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Religion as an Object of Science in Atheistic Society: The Function of the Historical Museum of Religion and Atheism in Late Socialist Russia

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When “religions” are studied as an object of science, they are condemned to losing their transcendental and esoteric meanings. In this context, religious studies have facilitated the process of secularism and religious pluralism, and vice versa. The definition of secularism is one of the most provocative questions among specialists.¹ According to the general definition, secularism is the separation (or “emancipation”) of politics, education, economy, and other social systems from religion. The theories and processes of secularism have been researched in many cases on the basis of the experience in Western Europe, North America, and other modern democratic states. As a result, secularism tends to be treated “as a corollary of political liberalism, linking it to liberal doctrines that see society as a collection of autonomous individuals, and politics as a negotiation of personal interests.”²

Secularism in states of “militant atheism” has been considered to develop in its own particular way. However, the importance of religion has increased in the public sphere since the 1980s on a global scale. China, India, and Russia are no exception. The Chinese Communist Party actively attacked religious institutions especially during the 1950s and ’60s. After the economic reform in the latter half of the 1970s, the party began to guarantee the freedom of religion, and the importance of religion has been growing by rapid degrees since the 1980s, although it concerns only legitimate religious institutions.³ In India, religion has always been one of the most difficult political issues. With respect to Hindu nationalism, the political significance of religion has risen especially since the 1980s, under Rajiv Gandhi.⁴ It is important to consider these nations’ experiences of secularism, their state policies, their implementation methods, and also the following of popular religious practices all within a global context.

It was in the latter half of 2000 that researchers began to pay attention to the history of “religious studies (*religiovedenie*)” in Russia.⁵ There is no certain definition of *religiovedenie*, and

¹ For the most influential theories of secularism, see Bryan Wilson, *Contemporary Transformation of Religion* (London: Oxford University Press, 1976); Thomas Luckmann, *The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society* (New York: Macmillan, 1967); Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967); Karel Dobbelaere, “Secularization: A Multidimensional Concept,” *Current Sociology*, vol. 29, no. 2 (1981), pp. 3-213.

² Sonja Luehrmann, *Secularism Soviet Style: Teaching Atheism and Religion in a Volga Republic* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University press, 2011), p. 3.

³ Yukihiro Kawaguchi, “Byou to Girei no Fukko, oyobi sono Shuenka,” in Yuki Konagaya, Yukihiro Kawaguchi, and Sayaka Naganuma, eds., *Chugoku ni okeru Shakaisyugiteki Kindaika* (Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan, 2010), pp. 3-5.

⁴ Takeshi Nakajima, *Nashonarizumu to Shukyo: Gendai Indo no Hindu Nashonarizumu* (Yokohama: Shumpusha, 2005).

⁵ Cf. M. M. Shakhnovish, *Ocherki po istorii religiovedeniia* (SPb.: Izdatel'stvo Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta, 2006); A. Iu. Lavrent'eva, “Stanovlenie i razvitiie rossiiskogo religiovedeniia,” *Vestnik Pomorskogo*

there were no exhaustive discussions about when it was established concerning whether it comprises Russian mysticism and theology, or other substantial issues.⁶ Furthermore, the Soviet policy of state atheism brought about a unique problem regarding the relationship between “religious studies” and “scientific atheism.” In Soviet times, religion was discussed under the influence of ideology, which defined it as the “opium of the people,” or a “remnant of a disappearing past.” At that time, many specialists had no doubt that religious studies likely started after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, today many researchers have begun to disprove the established understanding about the origin of religious studies in Russia.

Even in the Soviet period, it was possible to study religion as an object of science, or rather, it was the only “correct” approach to understanding what religion was. Analysis under the academic approach toward “religious studies” in Soviet Russia shows the socialist attitudes toward religion.

It was not the state universities but the Academy of Sciences and its museums of religion that played an important role in establishing *religiovedenie* at the end of the nineteenth- and the beginning of twentieth-century Russia. In this paper, I will show the affects of the secularist experience on the development of *religiovedenie* in Soviet Russia, using the theory and activities of the State Museum of Religion as an example.

1. How to “exhibit” religions

There are few museums in the world examining all the world’s major religious faiths. The State Historical Museum of Religion (hereinafter called GMIR) is one of the oldest museums of such kind. It is located in the center of St. Petersburg, which was named Leningrad in the Soviet period (1924-1991). The Academy of Sciences has characterized this city as the center of science since the tsarist era. The head of the Department of Religious Philosophy and Religious Studies at St. Petersburg University M. Shakhnovich points out the significant role of “the Petersburg school” in the development of Russian religious studies. She wrote that “the miraculous cooperation between the Academy of Sciences, the university [Saint-Petersburg State University — S.T.], the Hermitage Museum, and the Kunstkamera [the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography — S.T.]” facilitated raising the level of religious studies to the Western European standard.⁷

Ethnographer and corresponding member of the Academy L. Sternberg (1861-1927) and anthropologist V. Bogoraz-Tan (1865-1936) took the initiative of organizing an exhibition of the

gosudarstvennaia universiteta. Gumanitarnye i sotsial'nye nauki, no. 2, (2007), pp. 70-73; M. Iu. Smirnov, *Ocherk istorii rossiiskoi sotsiologii religii* (SPb.: Izdatel'stvo Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta, 2008); A. I. Arinin, “Vopros o proiskhozhdenii i sovremennom razvitii rossiiskogo religiovedeniia,” *Uchenye zapiski Orlovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, no. 1, (2011), p. 93-97.

⁶ Some researchers see two main streams in *religiovedenie*. The former is close to Russian mysticism and theology, and the later inherits the approach of scientific atheism. L. M. Mitorokhin, “Ot nauchnogo ateizma k naukam o religii: filosofii religii i teologiiia,” *Voprosy religii i religiovedeniia*, Vypusk 1, Chast' 4 (2009), p. 41; A. I. Arinin, “Vopros o proislozhdenii i sovremennom razvitii rossiiskogo religiovedeniia,” p. 95.

⁷ M. M. Shakhnovich, “Peterburgskaya religiovedcheskaia shkola: Istoki i traditsii,” *Voprosy religii i religiovedeniia*, Vypusk 4, Kniga 1 Chast' 1 (2010), p. 7-14.

religious materials of the Siberian peoples as early as 1923.⁸ It is interesting that both of them were *narodniki*, members of “The People’s Will” and were exiled to the Far East and Siberia, where they began to research the manners and customs of the indigenous peoples.

Their understanding of religion was strongly influenced by historical materialism and Marxist theory. That is a mixed concept of “religious essentialism” and “evolutionary theory of religions,” both of which were widespread in Western Europe during the establishment of religious studies, especially in the latter half of the nineteenth century. According to the theory of “religious essentialism,” which was formed in the process of colonization, the most primordial form of religion must show the essence of religions. A primordial form was thought to develop toward a higher, more sophisticated form in stages and in accordance with certain laws, that is, the “evolution theory of religions,” which rests on Hegel’s dialectic and philosophy of history.⁹ According to these concepts, Soviet science of religion defined religion as a “remnant of a disappearing past (*perezhitki proshlogo*),” and aimed to expose a “reactionary, class essence (*reaktsionnaia, klassovaia sushchnost*)” of religion.

The attack on religion caused an upsurge of antireligious museums and exhibitions, which treated religious belief as “a direct threat to Bolshevik rule from enemies within and abroad” by the end of the 1920s. At the same time, these museums extensively employed obvious, high-impact visual images for the illiterate and minimally literate population.¹⁰ The GMIR was unique among museums of religion.

The GMIR was established in 1932 and belonged to the Academy of Sciences. The museum showed the “emergence and evolution of religious faiths in accordance with the stages of social development.”¹¹ It was based on another preceding antireligious exhibition, which was organized by Bogoraz-Tan and reflected his and the late Sternburg’s scientific interests.¹² The museum presented the change of religious ideology from primitive societies to the contemporary world, categorizing the exhibits as follows:

1. Religion in primitive societies
2. Religion in antiquity
3. Western and Eastern religion in the feudal era
4. Religion in the capitalist period
5. Religion and atheism in Russia and the Soviet Union¹³

⁸ Istoricheskii arkhiv GMIR (Istoricheskii arkhiv Gosudarstvennogo muzeia istorii religii), f. 1, op. 1, d. 311, l. 1; T. V. Chumakova, “Muzei istorii religii: Akademicheskii period,” in Zh. I. Alferov, ed., *Akademiia nauk v istorii kul'tury Rossii XVIII-XX vekov* (SPb.: Nauka, 2010), p. 211.

⁹ Manabu Watanabe, “Shukyokigenron to Syukyogaku no Kigen,” *Shukyo heno Shiza* (Iwanami Shukyo Koza 2) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003), pp. 120, 122-123.

¹⁰ Daniel Peris, *Storming the Heavens: The Soviet League of the Militant Godless* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 72-75.

¹¹ T. V. Chumakova, “Muzei istorii religii AN SSSR v nachale 1930-kh gg.,” *Trudy gosudarstvennogo muzeia istorii religii*, no. 6-7 (2007), p. 16.

¹² T. I. Shcherbakova, “Ot vystavki k muzeiu: period stanovreniia Muzeia istorii religii AN SSSR (1930-1932 gg.),” *Trudy gosudarstvennogo muzeia istorii religii*, no. 2 (2002), p. 32.

¹³ A. M. Leskov and Ya. I. Shurygin, eds., *Muzei istorii religii i ateizma: putevoditel'* (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1981), p. 17.

However, the GMIR was also expected to play a significant role in propaganda. Not only materials for worship, but some antireligious posters and explanation were displayed in the exhibitions, too. It was the curators who characterized the unique view of the museum on antireligious propaganda, rejecting caricatures and other popular and often profane exhibitions as “vulgar.” They were the most advanced researchers of religion, and included among them were N. Matorin, A. Nevskii, and A. Pokrovskii.

At the same time in fact, the curators met great difficulties in pursuing their academic interests under the pressure of the Soviet powers, which expected the museum to be a center of antireligious propaganda. For example, N. Matorin, a curator of the GMIR and a Leningrad branch chief of the Soviet League of the Militant Godless, was arrested in January 1935,¹⁴ and another curator, A. Pokrovskii, was ousted from the GMIR in March. The affair forced the museum to pay more attention to the politicization of the secularization campaign.¹⁵ However, the strategy was not at all stable. Another curator M. I. Shakhnovich saw a shift “from propagandistic exhibitions to scientific activities” from 1937 to 1941.¹⁶ Thus, we can consider the GMIR as not only scientific, but also propagandistic, changing the character of its activities according to the religious policy of the Soviet powers.

2. Transition from “antireligion” to “scientific atheism”

The religious policy in the 1920s-’30s was carried out mainly by “administrative measures,” including compulsory disclosure of church buildings, seizure of property, and murder of clergymen and believers with the sole purpose of undermining and shutting down the Church. However, the effect of militant atheism in secularization was rather dubious. According to the 1937 census, above half of the population turned out to be religious believers.¹⁷ Furthermore, the Second World War, which was called the Great Patriotic War in the USSR, forced the Communist Party to cooperate with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), which was considered to be able to call the nation to unite in wartime. Stalin met with the leaders of the ROC in September 1943, as a result of which the jurisdiction of a patriarch (Patriarchate) was restored and several monasteries and seminaries reopened.

The secularization policy also shifted after the war, toward one that followed a “cultural approach.” For example, the most powerful antireligious institute, the League of the Militant Godless, was dissolved in 1947 and was taken over by the Knowledge Society (*Obshchestvo*

¹⁴ Peris, *Storming the Heavens*, p. 210.

¹⁵ T. V. Chumakova, “Muzei istorii religii: Akademicheskii period,” p. 224.

¹⁶ M. I. Shakhnovich, “Dvadtsatipiatiletie muzeia istorii religii i ateizma Akademii nauk SSSR,” *Voprosy istorii religii i ateizma*, no. 5 (1958), p. 414.

¹⁷ The curators of the GMIR were involved in making the questionnaire on religious beliefs and activities. See T. V. Chumakova, “Muzei istorii religii: Akademicheskii period,” p. 226. Eighty percent of the respondents answered the questions, and 56.7 percent of them were believers. The results had been concealed until 1990. V. B. Zhiromskaia, “Religioznost’ naroda v 1937 godu (po materialam Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia),” *Istoricheskii vestnik*, no. 7 (2000). [http://krotov.info/history/20/1930/1937_zher.htm]

“*Znanie*”).¹⁸ The new direction of secularization was reflected in two decisions of the Communist Party, both of which were adopted in 1954. The first is the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (CCCP) on July 7 “about the great faults in the propaganda of scientific atheism and measures for its improvement,”¹⁹ and the second is the decision of the CCCP on November 10 “about mistakes in the execution of the propaganda of scientific atheism among the population.”²⁰ These were the first official documents in which “scientific atheism” was employed as a special term, replacing “antireligion.” With these decisions, “scientific atheism” became the main focus of the religious and atheistic policy in late socialist Russia.

July’s decision aimed to improve the mistakes of the secularization policy, being confronted with the question of the increase in the influence of religion in everyday life.²¹ For this purpose, the decision stressed the need to expand the atheistic worldview to the level of high ideals and scientific method (*ideino-nauchnyi uroven’*) through the diffusion of scientific knowledge. However, the decision was executed in as coercive a manner as before, and it was soon replaced by the new November decision.

The decision prohibited direct attacks on religions, saying that “from now on, deeds amount to a desecration of the feelings of believers and clergymen, and administrative measures in church activities will be never allowed.” In the decision, it was recognized that there were certain local organizations and individuals allowing administrative interference in activities of religious institutions and groups, and this was referred to as “mistakes of antireligious propaganda.” The decision made a clear distinction between antireligious propaganda and the new direction of “scientific atheism,” saying that “correcting the failures of antireligious propaganda must not result in a decrease in propaganda of scientific atheism,” which was defined as “a constituent element of Communist education for laborers that aims to spread scientific and materialist knowledge among the masses and to emancipate believers from religious superstitions.”

In other words, the secularization policy gave concrete meaning to “scientific atheism” after WWII. People were expected to keep “the new socialistic rituals,” such as celebration of new-born infants, marriage, entrance into certain social organizations, and celebration of socialistic holidays, such as Victory Day, Revolution Day, and so forth.²² At the same time, the new direction attached greater importance to media and education for the purpose of propaganda of scientific knowledge and materialist thinking. Several scientific journals began to be published for researchers and propagandists. *Problems of History of Religion and Atheism* was printed from 1950 to 1964,

¹⁸ Peris, *Storming the Heavens*, pp. 222-223.

¹⁹ “Postanovlenie TsK KPSS o krupnykh nedostatkakh v nauchno-ateisticheskoi propagande i merakh ee uluchsheniia ot 7 iulia 1954 g.,” *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo Soiuz v rezoliutsiakh i resheniakh s’ezdov, konferentsii i plenumom TsK (1896-1986)*, vol. 8 (Moskva: Politizdat, 1984), pp. 428-432.

²⁰ “Postanovlenie TsK KPSS ob oshibkakh v provedenii nauchno-ateisticheskoi propagandy sredi naseleniia ot 10 noiabria 1954 g.,” *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo Soiuz v rezoliutsiakh i resheniakh s’ezdov, konferentsii i plenumom TsK (1896-1986)*, vol. 8, pp. 446-450.

²¹ With regard to the people’s reaction toward the change of religious policy by Stalin, see A. S. Kiselev, ed., *Moskva poslevoennaia: arkhivnye dokumenty i materialy* (Moskva, 2000), pp. 497-503.

²² For a study focusing on the new traditions, see Christel Lane, *The Rites of Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society—The Soviet Case* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

Annual Report of Historical Museum of Religion and Atheism came out from 1957 to 1963, and the popular science journal *Science and Religion* appeared in 1959.

Universities and other institutions of higher education started an “elementary course of scientific atheism” for every student in 1959, and made it a compulsory subject in 1964.²³ Thus, the role of propaganda became more important during the last decades of Soviet Russia.²⁴

The GMIR also followed this direction. In 1945, a new director of the GMIR was appointed, an old Bolshevik V. Bonch-Bruevich (1873-1955), who took special care not to disrespect religious believers.²⁵ It was declared that the general plan and purpose of the museum in 1953 was this: “[We consider that] it is possible to establish a truly scientific museum by means of a critical reflection on the longtime experience of antireligious museums. . . . Soviet historiography is free from a vulgar materialist understanding of religion. Such an understanding denies the active role of religious ideology in a developing society, and lumps together a range of historical issues of religion and atheism as propaganda of military atheism.”²⁶ In this context, the GMIR claimed to be one of the biggest centers of “scientific atheism” in Soviet Russia.

At the same time, the document pointed out that it was only Marxism-Leninism that presented a scientific understanding of religion, and according to the ideology, the essence of religion was defined by the oft-quoted “opium of the people” (Marx), “a kind of spiritual cheap alcohol (*rod dukhovnoi sivukhi*)” (Lenin), and “something opposite to science” (Stalin).²⁷ According to the general plan, the restarted GMIR, which should be “free from a vulgar materialist understanding of religion,” faced a serious contradiction from the beginning, defining religion too simply and dismissively.

People noticed the change in the secularization policy itself; however, even specialists and propagandists found it hard to differentiate between the connotations of “antireligion” and “scientific atheism.” This fact suggests that the majority of Soviet people took part in the creation of an atheistic society, not positively but passively.

3. Theory and practice of the GMIR

In 1961, the GMIR was transferred from the jurisdiction of the Academy of Sciences to that of the Ministry of Culture. It meant that the museum was requested to play a greater educational

²³ Anderson, *Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet Union and Successor States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 40-41; David E. Powell, *Antireligious Propaganda in the Soviet Union: A Study of Mass Persuasion* (Cambridge: The MIT Press), p. 56; F. Garkavenko, ed., *O religii i tserkvi: sbornik dokumentakh* (M., 1965); p. 87; “O meropriiatiakh po usileniiu ateisticheskogo vospitaniia naseleniia,” *Partiinaia zhizn'*, no. 2 (1964), p. 23.

²⁴ David E. Powell, *Antireligious Propaganda in the Soviet Union*, p. 7.

²⁵ M. M. SHakhnovich, “Muzei istorii religii AN SSSR i otechestvennoe religiovedenie,” *Religiovedenie*, no. 4 (2008), pp. 150-158;

[<http://www.religiopolis.org/religiovedenie/786-muzej-istorii-religii-i-otechestvennoe-religiovedenie.html>]; Nobuo Shimotomai, “Bonchi-Bruevich to Renin Byo no Shisou,” in Yuki Konagaya and Masanori Goto, eds., *Shakaishugiteki Kindaika no Keiken* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2011), pp. 234-264.

²⁶ Istoricheskii arkhiv GMIR, f. 1, op. 1, d. 311, l. 2.

²⁷ Istoricheskii arkhiv GMIR, f. 1, op. 1, d. 311, ll. 3-4.

and propagandistic role. The role of GMIR became more multifaceted and the curators were expected to engage in the following tasks:

- 1) Organizing exhibitions
- 2) Researching history and function of exhibits
- 3) Collection of new artifacts for exhibitions
- 4) Methodological teaching about atheism to other organizations
- 5) Excursions, lectures and other educational activities

The curators were sent all around the Soviet Union, giving lectures about scientific atheism, and researching the activities and thoughts of clergymen and believers.²⁸ They got to know the atheistic and religious activities in local areas through their fieldwork. They realized the difficulty in spreading the scientific atheist way of thinking, especially in rural villages.

In order to ascertain the reason that atheistic propaganda was not having a sufficient effect on the population, the curators investigated religious faiths and customs in *Vyborg* City from 1962 until 1964. *Vyborg* is located not far from the border of Finland, and was annexed to the USSR as a result of the Soviet-Finnish War in 1944. After the war, the Finnish residents left, while immigrants from different cities of the USSR made up the larger part of the population.²⁹

The curators interviewed two hundred families about their cultural activities, family structure, school education, and so forth. This inquiry illustrated that one family out of every ten in the center of the city and one family out of every five in the suburbs house icons in their homes. Most believers were old people and they visited Orthodox churches purely out of habit. The number of baptisms had clearly decreased between 1963 and 1964.³⁰ These facts show that *Vyborg* was a model of an atheistic society. Such an atheistic city was an exception. Probably because the war and immigration destroyed the religious traditions of the city.

The curators found much higher religiosity in the western part of *Pskov* Prefecture, which had belonged to Estonia until 1940, and had then been occupied by Nazi Germany for four years. Visiting a factory in 1963, curators found more than 64 percent of the interviewed families had icons in their homes.³¹ According to the report, under the considerable influence of Pskovo-Pechersky Monastery, which was not closed through the Soviet era, people could not go to the Kolkhoz club to listen to the atheistic lectures, fearing that they would be despised, or even beaten.³² When a leader of a certain village club planned to produce a play named *Talking Icons*, no one auditioned. As a result, the leader had no choice but to play in it by himself, and after the play, the village ignored him and held him in low regard.

At the same time, the curators held atheistic seminars for local propagandists in three cities of the prefecture, and asked the participants about their struggle with religious superstitions. However,

²⁸ V. N. Sherdakov, "Muzei istorii religii i ateizma v sisteme nauchno-ateisticheskoi propagandy," *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma*, no. 19 (1976), pp. 97-98.

²⁹ Riita Kosonen, *Governance, the Local Regulation Process, and Enterprise Adaptation in Post-Socialism: The Case of Vyborg* (Helsinki: Helsinki School of Economics, 2002), pp. 119-122.

³⁰ Istoricheskii arkhiv GMIR, f. 1, op. 1, d. 587, ll. 1-4.

³¹ Istoricheskii arkhiv GMIR, f. 1, op. 1, d. 531, l. 2.

³² Istoricheskii arkhiv GMIR, f. 1, op. 1, d. 548, l. 4.

most of the participants did not answer: only five people responded out of twenty participants at the seminar in *Pechory*, five people out of hundred in *Ostrov*, and twenty-five people out of sixty in *Nevel*.³³ This implies that even propagandists did not dedicate themselves to atheistic activities.

The *Tikhvin* region of Leningrad Prefecture located two hundred kilometers to the west of its capital was famous for the tradition of the Old Believers, who had a number of strict religious customs. When the curators of the GMIR investigated this region in 1968, atheistic propaganda was conducted by the former members of the League of the Militant Godless, who were around seventy years old, while the younger generation did not so actively take part. Although more than a hundred and fifty people had received special education in atheism in the last ten years preparing them to be propagandists, just fewer than ten people actually conducted their atheistic tasks. Furthermore, those who were born in the 1930s and 40s began to visit the Church more frequently especially to celebrate Christmas and Easter. More than 35% of the parish members consisted of the middle-aged people.³⁴ This fact was clearly incompatible with the communist theory, which insisted almost all the believers were non-educated old women, whilst the younger generation, who were taught scientific materialism, would begin to place no significance on religion.

On one hand, people who tried to practice scientific atheism seriously and literally were often considered to be “heretics,” because religion and Communism coexisted “peacefully” in such regions. On the other, scientific atheism did indeed have certain impacts. A large majority took part in atheistic seminars and meetings, and celebrated important rites of passage and holidays, though it did not mean they actually internalized a materialist way of thinking. For most people there was no conflict with the regime, as long as they performed as they were expected, even if they did not understand scientific atheism.

4. Conclusion

The purpose of scientific atheism was to spread a view of the world based on materialism, not to attack religious organizations and believers. Religious studies, which treat religions as an object of science, reached a level almost equal to scientific atheism, leaving the border between science and propaganda ambiguous. On the one hand, Soviet religious studies investigated actual religious activities in society. On the other, researchers would testify to the validity of the evolutionary theory of religions; the increase in atheistic meetings and socialist rituals and holidays were a result of a declining religious view of the world.

Thus, scientific atheism became more and more predictable, uninteresting, and insubstantial. Today, many Russians say that they have never been atheists in spite of the official politics; however, the majority took part in atheistic events, even if this was in a passive manner. Scientific atheism facilitated a particular secularism in Soviet Russia in this way.

³³ Istoricheskii arkhiv GMIR, f. 1, op. 1, d. 547, l. 2.

³⁴ Istoricheskii arkhiv GMIR, f. 1, op. 1, d. 616, ll. 4-7.