

Situating India in Asia: The Nehru Years

Mridula MUKHERJEE

On independence in 1947 and even before, it was Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister and freedom fighter, who was the main architect of her policy on international issues. His vast knowledge of world history, his deep understanding of social, political, and economic forces that guide the destiny of nations, his grasp of contemporary ideologies such as Fascism and Marxism, his first-hand experience of colonialism and imperialism, enabled him to evolve a foreign policy suited to India's needs and the world's. He realized that given her great civilization, India could not but aspire to the right to speak in her own voice. Her recent hard-won freedom from the colonial yoke would also be meaningless unless it found expression in the international arena. Being sub-continental in size, too, ruled out an assumption of client status for India. An independent voice was not merely a choice, it was an imperative.

It was Nehru who gave this voice shape in the form of the idea of non-alignment and organizational cohesion through the Non-Aligned Movement. The immediate context for the emergence of this movement was the division of the world into two hostile blocs after World War II, one led by the US and the Western powers and the other by the Soviet Union. Nehru's understanding was that the newly independent, poor countries of Asia and Africa had nothing to gain and everything to lose by falling for the temptation to join the military blocs of the big powers. They would end up being used as pawns in contests for power of no relevance to them. Their needs were to fight poverty, illiteracy, and disease, and these could not be met by joining military blocs. On the contrary, India and other similarly placed countries needed peace and quiet to get on with the business of development. Their interests lay in expanding the "area of peace," not of war or hostility. India, therefore, neither joined nor approved of the Baghdad Pact, the Manila Treaty, SEATO, or CENTO, which joined the countries of West and East Asia to the Western power bloc.

Nehru's understanding of India's place in Asia and of Asia's place in the new world order that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War has to be understood within the overall context of his approach outlined above. There is no doubt that Asia

loomed large in his consciousness. This is testified to by the fact that even before independence, in March 1947, at his instigation, the Asian Relations Conference attended by more than twenty countries was held in Delhi. The issues of the conference were Asian independence and assertion on the world stage.

While this conference concerned itself with general issues, the Second Asian Relations Conference was called in response to a very specific problem: the Dutch attempt to re-colonize Indonesia in December 1948. Nehru invited states bordering the Indian Ocean, and most Asian countries as well as Australia came. The conference resolved to deny all facilities to Dutch shipping, and sent its resolutions to the UN. Within a week, the Security Council resolved that a ceasefire be declared and that the Indonesian national government be restored. The de-colonization initiative was carried further forward at the Asian Prime Ministers' Conference at Colombo in 1954 and the Afro-Asian Conference called by India and the other Colombo powers at Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. The conference was also a precursor to the Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference, as it passed resolutions on world peace and the dangers of nuclear weapons.

Korean War

The end of World War II left Korea divided between a Communist North controlled by the Socialist camp and a South dominated by the Western powers. K. P. S. Menon, who was elected chairman of the United Nations Commission on Korea in late 1947, had in a report to the UN appealed "to the great powers to let Korea be united," warning that else, "Korea may blow up," but it was to no avail. When North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950, India supported the US in the UN Security Council, condemning North Korea as the aggressor and calling for a ceasefire. But American pleasure was soon to turn to anger when they found that India had abstained from voting on another resolution calling for assistance to South Korea and the setting up of a unified command for this purpose. India's main concern was to prevent the entry of outside powers into the conflict. Nehru appealed to Truman and Stalin and received a warm response from the latter. But meanwhile, General MacArthur, at the head of US forces under UN command, after pushing North Korean forces out of South Korea, without the approval of the UN, crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea and continued towards the Yalu River that separated Korea from China. Chou En-lai, the Chinese prime minister, warned the Western powers through the Indian ambassador to China, K. M. Panikkar, of retaliation, but to no purpose. (India was the only link between the West and the East in Peking at that time.) China thereupon sent in waves of armed "volunteers" and succeeded in pushing back American troops south of the 38th

parallel, which resulted in huge Chinese, Korean, and American casualties. Nehru tried again at this point to bring about an end to the war by organizing a conference, but the US queered the pitch with an ill-timed UN resolution declaring China the aggressor. India voted against it because it was clearly MacArthur and not China who was the aggressor in North Korea.

A military stalemate ensued, but despite India's tireless efforts, it took till June 1953 to get both sides to agree to a ceasefire and evolve an acceptable formula for the repatriation of prisoners of war. It was Krishna Menon who finally succeeded in fashioning a formula that the General Assembly of the UN and, after Stalin's death, the Soviet bloc accepted. A Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission was set up with an Indian, General Thimayya, as its chairman, and an Indian "Custodian Force" under his charge was made responsible for the difficult task of repatriating soldiers. The Korean War had tested India's faith in non-alignment and commitment to peace to the utmost, and she had not been found wanting. She stoically faced first Chinese and Soviet hostility because she voted to declare North Korea the initial aggressor.

She then endured American wrath for refusing to go along with Western intervention in the war, and for refusing to declare China the aggressor. In the midst of this, in 1950, China invaded Tibet and annexed it without any effort to keep India in the picture. Though upset, Nehru did not allow this to influence his stand on the Korean War. India continued to press the UN to recognize and give a seat to Communist China on the Security Council, especially now that the USSR had withdrawn from it in protest. India also badly needed food aid from the US to meet the near-famine conditions at home but did not allow this to blind her to the US stance on Korea. She continued to press ahead even if success was not always apparent. In the end, India's stand was vindicated: both sides had to recognize the same boundary they had tried to change.

The world now recognized the worth of non-alignment. It was difficult to dismiss it as mealy-mouthed, cowardly neutrality or as idealist hogwash. The USSR clearly began to see India in a different light. The Soviet prime minister, Bulganin, even told the Indian ambassador, K. P. S. Menon, that the USSR "fully appreciated India's position in the Commonwealth and hoped that India would continue to remain in it." This was a big change from the time when membership of the Commonwealth was seen as final proof of India's succumbing to Western imperialism!

Indochina

The end of the Korean War brought only momentary respite to Asia. In early 1954,

Indochina appeared to be on the brink of becoming the next theatre of the holy crusades against Communism, with the US keen to pour in massive aid to shore up the weary and hesitant French colonial power in its ongoing (since 1945) war with the Viet Minh. Nehru's initiative to appeal for a ceasefire in February 1954 was followed by his obtaining the support of several Asian leaders at the Colombo Conference in April 1954 for his six-point proposal for a settlement. Krishna Menon was sent to explain the Asian point of view to the Geneva Conference on Indochina (to which India was not invited as a member). These steps, besides Nehru's meeting with Chou En-lai in 1954 in Delhi, and other behind-the-scenes parleys and assurances helped prevent the further internationalization of the Indo-Chinese conflict. India obtained guarantees from China for the neutralization of Laos and Cambodia and promises from Great Britain and France to China that they would not allow the US to have bases in Laos and Cambodia. The significance of India's role in the negotiations was evident from the reference by Pierre Mendes-France, the French prime minister, to the Geneva Conference as "this ten-power conference – nine at the table – and India." At China's request, India was appointed chair of the International Control Commission and its work included supervision of imports of foreign armaments into Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. For the time being, the danger of the Chinese intervening on behalf of the Viet Minh and of the US increasing its support to the French, even to the point of introducing nuclear weapons into the region, was averted. France was tired of the war, Britain apprehensive of bellicose US intentions, and the USSR, particularly after Stalin's death, groping towards "peaceful coexistence." While the control commissions were later subverted through US diplomacy and Indochina became a major Cold War theatre, all subsequent peace efforts in fact employed solutions prescribed by Nehru.

Suez Crisis

This example is from West Asia. In 1956, in an impulsive reaction to US and British pressure to abandon its declared policy of non-alignment, the latest move being the Anglo-American withdrawal of the promised financial aid for building the Aswan Dam on the River Nile, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal. This alarmed the users of the canal, and Britain and France in particular demanded international control over it. India was a major user herself but she recognized that under the Constantinople Convention (1888), the Suez Canal was an integral part of Egypt. She urged both Cairo and London to observe restraint and tried at the London Conference in August 1956 to obtain agreement on a formula that included Egyptian control, an advisory role for the users, and settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter. The Indian proposal met with widespread approval,

including from Egypt. Later, when France and Britain got Israel to attack Egypt and landed their troops in Suez, they were severely condemned by even the US and the UN, and Nehru called it “naked aggression” and a “reversion to the past colonial methods.” The withdrawal took place under UN supervision and Indian troops participated in large numbers in the peace-keeping force. India continued to support Egyptian interests in subsequent negotiations leading to a settlement even while trying to ensure that British and other users’ interests were protected. In time, even Britain accepted the fairness of India’s approach and the episode did not leave any permanent mark on Indo-British relations.

The Congo

I am including the Congo in this study even though it is in Africa because the Indian policy in this instance illustrates its overall approach, which is equally relevant in the Asian context.

A very major achievement of Indian foreign policy was its role in helping maintain the integrity and independence of the Congo. The Congo had barely gained her independence from Belgium on 30th June, 1960 when its copper-rich province of Katanga announced its independence from the Congo! Its head, Tshombe, was clearly being backed by Belgium, and Belgian troops were also sent to the Congolese capital ostensibly to protect Belgian citizens. Lumumba, the prime minister of Congo, appealed to the UN, US, and USSR for help, and the UN asked its secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjold, to organize all necessary help. The next few months witnessed an unseemly drama in which foreign powers propped up their favourite local players in a mad scramble for power. The US supported the president, Kasavubu, the Soviets backed Patrice Lumumba, and the Belgians blessed the army leader, Mobutu. Their tactics were eventually to lead to the murder of Lumumba.

Lumumba’s murder shocked the world and when Nehru forcefully demanded that the UN play a more decisive part, get rid of the mercenaries and the foreign troops, stop the civil war, convene a parliament, and form a new government, and added that India was ready to commit troops for the purpose, the UN agreed. The Security Council adopted a resolution on 21st February, 1961 and Indian armed forces successfully brought the civil war to a close, restoring the central government’s authority over Katanga and the rest of the country by March 1963. Dag Hammarskjold is reported to have said, “Thank God for India,” and the praise was not undeserved. It was indeed one of the finest moments for India’s policy of non-alignment, was of help to the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia, and strengthened the role of multilateral bodies such as the UN. Nehru had again

shown that given the will, non-alignment could work and there was not just space but also the need for the non-aligned to assert themselves on the side of the newly emerging nations, who were sought by the eager superpowers for enlistment in an enterprise that would only take away their freedom even before they had had time to savour its taste.

India and China

India adopted a policy of friendship towards China from the very beginning. The Congress had been sympathetic to China's struggle against imperialism and had sent a medical mission to China in the thirties as well as calling for a boycott of Japanese goods in protest against the Japanese occupation of China. India was the first to recognize the new People's Republic of China on 1st January, 1950. Nehru had great hopes that the two countries with their common experience of suffering at the hands of colonial powers and mutual problems of poverty and underdevelopment would join hands to give Asia its due place in the world. Nehru pressed for representation for Communist China on the UN Security Council, did not support the US position in the Korean War, and tried his best to bring about a settlement in Korea.

In 1950, when China occupied Tibet, India was unhappy that it had not been taken into China's confidence, but did not question China's rights over Tibet since at many times in Chinese history, Tibet had been subjugated by China. In 1954, India and China signed a treaty in which India recognized China's rights over Tibet and the two countries agreed to be governed in their mutual relations by the principles of Panchsheel. Differences over border delineation were discussed at this time, but China maintained that it had not yet studied the old Kuomintang maps and that these could be sorted out later. Relations continued to be close and Nehru went to great lengths to promote China and Chou En-lai at the Bandung Conference.

In 1959, however, there was a big revolt in Tibet and the Dalai Lama fled Tibet along with thousands of refugees. He was given asylum in India but was not allowed to set up a government-in-exile and was dissuaded from continuing his political activities. Nevertheless, the Chinese were unhappy. Soon after, in October 1959, the Chinese opened fire on an Indian patrol near the Kongka Pass in Ladakh, killing five Indian policemen and capturing a dozen others. Letters were exchanged between the two governments, but no common ground emerged. Then, Chou En-lai was invited for talks to Delhi in April 1960, but not much headway could be made and it was decided to let officials sort out the details first.

The 1962 Chinese Attack

On 8th September, 1962, Chinese forces attacked the Thagla Ridge and dislodged Indian troops, but this was taken as a minor incident. Nehru went off to London for a conference and after returning home, once again left for Colombo on 12th October. A week later, the Chinese army launched a massive attack and overran Indian posts in the eastern sector in NEFA or what was later Arunachal Pradesh. In the western sector, on 20th October, thirteen forward posts were captured by the Chinese in the Galwan Valley and the Chushul airstrip threatened. There was a great outcry in the country and a feeling of panic about Chinese intentions. It was thought that the Chinese would come rushing into the plains and occupy Assam, and perhaps other parts as well. Twenty-four hours later, the Chinese declared a unilateral withdrawal and, as unpredictably as it had appeared, the Chinese dragon disappeared from sight, leaving behind a heart-broken friend and a confused and disoriented people. India took a long time to recover from the blow to its self-respect, and perhaps it was only the victory over Pakistan in the Bangladesh War, in which China and the USA also supported Pakistan, that restored her sense of self-worth. Nehru never really recovered from the blow, and his death in May 1964 was most likely hastened by it.

At the time of the attack, and afterwards, in the press and in academic writing, attempts have been made to hold Nehru responsible for the Chinese perfidy. One kind of argument sees him as a naive fool who was blinded by sentiment and failed to guard Indian interests in the face of an inevitable Communist betrayal. Another view, expounded most notably by Neville Maxwell in *India's China War*, makes Nehru out to be a stubborn nationalist who, pushed by jingoist public pressure, refused to settle the borders with China on the very reasonable terms offered by the Chinese and instead followed from 1959 a "forward policy" which provoked the Chinese to attack in self-defence. Neither view does justice to the sophistication of Nehru's understanding of China and the subtlety of his policy.

Nehru's understanding of Chinese history and of the history of revolutions, especially the Russian Revolution, had convinced him that China should not be isolated and pushed into a corner, but should be brought into the community of nations and its revolution humanized. "We know enough history to realize that a strong China is normally an expansionist China," he said, but did not want to precipitate any conflict with China as it would be as disastrous for both countries as was the French-German conflict. Before the 1962 attack, on 7th December, 1961, in the Lok Sabha, he said that "a huge elephant of a country sitting on our border is itself a fact that we could not ignore." He added that soon after the Chinese Revolution, he had come "to the conclusion that our borders were going

to be, well, threatened in some way.” Nehru’s long statement on 3rd September, 1963 in the Rajya Sabha explained at length about not wanting to spend too much on the military and emphasized the building of one’s own strength as that is the only security. “No country that is not industrialized is militarily strong today,” and “the real thing before us was to strengthen India industrially and not superficially, by getting an odd gun or an odd aircraft.” With Pakistan already hostile, India did not need another neighbour as an enemy. Preparing for war on two fronts would have meant an end to development. Therefore, the conflict, even if inevitable, should be delayed as much as possible by adopting a friendly approach and asking others to do the same, for example by trying to get China into the UN. He understood that the Chinese occupation of Tibet meant a common border with its attendant conflicts. But he also saw that China could not think of expansionism as yet, as it had big problems to solve. After the revolt in Tibet and the Dalai Lama’s arrival, and the border clashes, he was well aware of the dangers, but what good would it have done to threaten China? In an effort to checkmate the Chinese, he did make diplomatic preparations, by moving closer to the Soviets. He had never bought the line that Communist China and Communist USSR would team up and, perhaps along with Indian Communists, threaten the Indian state. He did not believe that China was a tool in the hands of the Soviets, nor did he make the mistake of thinking that the Soviet Union would back her Communist brothers against her Indian friends, as many in India argued.

Nehru was shocked by the scale of the attack, as he had thought that there may be occasional border skirmishes here and there, but not an invasion of this nature. He erred in not anticipating the precise nature of the attack rather than in the foreign policy he pursued. To his credit, Nehru tried his best to retrieve the situation and get the country back to its bearings.

Most commentators are now agreed that India’s defeat at China’s hands in 1962 was not the result of Nehru’s naive faith in Chinese friendship, Utopian pacifism, and the consequent neglect of India’s defence preparedness. On the contrary, between 1949–50 and 1962, the strength of the Indian Armed Forces doubled from 280,000 to 550,000 and that of the Indian Air Force, from seven combat squadrons in 1947 to nineteen by 1962. The war with Pakistan in 1965 was fought with the same equipment and no debacle occurred. Nehru was well aware and had been warning of the possibility of border clashes with the Chinese since 1959. But neither the political nor the military leadership anticipated the precise nature of the Chinese attack, and were therefore taken by surprise.

Maxwell’s theory of Indian aggression is not treated seriously by most experts, as it is too obvious that India had no inkling, let alone intention, of provoking a conflict. Her

prime minister and defence minister were out of the country, the chief of staff on leave, a senior commander on a cruise. What was India to gain from provoking a war, anyway? On the contrary, it can be shown that it was Chinese imperatives, of which Maxwell shows no awareness, that brought them to war, not Indian provocation. And the factors that propelled China in the direction of conflict were beyond Nehru's control.

Take Tibet: every strong Chinese government had tried to integrate Tibet. But Tibet wanted independence. Nevertheless, Nehru accepted the Chinese position on Tibet in the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement without even securing a quid pro quo on the border, which was possibly a mistake. Only in 1959 did Chou En-lai claim territory in Ladakh and NEFA, this is in the wake of the Khampa revolt and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India with many refugees. China accused India of instigating the Dalai Lama and objected to his asylum. No Indian government could have refused him asylum and India did not instigate the rebellion. Nehru did not allow a Tibetan government-in-exile, or any political activities. But he could not have prevented the Tibetan revolt!

Nor was Nehru able to succeed, despite his best efforts, in influencing US policy. The US refusal to accommodate China, her insistence that Formosa (later Taiwan) was the only legitimate China, which also meant that Communist China was denied a seat on the Security Council of the UN, and the attempt to checkmate her in Korea and Indochina frustrated her and pushed her onto a path to aggressive assertion. In fact, the US played no small role in making China paranoid about her security and helping the extremist left elements to come to the fore in China.

Nor was Nehru the architect of Sino-Soviet differences, which had their own role to play in increasing Chinese insecurity and pushing her in an adventurist direction. These differences existed for some time but came into the open in 1959. When clashes took place between India and China on the border, the Soviets remained neutral. In April–May 1962, a number of incidents occurred on the Sino-Soviet border in Sinkiang. The Soviets charged the Chinese with more than five thousand violations of the border, and the Chinese charged the Soviets with enticing tens of thousands of their citizens across the border. In 1959, the Soviets had repudiated the treaty that they had signed with China on the development of nuclear weapons. In the first week of August 1962, the Soviets signed an agreement with India on the manufacture of MiG-21 aircraft. They had not done so with China. In the last week of August, the Soviets told the Chinese that they were going ahead with negotiations for the Partial Test Ban Treaty. The Chinese took this as being aimed at checking their efforts to develop nuclear weapons. This was all the more galling to the Chinese because they felt that the Soviet Union was now in a position to use her weight to secure Chinese

interests in the international arena. To quote V. P. Dutt, Sinologist and foreign policy expert,

China had arrived at a new theoretical understanding of its own national interests. It had despaired of a peaceful solution to the outstanding problems with the United States and the fulfilment of its primary objectives, namely the return of Taiwan ... acceptance of China as a great power, seat in the Security Council. ... It had now come to believe that the international balance of forces was shifting in favour of the socialist camp in view of Soviet advances in rocketry and ICBMs and that the time had come for the adoption of an uncompromising and militant line in order to compel the United States ... to make concessions to China.

The Chinese were also upset that the Afro-Asian countries were following India's line of seeking friendship and assistance from both the USSR and the USA, rather than the Chinese line of keeping her distance from both. By reducing India's stature, they could hope to have their line accepted. Therefore, it is not at all unlikely that the Chinese attack on India had little to do with issues between India and China, but was a reaction to a feeling of isolation, abandonment, and frustration. By attacking India, they may have wanted to topple Nehru or at least push India into the Western camp so that the USSR could have no illusions about Indian non-alignment and would have to rethink her policy of peaceful coexistence, which, the Chinese figured, was leading to their isolation. They failed on both counts. In fact, V. P. Dutt testifies that Deng Xiaoping said later to an Indian delegation of which he was a member that it was Khrushchev who was responsible for the 1962 war.

Thus, the causes of the 1962 attack were related more to China's own compulsions than to anything that Nehru or India did or could have done. Not being able to gain recognition from the US, a UN seat, leadership of Afro-Asia, Soviet support on the nuclear issue, or a resolution of the border dispute with India, Chinese politics took a leftward turn. By humiliating India, China wanted to show that her policy of peace and non-alignment was not feasible. Nor was the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. India would leave the policy of non-alignment under pressure, and other countries of Asia and Africa would follow the Chinese lead. Thus, the cause of the Indian military humiliation could not be reduced to Indian foreign policy failure. It could "only be characterized as one of those unforeseeable random events of history."

If India's policy towards China was a failure, which other country's was a success? The US did a complete volte-face in 1971, and the USSR began to change, at least after

1959. The debacle of the India-China War in no way raises doubts about the correctness of Nehru's basic thrust in foreign policy. For example, non-alignment ensured that even in the India-China War, the US and the Soviet blocs were not ranged on opposite sides and India succeeded in gaining greater or lesser sympathy from both. This was an unusual occurrence in the days of the Cold War. Secondly, Nehru had been right in pursuing a policy of friendship with China, even if it ended the way it did. Especially given the hostile relationship with Pakistan (which surfaced soon after independence with the conflict over Kashmir and grew into a serious threat when it was exacerbated by the US decision in 1954 to give military help to Pakistan), it was in India's interest to try its best to avoid having another hostile neighbour and thus be caught in a pincer movement.

India's espousal of China's right to have a seat on the UN Security Council was not given up by Nehru even after the India-China War since he rightly believed that the Western powers' isolation of China only pushed her into becoming more irresponsible. Besides, as Nehru was most fond of pointing out, defence was not just a matter of weapons, it was also a function of economic development, of self-reliance; otherwise, defence was only skin deep. A newly independent poor country like India could ill have afforded to divert her scarce resources into producing a massive military machine. On the contrary, by building up India's economic strength, Nehru enabled his successors to win impressive military victories.

The policy towards Asian countries was thus formulated within a broad framework of an understanding of the post-war and post-colonial world, the Cold War imperatives, and the needs of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. One principle evolved in this context was that of non-alignment. It was not a blueprint for policy; it was an approach, a framework, a method, not a straitjacket but a lodestar by which the young nation could steer its course in the dark night. Instead of imposing any rigidity on Indian foreign policy, non-alignment let it evolve to meet the changing needs of Indian society. It did not get in the way of the close relationship that developed with the USSR from 1954 onwards. Nor did it constitute an obstacle to India joining the Commonwealth. In fact, Nehru's internationalist and humanitarian worldview did not lead to any sacrifice of Indian interests or neglect of her defence needs, as is sometimes alleged. Nor was Nehru a pacifist who refused to use force to defend Indian interests when necessary. In 1947–48, he ordered the use of force in Kashmir (with Gandhiji's approval), Junagadh, and Hyderabad, and in 1961 in Goa.

The visionary nature of Nehru's understanding of international relations is shown by the fact that the rest of the world has slowly come to adopt much of what was dismissed

as naive and impractical when first articulated. Nuclear disarmament has become an accepted and much-desired goal globally. Both the US and the ex-Soviet Union agreed that a nuclear war could not be won and must therefore not be fought. In February 1972, the Americans and the Chinese signed the Shanghai Communiqué which declared their mutual relations to be based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence – Nehru’s Panchsheel! It is no small consolation to India that the Chinese were forced to adopt the very same principles, expounded by the very same man, that they had betrayed so heartlessly in 1962 when they attacked India. These principles were first embodied at Nehru’s insistence in the Agreement on Tibet between India and China in 1954.

In further vindication of Nehru, and Gandhi, the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev signed with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi the New Delhi Declaration of November 1996, laying down the principle of non-violence in international relations, and in community life within nations. It is being increasingly realized that even conventional wars at the modern level of technology are too destructive. Besides, they have singularly failed either to change borders very much (as in the Iraq-Iran War) or to keep populations under occupation (as in Vietnam, Afghanistan, the West Bank, etc.) The only workable ideal that remains with us is the one that Nehru espoused: that of a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world.