Summary

Migration and Screening of German Inhabitants in Upper Silesia from January to July 1945:
The "Wild Expulsions" and Their Structure

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This paper examines the structures and processes underpinning the flight and expulsion of Germans from Central and Eastern Europe at the end of World War II and in the immediate post-war period, with a specific focus on Upper Silesia from January to July 1945. By analyzing German testimonies and Polish published historical sources, the study offers a multifaceted perspective on the movement and national screening of individuals traditionally identified as "Germans."

The expulsion process in Upper Silesia unfolded in three interconnected stages: flight, screening, and forced migration. Initially, the "flight" of the German population, while not explicitly "forced," was heavily influenced by the fear and disarray provoked by the advancing Soviet army in early 1945. The invasion exacerbated the sense of crisis among local inhabitants, prompting some to flee while others remained due to circumstantial constraints.

During the subsequent phase of national screening, Polish authorities faced significant challenges in defining practical criteria for identifying national affiliation. The inhabitants of Upper Silesia exhibited a spectrum of sense of belonging, often detached from strict national categorizations of "Germans" or "Poles." The criteria for identifying "Polish" individuals, ostensibly based on "Polish nationality" (polska narodowość), were nebulous and inconsistently applied, reflecting the region's complex and ambiguous sense of belonging. Consequently, the screening process often relied on ad hoc judgments by local officials, who exercised considerable discretion in determining national affiliation.

Thirdly, the "wild expulsions" (die wilden Vertreibungen) are of particular significance. Beginning in the summer of 1944, the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego) deliberated on the deportation of German inhabitants, with a final decision reached by May 1945. By this time, the Polish government had consolidated control in Upper Silesia and

initiated systematic expulsions without international endorsement. These coercive measures allowed affected individuals to carry only minimal possessions, underscoring the forced and unilateral nature of the process. Historical records consistently portray these expulsions as highly oppressive, leaving no room for resistance.

Through detailed analysis, this paper elucidates the structural dynamics of screening and migration during the "wild expulsions" in Upper Silesia. In a region marked by blurred distinctions between "Germans" and "Poles," Polish authorities and military personnel implemented migration policies under intense pressure to meet governmental objectives. The lack of clear criteria for defining "Polish nationality" compelled local authorities to adopt oversimplified standards, disregarding the nuanced sense of belonging and affiliations of the local population.

Based on the discussions in this paper, the following conclusions can be drawn: The screening and migration measures during the "wild expulsions" were a multifaceted phenomenon shaped by both the pressures to implement government policies and the improvised, case-by-case decisions made by local administrative bodies and personnel on the ground. These measures emerged as a result of local officials and personnel navigating the tension between the Polish government's policies and the practical challenges of screening the inhabitants.

To Whom Does the Sea Belong? : Maritime Control by England and France before the Hundred Years' War

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In Roman law, the sea was defined as "res nullius" (belonging to no one) or "nullius territorium" (no one's territory). This means that the sea was exempt from claims of individual ownership, instead belonging to all as a public good. This status of the sea as a no-man's-land was carried over into the Middle Ages. N.A.M. Rodger argued that in the Middle Ages, the sea was "a lawless zone beyond the boundaries of civilized society."

However, in reality, as a result of the development of maritime trade that began around the 13th century and the centralization of royal power and regional power, various bodies began to claim sovereignty over the seas in the late Middle Ages, and disputes began to arise between these powers over control of the seas.

For example, from the time of the so-called Angevin Empire in the second half of the 12th century, the coastal areas of France from the English Channel to the Bay of Biscay were known as the "Sea of England", and came under the influence of the Plantagenet monarchy. The Plantagenet kings used their own maritime law, known as the Law of Oléron, to exclusively handle disputes that arose in those waters.

This situation changed completely in 1202, with the invasion of Philip II, King of France (reigned 1180–1223) into English continental territories. The conquest of Normandy in northwestern France and Anjou, Maine and Poitou in the central-western France by Philip II and his son Louis VIII (reigned 1223–1226) divided the "English Channel" and from then on, the English and French royal powers began to assert their respective jurisdiction over disputes that arose along the French coast.

In this paper, we will 1) detail medieval lordship over the sea, 2) examine maritime disputes that occurred in the English Channel and along the Atlantic coast, and 3) explore the war of Saint-Sardos (1324) and the maritime disputes that accompanied it, which occurred just before the Hundred Years' War, in order to consider the issue of maritime sovereignty for the medieval English and French royal powers.

As a result of our research, we found that despite various attempts, the attitude towards maritime disputes between England and France remained at an impasse. Therefore, France began to develop maritime courts in the second half of the 14th century in order to establish jurisdiction over coastal areas.

Transnational Practices and Social Spaces: Transnational Migration and the Life-Worlds of Korean-Chinese Communities along the China-North Korea Border

Piao Huan

This study examines the process of self-actualization among Korean Chinese through migration across individual, local, regional, and national spaces from the 1950s to the 1990s. I explore their transnational migration experiences across three distinct periods: (1) before the advent of the "Choseon Baram" (North Korean Wind) phenomenon, (2) the "Choseon Baram" phenomenon itself, from late 1957 to around 1964, and (3) the pluralistic life practice of "Bottari Jangsa" and its interconnected social networks.

The study focuses on the dynamism and subjectivity of individuals in transnational social spaces by analyzing their specific migration experiences. It explores how Korean-Chinese people constructed their Life-Worlds and interacted socially throughout this period. I argue that transnational social spaces existed in both the northern part of the Korean Peninsula and northeastern China, and that these spaces retain historical continuity. In contrast to conventional discussions of transnationalism, which often emphasize national boundaries and immigrant entry [Bash et al., 1994:5], this study suggests that transnationalism in these regions emerged as the nation-state system gradually intervened. As different national apparatuses were established and strengthened, the historical living spaces used by these communities remained intact and continued to be utilized.

The emergence of small-scale migrant trade, known as "Bottari Jangsa," involved individuals traveling between China and North Korea to conduct business. This trade developed due to two specific historical conditions: (1) a traditional, complementary economic relationship had already formed by the late 19th to early 20th centuries in the border area north of the Tumen River, with residents from both sides engaging in cross-border trade; and (2) this relationship endured, fostering a community of individuals who continued conducting cross-border business, building on the established economic rapport.

The practice of "Bottari Jangsa," which Korean-Chinese engaged in across national borders, reflects the formation of their pluralistic sense of belonging and underscores the preservation of Korean cultural values and changes in social structure over time.

Japan's Aral Sea Basin Development Assistance and Its Lessons

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This paper examines the development assistance granted by Japan to the Aral Sea basin and the lessons learned from it. The Aral Sea, once the fourth largest inland water body in the world, has drastically shrunk due to extensive irrigation development and inefficient water usage during the Soviet era. This environmental catastrophe has resulted in severe socio-economic and health problems in the region, prompting international efforts, including those from Japan, to address the crisis. However, many of these efforts have failed to achieve sustainable long-term results.

Japan's involvement primarily took place through the Japan Global Infrastructure Fund Research

Foundation (Japan GIF), which collaborated with government agencies and private enterprises to conduct research and organize international forums aimed at large-scale transboundary infrastructure development and environmental protection. Despite its initially proactive role, Japan GIF's efforts gradually diminished due to challenges in coordinating with international organizations and the evolving political landscape of Central Asia following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As the newly independent Central Asian states pursued their own policies and the World Bank assumed a leading role, Japan GIF's influence became increasingly limited, making it difficult to achieve integrated water resource management at the basin level.

Japan's engagement in the Aral Sea issue can be categorized into five distinct phases:

1. Recognition Phase (1990–1991): Establishment of Japan GIF and initial collaboration with the Soviet Union.

2. Expansion Phase (1992–1994): Active role in coordinating international assistance efforts.

3. Project Formation Phase (1995–2000): Development of concrete projects in collaboration with the Ministry of Construction and JICA.

4. Reconstruction Phase (2001–2009): Efforts to restructure support strategies and strengthen cooperation with other stakeholders.

5. Disillusionment Phase (2010–present): Scaling down of assistance and limited impact.

A key lesson from Japan's involvement is the critical importance of establishing a cooperative framework among the riparian states when addressing transboundary environmental issues. Although Japan GIF emphasized the necessity of an integrated approach to water resource management, political and economic factors hindered its implementation. Moreover, donors' aid in the Aral Sea basin was primarily focused on small-scale technical cooperation projects with locals, which were insufficient to achieve large-scale rehabilitation of the Aral Sea basin. This means that there was a mismatch between two scales: the 'ideal' result envisaged for Aral Sea assistance, and the 'actual' international cooperation being implemented. A 'temporal mismatch' also occurred in the Aral Sea basin, corresponding to discrepancies between timescales of development, the formulation of environmental conservation measures, and environmental changes. When donors commit to addressing transboundary environmental issues, it is crucial to consider these mismatches as risk factors while thoroughly understanding each country's logic-building process within its cultural and social context. Promoting trust-building among riparian countries and fostering regional dialogue and integration are essential.