

## Preface

This collection of essays is part of the project “The Collapse and Restructuring of Empires and Transformation of the World System” (Group 4) in the framework of the larger project “Comparative Research on Major Regional Powers in Eurasia” (Grant-in-aid for Scientific Research on Innovative Areas from the Japanese Ministry of Education and Science, 2008–13). Group 4 focuses on the history of Eurasian regional powers, the imperial or colonial past of such powers, and the reconfiguration of international relations after the fall of empires. While the “Regional Powers” project mainly deals with Russia, China, and India, Group 4 also studies the Ottoman Empire, Japan, Iran, the so-called “American Empire,” etc. This should help us understand the interactions among empires, semi-empires, nation-states, and colonies in the worldwide international system and better grasp the historical backgrounds of regional powers.

The first two papers were originally presented at the First Congress of the Asian Association of World Historians in Osaka on May 31, 2009, and both intend to theoretically contribute to comparative imperial studies using the examples of Central Asia, India and other regions. Alexander Morrison starts by posing some theoretical questions concerning “modern” imperialism, and observes that an important feature of modernity was a “common temporal awareness” that led empires to global rivalry. He shows that the distinction between the Western European overseas empires and the Russian land-based empire was not absolute but relative, and that British India had more in common with Russia than is often supposed. Comparing Russian rule in Central Asia and British rule in India, Morrison points out that differences between them were not stark in the “colonial” nature of administration, although the British sought to effectively rule through local intermediaries, whereas the Russians could not well control local society and did not develop “colonial knowledge.” The sharpest distinction appeared in fiscal policy: While the British exploited India, the Russians were driven by autarkic concerns to make their empire independent of imports (especially of American cotton) and they consistently subsidized the colonial periphery.

Uyama Tomohiko<sup>1</sup> addresses some conceptual issues that may be important in comparing Russian Central Asia with other colonies and empires. The first is that the dichotomy of colonizer/colonized should not be exaggerated, and that one must recognize

---

<sup>1</sup> In this volume, Japanese and Chinese names are written with the family name first.

that the authorities' attitudes toward two or more groups of people were interconnected and that the image of any one group was diverse and fluid. The second is that some existing concepts such as "the invention of tradition" (E. Hobsbawm, et al.), "the classifying mind of the colonial state" (B. Anderson), and imperial "Ornamentalism" (D. Cannadine) have the potential for further comparative research. Third, Uyama explores ways of empirical comparison based on the example of the Orientalist-Anglicist controversy in India and its possible Russian analogy. Fourth, from the viewpoint of comparing interactions between imperial power and local society, he examines why Central Asian elites cooperated with Russia and points to modernization as an important factor in the strategies and behaviors of colonial intellectuals.

Fukuda Hiroshi's article is the only one in this volume that focuses on Europe, or more specifically, small nations in Central Europe located between empires. The essay's hero is Milan Hodža, a Slovak statesman who proposed a number of variations of Central European cooperation. Under the Habsburg Empire, he attempted to use the empire as a protector of small nations, collaborating with the imperial heir Franz Ferdinand and opposing Magyar nationalists. In the interwar period, he became one of the political leaders of Czechoslovakia, striving to cultivate the peasantry as the core bearers of democracy and to forge partnerships with other Central European countries through the International Agrarian Bureau. During World War II, he put forward the idea of establishing a Central European federation as a postwar vision. All his attempts ultimately failed because of numerous obstacles, including the territorial disputes and minority issues of Central European states, but his ideas are of interest as survival strategies for small nations between Germany and Russia.

The other five papers were originally presented at the workshop "New International Order of Asia and Regional Powers in the 1950s and 1960s," held in Tokyo on March 8 and 9, 2010. Akita Shigeru's introduction points out that political decolonization, the emergence of the Cold War regime, and the shift in hegemony from the United Kingdom to the United States were closely interconnected in Asia in the 1950s. The responses to the transformation of the international order by newly independent states, especially India, also played important roles in the decolonization of Asia.

Penny Von Eschen underscores the centrality of colonialism in the shaping of the Cold War in Asia and globally, rejecting a U.S.-Soviet centered account. During WWII, while the British showed no intention of renouncing their empire, the Americans supported the extension of freedom to colonized peoples, and anticolonial activists sought to exploit the split between them. After the war, however, in the many areas where the

## Preface

accelerated anticolonial activity carried into armed conflict between independence movements and colonial European powers, the United States nearly always backed up its colonial allies. The Cold War usurped prospects of a democratic world order, and the U.S. fight against Communism often resulted in the suppression of nationalism and bloody wars, devaluing African, Asian, and Latin American lives. Von Eschen argues that the extension of U.S. power depended on the social production of new forms of racial thinking.

Niu Jun investigates the evolution of and changes in Chinese foreign policy in the 1950s. In the first stage of building itself as a Communist state (1948–53), China “leaned to one side,” i.e., toward the Soviet Union. Stalin took advantage of this situation and pressured China to enter the Korean War, suggesting that otherwise China would not be able to get Taiwan. In the next stage (1954–57), China sought peaceful coexistence with neighboring countries to create a security buffer and participated in multilateral international conferences in Geneva and Bandung. From 1958–59, however, Chinese foreign policy re-radicalized against the background of the conflict with Khrushchev and the “Great Leap Forward” campaign. During the entire period, Chinese foreign policy was swayed by domestic politics.

Sergey Radchenko contrasts Soviet policies toward Asia under the two different leaders: Stalin and Khrushchev. Stalin, primarily concerned with advancing Soviet security interests, frequently meddled in the affairs of regions neighboring the USSR, such as Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Northern Iran, although he readily abandoned his allies when higher-priority tasks appeared. In contrast, Stalin was less interested in remote South and Southeast Asia, sometimes assigning Chinese Communists the task of leading the revolutionary struggles in these regions and other times giving misguided advice to local Communists. With the advent of the era of decolonization, and with the Soviet Union becoming a global power rather than a regional power, Khrushchev reached out to Asia, Africa, and Latin America far more ambitiously than his predecessor had done. He was even more interested in such non-socialist countries as Egypt, India, Burma, and Indonesia than in his country’s socialist allies in the Third World. His ambition backfired when China split with the Soviet Union, winning North Korea (and to some extent, North Vietnam) to its side, but in the mid- to late-1960s, the Soviet Union improved its standing thanks to China’s radicalization during the Cultural Revolution. Khrushchev and later Soviet leaders believed that the future of socialism hinged on the outcome of battles for hearts and minds in the Third World.

Mridula Mukherjee traces the evolution of Indian diplomacy under the leadership

of Nehru. He advocated the Non-Alignment Movement, striving to prevent newly independent Asian and African countries from becoming pawns of big powers. India refused to condone Western intervention in the Korean War, despite its acute need for food aid from the United States. India obtained promises from other great powers for the neutralization of Laos and Cambodia at the end of the First Indochina War, supported Egyptian interests in the Suez Canal, and helped bring the civil war in the Congo to a close. In promoting the Non-Alignment Movement in Asia, India experienced great difficulties in its relations with China. Although India was the first country to recognize the People's Republic of China, the latter was unhappy with the Dalai Lama's asylum in India. According to Mukherjee, the Chinese attacked India because they felt isolated from the U.S. and the USSR, and wanted to prove that non-alignment was an illusion. India, however, tried its best to avoid hostility with China because, with Pakistan already hostile, it did not need another neighbor as an enemy.

Taking the papers on decolonization together, we can understand how the postwar international order in Asia was woven by the internal politics of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and India, and by their ambitious battles for hearts and minds in newly independent countries. Relations between powers were connected with situations in other regions, sometimes in unexpected ways. The "common temporal awareness" of modern states and the interconnectedness of relations between distinct regions, which are concepts derived from imperial studies, are also valid in post-imperial studies.

Finally, the editor would like to express his sincere gratitude to Prof. Akita Shigeru, who was the main organizer of the First Congress of the Asian Association of World Historians as well as the workshop "New International Order of Asia and Regional Powers in the 1950s and 1960s," and to Dr. Fukuda Hiroshi, who took charge of the technical editing of this volume.

Uyama Tomohiko  
Sapporo, June 2012