

The basic structure of the union republics (for example, Ukraine) and the autonomous republics (for example, Bashkiria) was principally identical, modeled on the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), while the autonomous regions were organized in line with the ordinary provinces of the RSFSR. Taking account of the possibility of the autonomous regions being upgraded to autonomous republics or even union republics, one might say that the Bolsheviks approved a standardized, not particularist, approach to the problem of how to manage imperial diversity, granting some type of "republic" to each nationality living in the country. This strategy was quite appropriate for the era of total war: on the one hand, the standardization of all national units had to be effective for the sake of mobilization; on the other hand, the "republic" was a time-tested device to turn subjects of the monarch into politically active citizens. The Bolsheviks started where the Kadets stopped, not hesitating to pull into political activities non-Russian, "backward" nationalities. In contrast to Kokoshkin's condescending view of the peoples of India, Stalin stated soundly in 1923 that "the more we go forward, the more nationalities we find. Today, we think of Hindustan as a solid whole body, whereas there are a lot of nationalities."[57]

56 See Hirsch, *Empire of Nations*.

57 *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, 1991, no. 5, p. 165.

All these indicate that a radical transformation had occurred in the structure of the former Russian Empire as a multinational state during the Great War, revolution, and civil war. Mass mobilization during these years had remodeled "nationalities" from traditional estates to units of modern politics. By granting the status of standardized "republic" to each nationality, the Bolsheviks institutionalized this transition, at the same time trying to tame the nationalism of various nationalities.

Despite this radical transformation, however, the USSR was not wholly deprived of the characteristic features of imperial rule. Above all, the scope of competence enjoyed by each national-territorial unit was rigorously restricted and regulated by the metropolitan capital (though the core territory peopled by the Great Russians was not free from this control, either, which situation was rarely observed in the colonial empires of those days). Then, the status of each national-territorial unit was determined by the capital, from above. It is especially true in the case of the autonomous republics of the RSFSR, the formation of which was decided not by treaty between the center and a region, but by the unilateral declaration of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK), with the exception of Turkestan and Bashkiria.[58]

58 Turkestan had been declared as an autonomous republic in its own constitution before the beginning of the civil war, and only in April 1921 was the relationship between it and the RSFSR confirmed by a VTsIK decree. K. Arkhippov, *Sovetskie avtonomnye oblasti i respubliki* (M.: Gosizdat, 1925), pp. 56–58.
The first of the autonomous republics in the RSFSR, the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (BASSR) was organized in March 1919 as a result of a compromise treaty between the Bolsheviks and the Bashkir national movement. The movement led by Akhmed Zeki Validov adopted a resolution in December 1917, demanding a Russian Federation and the approval of Bashkiria as its constituent state (*shtat*), modeled on the Switzerland Constitution. See Iskhakov, *Rossiiskie musul'mane*, p. 418. The establishment of the BASSR in March 1919 thus partly realized the demand for the federalization of Russia raised during the 1917 Revolution. However, the compromise did not last long. After several occasions of conflict, in May 1920, the VTsIK unilaterally issued a decision on the state structure of the BASSR, granting only administrative autonomy to Bashkiria in some restricted spheres. See Jeremy Smith, *The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917–23* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999),

As concerns the union republics, their official status as sovereign states notwithstanding, the scope of their competence was likewise determined from above.[59] In this sense, the USSR had inherited the imperial center-periphery relationship, typical in the Russian Empire and reflected in Kokoshkin's view of autonomy.

In the 1920s, many Soviet theorists of state tried to give clear definitions of the "autonomous" status of the national-territorial units composing the USSR. Having not yet severed their connection with the academic tradition of pre-revolutionary Russia, they often turned to German state theory. However, the Soviet scholars found themselves in an awkward situation, since they had to admit that the scale of competence enjoyed by the national-territorial units was indeed as restricted as that of the autonomous regions of ordinary empires, or indeed even more so.

To begin with, many Soviet scholars agreed that the autonomous regions were just "national provinces" (*natsional'nye gubernii*) in essence.[60] K. Arkhippov, who had studied most minutely the legal status of these regions, also concluded that the "autonomy of national regions is identical to autonomy of provinces," that is, they enjoyed

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pp. 94–98; Daniel E. Schafer, "Local Politics and the Birth of the Republic of Bashkortostan, 1919–1920," in Suny and Martin, *A State of Nations*; *Dekrety Sovetskoi vlasti*, tom 8 (M.: Politizdat, 1976), pp. 220–221.

59 Typically enough, the Politburo seems to have considered the relations between the RSFSR and Ukraine on the one hand and those between the RSFSR and autonomous Bashkiria on the other hand in a similar framework. On June 14, 1920, the Politburo approved a thesis prepared by Stalin: "To define precisely and unconditionally the limits of the rights of the Bashkir Republic and the norms of its relations with the RSFRS on the basis of established practice in Ukraine (via the TsK [Central Committee of the Party] and the VTsIK)." Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI), f. 17, op. 3, d. 68, ll. 1, 4.

60 D. Magerovskii, "Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik," *Sovetskoe Pravo*, 1923, no. 1(4), p. 9; A. Turubiner, "K voprosu o polozhenii Avtonomnykh Respublik v SSSR (v diskussionnom poriadke)," *Vlast' Sovetov*, 1923, no. 6–7, p. 48.

only administrative self-government with the right to issue local ordinances.[61]

Concerning the status of the autonomous republics in the RSFSR (and in the USSR), Ukrainian scholar N. I. Palienko maintained in 1923 that they be ascribed not to states, but to autonomous regions, such as the Provinces of the Netherlands, Finland of the Russian Empire, the Provinces of the Austrian Empire, and the Dominions of the British Empire.[62] This was a recognition that the autonomous Soviet republics occupied in the RSFSR a place similar to autonomous regions (or Jellinek's state-fragments) of ordinary empires (except for the Netherlands). More radically, in his 1922 article, B. D. Pletnev even denied the federative nature of the RSFSR and asserted that it was a unitary state, including a series of national-territorial units (the autonomous republics), "the competences of which were hardly different from that of our pre-revolutionary provincial zemstvos."[63]

So let us proceed to examining the status of the union republics, which had been on an equal footing with the RSFSR during the civil war as independent states and which remained "sovereign" states after the formation of the USSR. For a start, the metropolitan Bolsheviks evaluated the independence of Ukraine and other republics during the civil war mainly as a matter of tactics.[64] After the formation of the Soviet

61 Arkhippov, *Sovetskie avtonomnye oblasti*, p. 41. N. I. Parienko also pointed out that the "autonomy of these regions has an administrative, not legislative, character." N. I. Palienko, *Konfederatsii, federatsii i Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik* (Odessa: Gosizdat Ukrainy, 1923), p. 13.

62 Palienko, *Konfederatsii*, pp. 13–15.

63 See, Magerovskii, "Soiuz," p. 12.

64 How the Politburo handled matters with Ukraine clearly showed this. The Politburo evaluated an independent Ukraine first of all for the sake of propaganda. On February 17, 1920, in answer to a proposal of Kh. G. Rakovskii, chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars, to restore the Presidium of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee in view of the liberation of Ukraine by the Red Army, the Politburo gave its approval, but only on the condition that "this Presidium does not set up any practical (*delovoi*) apparatus, but assumes only the function of foreign representation." Evidently discontented, Rakovskii inquired again about the rights and functions of the Pre-

Union in 1922, these independent republics were offered the status of union republic and declared to be sovereign states within the USSR. But several Soviet scholars wondered whether this was logically correct. Palienko wrote that the union republics had ceased to be sovereign states after the formation of the USSR, "since they are subordinated in many relations to a common state [the USSR]."[65] In the forward to Palienko's monograph, People's Commissar for Justice of Ukraine M. Vetoshkin tried to modify this argument, emphasizing the right of secession guaranteed for the union republics by the USSR Constitution.[66] Nevertheless, D. Magerovskii also had doubts about the sovereignty of the union republics, asserting that the sovereignty of each union republic indeed existed, but it did not become apparent for the period of the existence of the USSR. Magerovskii made a proposal if not to "cast away the notion of sovereignty," to introduce a new notion of "potential sovereignty," although an authority on Soviet state law, A. G. Goikhbarg, criticized this proposal in a public debate at the Institute of Soviet Law.[67]

Arkhippov elaborated on the difference between the autonomous republics and the union republics. He had to admit that theoretically "each group represents a particular group of autonomous republics." This argument was based on German state theory, especially Jellinek's. According to the latter, the competence of "self-organization," that is, the power to establish its own constitution, "is a substantial indication of a constituent member of a federation, different from an ordinary, yet autonomous, part of the state." From this viewpoint, the union republics within the USSR were deprived of any substantial indication of a member state of a federation; consequently, they were solely autono-

sidium, only to receive an identical answer. In addition to this, on February 28, the Politburo approved a proposal of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR G. V. Chicherin that Rakovskii be appointed people's commissar for foreign affairs of Ukraine, with instructions "not to found an apparatus of the commissariat." RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 62. l. 1; d. 63. l. 1.

65 Palienko, *Konfederatsii*, p. 44.

66 Palienko, *Konfederatsii*, pp. 6–9.

67 Magerovskii, "Soiuz," p. 17; Magerovskii, "Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik," *Vlast' Sovetov*, 1923, no. 6–7, p. 13.

mous parts of a state, similar to the autonomous republics.[68] In this way, Soviet legal scholars of the 1920s admitted that not only the autonomous Soviet regions, but also the two types of the "Soviet republic"—the union republics and the autonomous republics—enjoyed quite restricted competence, to the same degree as the autonomous provinces of ordinary empires, or perhaps even less.

These Soviet scholars did not, of course, think that the USSR was inferior as a multinational state to the British Empire or other empires. Arkhippov himself underscored the incorrectness of uncritically applying the concepts of bourgeois constitutional law to studies of Soviet law.[69] Soviet legal theorists justifiably pointed out the political importance of giving autonomy to nationalities living in the former Russian Empire.[70] Indeed, the development of a political and national consciousness of these nationalities, fostered by a national-territorial framework of the (autonomous) Soviet republics, would have crucial significance for the fate of the USSR.

Nevertheless, we cannot underestimate the fact that the national-territorial units composing the USSR were in essence "autonomous." Here, the continuity between the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as a multinational state was more distinct than anywhere else. This continuity was not so straightforward, since the Bolsheviks had introduced

68 Arkhippov, *Sovetskie avtonomnye oblasti*, pp. 51, 53, 67.

69 Arkhippov, *Sovetskie avtonomnye oblasti*, pp. 61, 63. Arkhippov criticized German state theory for overlooking the fact that a uniformity of the social and economic style (socialism in the case of the USSR) of constituent states fostered the consolidation of a federation. It is noteworthy that he thus criticized the static feature of German state theory like Korf, but from the opposite side. Korf emphasized that the British Empire was moving toward becoming a de facto federation, overcoming the rigorous categorization of statehood in German state theory, while Arkhippov observed that the centralization of the Soviet Union nullified Jellinek's definitions of various ranks of statehood. Here is a remarkable symmetry between the British Empire and the Soviet Union in the mirror of German state theory: the former was an empire transforming into a de facto federation, the latter a federation metamorphosing into a de facto empire.

70 Magerovskii, "Soiuz," p. 9; Arkhippov, *Sovetskie avtonomnye oblasti*, p. 41.

the various types of Soviet "republic" as a new device for mobilizing the non-Russian nationalities, thus upgrading the Russian Empire in accordance with the age of total war, revolution, and nationalism. However, this upgrading had been carried out by an imperial way, with the metropolitan capital granting autonomous status to the peripheries from above. In this sense, the USSR was an empire, an "empire of republics."

Chapter 6

The Making of "an American Empire" and US Responses to Decolonization in the Early Cold War Years

Kan Hideki

Roger Louis, the authoritative historian of British imperial policy, once noted that American anti-colonialism was "always reconciled with the needs of security" or anti-communism.[1] And yet he also stressed that American anti-colonialism "could not be dismissed merely as a self-serving or shallow slogan." "It was a genuine sentiment," he added, "amounting to an article of faith on the part of the American people." He went so far as to assert that it was "a force in itself which helped to shape the substance of defense, economic, and foreign policy" and that it was "a set of principles that most Americans upheld."[2]

What can we make of these contradictory statements? Louis' emphasis on American anti-colonialism as "amounting to an article of faith" among Americans or as "a force itself" that shaped the substance of US Cold War policy needs to be modified. This paper will argue that Louis overemphasizes the importance of anti-colonial sentiment in US

* The paper was submitted on June 15, 2013.

1 William Roger Louis, "American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire," in William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, *The 'Special Relationship': Anglo-American Relations since 1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 262, 273, 283.

2 Ibid., pp. 263–264, 273.

foreign policy, particularly for the policymaking elite. The US attitude toward self-determination, self-government and anti-colonialism was ambiguous and often remained rhetorical. The anti-colonial ideology almost always gave way to US security needs and anti-communism. Therefore, the paper tries to explain the sources of this ambiguity by locating it in the complex interactions of the three major trends in the early Cold War period: colonialism, anti-colonial nationalism and the US logic of the Cold War, in addition to American skepticism of dependent peoples' ability to govern themselves effectively.

Moreover, to better understand the sources of this ambiguity, we also need to place our analysis in the larger context of the US attempt to construct an informal American empire. The US postwar project was to build a liberal-capitalist order that neither conformed to Europe's imperialist/colonial order nor to the socialist order pursued by the Soviet Union.[3] US policymakers believed that both European and Soviet-style colonialism were variants of "extreme colonialism." Particularly threatening to the US project was the latter. Mason Sears, a State Department official in the Office of Dependent Area Affairs, observed in August 1953 that the type of "Communist imperialism" seen in Eastern Europe was "colonialism in its most objectionable and repressive form."[4] Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs Henry A. Byroade agreed. Admitting that Western colonialism was "on its way out," he noted in October 1953 that "a new form of imperialism" or "Soviet colonialism" had begun to "extend a clutching hand to every

3 Since the announcement of Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points in 1918, the US pursued the liberal project. This project was again articulated in the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, declaring that the US would pursue a policy of respecting "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live" as well as wishing to see sovereign rights and self-government among dependent peoples. The US would also promote "access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world." In this paper, the US pursuit of such goals as mentioned above will be called "the liberal project," reflecting the logic and requirements of a "liberal empire."

4 Memorandum by Sears, August 18, 1953 "US Policy on Colonial Issues," *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter cited as *FRUS*)*, 1952–1954*, III (1979), 1162–1163.

quarter of the globe."[5] Likewise, Sears commented that they could not support "extreme anti-colonialism" because both "extreme colonialism" and "extreme anti-colonialism" were "made to order for communist exploitation."[6]

Washington policymakers' objection to both extremes meant that the US had to take a middle-ground position. This position needed to be examined in terms of the changing status of the US in relation to the Western colonial powers in the perceived bipolar world. In this connection, the suspicion held by British Ambassador to the United States Sir Roger Makins of the US motive in 1954 was revealing. The British ambassador wondered if the Americans were "out to take our place in the Middle East." Louis, however, calls such a view "problematical."[7]

This chapter, therefore, further explores this imperial question and suggests that Washington policymakers consciously tried to substitute their influence for those of the other Western colonial powers when they judged that the colonial governments were not doing as good a job as Washington thought they should be doing in maintaining the stability and order required to contain communist threats. Under such a threatening situation, Washington's view of anti-colonialism served US purposes and interests relatively well by exploiting the ideology as rhetoric to justify taking over responsibility for dependent areas. We should not lose sight of this side of the question. The US support for anti-colonialism and self-determination functioned as a set of ideologies for expanding the predominantly liberal-capitalist domain of the postwar order within the Western bloc.

Various factors influenced US responses to decolonization. The way these factors affected the decolonization process varied depending upon the internal conditions of dependent areas, the international situations that surrounded these areas and on US policymakers' perceptions of interests and their ideological biases. Therefore, with these factors in mind, the paper examines two historical cases: US responses to decolo-

5 Address made by Byroade, October 31, 1953, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, XI (1983), 55.
6 *FRUS, 1952–1954*, III, 1162.
7 Louis, "American Anti-Colonialism," pp. 261–262.

nization in Malaya during the Emergency and in the Middle East during the Suez Crisis.

Such an examination will show three things. First, as to the American tradition of "anti-colonialism," we need to distinguish between policymakers in particular and the American public in general. Second, US policymakers placed more emphasis on the dictates of the Cold War than on self-determination and independence for dependent areas. Third, US government officials were tempted to construct American spheres of influence after the Western colonial powers retreated. Moreover, once the US established her own spheres of influence, she did not hesitate to militarily intervene in the third world to protect her interests.

Section 1 gives a brief overview of various factors which impacted US responses to decolonization in the US postwar liberal project as well as the conflicting interests which made Washington's attitude toward decolonization ambiguous and often inconsistent. Section 2 examines Washington's responses to decolonization in Malaya during the Emergency. Section 3 discusses America's imperial temptation in responding to decolonization in the Middle East during the Suez Crisis. The final section summarizes my arguments by making brief reference to US responses to the First Indochina War.

America's "Anti-colonialism" and the Requirements of a "Liberal Empire" in the Emerging Cold War

The past literature on the Second World War characterized it mainly as a struggle between the forces of fascism, constituted by the Axis powers, and those of anti-fascism, composed of the Allied powers, neglecting the complex nature of the war. However, it should be noted that it was also a war among imperialist rivals over spheres of influence, as well as a war for national independence.[8] Particularly noteworthy for the purpose of this chapter was the last feature: wars of independence. Peoples in col-

8 Yoichi Kibata, *Dainiji Sekai Taisen [The Second World War]* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2001), pp. 124–126; Takashi Saito, *Senkanki Kokusaiseiji Shi [A History of International Politics between the Two World Wars]* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978), pp. 303–308.

onies and dependent areas apparently shared the banner of anti-fascism with the colonial powers. However, their goal of achieving independence was in conflict with the colonial powers' desire to maintain or regain colonial control.

The United States, which had played a decisive role in leading the Allied powers to victory, soon found herself in conflict with the Soviet Union over postwar settlements. The US and the SU leaders, representing opposing blocs, vied to expand their spheres of influence. Consequently, the postwar years witnessed the development of complicated interactions between the Cold War and decolonization.

Firstly, the US began to approach decolonization with a view to containing the SU and communism. Secondly, a growing number of colonial and recently independent peoples whose primary goal was political and economic autonomy chose to keep their distance from Cold War rivalries. Faced with the bipolar structure of the Cold War, the US found it difficult to turn a deaf ear to the growing desire of colonial peoples for autonomy and independence. US government officials' fear was that Washington's neglect for their aspirations would drive them into the opposite camp, consequently bringing a balance of power inimical to US interests.

Given the above situation, the intensification of the Cold War rivalry and the concomitant rise of nationalism among dependent and newly independent peoples posed a serious dilemma for Washington policymakers. The US, with its anti-colonial tradition, tended to be critical of colonialism while sympathetic to the aspirations of colonized peoples. Given the importance that the Western colonial powers held in the US struggle against communism, however, Washington policymakers found it necessary to consider their needs. Faced with the trade-off between the two, Washington policymakers vacillated between colonialism and anti-colonial nationalism, and were often forced to make agonizing choices. As a result, US responses to postwar decolonization, despite the American tradition of "anti-colonialism," ended up being ambiguous and even merely rhetorical.

Assistant Secretary of State Byroade, who would later serve as Ambassador to Egypt from March 1955 to September 1956, observed in October 1953 that "the movement toward self-determination" was

"one of the most powerful forces" in twentieth century affairs. He also believed that "the new Soviet colonialism," compared with the disappearing Western colonialism, was "more poisonous" because the former masqueraded under the guise of nationalism or in the name of independence and economic progress. Under such circumstances, the real choice lay "between continued progress toward self-determination and surrender to the new Communist imperialism."

It must be noted, however, that sovereignty or independence, according to Byroade, should not be given immediately or unconditionally. Not only could premature independence be "dangerous," but it could also be "retrogressive and destructive." He believed that these dependent peoples were not mature enough to "maintain order" or "[improve their] social or economic conditions." The implication was that the granting of premature independence would make these peoples prey to Soviet Communism. In other words, anti-communism took priority over the self-determination or independence of dependent peoples.[9]

Another important consideration was US relations with certain European nations. Particularly important was the economic aspect of the colonial question. Byroade argued that the US could not ignore "the legitimate economic interests" that European nations possessed in dependent areas. A sudden disruption of economic relations "might seriously injure the European economies." Moreover, it was inseparably related to the question of US security, because the Atlantic defense system depended upon their economic soundness. Certain European allies represented "the major source of free-world defensive power," and Washington policymakers could not disregard "this side of the colonial question without injury to our own security."[10]

A similar view toward dependent areas was expressed by R. B. Knight, Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, who wrote a memorandum on Africa. On the one hand, Knight argued that the US should offer strong support for dependent peoples' aspirations for freedom and self-government. On the other hand, he believed that, in the midst of a power struggle with the USSR, US long-

9 Address made by Byroade, October 31, 1953, op. cit.
10 Ibid.

term interests would lose their meaning unless they were "reconciled with our immediate security interests." As a result, he reasoned that full cooperation with European colonial powers was "essential to the security of the US and to the success of its policy of containment of the USSR."[11]

Byroade's analysis and observations clearly show that, in the US vision of a postwar international order, national self-determination and independence for dependent peoples had a lower priority than anti-communism, security or US relations with the European colonial powers, as long as the colonial powers were able to govern the dependent areas effectively enough to keep communism from expanding its influence in those areas. When self-determination had a conflict of interest with anti-communism and security issues, the former had to give way to the latter.

The primacy of anti-communism and security in the US Cold War strategy found expression in the question of the former mandated territories of the South Pacific islands under Japanese control. When the administration of these islands was transferred in July 1947 to the US as the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), Washington policymakers took special care to place the areas under exclusive US control by devising a concept of "strategic area." Thus, the TTPI was designated as a "strategic area" in its 1947 trusteeship agreement.[12] As such, its formal status as a UN trust territory could be terminated only by the Security Council, on which the US could exercise a veto, and not by the General Assembly. As intended, the US Navy was thus able to build military bases for strategic purposes.

The US response to the UN trusteeship system over Micronesia was illustrative of the case in which US military requirements prevailed over the dependent peoples' desire for self-determination. Professor of History Takashi Saito cogently asserts that the UN trusteeship system

11 Memorandum by R. B. Knight, "U.S. policy towards colonial areas and colonial power," April 21, 1952, *FRUS 1952–1954*, III, 1103–1104.

12 For a more detailed analysis of arguments within the US government over how the concept of "strategic area" was developed, see William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

was "in practice, a new form of imperialistic division of the colonies by the powers."[13] It seems that certain US government officials were aware that this was the case. In February 1955, John F. Dulles, the Eisenhower administration's secretary of state, sent a letter with the following text to US Ambassador to the UN Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.:

> ". . . if we should endorse a general 20–25 year time-table for the attainment of self-government in Ruanda-Ugandi or Tanganika, the Belgians, British, or any other UN Member would argue cogently that self-government for the widely scattered islands of the Trust Territory should be envisaged in a much shorter time because their peoples are generally more advanced, and have had considerable experience through contacts with the outside world. This could be quite embarrassing for us since we are on record against the establishment of a timetable for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands."[14]

There was a minority view within the State Department which favored the establishment of timetables for self-government or self-determination. For example, Mason Sears, then the assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs, in a memorandum to the deputy under secretary of state of April 1955, felt that the US was too "solicitous" of the views of colonial powers such as Britain, France and Belgium. Sears believed that Washington should make friends with the Africans even at the risk of alienating or irritating European allies. However, a majority of State Department officials, including Dulles, saw such an approach as "too radical," believing that the US could befriend Africans "without alienating Europeans."[15]

As such, Dulles' comments indicate that insofar as the UN Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was concerned, the US was in a position

13 Saito, *Senkanki Kokusaiseiji Shi*, p. 38.

14 Letter, Dulles to Lodge, February 5, 1955, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, XVIII, 2–5.

15 Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs to the Deputy Under Secretary of State, April 20, 1955, *FRUS 1955–1957*, XVIII, pp. 6–7.

not much different from that of the European colonial powers. In this sense, the US also had a colonial profile.[16]

US Responses to Decolonization in Malaya and "Anglo-American Cooperation"

In June 1948, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) launched an armed struggle against the British government and the Federation of Malaya, and Malcom MacDonald, the British commissioner-general for the Far East, declared a state of emergency. The local authorities took ruthless measures to suppress the Communist insurrection, causing many casualties on both sides. According to British statistics, the casualties numbered 6,711 men among the guerrillas and 1,865 men among the security forces. The figures excluded additional civilian casualties that brought the total to 3,283 persons.[17] The Malayan Emergency lasted until July 1960.

The US attitude toward decolonization in Malaya until independence in August 1957 was that Malaya was a British responsibility.[18] There were several reasons why Washington regarded the problems of Malaya as British concerns. The Clement Atlee government had granted independence to India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma in 1947–48. However, the Labor government had no intention of extending independence to Malaya in the near future. Malaya was vitally important to the British economy. The rubber estates and tin mines of the Malay Peninsula

16 LaFeber convincingly demonstrates that the US had a history as a colonial power. Walter LaFeber, "The American View of Decolonization, 1776–1920: An Ironic Legacy," in David Ryan and Victor Pungong, eds., *The United States and Decolonization* (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), pp. 24–40.

17 Yoichi Kibata, *Teikoku no Tasogare: Reisen ka no Igirisu to Ajia [The Empire in Decline: Britain and Asia in the Cold War Years]* (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1996), pp. 135–136.

18 For other works which came to the same conclusion, see A. J. Stockwell, "The United States and Britain's Decolonization of Malaya, 1942–1957," in Ryan and Pungong, *The United States and Decolonization*, pp. 188–201. Kibata, *Teikoku no Tasogare*, p. 119.

contributed immensely to Britain's dollar-earning capacity. As such, the Truman administration was informed of the firm intention of the British government to maintain control of the Malay Peninsula. With British troops about to complete their withdrawal from India and Burma, Secretary of State George C. Marshall in mid-May 1947 instructed US Ambassador Lewis W. Douglas in London to send his evaluation of British intentions, capabilities and thinking—in particular, on the UK's defense commitment to the British Empire. The ambassador reported in reply that Malaya was "the one important area in the Far East" which the British evidently had no intention of abandoning. The reasons listed included the strategic importance of Malaya en route to Australasia, its valuable rubber and tin resources, and the political immaturity of its peoples.[19] Moreover, Britain lost India in 1947, the stronghold of the British Empire, so that the political and strategic importance of Malaya and Singapore had increased by the time it faced the Emergency.

What worried Washington more than anything else was the dollar shortage that European allies were facing at that time.[20] Compared with exports totaling 16.2 billion dollars, the US imported only 8.7 billion dollars' worth of goods in 1947. With the dollar gap expanding, it was feared that US exports would dry to a trickle. Moreover, Washington policymakers were concerned that the widening dollar gap would threaten postwar European reconstruction. The failure of European reconstruction would in turn increase the chances of communist encroachment on Western Europe.

When the British pound gained convertibility in July 1947, Britain faced a rapid outflow of US dollars. On August 20, London was forced to suspend convertibility. In March 1948, the US Congress passed a foreign assistance bill which included funds for the European Recovery Program (ERP). With $1.24 billion earmarked for Great Britain out of the ERP, London temporarily weathered the pound crisis. Late in the spring of

19 Douglas to Marshall, June 11, 1947, *FRUS, 1947*, I, 756.

20 For a full discussion of the dollar gap problem, see Hideki Kan, *Beiso Reisen to Amerika no Ajia Seisaku [Soviet-American Confrontation and US Policy toward Asia]* (Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 1992), pp. 200–214.

1949, however, the US economy went into recession, which resulted in a decrease of exports to the US from the sterling area, while US exports increased. As the result, the dollar-sterling gap widened again from $330 million at the beginning of 1949 to $633 million in the second quarter of the same year.[21]

Truman administration officials regarded the logical consequences caused by the dynamics of the capitalist world economy as a serious challenge to the US postwar goal of building a stable liberal world order. The dollar gap problem was perceived as indicating a crisis of the global capitalist system, consisting of Western and Asian allies, with the US at the center. Though the problem itself existed independently of the Soviet threat, the onset of the Cold War created the situation in which the US saw the USSR as the greatest obstacle to its envisioned world order of globalized market forces and liberalism. Another serious obstacle to this postwar order was instability and chaos accompanied by the process of decolonization in the third world.

Under such critical circumstances, Washington policymakers began to see Southeast Asia as part of a larger problem: At stakes was the stability of the capitalist world economy as well as the security of the Western bloc as a whole. Truman administration officials recognized the relationship between British economic difficulties and instability in Southeast Asia. For London to alleviate the dollar-sterling gap, Malaya loomed large. Of all American rubber imports in 1948, 452,647 tons (66.6%) came from Malaya. In 1949, the US imported 477,000 tons of natural rubber, with Malaya accounting for 55% of this and Indonesia accounting for 24%. In 1948, the US received 62% of Malaya's tin exports and

21 Andrew J. Rotter, "The Big Canvas, 1948–50," Ph.D. dissertation (Stanford University, 1981), pp. 98–101. Testimony of Richard Bissell, January 12, 1948, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings: European Recovery Program*, 80th Cong., 2nd session, 1948, pt. 1 (Washington, D.C., 1948), p. 273. Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 60–65, 456–459, 462–476.

in 1949 it received 80%.[22] In 1948, exports of Malayan rubber and tin earned the sterling area more US dollars than all of Britain's exports combined, and in 1949, sales of rubber alone would surpass all British exports in dollar value.[23]

Consequently, by late August 1949, Truman administration officials were convinced that the restoration of triangular trade provided the best hope for alleviating the British economic crisis. The British dollar deficit was partially offset by a British trade surplus with Malaya and a Malayan surplus with the US. Such perceptions among Washington policymakers affected their view of the British response to the communist insurgency in Malaya.

With the Maoist triumph in China in October 1949 and the Korean War in June 1950, the State Department found their "most important collaborators" in the British and their Empire-Commonwealth. NSC 51 of July 1949, formulated by the State Department Policy Planning Staff (PPS), stated as follows: "With China being overwhelmed by Communism, SEA [Southeast Asia] represents a vital segment on the line of containment, stretching from Japan southward around to the Indian Peninsula. The security of the three major non-communist base areas on this quarter of the world—Japan, India, and Australia—depends in large measure on the denial of SEA to the Kremlin."[24]

Based upon the above analysis, the PPS spelled out the US position on Malaya. "We should support British authority in Malaya," the PPS advised, "until such time as there may occur a basic change in the Malayan situation affecting this policy." Three months later, at a PPS meeting in January 1950, PPS head George F. Kennan remarked that the dissolution of the British Empire was not in the US interest, as "there were many things the Commonwealth could do which we could not do and which we wished them to continue doing." Charles E. Bohlen, US ambassador to France, was attending the meeting. He suggested that the

22 Pamela Sodhy, "'Passage of Empire': United States-Malayan Relations to 1966," Ph.D. dissertation (Cornell University, 1992), pp. 122–124.

23 Rotter, "The Big Canvass," p. 109.

24 "Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of State on US Policy toward Southeast Asia," NSC 51, July 1, 1949.

US and the UK "form a partnership with respect to overseas burdens," meaning that the British could turn more of their attention to Europe in return for being relieved of some of these burdens.[25]

Another important factor that influenced Washington's response to the armed insurgency in Malaya was that it was led by local communists. The British government emphasized that the movement was directed by an outside power and had nothing to do with national aspirations for independence. As a concomitant of the communist triumph in China and the Korean War, the containment not only of Moscow but also of Beijing became the central theme in American relations with Malaya. Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup was sent on a three-month tour of the Far East. "It is a fundamental decision of American policy," read his instructions, "that the United States does not intend to permit further extension of Communist domination on the continent of Asia or in the Southeast Asia area."[26] He and his mission spent three days in Malaya, from February 4 to 7, 1950.[27] In his final report, Jessup agreed with the State Department's report to the National Security Council, which held that all measures should be taken to prevent communist expansion in Southeast Asia. He claimed Indochina "the key to the situation," with Malaya, along with Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia, "considered to be less critical spots but are not to be neglected."[28]

The Jessup mission was followed at the end of February by the Griffin Mission to Asia, which was to study the technical assistance needs of the area. The Griffin Mission, led by R. Allen Griffin, a former deputy director of the Economic Cooperation Administration China program, viewed the Emergency as a grave communist threat, because the pres-

25 Minutes of the 7th Meeting of Policy Planning Staff, January 24, 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, III (1977), 619–622.

26 Evelyn Colbert, *Southeast Asia in International Politics, 1941–1956* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 138.

27 For background information on the Jessup Mission, see Samuel P. Hayes, *The Beginning of American Aid to Southeast Asia: The Griffin Mission of 1950* (Lexington: 1971), pp. 1–6.

28 "Oral report by Ambassador-at-Large, Philip C. Jessup, upon his return from the East," April 3, 1950, *FRUS, 1950,* VI, 69–76.

ence of effective communist guerrilla forces meant that Malaya was a "particularly inviting target for expanded Communist aggression, either from within or from without."[29] Therefore, the Mission emphasized that "suppression of the Communist campaign of violence is the key to the solution of all other problems."[30]

The Griffin Mission recommended that the US should provide a total of $4.5 million in immediate aid to Malaya. The Truman administration, however, rejected the Mission's recommendations for Malaya. According to Samuel P. Hays, who served as Griffin's deputy during the Mission, Washington was reluctant to "undercut British influence in Malaya and Singapore." In other words, US officials believed that "the British had the primary responsibility for that area."[31] The US government, however, was in agreement with the British that the military insurrection in Malaya was led by communist elements and, thus, had to be crushed militarily.

In March 1952, the State Department sent a message to the American consul in Malaya and Singapore as well as to the US embassy in London to the effect that "the present struggle in Malaya" was conducted "as an integral part of the free world's common effort to halt Communist aggression" and therefore that "British endeavours to defeat insurgents" should be supported.[32] The NSC report also declared that US policy was "to support the British in their measures to eradicate communist guerrilla forces and restore order."[33] Communist influence in movements for self-government or independence was a crucial factor in the US response to decolonization in Asia.

Compare the case of Indonesia's anti-colonial movement, for example. This is the case in which Washington responded differently from the communist-led insurgency in Malaya as the Indonesian movement was

29 Hayes, *The Beginning of American Aid*, p. 129.

30 Ibid., p. 127.

31 Ibid., pp. 28–31.

32 DOS to American Consul, Malaya and Singapore and US Embassy, London, March 4, 1952, RG 57, 297-0013-451, quoted in Stockwell, "The United States and Britain's Decolonization," p. 199.

33 NSC 5405, *FRUS, 1952–1954,* XII, pt. 1, 366.

led not by communists but by the nationalists. Between the Dutch reoccupation of the Netherlands Indies in 1945 and the successful suppression in 1948 of the abortive communist revolt in eastern Java against the Mohammed Hatta government, the attitude of Washington policymakers remained that of studied non-involvement in developments in Indonesia. They did not question Dutch sovereignty over the East Indies. Initially, the Truman administration not only refused to recognize the Republic of Indonesia as an equal party to the dispute but also extended lend-lease and surplus-property credits in excess of $100 million as well as subsequent Marshall Plan aid to the Dutch.[34]

However, several factors combined to make a radical shift in Washington's policy toward the Dutch-Indonesian clash. First, after the Truman Doctrine was announced in early 1947, the American response was increasingly shaped in a larger context of worldwide struggle against an international Communist movement directed by Moscow. Second, the success of the Marshall Plan for European recovery became the central focus of American policymakers in mid-1948. During the Marshall Plan hearings, Acheson stressed that, if the European Recovery Program (ERP) were to succeed, the Western European countries would have to increase their exports substantially. He understood that most of the exports would "go to Southeast Asia." Richard M. Bissell, secretary to the Subcommittee on Economic and Financial Analysis for the President's Commission on Foreign Aid, also testified that the Dutch, British and French possessions in Southeast Asia were "extremely important" to the success of the Marshall Plan because "they have historically been earners of dollars for the home countries." He emphasized that this was particularly true of the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya.[35]

34 Robert J. McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945–1949* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 139. As for the Marshall Plan aid, the US government was allocating $506 million to the Netherlands in early 1948, with the stipulation that $84 million was to be used for reconstruction of the Netherlands Indies, which favored the Hague. Ibid., p. 228.

35 Testimony of Dean Acheson, January 29, 1948, in US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings: U.S. Foreign Policy for a Post-War*

Third and most importantly of all, the armed revolt of September 1948 was quickly crushed by the Hatta government, which demonstrated that Hatta and Sukarno were in firm control of the nationalist movement. Robert A. Lovett, under secretary of state, noted that the Republic of Indonesia was "the only government in the Far East to have met and crushed an all-out Communist offensive."[36] When the Netherlands government continued to resort to arms, ignoring the UN Security Council cease-fire resolutions, the US government warned the Dutch that, unless they immediately entered meaningful negotiations with the Indonesian government, all economic assistance would be withdrawn from The Hague. Then, in January 1949, Lovett told the ambassador of the Netherlands that the Indonesian problem had blown up, as a result of Dutch military action, to the point where it was extremely difficult. Public and Congressional opinion, he warned, might jeopardize EAC aid to Holland and the North Atlantic Security Pact, which suggested that naming a date for the transfer of sovereignty might be the answer.[37] The Dutch understood the seriousness of the warning, which finally led to Indonesia's independence in December 1949.

In the meantime, US responses to the Emergency in Malaya continued to be defined by the same issues until the country gained independence in 1957: the containment of Communism, Britain's primary responsibility for Malaya, "Anglo-American cooperation" and the importance of the Malayan link in reconstructing Western Europe for the stability of the capitalist world economy. A memorandum by Major General H. J. Malony, the Department of Defense member on the Southeast Asia Aid Committee, noted that "Malaya is significant in this area because

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Recovery Program, 80th Cong. 2nd session, 1948, pt. 1, p. 739; Testimony of Richard M. Bissell, January 12, 1948, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings: European Recovery Program*, 80th Congress, 2nd session, 1948, pt. 1, p. 273.

36 Lovett to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers Abroad, December 31, 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, VI, 618–620.

37 Memorandum of conversation with the Ambassador of Netherlands by the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett), January 11, 1949, *FRUS, 1949,* VII, pt. 1, 139–141.

it is a large source of dollar earnings for the United Kingdom." These earning, in turn, impacted "British capabilities within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."[38] The Central Intelligence Agency in November 1951 also reiterated the importance of Malaya's European connection. "The loss of Malaya's dollar earnings," noted a CIA document, "would be a severe blow to the UK and indirectly to the US." It further stated, "the consequent maladjustment would be created in the strategic material and in the balance of payments position of the NATO countries, and could result in a serious setback in the role of NATO rearmament."[39] Subsequently, however, with NATO countries' economies on their way to recovery and stability in the mid-1950s and beyond, Washington policymakers' consideration of this factor decreased in importance.

Anglo-American cooperation in the decolonization process in Malaya continued for as long as the British handling of the communist insurgency contributed to the ever-growing importance of the US policy of containing communism in Southeast Asia. Moreover, when President Eisenhower moved into the White House, the US view that the problems of Malaya were a British responsibility remained basically unchanged. The drafters of an NSC Progress Report thought in July 1956, for example, that the US could do better than the British to counter Communist subversion by a comprehensive plan of action, but at the same time they admitted that "U.S. ability to influence events in these areas is . . . severely limited by the primacy of British influence and responsibility."[40]

America's Imperial Temptation and US Responses to Decolonization during the Suez Crisis

US responses to decolonization in the Middle East during the Suez Crisis were determined by such factors as Cold War imperatives, Arab

38 H. J. Malony, "US Position with Respect to Thailand, Burma, and Malaya," October 31, 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, VI, 154.

39 Memorandum by the CIA, November 13, 1951, *FRUS, 1951*, VI, 112.

40 NSC Progress Report on "US Objectives and Course of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia," July 11, 1956, NSC Series, Eisenhower Library, quoted in Sodhy, "Passage of Empire," p. 290.

nationalism, strategic importance (e.g., oil concessions in the area), the Arab-Israeli dispute and US sympathy for anti-colonialism.

Ernest Bevin, foreign minister of the Labor government which had succeeded Winston Churchill, declared in the Lower House in January 1948 that the Middle East constituted a vital element for world peace and the lifeline for the British Commonwealth.[41] Truman administration officials fully recognized the strategic importance of the Middle East to the British Empire, viewing the defense of Israel and the Middle East as a British responsibility. A memorandum prepared in the State Department mentioned that "the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East is vital to the security of the United States." However, as another memorandum indicated, the British should continue to "maintain primary responsibility for the defense of the area."[42] Kennan's memorandum reviewing the current trends in early 1948 also agreed that Washington should make every possible effort to support the UK's position in the Middle East. The Policy Planning Staff head added that "any policy on our part which tends to strain British relations with the Arab world and to whittle down the British position in the Arab countries" was "against the immediate strategic interests of our country."[43]

Washington's view of the British role in the area remained unchanged throughout the months of 1949. After the start of the Korean War in June 1950, such a view was even strengthened, though it did not last long. "Because of US commitments in other areas," a NSC document stated, "it is in the US interest that the United Kingdom has [sic] primary military responsibility for Israel and the Arab states." Another policy statement prepared in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, therefore, emphasized "close US-UK cooperation wherever possible," proposing

41 Yuta Sasaki, *Igirisu Teikoku to Suezu Senso [The British Empire and the Suez Crisis]* (Nagoya: Nagoya University Press, 1997), p. 40.

42 Memorandum prepared in the State Department, "The American Paper" (undated), *FRUS, 1947*, V, 575; Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Hare), November 5, 1947, ibid., 579.

43 Kennan memorandum, PPS 23 "Review of Current Trends: US Foreign Policy," February 24, 1948, *FRUS, 1948,* V, pt. 2, 656.

to "refrain from action which might tend to undermine the position of the United Kingdom in the Near East."[44]

At the same time, it should be noted that the security of the region, as well as its political and economic stability, was also "vital to the security of the United States."[45] Moreover, even though the region's primary responsibility lay in the hands of Great Britain, it did not necessarily follow that the US "should become a sort of Middle Eastern junior partner of the British."[46] As long as Arab states seemed oriented toward the West and generally successful in suppressing existing communist activities, Washington policymakers had no reason not to entrust the British with the task of managing whatever problems existed in the region. Such was the situation before the Korean War.

However, after the Korean War, Washington policymakers began to see Arab states and Israel as feeling more vulnerable vis-à-vis the USSR.[47] With Arab nationalism reaching its zenith toward the mid-1950s and intensifying tensions between colonialism and anti-colonialism, Washington policymakers began to worry about the decline of British influence in the Middle East, shaking the foundation of Anglo-American cooperation in the region.

Early signs of Washington's concerns about the British ability to deal effectively with Arab nationalism appeared during policy deliberations among the highest-ranking members of the Truman administration in the closing month of 1951. According to Washington policymakers, the major threats to Western interests in the Middle East lay in several mutually related factors: "the growing instability within the Middle East states," the tensions and hostile attitudes between the Arab states and Israel, the deteriorating relationships between Arab states and Western

44 NSC 47/5, "Statement of Policy Proposed by the NSC," March 14, 1951, *FRUS, 1951*, V, 96; Policy statement prepared in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, December 28, 1950, "Regional Policy Statement: Near East," *FRUS, 1950*, V, 278.

45 *FRUS, 1947*, V, 575, 579; *FRUS, 1949*, VI, 1430–1440.

46 *FRUS, 1947*, V, 579.

47 Staff Study by NSC, "US Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel," March 14, 1951, *FRUS, 1951*, V, 98.

powers, notably the United Kingdom, and "the prevailing attitude of neutralism." "In the past," an NSC study observed, "the United States has relied primarily on the United Kingdom for the maintenance and defense of Western interests in the Middle East." However, "the rapidly declining ability of the United Kingdom to maintain and defend Western interests" in parts of the region "creates the need for a review and restatement of US policy toward the Middle East."[48]

The greatest concern of Washington was that, with approximately half of the world's known oil reserves in the Middle East, access to these rich reserves was "of great importance to the Free World." Consequently, it was in the US interest "to take whatever appropriate measures it can" to maintain and defend these interests. In other words, the extension of Soviet control over the region, it was feared, would "mean a violent shift in the world balance of power." Under such circumstances, the NSC study concluded that the West clearly "must work toward the establishment of a new basis and a new kind of relationship with the Middle East states." In other words, it seemed doubtful that the US or the UK, or even both together, could maintain and defend Western interests in the area "in the 19th century fashion."[49]

These views were incorporated into the NSC study dated April 24, 1952. What is particularly noteworthy in this study was Washington's view of the situation in the Middle East. The danger in this area to the security of the Free World was seen as arising "not so much from the threat of direct Soviet military attack as from acute instability, anti-Western nationalism and Arab-Israeli antagonism." To tackle these sources of instability and disorder in the region, US policymakers believed that Washington "should take an increased share of responsibility toward the area." They thought, however, that at this point, they should do so "in concert with the United Kingdom."[50] The implication was that so

48 Draft Study by NSC, "Position of the United States with Respect to the General Area of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East," December 27, 1951, *FRUS, 1951*, V, 258–259.

49 Ibid., 258–259.

50 NSC 129/1 "US Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Arab States and Israel," April 24, 1952, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, IX, 223–224.

long as the UK performed well in ensuring the security and stability of the region, it was desirable for the US to continue cooperating with the British. Otherwise, however, the US might have to take over the responsibility from the British.

US imperial temptation began to show itself during negotiations on a base agreement between Britain and Egypt from 1953 through July 1954. The US government tried to maintain a balance between Arab nationalism and Anglo-American cooperation throughout the bilateral negotiations. On the one hand, Washington policymakers continued to take the position that the stability and defense of the Middle East was a British responsibility. On the other, they thought that the issue of withdrawing British troops from the Suez Canal area should be worked out between the two parties concerned.[51] Unsatisfied with Washington's attitude, Prime Minister Churchill sent a personal letter to President Eisenhower in March 1953. "I am very sorry," he lamented, "that you do not feel that you can do much to help us about the Canal Zone." Churchill could only hope that "it will not look as if the United States is taking sides against us."[52]

Washington's need for a balancing act as well as initially studied non-involvement in the Suez base agreement negotiations was influenced by the extraordinarily harsh views entertained by Egyptian leaders toward the British presence. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Mutual Security Administration Director Harold Stassen visited the Near and Middle East from May 9 through 29, 1953. On May 11 and 12, they met the Egyptian leaders. Prime Minister Naguib told the US participants at the meeting that the main obstacles for improving relations between Egypt and the US were the US's pro-Israel policy in the Arab-Israeli dispute and her support for the UK in the Middle East. At the meeting on the second day, Abdel Gamal Nasser made it crystal-clear that the Egyptian people thought of the Middle Eastern Defense Organization (MEDO) as a "perpetuation of occupation" and that "British influence

51 *FRUS, 1952–1954*, IX, pt. 2, 1997–2000, 2022–2023, 2024–2025, 2042–2043.

52 Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower, personal correspondence, March 18, 1953, ibid., 2026–2027.

must entirely disappear." Dulles came away from these meetings feeling that the situation in Egypt was "more serious than" the Department of State had recognized. He even felt that "[the] possibility of open hostilities in [the] near future is real." Based on the observations from these meetings, Dulles reported at the NSC meeting in June that the present concept of a MEDO, with Egypt as the key, had to be abandoned. The NSC meeting concluded that the US "should concentrate now on building a defense in the area based on the northern tier," including Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey.[53]

As a result, the Eisenhower government distanced itself from London's initiative to reorganize the abortive Middle Eastern Command into a Middle Eastern Defense Organization which Nasser saw as the UK's attempt to justify the continued stationing of its troops in the Suez. In a similar vein, the US government informed the British government that Washington would not join the Baghdad Pact because tackling the Arab-Israeli problem was considered more pressing from Washington's point of view. Moreover, Nasser violently opposed the pact because he not only suspected the nature of the pact's underlying purpose but also saw Israel as posing a more immediate threat to Egypt's security.[54]

In the meantime, in Egypt, the "Free Officers" including Nasser, with the help of new recruits from the army, had overthrown King Farouk in July 1952 and established the Revolutionary Command Council. Major General Muhammad Naguib became prime minister of the new government, while Nasser called the shots in the background. What should be noted in this connection was the role of operatives in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), such as Kermit Roosevelt, the

53 Memorandum of conversation, May 11, 1953, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, IX, 10; Memorandum of conversation, May 12, 1953, ibid., 21; The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State, May 13, 1953, ibid., 25; Memorandum of discussion at the 147th Meeting of the NSC, June 1, 1953, ibid., 381–386.

54 Donald Neff, *Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East* (New York: The Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, 1981), pp. 75–76. Sasaki, *Igirisu Teikoku to Suezu Senso*, pp. 117–126.

CIA's specialist on the Middle East, and Miles Coperland, Roosevelt's undercover agent in Cairo. By late 1951, CIA officials had been conferring regularly with intermediaries of the "Free Officers" as they discussed plans for the overthrow of King Farouk. Because of Roosevelt's "extremely close ties" with Nasser, the Egyptian leader was considered "an agency asset."[55] Such being the case, the US not only had advance knowledge of the July coup but also actively encouraged the action. Even after Nasser's defiance in September 1955 of Washington's pressure to scotch the arms deal with the Soviet bloc, covert links with the CIA were maintained. After the Egyptian arms deal, CIA Director Allen Dulles instructed the Cairo station that "Nasser remains our best hope" and that "we believe State Department will within limits of overall policy cooperate to mitigate long-term efforts of arms deal if Nasser in turn cooperates."[56] A policy of leaving the door open to Nasser to return to good relations if he so desired can be read as a precautionary measure by Washington against the possibility that the UK might be pushed out of Egypt in the future.

In contrast, the coup caught the British by surprise. They had been aware of the close relationship between the CIA and Nasser. Not only did they resent it, but they also suspected Washington's motives in maintaining such close ties. Evelyn Shuckburgh, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's closest assistant from 1951 to 1956 and under-secretary in charge of Middle Eastern affairs of the British Foreign Office from 1954 to 1956, wrote in his diary entry of December 2, 1952: "Slept badly and became very depressed about the world in general. Our economic situation, German and Japanese competition, destruction of British influence in the Mediterranean and Middle East . . . The Americans not backing us anywhere. In fact, having destroyed the Dutch empire, the United States are now engaged in undermining the French and British empires as hard as they can." On May 2, 1954, Eden snapped to Shuckburgh that "[A]ll the Americans want to do is to replace the French and run Indo-

55 Neff, *Warriors at Suez*, p. 177.

56 Scott Lucas, "The Limits of Ideology: United States Foreign Policy and Arab Nationalism," in Ryan and Pungong, *The United States and Decolonization*, pp. 146, 150.

China themselves. They want to replace us in Egypt too. They want to run the world."[57]

Here is the situation in which Great Britain found it increasingly difficult to maintain its position in the Middle East. Washington policymakers were worried that a power vacuum would emerge with the declining power of the British Empire. In other words, they found that they were increasingly placed in a situation where the Cold War logic left no choice but for the US to take over responsibility for the area so that Moscow could not move into a possible power vacuum. On the other hand, the British government was greatly concerned that, should Britain be pushed out of the Suez Canal area, she would lose influence not only in the Middle East but also in what had been her traditional spheres of influence in other parts of the world. However, the Eisenhower administration was prepared to bear the costs that a hegemonic power had to shoulder to contain Communist expansion in the Middle East.

While negotiations over a Suez base agreement were under way between the Naguib government and London, meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the US and the UK were held at the Department of State in July 1953. Lord Salisbury attended these meetings on behalf of Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Dulles told the British participants that a MEDO-type defense arrangement was unrealistic, as Lebanon and Syria were not preoccupied with the Soviet threat, and that an arrangement based on the northern tier of countries was preferable. Dulles also wondered if the UK had "reverted to the old type hardboiled approach formerly employed in dealing with Arab states," making it clear that such a policy would not succeed. Lord Salisbury replied that such criticism was "not in accord with the facts," citing the British postwar record of dealing with its colonial possessions such as India, Pakistan, Ceylon and the African colonies.[58] From these exchanges of opinion, Lord Salisbury had

57 Evelyn Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez: Diaries 1951–1956* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), pp. 63, 187.

58 First Meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the US and the UK, July 11, 1953, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, V, pt. 2, 1638; Second Meeting, July 14, 1953, ibid., 1680–1681.

the impression that the US government not only saw the British position on the base negotiations as "reactionary" but also tried to maintain some distance and mediate in the bilateral negotiations.

Also surprising to London was the fact that the US government, without consulting the British, was directly communicating with Naguib and actually acting as mediator between the UK and Egypt. At the above-mentioned meetings of foreign ministers, Dulles showed Salisbury the Egyptian prime minister's letter to President Eisenhower which attached the Egyptian formula concerning the Suez Canal base negotiations. Naguib's letter stated that conclusion of an agreement concerning the Suez Canal base was conditional on "the immediate evacuation of all British personnel in the Canal Zone." In addition, the Egyptian formula referred to Egypt's plan to consult not only with the UK but also with the US regarding measures to "strengthen Egypt militarily and economically."[59] The British government saw Washington's moves as a very dangerous first step on the part of the US to secure a foothold in the Middle East by acting as a mediator for Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on a base agreement.

Nevertheless, London found it desirable to have some kind of agreement rather than risk losing everything with no agreement. Finally, in July 1954, both the UK and Egypt signed a base agreement which allowed Britain the right to reintroduce her troops in time of war, while the British government pledged to withdraw all the troops from the Suez Canal base by June 1956.

Washington had its own reasons for not getting too involved in Anglo-Egyptian base negotiations. During his visit to Egypt in May 1953, Dulles was quite impressed by the intensity of enmity and distrust toward the British among the Egyptian leaders. Naguib told the secretary that originally the Arab peoples felt bitterness only against the UK. However, they "now feel that the UK has shifted some of the burden of

59 For the documents, see Egyptian Prime Minister Naguib to President Eisenhower, July 10, 1953; Egyptian Formula concerning the Suez Canal Base. The UK and US Foreign Ministers discussed the formula at their meetings on July 11 and 14, ibid., 1696–1699.

bitterness on the shoulders of the US."[60] Accordingly, Dulles reported at the NSC meeting of June 1953 that "the prestige of the Western powers in the Middle East was in general very low" and that the US "suffered from being linked with British and French imperialism." The Secretary also explained at the same NSC meeting that, in their meetings with the Egyptian leaders, Dulles and Stassen "had done everything they could to allay hostility" to the US.[61] In fact, Dulles told the Egyptians that "British troops should evacuate and Egyptian sovereignty should be fully restored." Therefore, Dulles told the NSC members that, in his opinion, the US had "no desire to back the UK in 'imperialism' or 'colonialism'."[62]

Anglo-Egyptian relations continued to deteriorate. The sudden raid on Gaza by Israeli troops on February 28, 1955 had forced Nasser to radically change his policy priority from economic development to rearmament and defense. Nasser now placed the highest priority on obtaining arms. Despite his repeated requests for arms from Washington, however, the Eisenhower administration refused to respond, and Britain and France followed suit. Their non-cooperation on supplies of arms led Nasser to turn to Moscow, and the Egyptian leader announced an arms deal with Czechoslovakia in September 1955. Suddenly taken aback, both Washington and London offered to finance the Aswan Dam project. In December 1955, Washington, London and Cairo came to an agreement to finance the project. The Anglo-American intention of this aid was to prevent Nasser from moving more favorably toward Moscow. However, unable to change Nasser's mind, the US government abruptly told Cairo in July 1956 that Washington would withdraw the offer. In retaliation, Nasser announced on July 26 that he had signed the decree nationalizing the Suez Canal Company.

Washington and London responded differently to the Suez Crisis. On July 27, 1956, the British cabinet made the decision to take military

60 Memorandum of conversation, prepared in the Embassy in Cairo, Subject "Egypt," May 11, 1953, *FRUS, 1952–1954,* IX, pt. 1, 10.

61 Memorandum of discussion at the 147th meeting of the NSC, June 1, 1953, ibid., 383.

62 Memorandum of conversation, prepared in the Embassy in Cairo, Subject "Egypt," May 11, 1953, ibid., 20.

action even if they had to do it alone. They so informed Washington. However, Eisenhower administration officials were against the use of force. On August 1, 1956, Dulles told Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd that "a way must be found to make Nasser disgorge."[63]

However, Dulles also told Lloyd that "force is the last method to be tried." He said he would not "exclude it [force] if all other means fail." In other words, "if it is used," Dulles explained, "it must be backed by world opinion." "Without adequate preparation of public opinion," the US could not associate herself in a military undertaking. More specifically, Dulles pointed out that US Congress and public opinion were not yet prepared for it. The next day, he met French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau and reiterated the importance of mobilizing world opinion and "in particular US opinion" before any strong action was taken.[64]

Dulles thought that Nasser could be brought to "disgorge by means other than military." What he meant by this was to have a conference of interested parties concerning international control of the canal. If Nasser refused to accept an arrangement for international control recommended by conference, "world opinion, and in particular US opinion, would be clarified." It would then "become possible to consider stronger action if it should appear necessary."[65] At a White House inner conference on July 31, Dulles again remarked that "if a proposal of this kind were made to the Arabs with world backing," "it would be possible to take armed

63 Memorandum of a conversation, British Foreign Office, London, August 1, 1956, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, XVI, 95.

64 Ibid. For Dulles-Pineau conversation, ibid., 101.

65 Telegram from the Embassy in the UK to DOS, London, August 2, 1956, ibid., 101. See also, memorandum of a conversation between PM Eden and SOS Dulles, London, August 1, 1956, ibid., 98–99. The transcript of the British Foreign Office on this point gives the reader the impression that Dulles was more permissive about resorting to force. Dulles thought if "it should be possible to create a world public opinion so adverse to Nasser that he would be isolated," then "if a military operation had to be undertaken, it would be more apt to succeed and have less grave repercussions than if it had been undertaken precipitately." Ibid., note 2, 95–96.

action if it becomes necessary with a good chance of retaining a large measure of support."[66]

The Suez Canal Conference, known as the 22-Power London Conference, met in London from August 16 to 23. On August 23, the establishment of the Five-Nation Committee, also known as the Suez Committee, was announced. The Suez Committee was entrusted with the task of operating, maintaining, developing and enlarging the canal, but this Eighteen-Power Proposal would be rejected by Nasser on September 9. However, what Dulles had in mind was exactly this kind of conference, a genuine effort to mobilize not only world opinion but also US opinion before any resort to force.

Dulles stressed the need for genuine efforts by London and Paris to mobilize world opinion for the following reasons. First of all, the US government felt it necessary to maintain a balance between colonialism and Arab nationalism. The balancing act required Washington to behave cautiously, because peoples in the Middle East were suspicious of US relationships with the other colonial powers. In the Cold War rivalry, the US could not risk driving non-communist Arab countries into the Soviet bloc. Rather, the US should seek to guide the nationalist pressures throughout the area into channels not antagonistic to the West. Thus Eisenhower told Churchill in July 1954 that "should we try to dam [nationalism] up completely, it would like a mighty river, burst through the barriers and could create a havoc." Therefore, the president advised the prime minister that the West should "make constructive use of this force" so that the result could "redound greatly to our advantage, particularly in our support against the Kremlin's power."[67]

At an NSC meeting in November 1, 1956, Dulles offered the following observation. "For many years now," the secretary said, "the United States has been walking a tight rope between the effort to maintain our old and valued relations with our British and French allies on the

66 Memorandum of a conference with the president, White House, July 1, 1956, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, XVI, 63.

67 Eisenhower to Churchill, July 22, 1954, Ann Whitman Series, David D. Eisenhower Diaries, Box 4, DDE Personal Diary, January-November 1954, quoted in Lucas, "The Limits of Ideology," p. 147.

one hand, and on the other trying to assure ourselves of the friendship and understanding of the newly independent countries who [sic] have escaped from colonialism." However, the US "could not walk this tight rope much longer." "Unless we now assert and maintain this leadership", he continued, "all of these newly independent countries will turn from us to the USSR." If they supported the French and the British on the colonial issue, the US "will share the fate of Britain and France." President Eisenhower agreed that "in doing so," the US would "lose the whole Arab world."[68]

Given their view of the world situation and the consequences that military measures were likely to bring about, it was clear which course the US should follow.

Beginning with Israel's invasion of Egypt on October 29, 1956, the Suez War broke out, and two days later, British and French forces bombarded Egyptian airfields in the vicinity of the Suez Canal Zone. The Eisenhower administration responded by pressuring London and Paris to accept the UN resolution calling for a ceasefire with the withdrawal of forces and the acceptance of a UN police force. Washington's decision to suspend oil supplies, as well as its refusal to support an impending collapse of the pound sterling, was decisive in finally forcing Britain and France to withdraw their troops from Egypt on December 21, 1956.[69]

The crucial difference between Washington and London/Paris was that, for the latter, the stakes were too high to let Nasser get away with nationalizing the Suez Canal. Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan explained the position taken by the British Cabinet, telling Dulles in August 1956 that "if this action were not met by the utmost firmness a chain reaction would be started which would ultimately lead to the loss of the entire British influence in the Middle East."[70] French Foreign

68 Memorandum of discussion at the 302d meeting of NSC, November 1, 1956, ibid., 906, 910.

69 Diane B. Kunz, *Butter and Guns: America's Cold War Economic Diplomacy* (New York: The Free Press, 1997), pp. 84–87.

70 Memorandum of a conversation, London, August 1, 1956, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, XVI, 108.

Minister Pineau shared his view with the British, stressing the vital interests involved in the dispute. At a tripartite meeting among the Foreign Ministers in early October, when Dulles told Lloyd and Pineau that the US was against resorting to force, the French Foreign Minister retorted, "we don't think the US Government realizes the importance that France and the UK attach to Suez. It is not merely the Canal, but is the Middle East, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia that are involved."[71]

Both Eisenhower and Dulles were aware that London and Paris were playing for extremely high stakes. Dulles showed his sympathy with and understanding of their position on several occasions. He remarked to the president in August 2, 1956, as follows: "I am not sure from their standpoint they can be blamed as they feel, probably with reason, that if Nasser gets away with his action, this will stimulate comparable action throughout the area which will end British and French positions in Middle East and North Africa, respectively."[72] Notwithstanding his objection to use of force under the circumstances, Eisenhower himself asked rhetorically at an NSC meeting on August 9, 1956, "how Europe could be expected to remain at the mercy of the whim of a dictator." He thought that Nasser "had gone too far."[73] Such sympathy and understanding of their positions led Dulles to remark to Selwyn Lloyd and Christian Pineau, the British and French foreign ministers, in October 1956 that "the US would not want to say that circumstances might not arise where the only alternative would be the use of force. Sometimes one must use it without prospect of a satisfactory outcome."[74]

When the die was cast, however, the US government worked against the Anglo-French decision for military action, because it was feared that such measures would lose the sympathy of peoples not only in the Middle East but also in other parts of the world, eventually driving them to the Soviet Union. The Cold War logic prevailed. As Dulles said at an

71 Memorandum of a conversation, New York, October 5, 1956, ibid., 641.

72 Message from Dulles to the President, London, August 2, 1956, ibid., 110. See also, Dulles' July 31 remark, ibid., 64.

73 Memorandum of discussion at the 292nd meeting of the NSC, August 9, 1956, ibid., 174.

74 Ibid., 642.

NSC meeting in November 1956, "it is not less than tragic that at this very time, when we are on the point of winning an immense and long-hoped-for victory over Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe, we should be forced to choose between following in the footsteps of Anglo-French colonialism in Asia and Africa, or splitting our course away from their course." From Washington's standpoint, "what the British and French had done was nothing but the straight old-fashioned variety of colonialism of the most obvious sort."[75]

The Suez Crisis became a turning point in the Middle East from which the US emerged as the most influential player, with the UK and France as junior partners. The announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine in March 1957 was an expression of US determination to take responsibility for the region as a hegemonic power. The president was authorized by Congress to use force whenever he thought it necessary, in order to prevent "international communism" from conquering the Middle East.

It did not mean, however, that US policy in the region was consistent with the principle of anti-colonialism. The US priority on the containment of the Soviet Union remained unchanged, thereby making stability and order in the newly independent countries more important than faithfully following the principles of self-determination and sovereignty. The US government also continued to foster and sustain pro-American regimes, or at least it tried to accommodate nationalist regimes not antagonistic to US interests in the area.

Once the US replaced the colonial powers in the region, its foreign policy dilemma there became apparent. Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic in early 1958. By early June, internal strife had escalated into a civil war in Lebanon, where rebel forces were supported by Syria under Nasser's influence. Moreover, on July 14, 1958, the pro-Western Iraqi kingdom fell to nationalist army officers who admired Nasser. Eisenhower was afraid that Lebanon would be next. So on the day of the Baghdad coup, Eisenhower ordered US troops to land in Lebanon, followed by the UK's deployment of troops to Jordan.

An intriguing conversation took place at this point between Dulles and Eisenhower. The president said at a conference on July 14 that "to

75 NSC 302 Meeting, November 1, 1956, ibid., 909.

lose this area by inaction would be far worse than the loss of China, because of the strategic position and resources of the Middle East." He also remarked that "the most strategic move would be to attack Cairo in the present circumstances, but of course this cannot be done." Dulles agreed. "Many will say," the secretary said, "we are simply doing what we stopped the British and the French from doing at the time of the Suez crisis."[76]

As Dulles admitted, the rationale and logic behind their decision to send troops to Lebanon were not so different from those that the UK and France had relied upon during the Suez Crisis. The US, as the protector of the region against communism, saw no choice but to demonstrate its military power to buttress faltering non-communist regimes in the area.

By Way of Conclusion

A more or less similar pattern of behavior and thinking can be observed in the case of US responses to the First Indochina War. US governments under Truman and Eisenhower regarded Indochina as a French responsibility. Both administrations viewed France's colonial outlook and methods as "dangerously outmoded." At the same time, however, US policymakers were aware of Ho Chi Minh's Communist connections. Their concern over Ho's Moscow and Beijing connections grew as the Cold War rivalry intensified. Truman made the decision to provide military assistance to France in the fight against Vietminh forces. Behind this decision was the administration's view, expressed by Acheson, that "[the] question [of] whether Ho [is] as much nationalist as Commie is irrelevant. All Stalinists in colonial areas are nationalists. With achievement [of] national aims (i.e., independence) their objective necessarily becomes subordination [of] state to Commie purposes and ruthless extermination not only [of] opposition but [of] all elements suspected [of] even [the] slightest deviation . . ."[77] NSC 64 of February 1950 thus

76 Memorandum of a conference with the President, July 14, 1958, *FRUS, 1958–1960*, XI, 213–215.

77 William A. Williams et al., eds., *America in Vietnam: A Documentary History* (New York: Anchor Books, 1985), pp. 95–96.

declared that "it is important to United States security interests that all practical measures be taken to prevent further communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indochina is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat."[78]

After France's debacle in Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, the US made a series of important decisions to replace France in Indochina. These included a willingness to defend Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam and to provide direct economic and military assistance to these states without going through France, the choice of Ngo Dinh Diem as a US collaborator and the US takeover of responsibility from France in the training of South Vietnamese forces.[79] Most of all, Eisenhower administration officials were motivated by their conviction that the Associated States of Indochina should be given independence without which America's liberal project would not succeed.

However, Dulles and Eisenhower were well aware of the dilemma that their independence would entail. On the one hand, "it was essential," Dulles stated, "to eliminate from the minds of the Asians any belief that we were intervening in Indochina in support of colonialism." On the other hand, he did not think the Associated States were ready for "complete independence." If they were "turned loose," "it would be like putting a baby in a cage of hungry lions." Therefore, the US had to take care of them through the formation of a SEATO. Otherwise, Dulles believed that "the baby would rapidly be devoured."[80]

This was the real dilemma Washington policymakers faced in responding to decolonization in the third world. Dulles stated in July

78 Report to the NSC by the DOS, NSC 64, February 27, 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, VI, 747.

79 For a more detailed analysis, see the author's article, "Amerika 'Teikoku' no Keisei to Datsu Shokuminchika Katei e no Taio" [The Making of the American Empire and US Responses to Decolonization], in Katsuhiko Kitagawa, ed., *Datsu Shokuminchika to Igirisu Teikoku [Decolonization and the British Empire]* (Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 2009), pp. 111–152, esp. 128–140.

80 Memorandum of conversation by the Counselor (MacArthur), May 11, 1954, re. "Informal and Unofficial Notes on Meeting at the White House on Indochina," May 10, 1954, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, XIII, 1528.

1953 that the greatest danger in the world to small, weak states that were "relatively inexperienced in self-government" was Moscow's aggressive policy. He noted that Stalin had once stated: "nationalism is a slogan which is to be used to break up the unity of the free world, and to obtain independence for various areas which the Soviet Union would then try to absorb into its own orbit."[81] Given the subsequent deepening of US military intervention in Vietnam, particularly after the Kennedy administration, it was ironic that Dulles' above statement also applies to US responses to decolonization not only in the first Indochina War, but also in other areas of the world, including the Middle East during the Suez Crisis.

Perhaps Dulles was aware of it. In the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, the Secretary of State ruminated with President Eisenhower in the following words:

> We must bear in mind that some of our friends felt that they were having to bear the burden of our present policies. In this connection, I referred to [Syngman] Rhee, Chiang [Kai-shek], the Dutch in Indonesia, the French in Indochina, the British, French and Israelis in the Middle East, and the Hungarians. All of them were being sacrificed to our policies. I mentioned that while we did not seek it, we in fact did tend by our anti-colonial policies gradually to replace British, French and Dutch interests in what had been their particular spheres and that there was a tendency on the part of those colonial countries to attribute this motivation to us.[82]

81 US minutes of a meeting of representatives of the US, France, and the Associated States of Indochina, at the DOS, July 13, 1953, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, XIII, 675.

82 Memorandum of conversation with the President, December 3, 1956, Meeting with the President File, D. D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, quoted in Ronald W. Pruessen, "John Foster Dulles and Decolonization in Southeast Asia," in Marc Frey, Ronald W. Pruessen, and Tan Tai Yong, eds., *The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives on Decolonization* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 226–240, esp. 240.

Chapter 7

Road to Bandung: China's Evolving Approach to De-Colonization

Qiang Zhai

When the Chinese Communists took power in October 1949, they faced a world in rapid transformation. During World War II, the Japanese invasion had greatly weakened the European colonies in Asia, facilitating the process of decolonization in the region. After the war, it was in Asia where the Cold War and decolonization interacted most intensely. As the anti-colonial movement gathered momentum, both the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to steer it into the Cold War orbit. Thus, what began as a revolt of the South against the oppression of the North was hijacked by the competition between the East and the West, creating a complex historical phenomenon. As the Cold War moved beyond Europe to Asia and other parts of the world, it transformed itself from its European origins as a geopolitical contest between Washington and Moscow to become a rivalry of competing social and political systems and orders, a struggle to define the model and meaning of progress as people strove to win independence from the shackle of colonization, to cope with political upheavals, social revolutions, economic transformations, and racial and ethnic conflicts. The Cold War not only coincided temporally with the struggles for national independence and freedom that took place in the colonial territories after WWII, but also influenced the temper, pace, and results of those struggles.

How did Mao and his comrades view the connection of their revolution to the dual processes of the Cold War and decolonization? How did Moscow's approach shape their attitude toward non-communist nation-

alist leaders in Asia? How did their policy toward the emerging Afro-Asian states evolve in the first half of the 1950s, culminating in their breakthrough diplomacy at the Bandung Conference in 1955? Answers to these questions will shed light on Beijing's relations with the Soviet Union and the United States, on its interactions with non-Western nationalist states, and most importantly, on how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders apprehended threats and identified interests and opportunities in Asia, and how they understood and defined China's place in the postwar world.

Changes in Postwar Politics in Asia

The Second World War shook the foundation of the Western colonial empire in Asia. South and Southeast Asia were among the most unstable colonial territories in the world. Britain, the strongest of the European powers, was quick to recognize the high financial and military cost of maintaining its colonial possessions, embarking on a path of imperial retreat. In August 1947, it completed its transfer of power in South Asia by granting independence to India and Pakistan. A year later, it built on the precedent set in the South Asian subcontinent by allowing Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Burma to become independent. In Malaya, which was of greater economic value due to its role as one of the British Empire's top dollar earners through its export of rubber and tin, London tried to make its control more efficient by introducing constitutional reform. In 1948, it unveiled a new federal governmental system that envisioned strong central government control over security and finance while providing for a degree of local autonomy for the Malay-dominate sultanates.[1]

1 John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-war World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988); Nicholas Tarling, *Britain, Southeast Asia, and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Hans Antlöv and Stein Tønnesson, eds., *Imperial Policy and Southeast Asian Nationalism* (Richmond: Curzon, 1995); Jost Dulffer, "The Impact of World War II on Decolonization," in Marc Frey, Ronald W. Pruessen, and Tan Tai Yong, eds., *The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives on Decolonization* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 23–34.

In contrast to Britain, the Netherlands and France were less accommodating to the demands and pressure of nationalist movements in Asia. Both powers had suffered a loss of prestige during WWII, and therefore viewed the restoration of their colonies in Southeast Asia as crucial to their national rehabilitation and revival. Both, however, encountered strong resistance when they attempted to reestablish their domination. In the Dutch East Indies, Japan had promoted Indonesian nationalism by freeing leaders such as Sukarno and Hatta from Dutch prisons and permitting the organization of an indigenous militia. When WWII ended in August 1945, the nationalists were therefore prepared to exploit the power vacuum to create a Republic of Indonesia and were resolved to prevent the Dutch from returning.[2]

What happened in Vietnam was a most telling case of the intersection between decolonization and the Cold War in Asia. Taking advantage of the Japanese destruction of the French colonial authority during WWII, Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnamese independence by establishing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in September 1945. Ho's new government, however, immediately encountered a test of survival as France launched a military campaign to reclaim its colonial possession in Indochina. Motivated by Cold War calculations, the United States abandoned its wartime position of supporting Vietnamese independence and endorsed France's efforts to recover its colonial empire in Southeast Asia.[3]

In 1948, left-wing insurgency broke out in Southeast Asia. In March communist forces plunged newly-independent Burma into civil war,

2 Robert J. McMahon, "Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Reoccupation of the Netherlands East Indies," *Diplomatic History* 2 (1978), pp. 1–23; idem, *Colonialism and the Cold War: The United States and the Indonesian Struggle for Independence, 1945–1949* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981); Richard Mason, "Containment and the Challenge of Non-Alignment: The Cold War and U.S. Policy toward Indonesia, 1950–1952," in Christopher E. Goscha and Christian F. Ostermann, eds., *Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945–1962* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 39–67.

3 Mark Atwood Lawrence, *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

in June the Malayan Communist Party waged an armed revolt against British rule, and in September the Indonesian Communist Party took up arms against Sukarno's government. All of a sudden, the region looked to be on the brink of political meltdown. American and British officials at the time tended to regard these seemingly spontaneous left-winged uprisings as directed and coordinated by the Soviet Union, but most scholars tend to argue that they had developed from local circumstances rather than as responses to any instructions from the Kremlin.[4] Although there is no evidence to prove that Stalin orchestrated the outbreak of communist insurgency in Southeast Asia in 1948, it is plausible to argue that the declaration of the "two-camp" theory by Andrei Zhdanov at the inaugural meeting of the Cominform in September 1947 inspired and emboldened communist groups in Southeast Asia to follow a course of armed struggle. In this sense, the historical trajectories of the Cold War and decolonization intersected and collided, creating national divisions, rivalries, and civil wars—most often between communist and anti-communist forces—within the process of anti-colonialism.

The CCP Confronts Postwar Asia

When the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, they chose to lean to the side of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. They perceived dual meanings and identities of their revolution in the context of world history. They believed that the Chinese revolution had world significance in two respects: first, it represented a continuation of the Russian revolution, and like the Russian revolution, it belonged to the worldwide effort to destroy the capitalist system and to establish the proletarian dictatorship; second, because of China's unique historical background and experiences in modern times, the Chinese revolution offered an example to colonial countries in the non-Western world. Unlike the Russian revolution, which emerged from a former imperialist state, the Chinese

4 For recent reassessments of this issue, see the following two special issues: "1948 Insurgencies and the Cold War in Southeast Asia Revisited," *Kajian Malaysia: Journal of Malaysian Studies* 27:1&2 (2009); "Asian Cold War Symposium," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 40 (October 2009).

revolution took place in a rural country, which had suffered at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialism and colonialism.[5]

In analyzing the issues of war and peace in world politics, Mao and his colleagues followed closely Zhdanov's "two-camp" theory. Speaking at a party politburo meeting on September 13, 1948, Mao asserted that his assessment of the global trend was the same as that made by Zhdanov at the Cominform opening conference, namely, the revolutionary forces were superior to the anti-revolutionary forces in the world and that the war plan of the reactionary forces could be broken. Eager to contribute to the strength of the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union, Mao declared that "the international situation is in our favor."[6]

The CCP leaders displayed enthusiasm in supporting communist rebellions in Southeast Asia and showed distrust and hostility toward the newly independent countries in Asia that were not led by communist parties, claiming that they were still under the control of their former masters and that armed revolution by local communists represented the only hope to liberation. They rejected the notion that there could be "neutrals" and insisted that everyone had to "lean to one side or the other." They believed that the Chinese model of relying on armed struggle to seize power in a rural society was relevant and applicable to revolutionary movements in Asia. Addressing a group of delegates from Asian and Australian trade unions in November 1949, Liu Shaoqi, the number-two man in the CCP leadership, proudly declared that "Mao Zedong's road" to victory could be followed by people in colonial and semi-colonial countries, who were striving to achieve liberation.[7]

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5 Lu Dingyi, "The World Significance of the Chinese Revolution," June 30, 1951, in *Lu Dingyi wenji* [Collected Works of Lu Dingyi] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1992), pp. 432–439. Lu Dingyi was a major theoretician within the CCP.

6 Mao's speech at the CCP politburo meeting, September 13, 1948, in *Mao Zedong wenji* [Collection of Mao Zedong's Works], vol. 5 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1996), pp. 141–146.

7 Liu Shaoqi's address at the Conference of Asian and Australian Trade Unions, November 16, 1949, in *Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao* [Liu Shaoqi's Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2005, pp. 160–169.

As the Chinese Communist forces reached the borders with Vietnam and Burma in late 1949 and early 1950, the CCP elites expected that the communist parties in Southeast Asia would send representatives to the southern provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi to seek contact with the CCP. In an instruction to Chen Geng, chairman of the Yunnan People's Government, on March 3, 1950, Liu Shaoqi asked him to provide "a warm welcome and assistance" if the communist parties in Southeast Asia, especially from Vietnam and Burma, dispatched envoys to Yunnan.[8]

In a speech to a gathering of party intelligence officials in April 1950, Zhou Enlai dwelled on the importance of assisting revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia. Urging his listeners not to be content with the victory that China had achieved, he declared: "We should be prepared to shoulder the burden of helping to liberate the entire world . . . From now on, we should help the oppressed nations and brothers in the East such as Korea, Indonesia, and Vietnam to liberate themselves. If all these nations have risen up and won liberation, would it not be true that the power of the people all over the world will be greater and that imperialism will be more vulnerable to collapse?" After examining internal and external difficulties facing the United States, Zhou pointed out that "our tasks include consolidating of world peace and preventing the rearming of Japan and Germany and that our current focus is to liberate Taiwan, completely defeat Chiang Kai-shek, and assist the revolutionary movements of weak nations in Southeast Asia."[9]

In January 1951, the CCP created the Department of International Liaison to handle relations with fraternal parties, and Wang Jiaxiang was appointed the director. In a letter to Wang on January 16, Liu Shaoqi explained that his "most important task" would be to establish contact

8 Liu Shaoqi to Chen Geng, March 3, 1950, in *Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao*, vol. 1, pp. 572–573.

9 Zhou Enlai's speech at the Work Conference of the Second and Fifth Bureaus of the Intelligence Department of the People's Revolutionary Committee of the Central People's Government, April 1, 1950, in *Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao* [Zhou Enlai's Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC], vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2008), pp. 240–255.

with fraternal parties in the East and to provide assistance to them. "At the moment," Liu informed Wang, "the parties of Japan, Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaya all have representative in Beijing."[10] But the nature and scope of China's aid to those parties, except Ho Chi Minh's movement, remain unclear because of the unavailability of primary sources from Beijing.[11]

In contrast to its eagerness to support the communist movements in Southeast Asia, the CCP's attitude toward non-communist political leaders in Asia was suspicious and hostile. For instance, following Moscow's line,[12] the CCP denounced Jawaharlal Nehru as a "stooge of imperialism" and lambasted his suppression of the Indian Communist Party.[13] *Shiejie zhishi* [World Knowledge], the CCP propaganda organ, labeled Nehru as an "Asian Quisling"[14] and

10 Liu Shaoqi to Wang Jiaxiang, January16, 1951, in *Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao*, vol. 3, p. 25.

11 On China's aid to Ho Chi Minh's anti-French struggle during the First Indochina War, see Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), chaps. 1–2.

12 Stalin regarded post-colonial governments as tools of Western imperialism. Vojtech Mastny, "The Soviet Union's Partnership with India," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 12:3 (Summer 2010), p. 52. The Soviet press branded Nehru's government as "an Indian variant of bourgeois pseudo-democracy," and Nehru himself as a "running dog of imperialism." Golam Wahed Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 8.

13 Wang Chen, "China's Policy toward India and the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, 1949–1951," *Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu* [Journal of Contemporary Chinese History Studies] 2 (2002), pp. 63–74; Dai Chaowu, "Indian Foreign Policy, Great Power Relations, and the 1962 Sino-Indian Border Conflict," in Niu Dayong and Shen Zhihua, eds., *Lengzhan yu Zhongguo de zhoubian guanxi* [The Cold War and China's Relations with Neighboring Countries] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2004), pp. 487–556. In contrast to Mao's hostility, Nehru saw China as a friend and a partner in leading post-colonial Asia. Thant Myint-U, *Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), p. 225.

14 Hu Jin, "Liberate Tibet and Smash Imperialist Plots," *Shijie zhishi* [World Knowledge], supplement no. 2 (December 9, 1949).

condemned the United States for using Nehru as its "agent in the East" to replace Chiang Kai-shek.[15] In a November 1949 telegram to B. T. Ranadive, general secretary of the Indian Communist Party, Mao expressed his hope that the combined struggle waged by the Indian Communist Party and other Indian patriots would liberate India from "the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators."[16]

Even though neutralist Burma was the first noncommunist state to recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) and endorsed its claim to represent China in the United Nations, Beijing remained antagonistic toward the government in Rangoon and sought cooperation with the Burmese Communist Party.[17] Recalling Burma's ties with China in the early 1950s, Burmese premier U Nu wrote in 1958: "Our relations with the new Chinese regime remained uncertain for a number of years . . . The new Chinese government seemed inclined to give our Communists their moral support, apparently regarding us as stooges of the west."[18]

It is important to note that Stalin was ambivalent about the relevance of the Chinese revolutionary model to countries like Indonesia and India. In the fall of 1950, Stalin received separately letters from the communist parties of Indonesia and India regarding their intention and preparations to seize power in their countries. Referring to China as their role model, both letters stressed the importance of waging armed struggle to topple world imperialism and its local puppets. In his reply, however, Stalin advised caution, emphasizing that conditions were not ready

15 *Shijie zhishi* 9 (March 10, 1950).

16 Mao's telegram to B. T. Ranadive, November 19, 1949, in *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* [Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1987), p. 146.

17 Lucian Pye, "The China Factor in Southeast Asia," in Richard H. Solomon, ed., *The China Factor: Sino-American Relations and the Global Scene* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981), pp. 216–256; Josef Silverstein, *Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 171.

18 U Nu, *Premier Report to the People* (Rangoon: GUB, 1958), pp. 35–36. See also Maung Aung Myoe, *In the Name of Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar's China Policy since 1948* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), p. 22.

for conducting armed revolution in their countries. The Soviet leader insisted that the primary task for the Indonesian and Indian communists at the moment was to implement agrarian reform, liquidating feudal landed property and transferring it to peasants. Fearing that the Chinese example might inspire Asian communists to take drastic and premature actions, Stalin tried to downplay the CCP's success and to demonstrate that Mao's victory was an exception, rather than a norm, that the CCP could win only because of assistance from the Soviet Union, which shared a border with China, and that similar assistance was not possible for countries far away from the Soviet Union.[19]

Stalin's disapproval had an effect on the CCP because after 1951 CCP officials refrained in their public speeches and publications from boasting the importance and relevance of "Mao's way" to other Asian countries. To maintain unity within the communist bloc and to avoid Stalin's suspicion of Chinese competition, Mao took pains to show deference to the Soviet leadership. He instructed his officials not to employ the term "Mao Zedong Thought" in their addresses and writings. Before the opening of the Second National Congress of the Communist Youth League in June 1953, Mao sent his secretary Chen Boda to advise League officials on how to prepare reports to be delivered at the Congress. As a result, neither the "Working Report" by Hu Yaobang nor the "Report on the Revision of the League Charter" by Li Chang contained reference to "Mao Zedong Thought."[20] Reliance on Soviet assistance in the early 1950s forced Mao to swallow his pride.

Reaching out to Neutral Countries

The CCP modified its policy toward neutralist governments in Asia in the mid-1950s, no longer treating them as reactionary forces or as merely

19 Ilya V. Gaiduk, "Soviet Cold War Strategy and Prospects of Revolution in South and Southeast Asia," in Goscha and Ostermann, *Connecting Histories*, pp. 123–136.

20 Li Chang, "My Good Teacher and Helpful Friend Hu Yaobang," in *Bainianchao* [Hundred Year Tide] 2 (1999), p. 25. This monthly journal frequently publishes recollections and memoirs by former Chinese communist officials.

"running dogs" of imperialist powers. During the 1954 Geneva Conference, Zhou Enlai visited India and Burma and held talks with Nehru and U Nu. Zhou agreed to base China's relations with India and Burma on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equal and mutual respect, and peaceful coexistence.[21] From Beijing's perspective, these principles represented a code of international conduct totally different from imperialism and hegemonism.

The result of the Geneva Conference, announced on July 21, 1954, brought the First Indochina War to a close. According to the Geneva Accords, a ceasefire would take place between the Communist forces and the French; Vietnam would be divided at the Seventeenth parallel with French troops withdrawing from north of that line; North and South Vietnam would neither enter military alliances nor permit foreign military bases on their territories; national elections, supervised by an international commission of Canada, India, and Poland, would be conducted within two years to unify the country; the Communist forces (Pathet Lao) would be allowed to regroup in two provinces in Laos; independent states would be established in Laos and Cambodia and general elections would be held there.[22]

On several occasions in the second half of 1954, Mao reiterated his approval of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Meeting with a British Labor delegation on August 24, Mao asserted that socialism could coexist with capitalism. Imperialism and feudal kingdoms so long as each side showed willingness to do so and that peaceful coexistence

21 Pei Jianzhang, chief ed., *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1949–1956* [Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China, 1949–1956] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994), pp. 100, 121–122; John W. Garver, *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001); Bertil Lintner, "Burma and Its Neighbors," *China Report* 28:3 (July-September 1992), pp. 225–259.

22 William J. Duiker, *Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), pp. 89–94.

could happen between different social and political systems.[23] In a conversation with Nehru two months later, Mao indicated his intention to apply the Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to China's relations with all countries.[24]

The endorsement by Mao and his associates of Indian and Burmese neutrality constituted an important adjustment of their earlier position of supporting revolutionary forces and rejecting neutralism in the Cold War. When they first assumed power in China in 1949, they believed that promoting revolutionary movements was not only desirable international politics because it weakened the reactionary forces, but also an unshakable international duty. One of the objectives of the Chinese revolution was to lead other colonial and semi-colonial peoples to the same path. By the mid-1950s, however, the CCP elites had come to recognize the increasing insufficiency and rigidity of their 1949 adoption of the leaning-to-one-side policy and its corollary of allowing no third approach.[25]

In the months after the Geneva Conference, Mao focused his attention on Taiwan. To prevent what he perceived as an American plan to separate Taiwan from China and to "break the political and military collaboration between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek," he decided to increase pressure in the Taiwan Strait.[26] While U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles was negotiating the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) agreement in Manila in September 1954, Mao ordered his troops to shell Quemoy (Jinmen) and Mastu (Mazu), Nationalist-held

23 The PRC Foreign Ministry and the CCP Central Documentary Research Department, comp., *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan* [Diplomatic Writings of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe and Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994), p. 160.

24 Ibid., p. 165.

25 On the evolution of China's Third World policy, see Samuel S. Kim, "China and the Third World: In Search of a Peace and Development Line," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., *China and the World: New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 148–178.

26 Wang Bingnan, *Zhongmei huitan jiunian huigu* [Recollections of the Nine-Year Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1985), pp. 41–42.

islands off the Chinese coast.[27] During the crisis, the Soviet Union defended the Chinese position, claiming that the U.S. interference with China's internal affairs was the real reason for the tensions in the Taiwan region. In October 1954, Khrushchev pleased Mao by visiting China and agreeing to return the naval base at Lushun (Port Arthur) taken by Stalin in exchanged for the Russian declaration of war against Japan in 1945.[28]

While it is true that in the post-Stalin period, Soviet and American leaders wanted to stabilize their relations and to prevent the danger of the Cold War becoming hot given the fact that both sides now possessed thermonuclear weapons, it is also true that they never abandoned their competition for influence in the world. They maintained their belief that their system represented the best political, economic, and social model for the mankind. Their efforts to win the hearts and minds of people in under-developed and colonial countries intensified.[29]

Stalin was more preoccupied with events in Europe during the early Cold War. In general, he exhibited little interest in areas of the world not adjacent to his country and had not invested economic or military resources in those regions to compete with the West. In Southeast Asia, Stalin refrained from providing economic or military aid to Ho Chi Minh

27 Michael Schaller, *The United States and China: Into the Twenty-First Century*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 148. For the Eisenhower administration's response to the Taiwan Strait crisis, see Robert Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy Toward Taiwan, 1950–1955* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), chaps. 8–9. Nehru opposed the creation of the SEATO, warning that the organization, by renewing old fears and feelings of insecurity, would stimulate actions in contradiction to the Geneva Accords. Roger M. Smith, *Cambodia's Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 76.

28 Pei, *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi*, pp. 29, 39; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), p. 18.

29 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Melvyn Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007).

in his struggle against French colonialism.[30] Toward the Middle East, Stalin failed to produce any coherent policy.[31] The new leadership in the Kremlin, however, was less stricken with the siege mentality of Stalin and more eager to undermine the interest of the West on the global scale.

By the mid-1950s, the Cold War had moved beyond its focus on Europe and East Asia to a broader area in the world. The Third World was aggressively asserting itself onto the American-Soviet agenda. The dissolution of the European empires had produced a generation of ambitious nationalist leaders anxious for endorsement, assistance, and legitimacy. They faced, however, the choice of either throwing their lot with one or the other of the two Cold War camps or remaining neutral. None of them except North Vietnam declared their allegiance to the Soviet bloc while a number of them were induced by the United States and its European allies to join Western-dominated regional security systems. The alternative of nonalignment in the Cold War was represented by India.

Nikita Khrushchev personified a new Soviet approach to the Cold War when he declared on an official visit to India in 1955: "Let us verify in practice whose system is better. We say to the leaders of the capitalist states: Let us compete without war."[32] Eager to reverse recent Soviet setbacks in Europe by opening a "second front" of the Cold War in Asia, Khrushchev hoped that he could use India to move the "correlation of forces" in the struggle with the United States decisively in Soviet favor.[33] Khrushchev's sojourn in India was very successful. According to an observer, Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin "looked like pilgrims from another planet with floppy felt hats and trousers so wide they could have

30 Ilya V. Gaiduk, *Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954–1963* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), chap. 1.

31 Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), p. 109.

32 Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War*, p. 57.

33 Mastny, "The Soviet Union's Partnership," pp. 50–90.

been used as sails. Huge crowds turned out to see them, and Nehru greatly enjoyed their visit, and sensed it was a personal triumph for himself as a diplomat as well as a prime minister."[34]

Not everyone in the Soviet leadership, however, shared Khrushchev's view. Molotov, for instance, called Khrushchev's new offensive "adventurism." Khrushchev replied: "Offensive is the best form of defense. I said we needed a new, active diplomacy because the impossibility of nuclear war meant that the struggle between us and the capitalists was taking on new forms . . . I'm not an adventurer, but we must aid national liberation movements."[35] Under Khrushchev's guidance, the Kremlin began to dispatch officials to the developing world in search of diplomatic ties and trade and cultural relationships. As the historian Jonathan Haslam aptly puts it, "In Asia willingness to accept nonalignment as an asset also indicated a sober assessment of realities on the ground rather than the will-o'-the-wisp of revolution."[36]

Leaders in Beijing praised Khrushchev's new diplomacy in the Third World. Yang Shangkun, a member of the CCP Politburo, wrote in his diary on January 3, 1956: "The flexible policy adopted by the Soviet Union has isolated the United States in many areas. The visit to India and Burma by Bulganin and Khrushchev represented the first contact between the Soviet Union and these Eastern countries over the last several decades and improved the Soviet position in Asia."[37]

Zhou Enlai at the Bandung Conference

Beijing contributed the proper ideological accompaniment to Khrushchev's drive to court the newly emergent nations in the Third World by

34 Quoted in Judith M. Brown, *Nehru: A Political Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 250.

35 William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), p. 354.

36 Jonathan Haslam, *Russia's Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 151.

37 Yang Shangkun, *Yang Shangkun riji* [Yang Shangkun's Diaries], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2001), p. 219.

participating in the Bandung Conference of Asian and African states in April 1955.[38] Attaching great importance to the meeting, the Chinese leadership wanted to seize the opportunity to woo neutral countries. In a speech at a party meeting on March 22, 1955, Liu Shaoqi dwelled upon the importance of winning the cooperation of neutral delegates at the forthcoming Bandung gathering. He pointed out that China should accord sufficient attention to the role of neutral countries because they played an important role in "opposing and hampering the war activities of the United States and resisting the American plot to organize aggressive military blocs." "As an independent international gathering by Asian-African states without the participation of imperialist countries," Liu concluded, the Bandung Conference "might exert a major impact on the anti-colonial struggle of Asian-African countries, on the effort to expand the force of peace in Asia and Africa, and on China's endeavor to win more acceptance of its principle of peaceful coexistence by Asian-African countries."[39]

The Chinese government kept its Soviet counterpart informed of its preparations for the conference. On April 6, 1955, Huang Zhen, the Chinese ambassador to Indonesia, told D. A. Zhukov, the Soviet ambassador to Indonesia, about the composition of the PRC delegation, which included a Chinese Muslim leader. Zhukov replied that the inclusion of a prominent Muslim figure in the delegation had "great significance."[40]

38 U Nu was one of the promoters for inviting China to the Bandung Conference. Because some countries opposed the invitation of China to the meeting, U Nu declared publicly that he would not go to Bandung if Zhou Enlai was not invited. Maung Aung Myoe, *In the Name of Pauk-Phaw*, p. 27. The Indian scholar Giri Deshingkar wrote: "At the Bandung Conference in 1955, Nehru decided to adopt a low profile for himself and to promote Zhou Enlai and the new Chinese state on the international scene." Giri Deshingkar, "India-China Relations: The Nehru Years," *China Report* 27:2 (April-June 1991), pp. 85–10 (The quote is on p. 90).

39 Liu Shaoqi's speech at the National Representative Conference of the CCP, March 22, 1955, in *Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao*, vol. 7, p. 129.

40 Zhukov journal entry, April 12, 1955, in Cold War International History Project Digital Archive, e-Dossier no. 26: "Soviet Policy in Indonesia during the 'Liberal Democracy' Period, 1950–1959," introduced by Larisa M. Efimova [accessed on November 9, 2011].

Zhou Enlai was appointed as the head of the Chinese delegation to the Bandung Conference. During the meeting, he greatly improved China's international image and diversified its global contact through his diplomacy of moderation, reconciliation, and pragmatism. He sought to impress leaders from the developing countries by soft-pedaling communist principles and by emphasizing common historical experiences that China shared with them. "In the wake of the Second World War," Zhou contended, "many countries became independent. Some countries were led by communist parties while other countries were led by nationalist leaders. Both groups, however, shared the same background of achieving independence from colonial rule. There is no reason why they should not understand, respect, and support each other. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence should serve as a foundation for friendship and cooperation among them."[41] China initially applied the Five Principles to its relations with India and Burma. Zhou now extended them to China's ties with all Third World countries, treating them as the cornerstone for the post-imperialist and post-colonial world order.

Zhou Enlai's efforts to avoid confrontation and seek consensus made it possible for the Bandung Conference to reach a satisfactory conclusion. He refrained from distinguishing between countries which maintained military alliances with Washington and those which had close ties with Moscow. The emphasis on themes common to all participants, such as political independence, social progress, economic development, and racial equality, allowed the meeting to hold together where it otherwise might have collapsed. That the ten-point Bandung Communique was based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence demonstrated Zhou Enlai's success in promoting these ideas to the delegates at the conference.

Zhou Enlai touched many delegates with his grace, reasonableness, and soothing words. He made a major impact on Prince Sihanouk and Cambodia's subsequent international orientation by convincing him that non-alignment provided the best safeguard for Cambodia's security

41 Pei, *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi*, pp. 243–244; Li Shenzhi and Zhang Yan, *Yafei huiyi riji* [Asian-African Conference Diaries] (Beijing: Zhongguo xinwen chubanshe, 1986); Ronald C. Keith, *The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 83.

against its neighboring historical antagonists (South Vietnam and Thailand), both of which were allied to the United States.[42] Toward Indonesia, Zhou tried to dispel apprehension about a Chinese fifth column by signing an agreement providing that overseas Chinese with dual citizenship should choose one nationality or the other. With the Philippines, a SEATO member, Zhou offered to conclude a non-aggression treaty. Thailand's delegates were invited to tour the Thai Autonomous Zone of Yunnan to assure themselves of the peaceful purposes of that zone. With Pakistani representatives, Zhou expressed understanding of their assurances that Islamabad's membership in SEATO was not directed against China.[43]

The Soviet Union came under attack at Bandung. Delegates from anti-communist countries like Iraq, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey accused the USSR of practicing neo-colonialism in Eastern Europe and of posing a new threat to the world. Zhou Enlai refuted the accusation as "contradictory against the facts." Zhou's strategy to deflect criticism of the Soviet Union was to emphasize the importance of decolonization, racial equality, and national independence. He urged participants at the meeting to "seek common ground while preserving differences."[44]

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42 Sophie Richardson, *China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 32. Sihanouk later described his first meeting with Zhou Enlai as "a case of 'love at first sight.'" Norodom Sihanouk with Wilfred Burchett, *My War with the C.I.A.: Cambodia's Fight for Survival* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1973), p. 202.

43 Xiong Huayuan, "Zhou Enlai and the Bandung Conference," *Dangshi wenhui* [Collection of Articles on Party History] 6 (1987), pp. 4–8; Xia Zhongcheng, *Yafei Xiongfeng: Tuanjie hezuo de yafei huiyi* [Strong Winds of Asia and Africa: United and Cooperative Asian-African Conferences] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1998), pp. 55–78; Tao Wenzhao, ed., *Zhongmei guanxi shi, 1949–1972* [A History of Sino-American Relations, 1949–1972] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1999), pp. 195–203; John W. Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 49.

44 Zhou's telegram to the CCP Central Committee and Mao, April 30, 1955, in The PRC Foreign Ministry Archives, ed., *Zhongguo daibiaotuan chuxi 1955 nian yafei huiyi* [The Participation of the Chinese Delegation in the 1955 Asian-African Conference] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2007), pp. 87–90.

During the Bandung Conference, China took steps to defuse tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Its attack on the offshore islands had not only failed to prevent Washington and Taipei from drawing closer to each other but also caused great fear among Southeast Asian countries, which desired a stable and peaceful international environment. During his speech before the political committee on April 23, Zhou Enlai announced that China was ready to negotiate with the United States.[45] Washington accepted Zhou's proposal, and the Sino-American ambassadorial talks began shortly afterwards in Geneva.[46]

What made the overture to the emerging postcolonial nations of Asia and Africa so attractive to the PRC, and what so unsettled American officials about it, was that Beijing seemed to possess a number of distinct advantages over the West in any competition for the hearts and minds of the Third World. Common experiences of victimization and humiliation at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialism, deep-rooted resentments against the hubris and arrogance of white racism, an abiding desire for speedy economic growth—all made the Third World arena highly susceptible to Beijing's olive-branches. Issues with regard to race, color, and religion were unavoidably prominent at a gathering of representatives from former colonies who were determined to terminate colonial

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See also Pei, *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi*, pp. 245–249. At Bandung, Nehru also tried to tone down the anti-Soviet rhetoric by some delegates. He took issue with the claim of the prime minister of Ceylon that the Soviet Union was committing "imperialism" in Eastern Europe. Nehru insisted that the countries of Eastern Europe were independent and recognized as such by the United Nations. Brown, *Nehru*, p. 261.

45 Carlos Romulo, chairman of the Philippine delegation to the Bandung Conference, later recalled that Zhou's statement "electrified the conference before the political committee." Carlos P. Romulo, *The Meaning of Bandung* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956), p. 19.

46 For a detailed account of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks, see Yafeng Xia, *Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949–1972* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

control by white men throughout the globe as soon and as widely as possible.[47]

Expanding China's influence in the Middle East was one of Zhou Enlai's goals at Bandung. The meeting provided him with a platform to voice China's views on contentious issues in the Middle East. To the surprise and pleasure of the Arab delegates, Zhou supported a conference resolution which demanded rights for the Palestinians, implementation of UN resolutions on Palestine, and peaceful settlement of the Palestine question. He called for rejection of foreign meddling in the Middle East, insisting that there was a parallel between the issues of Palestine and Taiwan and that neither could be solved peacefully unless intervention by outside forces was excluded.[48] In his report to Mao after the conference, Zhou wrote that his speech on the Palestine question "won the good will of many Arab countries, especially Egypt and Syria."[49]

Zhou Enlai first met Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser on April 14 in Rangoon when they were on their way to the Bandung Conference. Nasser told Zhou that Egypt faced threat from Israel and was in urge need of arms. He asked whether China could sell any weapons to Egypt. Replying that China was too dependent on Russian supplies to provide any assistance, Zhou suggested that Egypt should turn to Moscow for arms, and he promised that he would take the matter up with the Soviet Union. A few days after the Egyptian delegation had returned home from Bandung, Daniel Solod, the Soviet ambassador in Cairo, confirmed that China had transmitted the Egyptian request to his government. The Soviet Union, Solod said, would be willing to offer

47 According to Carlos Romulo, "there was clearly . . . a *racial element* . . . in the listing of the invited states. No 'white' nation was invited." (italic in the original) See Romulo, *The Meaning of Bandung*, p. 2.

48 George McTurnan Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 16; Lillian Craig Harris, *China Considers the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), pp. 87–88; Kuo-kang Shao, *Zhou Enlai and the Foundations of Chinese Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 222–224.

49 Zhou's telegram to the CCP Central Committee and Mao, April 30, 1955, in The PRC Foreign Ministry Archives, *Zhongguo daibiaotuan*, p. 88.

any amount of weapons, including modern tanks and airplanes, against deferred payments in Egyptian cotton and rice.[50]

At Bandung, Nasser informed Zhou Enlai that the Western domination of the world cotton market impeded the sale of Egypt's cotton, one of the country's principal exports. Zhou replied that if every Chinese wore clothes two inches longer, China would consume the entire annual production of cotton in Egypt. After the conference, Nasser dispatched his minister of industry and commerce to China to conclude trade agreements and to establish commercial offices in each other's capital.[51]

In sum, the Bandung Conference was a landmark event in post-WWII international politics. It reflected convergence of several trends in the post-colonial history of the world. The idea of Afro-Asian solidarity and the appeal of non-alignment were greatly enhanced at Bandung and remained important dreams and ideals in both continents for decades to come. Asia and Africa had awakened, and the psychology that had underlined and sustained "the white man's burden" had been banished to the historical dustbin. Zhou Enlai made an important contribution to the successful holding of the Bandung Conference. He raised China's international profile and frustrated Washington's effort to isolate the PRC. He promoted South-South cooperation at Bandung, triggering fears in Washington of the emergence of race-based Pan-Asianism.

After Bandung, there was a high degree of pessimism within the Eisenhower administration regarding developments in East Asia. Many

50 Muhamed Hassanein Heikal, *The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen* (New York: Doubleday, 1973), pp. 302–303; Anthony Nutting, *Nasser* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1972), p. 101; Yitzhak Shichor, *The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, 1949–1977* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 41.

51 Zhang Yue, "Zhou Zongli pai wo chushi Feizhou" [Premier Zhou Sent Me to Africa], in Gao Yong et al, eds., *Bujin de sinian* [Endless Memories] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1987), pp. 463–468. Zhang Yue served as deputy director of the Chinese Commercial Office in Cairo in 1956. See also Xiaohong Liu, *Chinese Ambassadors: The Rise of Diplomatic Professionalism since 1949* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 60; Pei, *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi*, pp. 276–277; Rami Ginat, *The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945–1955* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), p. 192.

American observers felt that the United States was on the way to losing the Cold War in Asia.[52] What disturbed American officials the most was the rise of anti-Americanism not just among developing countries but also in Western Europe. It was ironic that many emerging nations, while formally neutral, tilted toward the Communist camp, mainly because of their hostility toward Western European imperialism; and the Western European countries displayed more sympathy toward neutralism partly because of their suspicion of American expansionism and partly because of their apprehension about being dragged into a nuclear conflict in the developing world.[53] In a meeting with the American ambassador Douglas Dillon on October 4, 1955, French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay warned that "the US had not fully recognized the dangers inherent in the fusion of the Bandung and Soviet blocs, which he considered the gravest threat to the stability of the world."[54]

The Sino-Soviet "peace offensive" in 1955 exemplified by Khrushchev's "smile diplomacy" in South and Southeast Asia and by Zhou Enlai's dazzling performance at Bandung forced the United States and Great Britain to respond. Washington distanced itself from colonialism by lavishing aid to the post-colonial and anti-communist regime led by Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam.[55] London dis-

52 Matthew Jones, "A 'Segregated' Asia? Race, the Bandung Conference, and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy, 1954–1955," *Diplomatic History* 29 (November 2002), pp. 841–846; idem, *After Hiroshima: The United States, Race and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945–1965* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chap. 7.

53 Alessandro Brogi, *Confronting America: The Cold War between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011), p. 204.

54 Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, October 4, 1955, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957*, vol. 18, *Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), pp. 222–224.

55 On the Eisenhower administration's policy toward Vietnam, see George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975*, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001), chap. 1; David L. Anderson, *Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953–1961* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); John Prados, *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945–1975* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), chap. 1.

played a much more flexible attitude toward Malaya's constitutional development.[56]

Solidarity with Egypt in the 1956 Suez Crisis

In September 1955, Nasser concluded an agreement to purchase weapons from Czechoslovakia.[57] Seven months later, he withdrew recognition of Chiang Kai-shek's government and recognized the PRC. Nasser's decision antagonized the pro-Chiang Kai-shek China Lobby in the United States. They pressured the Eisenhower administration to suspend American aid to Egypt. In Congress, they found an easy alliance with two groups of lawmakers: congressmen from southern states, who questioned the U.S. policy of helping Egypt build the planned Aswan Dam which would allow Egyptian cotton to compete with American cotton; pro-Israel congressmen who were worried about Nasser's anti-Israel stance. In July 1956, Secretary of State Dulles announced the American decision to withdraw its offer to finance the construction of the Aswan Dam. Stung by this blow to his prestige and his ambition for the economic takeoff of his country, Nasser retaliated a week later by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company and indicating his plan to use the revenue from the canal to defray the costs of building the dam.[58]

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56 On British policy toward Malaya, see John G. Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 202–204; Anthony J. Stockwell, "Insurgency and Decolonization during the Malayan Emergency," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 25:1 (1987), pp. 71–81.

57 Guy Laron, "Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 Czechoslovak Arms Deal," *Cold War International History Project Working Paper* 55 (February 2007).

58 Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1992*, 7th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 185; William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World and Beyond: An International History since 1900*, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 277; Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*, 3rd ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), pp. 170–172.

Both Khrushchev and Mao displayed solidarity with Nasser during the Suez Crisis. After Britain and France invaded Egypt in late October, Khrushchev intervened. He proposed to the Eisenhower administration that a Russian-American settlement be imposed upon the area and warned British-French forces that, unless they immediately withdrew, the Soviet Union would resort to force, perhaps long-range rockets, to destroy their armies.[59]

On November 1, the Chinese government issued a statement condemning the Anglo-French intervention in the Middle East and pledging Chinese support to Egypt. Two days later, it lodged protest to the British and French governments, calling their actions in Egypt a violation of the UN Charter and a threat to world peace and demanding that they withdraw their troops from Egypt. Watching the Suez war closely, Mao even asked Zhou Enlai to send Nasser a proposal regarding Egyptian military deployment and strategic principles. For three days in a row (November 3–5), mass rallies were held throughout China in support of the Egyptian struggle against the British-French aggression. In a telegram to Nasser on November 10, Zhou Enlai indicated that China was willing to offer a cash donation of 20 million Swiss francs to Egypt. In the meantime, the Chinese Red Cross notified the Egyptian Red Crescent that it was prepared to donate medical supplies worth 100,000 Chinese yuan and to send medical teams to Egypt. In his reply to Zhou Enlai on November 22, Nasser expressed appreciation for China's assistance.[60]

Both Soviet and Chinese leaders drew encouraging and optimistic lessons from the Suez Crisis. Considering the eventual withdrawal of the British, French, and Israeli forces from Egypt a triumph of his diplomacy and nuclear bluff, Khrushchev felt that his policy in the Middle East since 1955 had been vindicated. He seemed to have convinced himself that the nuclear bluff was a useful tool to intimidate Soviet opponents on

59 Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War*, pp. 133–134; LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, p. 186; Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), p. 53.

60 Pei, *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi*, pp. 282–284; Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949–1976* [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997), vol. 1, p. 636.

the cheap.[61] "In the midst of the strategic stalemate in Europe and the Far East," historian Vladislav Zubok has observed, the Middle East "provided a new outlet for the Kremlin's renewed optimism and ideological romanticism."[62]

For Mao and his colleagues, the Suez conflict had highlighted the rise of nationalist power and exposed divisions within the capitalist bloc. Zhou Enlai said at a party meeting on November 16, 1956 that "the Egyptian incident demonstrates that imperialist powers do not dare to initiate large-scale wars. We should take advantage of this favorable situation to further reduce tensions in the East. Because there is less conflict between the interests of countries in the East, possibility exists to reduce tensions."[63] Mao told a group of party provincial secretaries on January 27, 1957 that "imperialist countries were more afraid of us than we are afraid of them."[64] In his speech at the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties on November 17, 1957, Mao specifically mentioned that the Soviet warning during the Suez Crisis checked the British and French aggression. He referred to the Suez war, the Soviet launch of Sputnik, the British disengagement from Asia and Africa, the Dutch exit from Indonesia, the French retreat from Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia, and the Algerian conflict, as indications that "the East wind is prevailing over the West wind."[65]

Conclusion

The demise of the imperial era and the concomitant emergence of the so-called Third World constituted two central and defining characteristics of twentieth-century international history. The process of decolonization (the North-South conflict) in the wake of WWII introduced great

61 Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War*, p. 137.
62 Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, p. 110.
63 *Zhou nianpu*, vol. 1, p. 638.
64 Excerpt of Mao's talk at the meeting of Party provincial secretaries, January 27, 1957, in *Mao waijiao wenxuan*, pp. 280–283.
65 Excerpt of Mao's speech at the Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties, November 18, 1957, in *Mao waijiao wenxuan*, pp. 291–300.

turmoil, violence, and upheaval to many parts of the world. This process shaped and was in turn shaped by another of the post-WWII era's central, defining features: the political and ideological competition between the United Sates and the Soviet Union for global influence and power (the East-West conflict). The appearance of Communist China as a regional power added a new dimension to the challenges that the former colonial powers and their nationalist successors would have to confront.

When the CCP took over power in China in 1949, it found itself caught in the middle of the two intertwining historical processes of decolonization and the Cold War. Mao threw in his lot with Stalin in the intensifying East-West confrontation. Sharing a common hostility toward capitalism, they were eager to make the world safe for communism. Intent on fostering communist revolution in Asia, they worked out a division of labor, by which the CCP would shoulder the primary responsibility of assisting radical movements in Southeast Asia, particularly Ho Chi Minh's war of independence against the French. Championing proletarian revolution in the world was a central part of Soviet and Chinese communist identities. Class struggle was the driver and shaper of politics, and without their revolutionary missions the Soviet Union and the PRC would possess no convincing self-justification and credibility.

Mao followed closely Stalin's lead in dealing with bourgeois nationalist regimes in Asia. After WWII, the decolonization process accelerated in Asia, and Stalin found himself unprepared and confused. He dismissed nationalist leaders like Nehru as mere agents of imperialism. Mao echoed Stalin's voice by labeling Nehru a "running dog" of imperialism. In the early 1950s, Moscow and Beijing synchronized their policies and approaches toward the newly emerging countries in Asia.

By the mid-1950s, however, the communist bloc had begun to display a greater sense of realism and willingness to compromise. Leaders in both Moscow and Beijing came to understand that the Third World was emerging as an important force in world politics, recognizing that the Third World was the best ground on which to compete with the West and that this would be possible only if the Soviet Union and the PRC befriended governments constituted differently. Beijing actively participated in the Bandung Conference, praising the virtues of neutralism in Asia. The friendly smile and the peaceful image certainly smoothed the

way for Zhou Enlai's encounters with many delegates. He narrowed the gap between China and their countries by shying away from communist rhetoric and by stressing shared opposition to colonialism and racial discrimination. His developmental messages displayed a kind of non-ideological flexibility few had expected from communist China.

The first half of the 1950s represented a "golden era" in the complex saga of Sino-Soviet relations. During this period, Beijing and Moscow closely coordinated their activities in confronting the U.S.-led capitalist world and in dealing with the emerging Third World. After 1956, however, the Sino-Soviet partnership began to fall apart as Khrushchev showed increasing interest in promoting "peaceful coexistence" and "peaceful competition" with the United States and as Mao switched to a more radical and militant direction in his domestic and foreign policies.

Chapter 8

Is China Becoming an Empire? Strategic Tradition and the Possible Options for Contemporary China

Tsai Tung-Chieh

Introduction: What is Empire?

Even though academic research on "empire" has a longstanding history, the definition of this term remains worthy of further discussion. It is generally acknowledged that the term "empire" refers to "an extensive group of states or countries ruled over by a single monarch, an oligarchy, or a sovereign state."[1] However, such an ambiguous definition cannot help to clarify the meaning of so-called "empire." In fact, the common impression of "empire" is that the term is not unrelated to concepts such as hegemony, great power, and superpower, with the main common chord being "an obvious relative superiority of power." One reason may relate to the common misuse or abuse of the term "empire" by modern European powers. On the other hand, the seeming naïveté of historians (the majority of whom may be influenced by nationalism) that leads to their direct acceptance of the proclaimed empire statuses of individual states also contributes to the chronic inability to clarify the definition of "empire." My personal view is that this term can be defined by the three criteria below.

1 See "empire," *Oxford Dictionaries*, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/empire

A Roughly Stable System with Geopolitical Scope

All social research requires a prior delimitation of geographic borders, and research on empire is of course no exception. Basically speaking, we can define the geopolitical environment within which the empire exists as a "world." The "world" will encompass most of the actors that connect with the empire through interactivity, providing actors with a main stage for action or a place for exchanging interests. Contrary to common knowledge, or just as the original idea of the term "world" which is a plural concept (that is, the "world" is a countable noun); the boundaries of the world are largely decided and drawn by the projection of power from the imperial core. In any event, due to the limits of power, the borders of a world cannot exist as a clearly demarcated line.

Absolutely Asymmetric Power above All Other Powers

As the center of the world and the ruler of the world order, the empire must hold an absolute (not merely relative) advantage in asymmetric power, whether in terms of territory, population, or economic power. Although NO scientific definition of such superiority exists, the difference in geographical size must exceed 50%, in order for the empire to secure its incomparable position and stability (or "world").

Institutionalization of World Order

To retain a meaningful role as the leader of the world, the empire must simultaneously be the ultimate arbitrator within the system and the source of legitimacy which needs to be secured by some form of rudimentary institutionalization. From a certain perspective, the previously mentioned "absolute asymmetry" also offers an important psychological and material basis for securing and executing the process of institutionalization. In other words, asymmetry not only increases the potential chance for successful deterrence, it also provides the possibility for adopting action to protect the system when necessary.

According to the criteria above, empire could be further described as "a way of effectively governing a civilized world where the main point is to demonstrate and maintain some kind of stable and non-moving historic order, with the policy goal being to effectively manage people within a specific region while shaping the world in which they exist." In

other words, we may also try to define "empire" as a balanced situation where "empire (political concept) = world (geographic concept)." In the giant tide of world history, such as with Persia under Darius I, Macedonia under Alexander the Great in the Hellenistic World, Rome in the Mediterranean System under the so-called Pax Romana, and China's Qin Dynasty in East Asia, there are some important cases of empire that we can find from the ancient past. It is worth noting here that, from today's viewpoint under globalization, most cases of empire in the pre-modern period were essentially cases of regional powers. Despite the fact that European countries (e.g.: Spain, France, Britain) that subsequently rose to power during the formation of a globalized world all claimed imperial status, many of these "empires" can be considered as merely great powers. Looking to the future, as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri point out, "empire is the political subject that effectively regulates global exchange; sovereign power governs the world."[2] Whether an "empire" could reappear on the world stage successfully or merely exists as a natural conclusion deduced from imaginings of historical experience awaits further observation.

China's Imperial History: An Overview

Obviously, the Warring States Period (*Zhanguoshiqi*, 403–221 BC) is a critical period in the development of the China-centric imperial geopolitical structure. With complete reform carried out by some main political units in terms of tax collection, personnel administration, legal institution, military mobilization, and economic policy during the period, not only was leadership of the ruler strengthened, but different political units were also encouraged to participate in the vicious spiral of security dilemma. In terms of its forms and goals, war gradually changed from the so-called *ceremonial prestige war* in the Western Zhou Period (with the goal of recognizing kings of Zhou as the system's highest suzerains) and *prestige limited war* in the Spring and Autumn Period (*Chunqiushiqi*, 770–403 BC) (increased intensity of war, with the main goals of acquir-

2 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. xi.

ing influence and dominance over other units), to *annexing total war* common in the Warring States Period (an even greater scale of military mobilization, with the goal of annexing the enemy), which contributed to the final collapse of the order built originally by the Western Zhou system. At the same time, it may have been that constant warfare gave rise to the universal desire for absolute order, with "empire" as a new concept of political system being introduced naturally.

In contrast to the tendency of traditional historians to treat the past two thousand years of Chinese history as a series of dynastic alternations, this paper seeks to approach the topic from the perspective of "the building and rebuilding of empires," proceeding from the First Empire (Qin-Han Empire) to the Second Empire (Sui-Tang Empire) and on to the Third Empire (Qing Empire) as the main subjects under examination, before explicating the main points in their respective foreign strategies and evolutionary process.

The First Empire: The Formation of a New System

This author designates the First Empire as the period beginning from the Qin Dynasty (221 BC), and mainly covering both the Western and the Eastern Han Dynasties (or the two Hans). This period was crucial for the development of both China and East Asia, as the basic scope of the international system in the region over the next two thousand years would be formed and then consolidated. The system also produced a foundation of legitimacy to support central authority, or the so-called concept of *Sino-centrism*.

In contrast to the Western Zhou system, which was mainly confined to the lower reaches of the Yellow River, in the early period of the First Empire, the scope of the system had already expanded northward to approximately where the Great Wall stands today, northeastward to the vicinity of the Liaotung Peninsula, southward to cover the whole Yangtze River valley, and westward near the opening of the Hexi Corridor; this would become the geopolitical basis for China's imperial establishments in the future, and it is generally known as "China Proper."[3] Moreover,

3 Concepts related to "China Proper" actually originated in the West, but the time of the term's first use is difficult to prove now. According to Harry Harding's

the regions from the Korean Peninsula to the Far East region of Siberia, from the dry steppes of Inner Mongolia to Central Asia and the outskirts of the Tibetan Plateau, and from the Pearl River valley to the northern part of the Indo-China Peninsula all gradually became important parts of the Sino-centric, or East Asian, system, due to their close connection and interaction with China Proper.[4]

From a certain perspective, the imperial structure established by Qin Shi Huang was similar to the feudal system of Western Zhou, with both systems trying to secure the "centralization of authority" in the form of a hierarchical framework. For example, under the Western Zhou system, the title *wang* or "king" was reserved for the ruler of Zhou. However, with claims to kingship by other units after the Warring States Period, the system seemingly headed towards a parallel structure while sowing the seeds of chaos due to competition. To re-establish the aforementioned hierarchical order, Qin Shi Huang's self-proclamation as *huangdi* or "emperor" was highly symbolic politically. Furthermore, in the two thousand years following the First Emperor's claim, theoretically only the ruler or the dominant power at the center of the East Asian system (mostly China) was able to make claims to the throne (of course, there were many exceptions) and provide symbolic meaning to the general existence of a stable world order.

After the establishment of the Han Dynasty, the ripening of the imperial structure caused the nationalistic concept of *Huaxia* (華夏) and the politically symbolic concept of the Middle Kingdom (中國, *Zhongguo*) to gradually develop towards cosmopolitanism, while *Tianxia* (天

research, the term existed as early as 1827. See "The Concept of 'Greater China': Themes, Variations, and Reservations," *The China Quarterly* 136 (1993), pp. 660–686. However, others point out that the concept of "China Proper" was first suggested by the British scholar William Winterbotham in the title *An Historical, Geographical and Philosophical View of the Chinese Empire* (1795).

4 In fact, Naito Konan (内藤湖南, 1866–1934) and some Japanese scholars have proposed the idea that what is called "Oriental history" is roughly equivalent to the history of Chinese culture, in other words, that the development of Chinese culture provides the scope of Oriental history. This view is objective and worthy as a reference.

下) was used to describe a new world order with the empire at the center.[5] Undoubtedly, before the First Empire, concepts related to cosmopolitanism might have emerged in China, but there still exist at least two important differences: First, there is a clear deepening in philosophical meaning of China's cosmopolitanism; second and more importantly, there is a more advanced level of institutionalized character or the development and realization of designs for managing that. Whether for the sake of maintaining national security or the existence of world order, the management of border regions (between the imperial core and the peripheral zones) and relations between the empire and its subordinates were critical, and these faces of management were mutually reinforcing. Not only did the First Empire establish official diplomatic institutions, in contrast to the more ceremonial and procedural tributary behavior of the Western Zhou Period, but major institutional changes occurred in the Western Han as well. In the Han Period, not only did related ceremonies become more complicated, leading to formal codes of conduct, but the Han emperors also extended the investiture system originating from the Qin Dynasty to their relations with neighboring states, introducing the norm that only the highest leader could hold the title of "emperor," with no other states being able to make claims beyond the title of "king" (*wang*). Extension of the system undoubtedly strengthened China's higher status as the center of the imperial hierarchy.

The Second Empire: Hybrid Character

While agricultural society in the central region matured and gradually widened the gap between itself and the tribes in peripheral regions, and the imperial government also greatly strengthened the effectiveness of its authority, some agricultural-nomadic peoples living in peripheral regions were forced to take up an absolute nomadic lifestyle under the continued pressure of outward expansion of the civilizing core. Control and regulations established by the imperial center to maintain border security and

5 For discussions on China's vision or *Tianxia*, see: 王柯，《民族與國家：中國多民族統一國家思想的系譜》（北京：中國社會科學出版社，2001年）；趙汀陽，《沒有世界觀的世界》（北京：中國人民大學出版社，2003年）等。

protect trade prompted nomadic peoples to make seasonal disturbances and strategic raids at imperial frontiers to offset their economic losses.[6] Nomadic pressure usually was a key factor in the disintegration and re-establishment of empire. For example, nomadic peoples moving on a large scale to the south in 331 AD not only overran and took over the lower reaches of the Yellow River, which was once the imperial heartland, but this tide of migration also initiated the process of national integration that continued until early 7th century, while setting new ethnic and national foundations for the re-establishment of the Second Empire.

Even though nationalism has been a dominant ideology worldwide since the 19th century, causing the search, development, and glorification of national characteristics to become the policy guide of state competition, in terms of historic reality, emphasis on "hybridization" seems to be the only way towards greatness. Not only was the "hybrid" concept adopted in the Sui-Tang Period of the Second Empire,[7] but the empire under Alexander the Great, the Pax Romana, and the current U.S. hegemony all demonstrate similar characteristics. Ironically, while the First Empire or the leader of the East Asian system was attacked by nomadic tribes in the 4th century, on the western front of the Eurasian continent, the Roman Empire, dominating the Mediterranean system, faced similar challenges. From the 3rd century, the West-wing people of Central Asia (mostly Aryan peoples) had exerted relentless pressure on the imperial frontier, and after gradually penetrating the Danube River valley, the

6 Wang Mingke (王明珂) divided the activity of nomadic peoples into two categories: subsistence raids, and strategic raids. Subsistence raids were seasonal and usually carried out in autumn or early winter, while strategic raids were carried out to threaten settled states. See Wang's 《遊牧者的抉擇：面對漢帝國的北亞遊牧部落》（台北：聯經出版公司，2009年）. However, here this author considers the former as included in strategic raids. For example, the Hun's pressure on the Han not only forced the latter to pay tribute to the nomadic tribe, but cross-border trade was also opened (the establishment of gate posts) during Wenti and Jinti's rule, providing economic benefits. See 余英時，《漢代貿易與擴張：漢胡經濟關係的研究》（台北：聯經出版公司，2008年）等。

7 See 谷川道雄著，耿立群譯，《世界帝國的形成》（台北：稻鄉出版社，2009年）。

nomadic peoples successfully entered the Italian Peninsula to carry out raids, which paved the way for the Huns, who would eventually destroy the Western Roman Empire in 476 and sweep across more than half of the European continent.[8] After the Huns subsequently brought great empires in both the East and the West into the "Dark Ages," it may be said that even though the development of civilization became temporarily dormant, the interaction and integration of nomadic and agricultural civilizations provided energy for creativity in the next stage while giving rise to major changes in the meaning of the re-established imperial structure.

In contrast with the First Empire, it is obvious that when confronting threatening forces from the periphery, the succeeding Second Empire seemed to have transformed from discrimination to a more accommodating stance; for example, Tang Taizong was venerated as *Tian Kehan* (天可汗), which means the greatest emperor in the world, confirming China's place at the center of the system. In fact, emperors in the Tang Dynasty have a long record of being crowned with the title *Tian Kehan*, with Xuanzong accepting the title seven times during his reign. Besides accommodating the peripheral, another characteristic of the Second Empire is demonstrated by the fact that the imperial economic center gradually moved southward from the Huanghuai Plain to the Yangtze River basin. A historical implication of such a great shift was the separation of the political and economic center in China; after that, the imperial capital no longer served as both the economic and political center. More importantly, as external challenges to the empire continued to come from the north, the southern shift of the economic center had the negative effect of extending supply lines and increasing logistical costs, which finally led to the collapse of the Second Empire. Nomadic peoples once again moved in from the north and extended their control over the heart-

8 The most renowned Hun leader is Attila, who is also known as "God's whip." Attila twice invaded the Balkan Peninsula, besieged Constantinople and entered Gaul (now France) before invading the Italian Peninsula and essentially defeating the Western Roman Empire. Under the lead of Attila, the Huns reached a short period of dominance between 448–450, with their influence stretching from the Aral Sea to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, south to the Danube and north to the Baltic Sea.

land of the old system for another long period. Later dynasties that successfully re-unified China Proper faced much more difficult conditions for re-establishing the empire.

The Third Empire: A Perfect Structure in Imperial History

Due to the constant southern migrations by nomadic tribes from the 3rd century, their long-term occupation of the traditional imperial center, and the continued adoption of "hybrid" policies by the re-established Second Empire in the face of a multiethnic environment, northern forces were provided with a rare opportunity to absorb agricultural civilization and narrow the gap in power with the center. In addition, the separation of the political and economic center mentioned above effectively made the Song Dynasty impotent in re-establishing an imperial structure, despite its reassertion of control over China Proper at the end of the 10th century. Despite the chronic wishful thinking of Sino-centric historians to include the Yuan Dynasty (or the Mongol Empire) as part of the "orthodox dynasty" system, it should be noted that during the Mongols' rise to power, at least until the death of Genghis Khan in 1227, the Mongolian sphere of influence continued to be mainly concentrated in the region spanning the steppes of Mongolia and Central Asia. After Mongke Khan (1251–59) succeeded in claiming power, Mongolia in fact separated into two parts. In other words, the reality may be that a united Mongol Empire generally imagined to span the Eurasian continent never existed.

Furthermore, though the Ming Dynasty regained control of China Proper which had been established and consolidated by the previous two empires, the "cosmic expansion" that originated from the geopolitical challenge brought by the Mongol's conquest of Eurasia in the 13th century and the new vision of sea power introduced by the Arab drive for trade in the Indian Ocean still became the most important obstacles to the Ming re-establishment of an effective empire. In other words, the Ming was offered two choices: to lock itself within traditional imperial bounds, or to accept new geopolitical variables and connect itself with the new transport artery that was gradually taking shape in Eurasia. However, the result was that neither goal was achieved. In contrast to the variance in length of the transitional period from the Western Zhou system to the First Empire (770 BC–221 BC) and from the First Empire to the Second

Empire (220 BC–580 AD), the transition from the Second Empire to the Third Empire (907–1644) was considerably long. The aforementioned new geopolitical effect is clear.

Regardless of the above developments, the Ottoman Empire that succeeded the Mongols and served as the new connecting hub at the middle of the Eurasian continent seemed to become uninterested in maintaining exchanges between East and West. With the Ottoman Empire investing more effort in strategic expansion towards Eastern Europe in the early 16th century, the geopolitical commotion along China's borders abruptly fell silent. Before the Industrial Revolution commenced in the 18th century, even though the Europeans had begun maritime expeditions to distant seas at the time, Europe was unable to convert those new passages into a geostrategic variable equivalent to the Silk Road. It was precisely under such structural context that the Qing Empire was able to exploit the opportunity offered by the East Asian system retreating into isolation once again to re-establish an imperial framework.

In contrast with the First and Second Empires, even though imperial architecture in itself hints at a high degree of centralization, surrounding security threats from Hun and Turkic peoples continued to challenge central authority. Before Europe unexpectedly exerted its pressure on the Third Empire in mid-18th century, the latter, which had been established by the Qing regime, enjoyed an environment that could almost be deemed "absolute security," the main reason being the Qing's enforcement of a highly integrative (hybrid) ethnic policy. Before entering China Proper, the Manchu had already established the *Lifan Yuan* (理藩院) to deal with issues related to its subordinates. Besides the *Lifan Yuan*, the Qing government also adopted flexible policies that catered to different regions to deal with related issues. For example, the Qing improved relations with the Mongols through frequent aristocratic marriages, controlled Tibet through the division of politics and religion, and strengthened central rule over the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau. As a result, the Qing became the only imperial period in Chinese history to disregard reinforcement of the Great Wall as an important national security priority.

New Challenges in Modern History

For the most part, research on China's foreign relations and their strategic implications have focused on a series of questions revolving around the Qing interaction with the European-led international community since the mid-18th century. As China was in a weak position relative to Europe at the time, it led research about China's foreign relations to easily target issues such as how and why China should seek to enter the international community but was unable to actively do so. At least until today, China has still never been analyzed objectively. Because the image of China has usually been twisted and fictional, it might be why we should reexamine the imperial history of China first.

Actually, if Europe had not ushered in a wave of globalization from the 16th century with the Age of Exploration and the Great Navigations, which spread European influence across the world, then the East Asian system that was established by Qing efforts toward imperial reconstruction would have achieved a higher degree of stability. Even though social conditions (人和, *renhe*) may not have been favorable (rule by ethnic minorities became the key variable in the failure of the Late Qing reforms) and despite the fact that the Third Empire met its demise with the coming of globalization, favorable geopolitical conditions (地利, *dili*)(limited projection of power at the start made the Orient the last arrival place of European settlers) and favorable timing (天時, *tianshi*) (after engendering a wave of assault at the end of the 19th century, the new imperialists were mired in two great wars mainly based on the European continent) saved China Proper from colonization. However, with the incompetence of new democratic systems to effectively resolve problems, and chronic external and internal threats (from feuds among warlords and two civil wars between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to the Japanese invasion) constantly foiling opportunities for recovery, in the process of the globalizing system's development and maturation, China did not gain opportunities for re-participating and competing in the new system until the end of the 20th century.

After the collapse of the Third Empire at the end of the 19th century, China is again entering another historic period of imperial transition. Currently, just like Qin during the establishment of the First

Empire, China is facing the similar challenge of a vast expansion in the scope of its system. In the foreseeable future, as China seems unlikely to consolidate its status and achieve the ultimate goal of stabilizing the international order through large-scale warfare as it had done in the past, the historical situation of China today may be close to that of the Ming Dynasty, at a critical point of strategic choice between a unified China Proper and new geopolitical variables. As the CCP regime is unlikely to adopt semi-isolationist policies like those of the Ming, the challenges confronting China are even greater.

China's Traditional Foreign Strategy in Retrospect

Although the rise of China has become a topic of heated discussion in international politics, in view of the historical development of the previous three Empires, "the re-rise of China" may more accurately describe the current phenomenon. On the path of China's potential re-rise, in the foreseeable future, one may expect the following issues to continue to be the focus of academia and popular opinion across the world: Will China rise? How will China effectuate its rise? What influences will that rise have on the global structure and order? How will other powers respond to the challenge of that rise? Will further conflicts be provoked? The answers to these questions may once again be sought in history.

Three Options for China's Ancient Dynasty

The historical development and essence of China's foreign relations can be divided into two main points: "one priority," and "three options." "One priority" refers to China's eternal policy of "domestic politics first, then foreign policy" as its highest principle for decision making. The reason is that, over the course of the past two thousand years, the inability to overcome technical barriers related to the issue of the scale of governance (wide territory and immense population) has chronically haunted China's ruling elite.[9] Despite the introduction of new manage-

9 Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, eds., *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 14, *The People's Republic*, part 1, *The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949–65* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), chap. 1.

ment skills provided by science in the industrial age, the government of a country with such a great size and high ethnic diversity remains a titanic challenge. The most important task for China's ruling elite remains how to acquire sufficient authority to support the legitimacy to rule.

After achieving the policy aim that we mentioned above or maintaining domestic stability, "three options" kick into the decision-making process against actual foreign strategic goals (refer to the following table).

Table: A Comparison of China's Traditional Foreign Strategic Options

Option	Political Premise	Main Content of Foreign Strategy
Imperial Policy	Dynasty under Unification	**Strategic Goals:** Gain the feedback of prestige; establish the system as the main feedback mechanism; aim external economic activity mainly at exchanges for prestige; pursue dominance from the threat of war and severance of trade. **Interactions with Other Actors:** These interactions serve as the source of political legitimacy for neighboring units and as confirmation for the hierarchical relationship that defines the center and the periphery. **War Possibility:** Adopt a passive defensive strategy, with wars mainly aiming at gaining prestige, thus remaining passive and not threatening the security of the target. **Ideology:** Cosmopolitanism and hybridization
Imperializing Policy	Dynasty under Unification	**Strategic Goals:** Gain an advantageous power position; focus on key competitors and attempt to demonstrate advantage through the application of pressure; depending on the situation, express limited compromise with stronger actors or competitors; pursue conditional intertribal marriages.*

		Interactions with Other Actors: These interactions serve as the source of political legitimacy for some neighboring units. **War Possibility:** Incline towards active offensive strategy, with wars being mainly power based, aimed at removing obstacles in the way of imperial establishment. **Ideology:** Inward-oriented nationalism
Status Quo Policy	Divided Regimes	**Strategic Goals:** Maintain survival of the regime; express servitude (kowtow) towards stronger actors in exchange for survival; use external economic activity to make exchanges for opportunities for survival; keep security through conditional intertribal marriages. **Interactions with Other Actors:** Maintain the limited interactions that are necessary. **War Possibility:** Adopt a defensive strategy, with wars being mainly based on self-defense, on reactions to the threat of aggression or on pre-emptive attacks. **Ideology:** Exclusionist nationalism

* In contrast to being an important diplomatic tool during the age of aristocratic rule, "political marriage" is clearly no longer an option today. Such strategy may be replaced by entering into a detrimental asymmetric alliance or bilateral treaty.

If the ultimate goal of foreign policy is securing political security, and the objective environment is favorable, then the best outcome (resulting in the highest security assurance) would obviously be an imperial policy. Not surprisingly, the difficulty of successfully building an empire is exceptionally high. In Chinese history, only the Qin-Han, Sui-Tang, and the Qing accomplished this feat. Despite the adoption of the *hezhan-*

bingyong (和戰並用, carrot-and-stick) strategy in the three imperial periods, maintaining the imperial system through the "structural *jimi* (羈縻) system" (using trade and economic inducements to buy political loyalty through a tributary system) while maintaining strategic advantage, and finally establishing a "perennial" world order by applying the policy of *yiyizhiyi* (以夷制夷, using barbarians to subdue barbarians), the fact is that in distant memory, China more often adopted either an imperializing policy (with the precondition of unification and the goal of establishing imperial structure) or a status quo policy (or a "non-imperial policy," with the goal of preserving the status quo, mainly during the periods of political fragmentation). The difference is that elites adopting an imperializing policy would exploit the so-called *yuanjiaojingong* (遠交近攻, befriending distant enemies while attacking nearby ones) strategy more frequently, targeting key enemies first and relentlessly seeking to diminish their strength. However, once elites forwent the goal of imperial establishment and turned towards status quo policy, the *yuanjiaojingong* policy could have been adopted when necessary (as in the Northern Song), while a realistic policy of regression, such as arranged marriages (和親, *heqin*) or the offering of dowries (納幣, *nabi*), remained the main policy choice.

Even in the periods when imperial policies were finally enforced, the imperializing policy was inevitably experienced in a process leading to completion of the imperial structure (in the early period of an imperial dynasty). Moreover, "degeneration" or the appearance of certain characteristics of imperializing policy might occur as a result of a general weakening of power near the end of empire. On the other hand, in terms of other imperial architects who failed (such as the Northern Song and the Ming), even though they might have possessed ideals for imperial establishment after the re-unification of China Proper and they might have attempted to push the imperializing policies, political reality still forced them to orient themselves towards non-imperial policies. Historical experience shows that once the task of uniting China Proper was completed, the dynasty usually went on to pursue imperializing policies, with the only exception perhaps being Western Jin (265–316).

The Effect and Influence of World Enlargement

In the past, the most important objective factor that affected China's strategic choice inarguably came from the challenge of world enlargement and its effects. Yet certain differences existed, as well, regarding the phenomenon.

First, the Qin Dynasty itself can be noted as a main source of world enlargement for its defeat of the six other states, conquering barbaric tribes on the territorial outskirts and establishing a geopolitical basis for China Proper for the next two thousand years. Second, in the face of geopolitical threats posed by the Mongols' establishment of the Eurasian passage and the initiation of the second enlargement of the world, the Ming Dynasty once adopted a more active response (such as Zheng He's distant expeditions in 1405–1433). Even though the Ming degenerated and became more passive as time passed, the Ottoman's defeat of the Eastern Roman Empire in 1453 and the severing of the East-West passage effectively annulled the negative effects of the Ming's isolationist policy. Finally, supported by the Industrial Revolution, the European expansion abroad forced the Qing to confront the challenge of the third world-enlargement effect led by the new European powers from late 18th century (since the arrival of the Macartney Embassy in 1792). As mentioned earlier, moving towards the end of a dynasty at the time, China had long before commenced the switch from imperialization to degeneration; thereby, in the face of new external challenges, China could only respond passively. Although Qing initiated various reform movements, the collapse of the empire remained inevitable.[10]

In contrast with European countries' achievement of the unfinished globalizing journey in the past four hundred years from the 16th century

10 It is worth noting that, in contrast to a progressive viewpoint of history, it is a fact that despite China's several confrontations with external pressure from expansion of the world, "the world is not under constant expansion." There are three key factors to world expansion: the objective reality of increased power projection, the existence of high-stakes motivations for expansion, and the existence of power differentiation or power vacuums. However, this is not the focus of this article. Due to space limitations, this author will forgo further discussion of this here.

to the 19th century, the new wave of globalization since the 1970s provides modern China with the challenge of a fourth world enlargement. This new situation, based on the characteristics of "openness" and "integration," was not the only thing to reduce the gap between China and the world; Richard Nixon's visit to China also served as a critical turning point.[11]

Compared with previous experiences, even though China is not the main driver of current development, the state is not pushed into the awkward position of passivity but is rather offered an opportunity to select its response from a more neutral and subjective point of view. In a certain sense, the geopolitical context of contemporary China may be at wide variance with the Ming Dynasty, but the two are similar in terms of the context for decision making. In other words, both have the opportunity to choose. Accordingly, not only did Deng Xiaoping adopt the gradual mode of "crossing the river by feeling the stones" (摸著石頭過河, *mozhe shitou guohe*) regarding economic reform, but he also adopted it regarding foreign relations. However, as the dictum "development above all else" (發展才是硬道理, *fazhan caishi yingdaoli*) suggests, China is prepared to confront the challenges of the new global order based on the traditional policy foundation of prioritizing domestic politics over foreign policy.

11 After the 1960s, as détente progressed, Washington's worldview changed, the Nixon Doctrine was introduced, and the "Vietnamization" of the war in Indochina was carried out. Coupled with the CCP's turn towards the pursuit of pragmatic and open policies at the end of the Cultural Revolution, opportunities for normalization appeared in Sino-U.S. relations. Besides the U.S. Seventh Fleet's withdrawal from Taiwan Strait in 1969 as a friendly gesture to China, Secretary of State William Rogers further announced U.S. support for the People's Republic of China's admission to the United Nations in 1971. The U.S. plan to reconcile with China was carried out in three stages: Pakistan president Yahya Kahn and other influential members of the elite were secretly asked to serve as messengers between the U.S. and China, then National Security Council Advisor Henry Kissinger paid a secret visit to Beijing in 1971, and finally, Nixon's visit to China and the agreement of the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972 sealed the deal.

China's Options: Now, and Then

Besides the above discussion, the more important question is what choice the CCP regime will make in the future. As mentioned earlier, after the 1911 collapse of the Third Empire (Qing) and the long period of internecine conflict among warlords and civil war between the KMT and the CCP, China finally completed the task of uniting China Proper again in 1949 (even though the goal of annexing Taiwan has yet to be realized; it has to be noted that Taiwan is traditionally excluded from the scope of so-called China Proper), standing at the possible starting point for an imperializing policy based on traditional logic. Without doubt, the current geopolitical environment that China faces is at great variance with the past. Coupled with the effects of a new wave of world enlargement, China's future is fraught with uncertainty.

Development of the CCP's Foreign Policy

Generally speaking, scholars often divide the development of China's foreign policy since the 1950s into the following periods: the first period (1950s), characterized by the "lean to one side" (一邊倒, *yibiandao*) foreign policy; the second period (1960s), the "two line" (兩條線, *liangtiaoxian*) policy and the so-called "middle ground" (中間地帶, *zhongjian didai*) theory; and the third period (1970s), the "single line" (一條線, *yitiaoxian*) policy and the "three worlds" (三個世界, *sangeshijie*) theory. The 1980s was characterized by the so-called "independent and autonomous foreign policy" (獨立自主外交, *duli zizhu waijiao*), while the 1990s to the present is the stage of great-power diplomacy (大國外交, *daguo waijiao*).[12]

Prior to the establishment of the CCP regime in 1949, Mao Zedong proposed foreign policy guidelines such as "setting up a new kitchen" (

12 See Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, "Peking's Growing Political, Economic, and Military Ties with Latin America," in David S. Chou, ed., *Peking's Foreign Policy in the 1980s* (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1989), pp. 389–391；尹慶耀，《中共的統戰外交》（台北：幼獅出版公司，1985年），頁4–12；張小明，〈冷戰時期新中國的四次對外戰略抉擇〉，收於劉山與薛君度編，《中國外交新論》（北京：世界知識出版社，1997年），頁1–20。

另起爐灶, *lingqiluzao*), "cleaning up the house before inviting visitors" (打掃乾淨屋子再請客, *dasao ganjing wuzi zaiqingke*), and "leaning to one side."[13] First, "setting up a new kitchen" means that, in contrast to accepted and traditional international norms (as the mainstream idea of the moment), the CCP rejected the concept that a new regime should inherit foreign relations from the previous government. The CCP essentially responded to nationalistic emotions harbored in China from the Qing Dynasty. Second, even though "cleaning up the house before inviting visitors" emphasized the elimination of the remnant influences of old imperialist powers in China, the slogan actually implied the complete annihilation of the remaining power of the KMT on the mainland and the consolidation of domestic unification. Finally, "leaning to one side" referred to the CCP's main diplomatic dilemma in the early stage of the regime, namely the issue of overreliance on the Soviet Union.[14] Besides the previous guidelines, in an essay published in 1952, Zhou Enlai included three more guidelines: "tit-for-tat" (禮尚往來, *lishangwanglai*; to return the "favor" of capitalist countries afterwards), "scratching each other's back" (互通有無, *hutongyouwu*; to connect with the world according to the principle of equality and mutual benefit), and "uniting peoples of the world" (團結世界人民, *tuanjie shijie renmin*; to put together, especially formerly colonized states).[15] Zhou's further guidelines reflect the fact that China was not limited to the "leaning to one side" framework, but sought to escape from the limitations of political ideology and preserve a flexible space for exchanges with capitalist states.

13 韓念龍主編，《當代中國外交》（北京：中國社會科學出版社，1987年），頁3。

14 謝益顯主編，《中國當代外交史》（北京：中國青年出版社，1997年），頁3–4；周恩來，〈新中國的外交〉（1949年11月8日），中華人民共和國外交部與中共中央文獻研究室編，《周恩來外交文選》（北京：中央文獻出版社，1990年），頁1–7；楊勝群與田松年主編，《共和國重大決策的來龍去脈》（南京：江蘇人民出版社，1996年），頁462–466；盧子健，《一九四九以後的中共外交史》（台北：風雲論壇出版社，1990年），頁22。

15 《周恩來外交文選》，頁51。

It is worth noting that the dependence of the CCP on the USSR during the regime's startup period was mainly based on a consideration of the latter's interest, which did not necessarily pertain to China's interest and often went against the rising populism in the country at the time. In response to nationalist sentiments coming from the masses, Zhou Enlai pointed out in 1949 that "[the CCP] holds a basic stance regarding foreign policy issues, which is the whole independence of the Chinese people."[16] Accordingly, China adopted a roundabout and progressive policy by reducing its dependency on the USSR first through the "middle ground" policy, before establishing an autonomous foreign policy through the so-called "three worlds" doctrine.[17] According to above traditional categories of policy option, despite the re-emergence of "revolutionary diplomacy" (革命外交, *geming waijiao*) during the Cultural Revolution (1966–68), something unseen since 1925–31,[18] and the CCP's constant reference to "independence and autonomy" in response to nationalistic popular demands, China's foreign strategy from 1950 to the 1990s demonstrated an essentially non-imperialist status quo policy. Deng's introduction of the guideline of "hiding one's light under the bushel" (韜光養晦, *taoguangyanghui*) after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 more sufficiently explains the basic guiding principle of the CCP's foreign policy.[19]

16 《周恩來選集》（北京：人民出版社，1980年），頁321。

17 The so called "middle ground" theory first appeared in the conversation between Mao and American reporter Anna Louis Strong. As Mao expressed, " . . . a wide middle ground lies between the U.S. and Soviet Union; here, there are many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial states that span across the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa. Before suppressing these countries, reactionaries in the U.S. will not move against the Soviet Union . . . Before long, these countries will understand their real oppressor, the Soviet Union or the U.S." See 尹慶耀，《中共的統戰外交》，頁45–47。

18 蔡東杰，《兩岸外交政策與對外關係》（台北：高立圖書公司，2001年），頁128。On the development of Revolutionary Diplomacy in 1925–31, see 李恩涵，《近代中國外交史事新研》（台北：台灣商務印書館，2004年），頁237–341。

19 See《鄧小平文選：第三卷》（北京：人民出版社，1993年），〈社會主義的中國誰也動搖不了〉，頁328–334，〈堅持社會主義，防止和平演

Transformational Diplomacy in the New Century

In the early stage of the CCP regime, as it had to concentrate on consolidating the vital interest of survival, the context of a status quo non-imperialist policy seemed to be a hard fact, and it served as the main departure for foreign thinking in the Deng Era (1978–97). As early as 1984, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that "China is a big country, and also a small country; 'big country' refers to large population and territory, 'small country' refers to China being a developing state . . . China lives up to the claim of being a small country, but she is also a big country, as in the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, China counts as one."[20] The statement expresses Deng's guarded recognition of China's power. The idea that came out of the above statement was the strongly protectionist concept of "anti-hegemony" (反霸, *fanba*). Not only did Hu Yaobang mention in the CCP's 12th Congress Report in 1982 that "anti-hegemony and maintaining world peace is the most important task of peoples in the world today," but Zhao Ziyang also mentioned at the 6th National People's Congress in 1983 that "China will not seek hegemony . . . regardless of who, where and what kind of hegemonism is initiated, we absolutely reject [such ignorance]." In 1990, Deng Xiaoping further stated that " . . . we should never take the lead . . . we are incapable of taking the lead . . . China will never claim hegemony nor will she take the lead."[21] Even until 2001, China's President Jiang Zemin still continued to claim that " . . . [in terms of] China's enforcement of independent and autonomous foreign policy, its basic goals include the rejection of hegemony and the maintenance of world peace."[22]

Nevertheless, with the achievement of positive effects in reform policy since the 1980s and the transformation of the international system

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變〉，頁346–348，〈中國永遠不允許別國干涉內政」，頁361–364。The motto is sometimes simplified as "observe calmly; hide our light under the bushel; stand firmly; act decisively." See 唐家璇，〈當前國際形勢與我國對外關係〉，《解放軍報》，1994年3月7日。

20 《鄧小平文選：第三卷》，頁105。

21 中共中央文獻研究室編，《十二大以來重要文獻選編》（北京：人民出版社，1986年），頁43與頁498；《鄧小平文選：第三卷》，頁358。

22 江澤民於2001年4月19日訪問阿根廷時的講話。

towards the development of multi-polarity in the Post-Cold War Era, China seems to have begun to adjust its foreign policies as well, under the combination of a gradual increase in comprehensive national power and a favorable objective environment.[23] As Deng Xiaoping pointed out, "the situation of American and Soviet monopoly over everything is changing; whether the world system became three, four or five poles . . . so-called multi-polarity, China counts as a pole; China should not diminish herself, she counts as a pole no matter what." It is clear that after experiencing a period of dependence (1950–60s) and a period of autonomy (1970–80s), China's foreign relations have been gradually moving towards a new period of expansion since the 1990s. Whether the task at hand is to adopt a preventative strategy in order to counter the hidden isolation policy of the West (headed by the U.S.), whether it is to prevent great powers from supporting domestic separatism or Taiwanese independence, or whether it is to continue to strive for an international environment that supports a running strategy of economic liberalization, China has not only elevated its influence in recent years, it has also placed high competitive pressure on the current U.S. hegemony, and it has done this through self-recognition of its international status,[24] frequent high-level exchanges to establish communication channels with the global system, the large-scale renewal of military armaments and facilities, and increased global participation through its seat on the UN Security Council.

Responding to the so-called "rise of China" has already become the chief aim of U.S. current strategic planning in the West Pacific.[25] For example, as William Kristol and Robert Kagan pointed out in 2000,

23 章一平，〈從冷戰後國際體系的複雜化看中國與大國關係〉，《世界經濟與政治》，第12期（2000年），頁22–23。

24 杜攻主編，《轉換中的世界格局》（北京：世界知識出版社，1992年），頁7。

25 Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Southeast Asian Perspectives on the Rise of China: Regional Security after 9/11," *Parameters* 33:2 (Summer 2003), pp. 98–107; Elizabeth Economy, *China's Rise in Southeast Asia: Implications for Japan and the United States* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005); Evelyn Goh, "Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China Challenge," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30:4 (2007), pp. 809–832.

despite the U.S. achievement of unprecedented status after the First Gulf War, more importantly, it still has begun to face the potential threat of China's rise.[26] President Barack Obama also expressed during the 2007 Democratic primary elections that "China . . . is neither our enemy nor our friend . . . she is a competitor of the U.S." The statement sufficiently hints at the conflict underlying Sino-American relations, which also forms the legitimate basis for the U.S. strategy of "return to Asia."

Conclusion: The Fourth Empire?

Following the Soviet Union's collapse and the end of the Cold War, for the first time since the end of the 19th century, groups of countries remain undivided in the East Asian regional system. Such outcome saves China from having to consider national defense in an environment rife with conflict, and for the first time in her modern history, China is able to engage all countries at the same time. In addition, with increased growth in economic and military influence, China can shape its neighboring environment while playing a more active role.[27] China's economic rise has had obvious impact on world economy since 1980s, and the speed of its growth may have even sprinted way ahead of China's expectations. For example, as the CCP's 13th Congress Report in 1987 points out, the GDP by 2000 was estimated to increase threefold over the amount of 1980; the actual increase was 6.55-fold.[28] In the CCP's 16th Congress Report in 2002, the goal for 2020 was set at twice the GDP in 2000; the figure was achieved earlier, by 2010. More importantly, China's rise is actually changing the general impression of the characteristics of the international structure. Not only did historian Niall Ferguson coin the

26 William Kristol and Robert Kagan, *Present Dangers Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy* (California: Encounter Books, 2000), p. 59.

27 Michel Oksenberg, "China: Tortuous Path onto the World's Stage," in Robert Pastor, ed., *A Century's Journey How The Great Powers Shape The World* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), p. 318.

28 國家統計局編，《中國統計摘要，2007》（北京：中國統計出版社，2007年），頁23。

word "Chimerica" in 2007, to emphasize the interest community formed by the world's greatest consuming state (U.S.) and saving state (China) and to show how the new structure would have a major impact on the world economy,[29] but Fred Bergsten further proposed the so-called *G-2* concept, suggesting that China and the U.S. should establish a model for equal negotiations and joint leadership in global economic affairs, in order to respond to challenges against U.S. interests on questions such as China's currency rate and international trade.[30] Furthermore, Oded Shenkar also points out that, despite China's continuing problems in the new century, the country will eventually regain her past glory. Particularly after China becomes the industrial, commercial and political center of the region, its influence will exceed the traditional scope of East Asia, first expanding to Central and Southeast Asia, then entering the Middle East due to its energy demand, and finally taking the lead in economic assistance towards Africa. In any case, China is bound to become a world-class power.[31]

Since the beginning of the new century, objectively speaking, not only has China had the potential to compete with U.S. hegemony, but China's growing intervention in global affairs has also encouraged Western observers to conclude that the development of China's foreign strategy has implications of neo-imperialism (especially in Africa). However, this article has no intention of pursuing such an ambiguous concept.

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29 Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick, "Chimerica and the Global Asset Market Boom," *International Finance* 10:3 (2007), pp. 215–239; see also Niall Ferguson, "What 'Chimerica' Hath Wrought," *The American Interest* 4:3 (2009), https://www.the-american-interest.com/2009/01/01/what-chimerica-hath-wrought/; Zachary Karabell, *Superfusion: How China and America Became One Economy and Why the World's Prosperity Depends on It* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010).

30 C. Fred Bergsten, "A Partnership of Equals: How Washington Should Respond to China's Economic Challenge," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2008, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64448/c-fred-bergsten/a-partnership-of-equals

31 Oded Shenkar, *The Chinese Century: The Rising Chinese Economy and Its Impact on the Global Economy, the Balance of Power, and Your Job* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004), p. 207.

In sum, based on the concept of strategic choice proposed above and the reality of China's rise in the new century, China does seem to harbor the potential to turn from her long-term non-imperialist stance in the 1950–90s towards the new tendency of imperializing policy. The transformation from discriminatory nationalism towards the development of limited nationalism in 1980–90s is major ideological evidence of China's change. However, since the end of the 1990s, increased tensions in Sino-American relations and Sino-Japanese relations (the U.S. and Japan being China's main global and regional competitors, respectively) and China's increasingly high-profile diplomatic stance against the U.S. and Japan reflect some aggressiveness in China's external strategy. Although some signs of transformational diplomacy have appeared in China's foreign relations, the country clearly remains a long way off from rebuilding an empire. It is worth noting that, despite the twentieth century being the so-called "American century," the lone superpower was unable to achieve the goal proposed by some observers of establishing an empire.[32] Given that the U.S. failed, what should one expect from a rising China with an uncertain future? In other words, even if the China's leaders have the idea of reviving a *Pax Sinica* (similar to the U.S. neo-conservatives during 2001–04), tangible results for evaluation will remain few and far between in the near future.

32 See Robert Cooper, "Why We Still Need Empires," *The Observer*, April 7, 2002, https://www.theguardian.com/observer/worldview/story/0,11581,680117,00.html

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