A Strategic Alliance between Kazakh Intellectuals and Russian Administrators: Imagined Communities in *Dala Walayatïnïng Gazeti* (1888-1902)

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Introduction

Reform[1] and national movements – first of all, Jadidism – have been central themes in the studies of the modern history of Central Asian and Russian Muslims. Usually, historians see the origin of reformism in those Tatar *'ulama* who were dissatisfied with the conservatism of their Bukharan teachers, and describe the spread of Jadidism within the framework of the history of the Muslim peoples. Although reformism is understood as a response to the Russian conquest of Central Asia, which made Muslims more acutely aware of their weakness and the necessity of reform, the Russians and the Russian Empire have been seen essentially as outsiders of Muslim movements.[2]

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1 In the Islamic context, reform (*islâh*) often means to improve conditions of Muslim society by returning to the first principles of Islam. Although Jadidism indeed had an aspect of reform in this meaning, the reforms that we examine here were basically devoid of Islamic connotations and coincided with modernism.

2 See, for example: Serge A. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); Azade-Ayse Rorlich, *The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986); Yamauchi Masayuki, *Surutangariefu-no Yume: Isuramu Sekai-to Roshia Kakumei* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1986); Komatsu Hisao, *Kakumei-no Chuo Ajia: Aru Jadido-no Shozo* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1996). I also have sought the origins of Kazakh reformism mainly inside the Kazakh society. Uyama Tomohiko, "The Kazak Intelligentsia at the Crossroads of Three Civilizations," in Timur Kocaoglu, ed., *Reform Movements and Revolutions in Turkistan (1900-1924): Studies in Honour of Osman Khoja* (Haarlem: SOTA, 2001), pp. 393-401.

Recently, Adeeb Khalid has presented a new paradigm. He argues that Jadidism in Turkistan was as much a result of the transformation of the society by Russian rule as a response to it, and describes how jadids appropriated Russian discourses for their own purposes.[3] In this paper, I will examine the close and intricate relations between Russian administrators and Kazakh intellectuals during the period in which the newspaper *Dala Walayatïnïng Gazetí* was published. As Khalid points out, reformism in different regions of the Russian Empire was not a single phenomenon, and many of the results of my analysis may not be applicable to regions other than the Kazakh steppe. But I hope that they will contribute to a reconsideration of the relationship between national movements and the nationalities policy of the Russian Empire.

1. An Interactive Newspaper

Dala Walayatïnïng Gazetí (literally, "Newspaper of the Steppe Region"; hereafter referred to as, *DWG*[4]) was a bilingual (Russian and Kazakh; the latter was printed in Arabic script) weekly published under the direction of the Governor-General of the Steppe from January 1888 through March 1902.[5] It is easily accessible, as it has been microfilmed by Norman Ross Publishing (the numbers for the year 1889 are missing), and a Kazakh bibliographer, Üshköltay Subkhanberdina, has compiled four volumes of collection of its main articles and a one-volume

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3 Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Idem, "Representations of Russia in Central Asian Jadid Discourse," in Daniel R. Brower & Edward J. Lazzerini, eds., *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 188-202.

4 In 1894, *DWG* acquired an additional Russian title: *Kirgizskaia Stepnaia Gazeta*.

5 Unfortunately, I have only finished analyzing *DWG*'s numbers for the years from 1888 to 1895, although I have briefly run through those from 1896 to 1902. Therefore, this paper is of a preliminary character. I hope to complete the analysis in the near future.

index (The Kazakh texts are transcribed into Cyrillic.).[6] However, scholars have rarely used it as a historical source, except mentioning its place in the history of Kazakh journalism and referring to articles on specific themes or by specific authors.[7] The fact that recent Kazakh scholars, who have paid special attention to pre-Revolutionary intellectuals since *perestroika*, have not seriously analyzed this newspaper, suggests that they have "nationalized" the history of reform movements, and the importance of the official Russian press is nearly unthinkable to them.

The Governor-Generalship of the Steppe was established in 1882, receiving Aqmola and Semipalatinsk oblasts (provinces) from the abolished Governor-Generalship of West Siberia, and Semirech'e oblast from the Governor-Generalship of Turkistan.[8] While publication of *DWG* began under the first Governor-Gen-

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6 Üshköltay Subkhanberdina, ed., *Dala walayatïnïng gazetí: Ädebi nŭsqalar / Literaturnye obraztsy, 1888-1894* (Almaty: Ghïlïm, 1989); Idem, ed., *Dala walayatïnïng gazetí: Ädebi nŭsqalar / Literaturnye obraztsy, 1895-1898* (Almaty: Ghïlïm, 1990); Idem, ed., *Dala walayatïnïng gazetí: Ädebi nŭsqalar / Literaturnye obraztsy, 1899-1902* (Almaty: Ghïlïm, 1992); Idem, ed., *Dala walayatïnïng gazetí: Adam, qogham, tabighat / Chelovek, obshchestvo, priroda, 1888-1902* (Almaty: Ghïlïm, 1994); Idem, *Dala walayatïnïng gazetí: Mazmŭndalghan bibliografiyalïq körsetkísh, 1888-1902* (Almaty: Ghïlïm, 1996).

7 The only detailed analysis of *DWG* is Qayïrjan Bekkhojin's dissertation, but he denied any relation between Tsarist policy and the progressive character of some articles in *DWG*, arguing that such articles appeared *despite* the colonialist intention of the publisher: Kh. N. Bekkhozhin, *Pervaia kazakhskaia gazeta <Dala ualaiaty> (1888-1902)*, Dissertatsiia na soisk. uchen. step. kand. ist. nauk (Alma-Ata, 1949). His analysis was later included in his monograph: Qayïrjan Bekkhojin, *Qazaq baspasözíníng damu joldarï* (Almaty: Qazaq memlekettík baspasï, 1964). Qambar Atabaev's arguments are basically similar to Bekkhojin's: Q. Atabaev, *Qazaq baspasözí: Qazaqstan tarikhïnïng derek közí (1870-1918)* (Almaty: Qazaq universitetí, 2000). Mikhail Fetisov used articles from *DWG* in his study of Kazakh social thought and criticism: M. I. Fetisov, *Zarozhdenie kazakhskoi publitsistiki* (Alma-Ata: Kazgoslitizdat, 1961). Virginia Martin cited *DWG* as a source on customary law: Virginia Martin, *Law and Custom in the Steppe: the Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and Russian Colonialism in the Nineteenth Century* (Richmond: Curzon, 2001).

8 Semirech'e oblast was transferred again to the Governor-Generalship of Turkistan in 1898.

eral, Gerasim Kolpakovskii (1882-1889), the period of its publication generally coincided with the period in office of the second Governor-General, Baron Maksim Taube (1889-1901), who had attained military fame in the suppression of the Polish insurrection in 1863 [1895, No. 31].[9] It was the second newspaper in Kazakh after the *Türkistan Vilayetining Gazeti*, which was basically an Uzbek (then called Sart) newspaper (1870-1917), but was also printed in Kazakh from 1870 to 1883. It is interesting to note that publication of a Turkic-language newspaper began in newly-conquered Turkistan, and then in earlier annexed Kazakhstan, while there was no newspaper in Kazan Tatar; the first Kazan Tatar newspaper appeared in 1904.[10]

The paper was composed of two sections: the official and the non-official. The official section was shorter, and contained orders and circulars from the Tsar, the governor-general and oblast governors, including announcements about personnel changes and the awarding of volost (district) chiefs and other administrators.[11] The non-official section was longer, and contained various contributions such as essays, poems, legends, information about agriculture and sanitation, book reviews, news about fairs, crimes and curious events.

The officially stated aims of the newspaper were "to let the native Kazakh[12] population know the measures and instructions of the local and supreme authorities concerning the Kazakh steppe and the Kazakh social administration, as well as to diffuse among the Kazakhs useful information about the nature of

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9 Here and after, I indicate the year and number of *DWG* in square brackets.

10 Alexandre Bennigsen & Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *La Presse et le Mouvement National chez les Musulmans de Russie avant 1920* (Paris: Mouton & Co, 1964), pp. 44-45.

11 Subkhanberdina's volumes consist mainly of articles from the non-official section, and include only a few articles from the official section.

12 The Kazakhs were then called "Kirgiz" in Russian and "Qazaq" in Kazakh. A part of the Semirech'e oblast's population was Kyrgyz, whom Russians sometimes called "Kara-Kirgiz" but usually "Kirgiz," without distinguishing them from the Kazakhs. Although the proper usage of Kazakh differentiated "Qazaq" and "Qïrghïz" (Kyrgyz), Kazakh texts in *DWG* often called the whole population "Qazaq."

the country and life of its inhabitants – both economic (stock-breeding, development of farming, barter trade, etc.) and spiritual (custom, traditions, folktales, legends, development of literacy, etc.)."[13] Editorials stressed that the paper was printed in "your" (i.e., the Kazakhs') mother tongue [1888, No. 1] and that it was a present from General Kolpakovskii to all the nomadic population [1888, No. 13].[14]

The newspaper was edited by Russian officials and Kazakh translators of the governor-general's office, and all the articles were initially written by them. Soon, however, Kazakh readers started to send their manuscripts to the editors [1888, No. 13], who readily published them. Contributors wrote that the Kazakhs were "ignorant" and the newspaper would help them study and come closer to the world [e.g., 1888, No. 15; 1890, No. 11; 1891, No. 41]. Editors and contributors commented on each other's articles, and contributors also criticized or commented on each other's work.[15] *DWG* was a kind of interactive newspaper, and created a forum for Russians and Kazakhs, editors and readers. Although it was published as a special supplement to the Russian newspaper, *Akmolinskie Oblastnye Vedomosti*, such interactiveness was not found in the latter, which mainly contained news and official announcements. While the Kazakh version of the *Türkistan Vilayetining Gazeti* also seems to have carried out a similar function to some extent, *DWG* was probably the most important forum for Kazakh intellectuals in the late nineteenth century.

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13 This statement was printed on the first page of every number from 1888 to 1893.

14 The place of *DWG* in the general policy of the Governor-Generalship of the Steppe is yet to be studied. In his report (*vsepoddanneishii otchet*) to the Tsar for the years of 1887 and 1888, Kolpakovskii did not mention *DWG*. Moreover, he strongly endorsed Russian Orthodox missionary work among the Kazakhs; such endorsement was never clearly stated in *DWG*. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv (RGVIA), f. 400 (Glavnyi shtab), op. 1, d. 1292.

15 For praise and criticism of one of the contributors, Jüsíp Köpeev, see [1890, Nos. 1, 19, 24, 26].

2. The Kazakh Steppe, the Empire and the World

Newspapers often create and/or represent the territorial perceptions of their editors and readers. Newspapers of the republics of the Soviet Union (e.g., *Kazakhstanskaia pravda*) reported news in three categories: "v respublike" (in the republic), "v strane" (in the USSR) and "v mire" (in the world), thus representing the multi-layered territorial perception of the people who lived in those republics. The title of *DWG* indicates that its primary concern was the territory of the Governor-Generalship of the Steppe. The unity of the governor-generalship was confirmed by news from its various localities, publication of the governor-general's orders, and also by his tours of inspection. In 1890 and 1894, Baron Taube toured the territory under his jurisdiction, meeting and awarding local Kazakh administrators. *DWG* described the tours in detail [1890, No. 26; 1894, No. 23, etc.], and a Kazakh contributor, Jüsíp Köpeev (famous as a poet and collector of folklore), praised the first tour for bringing the people a good omen, as a result of which thin livestock got fat [1890, No. 46].

However, neither the governor-general nor the editors of *DWG* seemed to try to forge an imagined community strictly on the territory of the governor-generalship. *DWG* often wrote of Kazakhs in Torghay, Ural'sk and Syr-Darya oblasts. Kazakhs in the westernmost region, the Inner Horde (in Astrakhan guberniia), also welcomed this newspaper [1890, No. 17], and there were frequent contributions from them. After all, *DWG* was unique, not so much for being a newspaper of the Governor-Generalship of the Steppe, as for being a newspaper in Kazakh. The word "steppe" itself has multiple meanings, and it could mean the Kazakh steppe; i.e., the whole territory in which the Kazakhs traditionally lived.

Peculiarities of the Kazakh steppe were represented on various occasions. When Crown Prince Nikolai visited Omsk in 1891 (on his way back from Japan after the Otsu incident), representatives of the Muslim population welcomed him with *qïmïz* (fermented mare's milk) and bread and salt (according to Russian custom). Nikolai then visited a specially organized open-

air exhibition of Kazakh cuisine, nomadic dwellings of rich and poor Kazakhs, and other commodities characteristic of the Kazakhs. He also attended a horse race organized in order to acquaint him with horse breeding on the steppe [1891, Nos. 15, 17, 49-51; 1892, Nos. 1-10]. When the first train of the Siberian Railroad arrived in Omsk in 1894, Transportation Minister Krivoshein was welcomed in a similar, but much less luxurious, manner [1894, No. 35]. The primary purpose of these events was to introduce Kazakh life to Russians, but at the same time, they showed the Kazakhs what the most characteristic features of the Kazakh steppe, in the eyes of the Russians, were. At least on one occasion, an exhibition about a Kazakh uezd that was to be held in Russian cities was shown beforehand to local Kazakhs [1890, No. 12].

DWG, both by itself and by reproducing articles from the *Türkistan Vilayetining Gazeti*, contained much about Central Asian regions other than the Kazakh steppe,[16] although, as we will see later, it clearly distinguished the sedentary population ("Sarts") of Central Asia from the Kazakhs. An editorial stated that the Kazakh steppe, where Russians and Kazakhs lived together, was a part of Turkistan and also of Asia [1888, Nos. 2, 5] (In this case, the word "Turkistan" is used in a broader sense than its legal usage indicating the territory of the Governor-Generalship of Turkistan.). In 1891, a large Central Asian exhibition was held in Moscow, and *DWG* described it in detail [1891, Nos. 9, 12, 21, 23]. The newspaper often wrote about the emirate of Bukhara and the khanate of Khiva as well.

DWG occasionally reported news about Russian Muslims outside Central Asia, in many cases summarizing articles from *Kaspii*, *Terjüman* and other newspapers. It may seem strange at first glance that *DWG* rarely paid attention to the non-Muslim regions of the Russian Empire. The editors seemed to promote the unity of the empire not so much by providing the Kazakhs with knowledge of its various regions as by stressing ties be-

16 According to the conventional Russian usage, "Central Asia" (*Srednia-ia Aziia*) excludes most of the Kazakh steppe.

tween the Tsar and his Muslim subjects, and the roles of Russian language and culture (see below).

The foreign country on which *DWG* most frequently reported was China, which bordered the Governor-Generalship of the Steppe. Some of its numbers prior to 1891 had a news section covering "Central Asia and China"; that is, news from China was reported together with news from Russian Central Asia and the vassal states of Russia. *DWG* wrote on such topics as trade with China (Russian Muslim merchants were sometimes robbed there) [1890, No. 48; 1891, No. 25], Muslim uprisings in the west of China [1895, No. 36], and Chinese agriculture [1897, Nos. 29, 30, 33, 34].

Besides China, *DWG* sometimes wrote about the Ottoman Empire, India and other countries that had sizable Muslims populations. Although its reports about other foreign countries were not constant, it published the folklore of various peoples of the world, including that of the Japanese [1889, Nos. 14, 15]. Thus, we can summarize the spatial structure of the world represented in *DWG* as follows: the Kazakh steppe in the center, other regions of Russian Central Asia (including Bukhara and Khiva) next, followed by other Russian Muslim regions and China. At the same time, *DWG* connected the Kazakhs with the whole world, though in an uneven manner.

3. Monarchism and Paternalism

It is worthy of note that *Dala Walayatïnïng Gazetí* began publication during the reign of Alexander III (1881-1894), which is usually called a period of counter-reform, conservatism and reactionism. While oppressing anti-government and revolutionary movements, Alexander III and his government took measures to improve the material and cultural life of various communities through, what Wada Haruki calls, *aimin seisaku* (people-loving policy).[17] In the field of nationalities policy, the gov-

17 Tanaka Yoji, Kuramochi Shun'ichi, Wada Haruki, eds., *Sekai Rekishi Taikei: Roshiashi 2, 18 Seiki – 19 Seiki* (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1994), pp. 290-293.

ernment was hostile to the Poles, and did not admit the cultural peculiarities of the Ukrainians, the Balts and other peoples in the west of the empire (although it did try to protect Ukrainian peasants economically), but generally took protectionist attitudes to peoples in the east who were thought to be weak (especially the Chuvash, the Kazakhs and Finno-Ugric peoples in the Volga-Ural region; the stronger Tatars were not included in this category).

We can observe a combination of conservatism and tolerance to non-Russians, not only during the reign of Alexander III, but also in other periods of the nineteenth century. Despite the Soviet stereotype that only progressive Russians helped ethnic minorities, many Muslim intellectuals were on good terms with conservative Russians. The famous Kazakh historian and ethnographer, Shoqan Wälikhanov (1835-1865), was a friend of Fedor Dostoevskii and Apollon Maikov. The Kazakh educator, Ibrahim Altïnsarin (1841-1889), worked under the direction of Nikolai Il'minskii and Minister of Education Dmitrii Tolstoi. Ismail Gasprinskii (1851-1914), the famous Turkic enlightener of Crimean origin, who published the *Terjüman* newspaper, was strongly influenced by Mikhail Katkov. The seemingly strange combination of Russian conservatism and Muslim nationalism can be explained by the concepts of protectionism and paternalism.

DWG closely connected monarchism and the protection of the Kazakhs. It reported not only about the Tsar and his family, but also about his grace to the Kazakhs. When representatives of the Steppe region visited St. Petersburg to celebrate Nikolai II's wedding, an editorial stated that, unlike Kazakh khans who had resorted to violent and barbaric oppression, the Tsar granted the Kazakhs the same rights as Russian peasants, and the laws of the empire strongly protected them. Participation of Kazakh representatives in the delegation together with Russians, according to the newspaper, was based on their common loyalty to the Tsar [1894, No. 51]. Earlier, a poem that the editors called "childishly naive and innocent (*detski naivnoe i beskhitrostnoe*)," was composed by a Kazakh on the occasion of the then Crown Prince Nikolai's visit, comparing the Tsar to the moon and the

sun that shone on the night (the people), and claming that the Tsar treated people equally and justly, like his own children [1892, Nos. 51-52; 1893, Nos. 1- 11].[18]

The editors of *DWG* also related the newspaper's aims to Tsarist protectionism. They wrote: "The superior officials of the great White Tsar('s administration) wish to know your life more closely, to go into your situation, to know your necessities and to take useful measures. It is for this purpose that they decided to issue a special newspaper in Russian and Kazakh,[19] as well as to enable the natives to receive reliable information about protectionist measures of the officials and tell them their actual needs through the newspaper [1888, No. 1]." Of course, the Tsar himself rarely came in contact with the Kazakhs directly. Instead, the governor-general and the governors appeared as their "protectors." The governor-general issued a circular and pointed out that Kazakhs often asked Russians with whom they accidentally became acquainted to write petitions on their behalf, and, as a result, the petitions' contents were distorted. He urged Kazakhs to write petitions in their mother tongue, stressing that the authorities employed translators in order to get in close contact with the indigenous population (*inorodtsy*) [1888, No. 1]. He also warned native administrators to strictly follow the regulations governing the levying of taxes in order not to impose too heavy a burden on the population [1888, No. 49], and to stop the practice of entertaining higher officials at the expense of the poorest people [1890, No. 23]. Thus, the Russian administration showed its intention to reduce mediation of Kazakh administrators and non-Kazakhs, and to directly contact and protect ordinary people.

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18 Interestingly, the poem's author, while praising Peter the Great for having "opened the world to us," Alexander I for having made wise laws and Alexander II for having given liberty and equality to all the people, attributed Alexander III's merit to the mighty power of his army.

19 In this article, the language was named in a rather unusual way: "Kaisak" in the Russian text, and "Muslim" in the Kazakh text.

4. Native Administrators as Common Opponents

After Russia abolished the title of khan in the Kazakh Middle and Junior Juz (Hordes) in 1822 and 1824, respectively, it appointed members of the khans' families (Chingizids) and other traditional leaders (among others, the *bi*s – tribal leaders who also had judicial functions) to administrative posts. It then gradually weakened the power of Kazakh leaders, especially that of the Chingizids. Non-Chingizids occupied more and more administrative posts. Curtailment of the power of traditional leaders was institutionalized by the Provisional Statute on Administration in the Steppe Oblasts of the Governor-Generalships of Orenburg and Western Siberia, enacted in 1868, which gave all the householders the right to participate in indirect elections of volost and village chiefs, as well as *bi*s (the latter's function was limited to that of judges in customary courts).

Malfunctions in the new electoral system soon became evident. It could not fill the vacuum of traditional authority, and became the venue for factional strife, about which *DWG* frequently reported. Elections cost candidates a lot of money for buying votes and offering bribes (election results required approval of the governor, and candidates often bribed Russian administrators), and once elected, volost and village chiefs levied unlawful taxes on the population in order to recover the expenses [1894, Nos. 32, 36]. An editorial pointed out that there had been proposals to make the post of native administrators appointive, but the government did not want to take electoral rights away from the Kazakhs, and urged them to carry out elections prudently [1895, No. 5]. Kazakh contributors also deplored the corrupt elections [e.g., 1895, Nos. 20, 25].

The *bi*s created no less serious problems than did the volost and village chiefs. Although they were required to write down their judgments, many of them were illiterate [1894, No. 37]. A Kazakh contributor, Babay Bürkít (pseudonym of Otïnshï Äljanov), wrote that very few of them were honest, just and trustworthy [1894, No. 41]. According to another contributor, Köshpelí Qazaqbaev, in old times there were famous *bi*s and customary law made sense, but now the Kazakhs' way of thinking had

changed under the influence of the Russians, the Tatars and the Sarts, and customary law had become outdated. Dishonest *bi*s abused ambiguous customary law for corrupt aims. Qazaqbaev proposed the limitation of the power of Kazakh courts (probably enhancing the power of Russian courts) and to make court regulations clear [1894, No. 46].

To be precise, the malfunction of the *bi*s' courts (named *narodnyi sud*, people's courts) was also caused by factors other than the *bi*s' corruption and outdated customary law. The chairman of the Aqmola oblast court, G. Kovalevskii, pointed out that the Kazakh population and the *bi*s themselves did not have a precise understanding of their *own* people's courts, and attempted to explain their competence and procedure [1892, Nos. 16-22]. This testifies that the people's courts were not pure customary courts but were regulated by Russian law, which was not well understood by ordinary Kazakhs and *bi*s. Speaking more broadly, faults in the native administrators and *bi*s were signs of weakness in the Russian administrative system in Central Asia. The Russian administration regularly gave awards to Kazakh administrators, but the Aqmola oblast governor complained to the uezd chiefs (they were Europeans) that their recommendations on Kazakh administrators included only short descriptions of their merits, and he could not judge whether they deserved their awards [1892, No. 16]. Apparently, Russian administrators were not always aware of the activities of their Kazakh subordinates. Volost chiefs moved along nomadic routes, and only began to build their offices (*volostnoi dom*) in winter pastures in the 1890s [1895, Nos. 33, 39]. It was not easy to collect taxes, and the Semipalatinsk oblast governor expressed his special gratitude to the Qarqaralï uezd chief when household (*kibitka*) tax was collected without arrears in the uezd [1891, No. 5].

Notwithstanding the complexity of the situation, the Russian administrators and Kazakh intellectuals who contributed to *DWG* were unanimous in criticizing Kazakh administrators. Although the Russian administration no doubt needed Kazakh administrators, it wanted to rid itself of the responsibility of the system's malfunctions and worked out a strategy to appeal di-

rectly to ordinary people and pose as their protector. Kazakh intellectuals, for their part, wanted to prove their progressiveness in contrast to the corruption and stagnancy of the Kazakh administrators. Thus their interests coincided.

5. "CIVILIZATION" AND EDUCATION

As is often pointed out, Russia justified its conquest of Central Asia citing its "civilizing role." An article in *DWG* stated: "Following the victorious Russian army, civilization began to enter Turkistan... The 'ships of the desert' – camels – step aside and give way to rumbling locomotives, which fill with its whistle the formerly dead steppe that had heard only the sound of wind... Here is the most important merit of Russia and the worldwide historical significance of the Russians' forward movement into Central Asia." [1890, No. 43] *DWG* reprinted an article from the *Türkistan Vilayetining Gazeti*, in which a Chimkent citizen wrote that after they were subjugated to the Russians, Turkistan Muslims began to associate with educated peoples and entered the world community [1890, Nos. 31, 32, 36]. Another article reprinted from the *Türkistan Vilayetining Gazeti* wrote that the rich Bukharans who visited St. Petersburg together with the emir "clearly saw that, besides the life straitened and limited by the requirements of Islamism, there is another life, more alluring and ebullient." [1893, No. 11]

The editors of *DWG* wrote that while in the 1820s – 1840s (i.e., the period of the revolt of Kenesarï and other uprisings) bloodshed and plunder were rampant on the Kazakh steppe, now the steppe is peaceful and prosperous. "One has only to pray for the White Tsar, bless the government and thank those who devote care to the steppe!" [1888, No. 13] However, they sometimes had to take into consideration the difference in viewpoint between the Russians and the Kazakhs. The name of a book chapter "Our conquests in Central Asia (*Nashi zavoevaniia v Srednei Azii*)" was translated as "Central Asian lands, subjugated by the Russians (*Orïsnïng Orta Aziyadaghï qaratqan jerlerï*)" in the Kazakh text [1888, No. 36].

Education was a theme on which Russian administrators

and Kazakh intellectuals could easily agree. *DWG* frequently reported on new schools and educational issues both on the Kazakh steppe and in other regions (Turkistan, Bukhara, Khiva, Kazan, Baku). Kazakh contributors also wrote much about education. Authors demonstrated the indispensability of education by various arguments; for example, an editorial regarded the defeat of great China ("a representative of Asiatic stagnation and ignorance") by small Japan, which acquired "European enlightenment and order," as a "good lesson for Muslim peoples." [1895, No. 15] The traditional educational methods of mullahs were generally thought of as outdated and ineffective. A Kazakh contributor, Qorabay Japanov, wrote that mullahs, themselves barely literate, resorted to corporal punishment, and they did not develop, but dulled, the intellectual ability of children [1895, No. 8]. In contrast, education in Russian schools for Kazakh children and the teaching of the Russian language were thought to be useful.

Russian education was considered the best means of bringing the Russians and Muslims together (*sblizhenie*)[1891, Nos. 15, 18]. Knowledge of the Russian language was thought to be useful both for ordinary people so as not to be dependent on others' mediation, and for the state so as to better govern the people. An editorial recommended everyone to learn at least three languages: the mother tongue, the state language (Russian) and the international language (French) [1891, No. 13].

It is worthy of note that the promotion of Russian was not considered to be in conflict with the preservation of Islam and the languages of Muslims. Kazakh students of the Russo-Kazakh teachers' training school in Orenburg studied Russian, Kazakh and the Shariah (Islamic law) [1895, No. 23]. An editorial asserted that Kazakhs in Russian schools could learn from teachers who were devoid of "Asiatic conservativeness" and use textbooks compiled on the best European models, while at the same time remain Muslims [1895, No. 27]. Advocating the usefulness of learning Russian, an article reprinted from *the Türkistan Vilayetining Gazeti* noted that the Shariah did not regard studying any language as a sin [1892, No. 44]. An article reprinted from *Terjüman* pointed out that Russian schools were not dis-

agreeable to Muslims, if they could learn their own language and creed there [1892, No. 50]. Generally, *DWG* referred to Gasprinskii's *Terjüman* very often,[20] indicating a similarity between the two newspapers' point of view with regard to educational and cultural issues. Gasprinskii had two strategies; one was to unite Turkic peoples and the other was to form an alliance between Muslims and Russians, and while the former alarmed Russian officials (including Il'minskii),[21] the latter had much in common with Russian policy.

The introduction of Russian education did not, however, proceed smoothly. Some people feared that pupils of Russian schools would be conscripted to military service or forcibly converted to Christianity [1891, No. 26; 1895, No. 32]. Graduates of schools were expected to be of use to the people [1891, No. 28], but a number of them either used their knowledge improperly or rapidly forgot what they had learned, and damaged the reputation of the schools [1895, Nos. 32, 43]. Not only the Kazakhs but also the educational institutions themselves were responsible for the underdevelopment of education. A Kazakh in Omsk pointed out that people on the steppe almost worshipped educated people and it was not right to complain about their indifference to education. In fact, it was very expensive for inhabitants of the steppe to send their children to towns for study, and the opportunity to study was very limited [1895, No. 37]. Unlike the Torghay oblast, Kazan guberniia and other regions where administrators had paid special attention to the education of *inorodtsy*, schools in the oblasts of the Governor-Generalship of the Steppe were small in number and were under the jurisdiction of uezd chiefs, not of the Ministry of Education, and, therefore, did not receive enough care [1895, No. 42]. However se-

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20 Articles reprinted from *Terjüman* related, for example, the usefulness of railroads [1888, No. 38], the possibility of creating a common Turkic language (although the article admitted that Kazakh was difficult to unite with it) [1890, No. 20], and the remarkable improvement of living standards in Turkistan since the Russian conquest [1890, Nos. 25, 36].

21 Mustafa Özgür Tuna, "Gaspıralı v. Il'minskii: Two Identity Projects for the Muslims of the Russian Empire," *Nationalities Papers* 30:2 (2002), pp. 273-277.

verely Russians and Kazakh intellectuals criticized Islamic education and however prestigeous Russian education was considered by Kazakhs, Russian education could not surpass the flexible network of Islamic education in its availability to the masses.

Besides education, agriculture was an important theme of discussion in *DWG*. Because of the authorities' regulations on the movement of livestock [1892, Nos. 18, 21, 22] and occupation of land by Russians (Kazakhs were obliged to rent land from Cossacks and officers [1895, No. 31]), nomadism was in decline.[22] Although some Kazakh readers advocated nomadism [1890, No. 23; 1894, No. 22], most authors (both Russians and Kazakhs) supported the introduction of sedentary farming. One of the Russian editors asserted that every nation had developed from the initial stage of hunting and fishing through the second stage of nomadic pastoralism to the third stage of agriculture, and those who did not understand this truth were destined either to perish or to be assimilated [1891, No. 3]. The newspaper published numerous reports on the Kazakhs' attempts at (sedentary) agriculture,[23] as well as information about farming technology.

Another topic concerned with the reform of Kazakh society was related to marriage and the status of women. Otïnshï Äljanov criticized Kazakh men for failing to recognize women's dignity and treating them merely as goods bartered for *qalïng mal* (bride price) and instruments for bearing children [1894, No. 33]. Qazaqbaev criticized marriages in the interest of factional strifes and the tendency for some Kazakh men to imitate the Tatars in segregating women [1894, No. 39]. *DWG* editors pointed out the ill effects of child marriage, which contradicted Islamic law [1895, Nos. 14, 20]. Thus, editors and contributors of

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22 The Aqmola governor insisted that the depression of livestock farming was caused by irrationality of management and the inability of the Kazakhs to adapt to new conditions [1891, No. 7/8].

23 Many Kazakhs began engaging in agriculture in their winter pastures without entirely abandoning nomadism, while some people built sedentary villages [e.g., 1895, No. 3].

DWG had basically similar opinions on the agenda for the reform of Kazakh society: education, agriculture and the status of women.

6. "LAZY" KAZAKHS, "GREEDY" TATARS AND SARTS

Some *DWG* contributors vividly expressed the Kazakh self-image. Asïlkhoja Qŭrmanbaev asserted that while the Kazakhs were not contaminated by "Central Asian fanaticism" and had the ability to progress, they were so careless that they did not succeed economically and were cheated by usurers [1894, No. 7]. He also criticized the rich Kazakhs who disdained physical labor and indulged in factional strife and lawsuits [1894, No. 7]. The Kazakhs' inclination to bring unfounded lawsuits and to bear false witness were pointed to by many other authors [e.g., 1894, No. 14]. Meanwhile, Dínmŭkhamed Sŭltanghazin, a former translator of the governor-general's office, maintained that it was not appropriate to think that underdeveloped peoples (including the Kazakhs) would eternally remain as such, and that labor and knowledge were essential for progress [1894, No. 12].

The Kazakhs' "laziness" was contrasted with the shrewdness of their neighbors, who were blamed for exerting a harmful influence on the Kazakhs. Qŭrmanbaev argued that one of the reasons for the moral degeneration among the Kazakhs was that healers (*tabîb*s) and mullahs from Kazan and Bukhara, who changed into merchants and usurers on the steppe, showed them the power of money [1894, No. 26]. Qazaqbaev claimed that the Tatars and the Sarts were similar in their craftiness and greed, and that they tended to take advantage of the Kazakhs' goodwill [1894, No. 51].[24]

Writers in *DWG* alleged the Tatars' negative influence especially when they wrote about language issues. One editorial made the dubious claim that Kazakhs bore false witness in Rus-

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24 Kazakhs ridiculed the Sarts with more disdain than the Tatars. *DWG* published several anecdotes about the alleged stupidity of the Sarts [1894, Nos. 34-40].

sian courts without scruple because the text of the oath contained many Tatar and Arabic words that they did not understand [1894, No. 36]. Qŭrmanbaev claimed that books edited by Tatars for the Kazakhs were written in a mix of the Tatar and Kazakh languages and related "imaginary deeds of fictitious heroes of the Prophet Muhammad's era"; therefore, such books could not serve as models for Kazakh literature [1894, No. 27]. In accord with Qŭrmanbaev, the editorial staff wrote: "Tatars who come into the Steppe are, in the interests of dark religious fanaticism, trying to decolor the original features of the Kazakhs' life, to distort their national legends or replace them with silly stories they have fabricated." [1894, No. 29] The newspaper appealed to readers to send in examples of Kazakh oral literature and descriptions of custom that reflected "moral purity," and published many articles about Kazakh folk culture.

The search for the pure nature of the Kazakhs partly led to a search for their ethnic origins. However, *DWG* authors did not attempt academic historical analyses and did not go beyond describing folk etymologies of the word "Qazaq (Kazakh)" and legends of Alasha khan, the mythical first Kazakh khan, who was thought to be either a commander of Batu's army or a son of a Kazan khan [1894, Nos. 20, 26].

Debates on the preservation of the Kazakhs' "purity" were mainly focused on language. Referring to Altïnsarin, Qŭrmanbaev claimed that Kazakh was very rich and expressive and had little in common with other Turkic languages, while Tatar was a mixed language whose expressions depended on Arabic and Persian borrowings. He considered that nations who endeavored to develop their own languages would be respected and attain a bright future, and asked *DWG* to set an example of the pure Kazakh language, expressing anxiety about those Kazakhs who were forgetting Kazakh after learning from Tatar and Sart teachers [1894, Nos. 27, 40]. Köpeev also stressed the richness of Kazakh, and advocated that loan words should be spelled in accordance with Kazakh pronunciation [1890, No. 23]. A mullah who was a native of Bukhara and lived in Zaysan wrote that Arabic loan words should be spelled in the same manner as in the Arabic language, but this was a minority opinion [1890, No. 23].[25]

Editors of *DWG* connected the elimination of harmful outside influences with learning Russian. They wrote that Kazakhs were cheated by leech-like Tatars and Sarts of their good livestock and animal products because they did not know Russian (and, probably, Russian regulations that protected their rights). According to them, if Kazakhs read Russian books, they could stop believing in superstitions and silly things propagated by Tatars, and move ahead of Tatars in terms of enlightenment [1893, No. 37].

CONCLUSION: THE END OF THE ALLIANCE AND RESTART OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT

DWG, as a forum of Kazakh intellectuals and Russian administrators, represented an imagined community of Kazakhs in the Russian Empire. The community was situated in a roughly defined area of the Kazakh steppe, which was closely connected with other Muslim regions under Russian rule. *DWG* asserted the benign nature and civilizing effects of Russian rule for all Russian Muslims, and, in a limited sense, represented an imagined community of Russian Muslims as well. But it clearly distinguished the Kazakhs from the Tatars and the Sarts, whose religious and economic activities were viewed negatively by both Kazakh and Russian writers in *DWG*. As I have argued elsewhere, Kazakh identity was already evident in the early eighteenth century when the Kazakhs fiercely battled against the Jungars, and in the mid-nineteenth century, the first generation of Kazakh modernist intellectuals began to clearly express their views on the cultural differences between the Kazakhs and their neighbors.[26] Among others, Wälikhanov and Altïnsarin showed

25 Another topic of linguistic discussion was whether Kazakh should be written in Arabic or Cyrillic script. Although the Kazakh texts of *DWG* were printed in Arabic script, it sometimes reported publication of Kazakh books in Cyrillic (i.e., in the style of Il'minskii). Äljanov claimed that children could learn to read and write Cyrillic much more easily than Arabic [1894, No. 39].

26 UYAMA Tomohiko, "Kazafu Minzokushi Saiko: Rekishi Kijutsu-no Mondai-ni Yosete," *Chiiki Kenkyu Ronshu* 2:1 (1999), pp. 95-96, 100-102. The nationalist discourse was not a mere fabrication of intellectuals but

concern over the Tatars' influence and advocated the preservation of the Kazakhs' customs and language. The nationalistic discourse in *DWG* was both a continuation of that of earlier Kazakh intellectuals and the result of Russia's anti-Tatar policy.

Russian administrators promoted the education of the Kazakhs (although not always successfully) in order to prove its civilizing mission and to prevent their Tatarization.[27] Kazakh intellectuals also supported the prevention of Tatarization and wanted to prove the usefulness of education, because many of them were themselves Russian-educated and knew the disadvantages associated with a lack of education. In the political sphere, Russian administrators were interested in decreasing the influence of corrupt local administrators, whom Kazakh intellectuals also criticized and disliked. Thus, Russian administrators and Kazakh intellectuals formed an alliance based on the concordance of their strategies, and the discourse of national movement developed in tandem with the universalist discourse about education and progress that were thought to be desirable aims both for the Russian empire and the Kazakh national community.

Another imagined community represented in *DWG* was that of the peoples of the Russian Empire. The unity of this community, however, was more fragile than that of the Kazakhs; it was only guaranteed by the allegiance to the Tsar that was expressed separately by these peoples and may not have been always sincere,[28] and by the Russian language that was not actually well diffused. The fact that *DWG* rarely reported on non-Muslim

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had roots in the attitudes of ordinary Kazakhs to other peoples. Some intellectuals, most notably Abay Qŭnanbaev, criticized their fellow Kazakhs for unfoundedly disdaining the Tatars and the Sarts.

27 It is almost impossible to determine to what extent Tatarization of the Kazakhs was a real "threat" and to what extent it was a fabricated myth.

28 During the Russo-Japanese war, a rumor circulated among the Kazakhs that the Japanese were Muslims related to the Kazakhs, testifying to their sympathy to a country that challenged Russia. Alikhan Bukeikhanov, "Kirgizy," in A.I. Kastelianskii, ed., *Formy natsional'nogo dvizheniia v sovremennykh gosudarstvakh: Avstro-Vengriia, Rossiia, Germaniia* (St. Peterburg, 1910), p. 598.

regions of Russia suggests the failure of the Russian administration to make the peoples of Russia familiar with each other and to create their solid community. [29]

Of course, *DWG* did not reflect the whole spectrum of Kazakh society. Its influence was limited to a small number of intellectuals.[30] Besides Russian-oriented intellectuals, there were more traditional and/or Islamic-oriented intellectuals. However, even the latter began to admit the necessity of Russian education,[31] and we can at least say that *DWG* was not distant from the dominant ideas of Kazakh intellectuals in the late nineteenth century.

After Governor-General Taube left Omsk to become a member of the State Council in 1900, *DWG* almost stopped publishing discussions of serious social problems. In March 1902, *DWG* ceased to be published and was reorganized into a new newspa-

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29 The revolt of 1916 revealed that the unity of the peoples of Russia was only politically relevant to intellectuals and was irrelevant to ordinary Kazakhs. UYAMA Tomohiko, "Two Attempts at Building a Qazaq State: The Revolt of 1916 and the Alash Movement," in Stephane A. Dudoignon and KOMATSU Hisao, eds., *Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia (Early Eighteenth to Late Twentieth Centuries)* (London: Kegan Paul, 2001), pp. 82, 92-93.

30 In March 1902, i.e., just before *DWG* was closed, the Aqmola governor reported to the Ministry of Internal Affairs as follows: "... the literacy rate (of the Muslim population) is so low that only a few of them read *DWG*, which is published for them." Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan (TsGA RK), f. 369 (Akmolinskoe oblastnoe pravlenie MVD), op. 1, d. 780, l. 34ob. I have not obtained any information about the circulation of *DWG*, but judging from the examples of other Kazakh periodicals of the Tsarist period, it was probably from several hundred to one or two thousand. The numbers of actual readers may have been higher, as literate Kazakhs often read books and newspapers aloud for illiterate people.

31 For example, Mŭrat Möngkeŭlï (1843-1906), who is known as a poet of *Zar zaman* (Time of Lament) who deplored Russian rule, was delighted that his friend graduated from a Russian school, and advocated the importance of knowing both Russian and Kazakh (customary?) law. Kenges Nŭrpeyísov et al., *Khalel Dosmŭkhamedŭlï jäne onïng ömírí men shïgharmashïlïghï* (Almaty: Sanat, 1996), pp. 10-13. I owe this fact to SAKAI Hiroki.

per, *Sel'skokhoziaistvennyi listok* (Agricultural Newspaper).[32] The three years between *DWG*'s discontinuance and the Revolution of 1905 are a "missing link" in the history of Kazakh intellectuals, as their activities in that period are little known. During and after the Revolution of 1905, however, Kazakh intellectuals resumed their reform movement, which later developed into the autonomous movement of the Alash Orda (1917-1920).

Some of the activists of the new movement were former contributors of *DWG* (Älikhan Bökeykhan, Jaqïp Aqbaev, Otïnshï Äljanov), but most of them only became prominent after 1905. Moreover, unlike the period of the publication of *DWG*, the Russian colonial administration were constantly suspicious of Central Asians. It was hostile to reformist intellectuals, and arrested or banished them.

Nevertheless, many of the reform programs of the new intellectuals were surprisingly similar to those discussed in *DWG*; criticism of Kazakh notables and administrators who exploited ordinary people, the necessity of modern education and knowledge of Russian, the idea that educated people should be of service to ordinary people, the necessity to preserve the Kazakhs' cultural originality and to develop the Kazakh language, and the improvement of the status of women. They criticized the laziness of the Kazakhs but, at the same time, believed in their ability to progress. The question of nomadism and sedentarization remained contentious, and one of the arguments for sedentarization was the same as that previously published in *DWG;* that civilization progresses through three stages from hunting through nomadism to agriculture. Reform of orthography also remained a matter of great concern, though new intellectuals rejected the Cyrillic alphabet and proceeded with reform of the Arabic alphabet. On the other hand, anti-Tatarism and flattery of the Tsar and Russian administrators almost (though not com-

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32 *Sel'skokhoziaistvennyi listok* (*Qala sharuasïnïng gazetï*) was bilingual in Russian and Kazakh, but was designed more for Russian peasants on the Kazakh steppe than Kazakhs. It ceased publication in 1905.

pletely) disappeared, and, in fact, their nationalism was much less aggressive than that of *DWG*.[33] Therefore, with some modifications, the spirit of *DWG* found its continuance in the activities of Kazakh intellectuals after 1905.

33 Cf.: UYAMA Tomohiko, "20 Seiki Shoto-ni Okeru Kazafu Chishikijin-no Sekaikan: M. Duratofu 'Mezameyo, Kazafu!'-o Chushin-ni," *Suravu Kenkyu* 44 (1997), pp. 1-36.