

## **Chapter 7**

### **Land-Owning Nobles and Zemstvo Institutions: The Post-Reform Estate System in Political Perspective**

Yutaka TAKENAKA

#### **The Japanese Historiography of Russia in the Postwar Era**

Japanese historians have devoted a great deal of energy to research in two major fields of Russian history; the first of those is agrarian and peasant history. In particular, the village commune of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has attracted much attention in the postwar historiography of Russia. It would seem that for Japanese Russia specialists, the peasantry remains both the most mysterious and the most interesting social group. The radical intelligentsia and factory workers are also popular, but less than the peasantry. Indeed, other sectors of society have been neglected or ignored, and we have hardly any monographs about them.

The second major field that has commanded our attention is intellectual history. A variety of intellectual themes have intrigued many Japanese specialists of Russian history. One of the most likely reasons for this is that although we previously were not in an advantageous position with regard to access to original sources indispensable for research into political or social history, the disadvantage for intellectual historians was less severe. They could commence their work with only some well-revised books of the thinkers or social activists they were interested in. The revision of texts was seen as basically a job for Russian historians.

Japanese scholars of Russian intellectual history can be rightfully proud of quite a few excellent monographs on famous Russian thinkers and their writings. We should do some critical self-reflection here, however, in that there were some unfortunate consequences of our excessive preoccupation with intellectual history. We have tended to overestimate the significance of intellectual aspects in Russia's development, and possibly the role of the intelligentsia itself, in our attempts to understand the Imperial period of Russian history as a whole. We sometimes have confused pictures of these times drawn by the intelligentsia with historical reality, without submitting such perspectives to sufficiently rigorous analysis. We allowed the interpretations of the intelligentsia to shape our own interpretations of each era with few questions or modifications. Our analyses of the political process thus tended to be oversimplified, and everything was too easily explained as having been the result of ideological struggles between progressive and conservative forces.

As for our study of intellectual history itself, it must also be admitted that there has probably been some bias stemming from our own political ideologies. Naturally, Russian conservatives were unpopular in Japan, while Decembrists, revolutionary democrats, revolutionary populists, and others were regarded with some measure of sympathy. Certain great novelists and historians of conservative political persuasion, as well as (since the 1970s) Slavophiles and conservative Westernizers, have been accepted as worthy of serious research. However, unmistakable "ideologues of autocracy" such as M.N. Katkov and K.P. Pobedonostsev have not attracted much interest from historians, despite their sizable historical influence.

Another characteristic of Japanese studies of intellectual history is that it tends to be deeply moralistic. Great importance has been attached to the sincerity of subjects as human beings, their aloofness from material motivations and worldly fame, a critical and militant attitude against repressive policies of the tsarist government, and above all

their sympathy for the common people and their miseries. Ethical purity has been preferred to accommodating pragmatism, the latter being seen as indicative of weakness rather than of political wisdom.

Consequently, revolutionary populists have been viewed as praiseworthy by every standard of evaluation which Japanese historians employed. Such populists were motivated by a high moralistic spirit even in the realm of politics. Their political action reflected their self-image of being agents of the people's will. As such, they aspired to realize the perfect embodiment of the people's will, rather than to achieve a stable political development which might have contributed more to the future welfare of the people.<sup>1</sup> Yet their ethical sincerity, reflected in their self-sacrifice and devotion to the cause of the people's salvation, deeply moved many intellectuals in post-war Japan.

Japanese historians generally looked upon the populist movement of the 1870s with respect and sympathy, and indeed they have done much to deepen our understanding of the populist ideas of the late nineteenth century.<sup>2</sup> Influenced as they were by the populist political thinking of that era, however, Japanese historians too readily granted the effectiveness and validity of political activism without fully considering the impact of such activity within the broader context of Russia's political development. The political thinking of that era in fact neglected the practical aspects of national development, and yet this has not been questioned by Japanese academics. It was apparently taken for granted that long-range, abstract ideals were superior to more mundane actions aimed at improving the concrete conditions of everyday life.

### **State-Society Relations and Local Administration**

Japanese historians have tended to oversimplify explanations of the problems relating to Russia's political development, and some aspects have been completely overlooked in spite of their significance to the political

modernization of Russia. One of great importance is the subject of public administration in the development of modern Russia, a subject which has not been much discussed by Japanese historians. Simple images of Russia's public administration have dominated the Japanese historiography.

For example, it is a widely accepted view (in Japan) that Imperial Russia was a bureaucratic society where every policy was dictated from above by administrative orders and police measures. This view reflects the traditional theory of the Russian state and society, which holds that in Russia everything was done from above (as contrasted with the West, where initiative for change often came from below).

This view now appears stereotypical and requires modification. Of course, in pre-modern societies there were virtually no active national organizations other than the state bureaucracy, the military, and religious institutions. It is not at all strange that these organizations should dominate "front stage" in public affairs. Any political regime cannot, however, survive without some sort of support from society. Governments need to institutionalize the voluntary support and cooperation of societies in some way or other; the Russian government was no exception.<sup>3</sup>

The necessity for cooperation from society was all the more urgent because the Russian bureaucracy was too inefficient to be called a modern bureaucracy *per se*, or to have accomplished its administrative functions entirely satisfactorily. In fact, it is considered to have frequently hindered rather than promoted social development. Therefore, Russian society in the Imperial period was in this sense extremely "under-governed," and the central government did not have adequate instruments at its disposal for effective policy-implementation.

Of course, we should not simply think that the Russian bureaucracy remained unchanged throughout the Imperial period. Significant changes in the first half of the nineteenth century should not be overlooked, such as the increasing importance that was being attached to higher education in the

promotion of officials, and changes in the functional organization of the government through the development of the ministerial system.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, this process of bureaucratic development has attracted the interest of social historians; one of the conclusions they have reached through their study of Russian officialdom is that officials were being separated from the landed nobility (in terms of lifestyle, outlook, and consciousness) during the reign of Nicholas I. As the bureaucracy grew larger, the percentage of nobles in the bureaucracy as a whole decreased. Additionally, more officials came to depend upon their salaries, rather than income from fixed assets and property. As far as high officials were concerned, their educational background displayed a shift from home education (the traditional style of the landed nobility) to school education at universities, the Lyceum, and the Juridical School.<sup>5</sup> These salient facts suggest that officials of this era should not simply be regarded as agents of the landowning estate. Neither should we, however, conclude that Russian officialdom of that period was exclusively oriented to public welfare. The state bureaucracy remained a sort of particularistic entity (*soslovie*), relatively closed and self-regenerating, even though it had undergone considerable institutionalization by the late nineteenth century.<sup>6</sup>

It is not at all strange that Imperial Russia did not have a genuine bureaucracy for a long time. Pre-modern society generally does not have the human resources necessary for efficient administration because of low living and educational standards which characterize that historical phase. It is virtually impossible to staff a bureaucracy with public-spirited and well-educated officials in a society which lacks a modern educational system, or to expect those officials to give priority to "national interest" or "public welfare."<sup>7</sup>

Nonetheless, each society must solve innumerable practical problems to achieve modern political life: convenient transportation and communication, primary education, a modicum social welfare, food supply, public safety, and so forth. Social and political stability depend upon the extent to

which these basic administrative tasks are carried out, and these tasks often depend on administration, particularly at the local level, for their realization. Therefore, efficient local administration is vital for political development. Since the Russian state bureaucracy did not have sufficient resources for that purpose, it needed the assistance of an influential sector of society to institutionalize state-society cooperation in the last half of the nineteenth century.

It is not uncommon for a state bureaucracy to try to use or rely on influential and loyal sectors of society in the process of modernization. Japan also had similar institutions for so-called "local self-government" in the Meiji era, formed under the strong ideological influence of the famous German jurist R. von Gneist and the direct guidance of his disciple A. Mosse. Russia introduced a similar apparatus called zemstvo institutions in 1864 three years after the abolishment of serfdom.<sup>8</sup> The new administrative system introduced as part of the Great Reforms was based on a dualistic principle, consisting of the state bureaucracy and the zemstvo institutions. The latter were established to complement the former (since the state bureaucracy lacked both fiscal funds and human resources for improving local conditions) and to facilitate the bureaucracy's basic tasks by enlisting the help of influential people of each estate (the landed nobility, peasantry, clergy, and townspeople) without undermining central government control over local society.<sup>9</sup>

In pre-reform Russia, only a small number of estate representatives had been allowed to join local administrations. Now, broader cooperation was required by the state bureaucracy, and the situation in post-reform Russia required special entities composed of estate representatives to coordinate various conflicting interests. Even (ex-serf) peasant representatives were expected to join these newly established authorities. Indeed, this was not an attempt to eliminate the traditional framework of social regimentation — the estate (*soslovie*) system — but to make it more flexible and efficient under the idea of "all-estateness." The state

bureaucracy and the zemstvo institutions each had their own unique functions and complemented each other. Both were integral parts of the whole administrative system.<sup>10</sup> The executive boards of zemstvo institutions played an important role in mediating between the state bureaucracy and the local representative assemblies. Some executive board chairmen were promoted to provincial governors, as were numerous marshals of the nobility.<sup>11</sup>

There were, of course, frequent conflicts between the zemstvos and the state bureaucracy, but these should not be interpreted in terms of the rather stale theory of local self-government being threatened by repressive government control.<sup>12</sup> This theory, attractive to those of liberal persuasion, needs to be revised on the basis of concrete historical analysis. The fact is that self-government as an ideal model was still little more than a dream in post-reform Russian society. The society still needed the authority of the central government and its local agents. That being the case, the dual system for local administration was well-suited to the reality of administrative capabilities then in existence. Internal friction should be understood more in view of the natural conflicts likely to arise when overlapping jurisdictions occurred, and examined in terms of the specific circumstances prevailing in each case.<sup>13</sup>

The administrative reforms of the 1860s brought about changes in the estate system as well. Originally, Russia's estate system was quite different from its Western counterparts. There were no cohesive groups with the clear collective consciousness and social basis to be called "estates" in a Western sense, but rather a number of different legal categorizations of the people for different administrative purposes. It is difficult to imagine that such estates in Russia would have been supporters of European-type constitutionalism.

The Great Reforms of the 1860s and early 1870s reorganized and simplified the estate system. Minor distinctions were eliminated and the barriers between estates

became lower. Above all, the greatest prop of the old estate system — serfdom — was finally abolished. The *raison d'être* of the estate system came into question as the social structure grew too complex to provide each "estate" with a distinct social identity in the post-reform period.<sup>14</sup>

There can be no doubt that the estate system was a hindrance to efficient government, because it divided the nation into numerous categories having particular rights and obligations, thus making administration more complex than it might otherwise have been. Furthermore, the estate system prevented formation of the unified, cohesive national consciousness which is indispensable for a modern state, since it encouraged each estate to view itself as possessing a distinct identity.

On the other hand, the estate system was expected to deter the rapid development of excessive social mobility, and thus act as a bulwark against the social instability and disorder which social modernization and the development of capitalist production might cause. The new diversified social relationships produced a variety of new classes and other social groups, all of which heightened the government's fear of losing control over society. Social classes were a phenomenon which evolved naturally, without the help of any edicts or government circulars, and were much more difficult for the government to control than estates. Reinforcement of the estate system (which was basically a legal entity dependent on the government's will) could be seen as a rational means taken to cope with these difficulties, despite the conflicting wish to abolish the system in the interest of efficient government and the creation of a national ethos.

Special legal and administrative treatment of estates was considered indispensable to the control of rural society in particular. This in fact was the reason why the Ministry of Internal Affairs, responsible for keeping rural society peaceful, consistently supported the estate system until it became a matter of doubt whether the estate system was really suited for that purpose in the twentieth century.<sup>15</sup>



### **The Landed Nobility in the Post-reform Period**

The most important estates in the post-reform era were the hereditary nobility and the peasantry. Each had their own estate institutions which helped them maintain their integrity. The other estates were much less significant in political and social terms than those two. It was therefore a task of vital importance to the tsarist regime itself to maintain a stable relationship between the hereditary nobles and the peasants.

The noble estate did not exactly coincide with the landowners as a social class. This is the reason the term "nobility" is more appropriate than "gentry" for the Russian *dvorianstvo*.<sup>16</sup> These essentially overlapped to a great extent, but were not completely identical; areas of divergence increased and broadened as the deep social changes which accompanied urbanization proceeded in the post-reform era.<sup>17</sup> The estate institutions, estate consciousness, and shared cultural tradition may have worked to enhance the cohesiveness of the noble estate, but the legal segmentation imposed by the state increasingly failed to reflect the social and economic diversity of a modernizing society. Certain conflicting elements were emerging within the noble estate.

The core of the noble estate was, however, still the middle-ranking landed nobility residing in the countryside. The crisis facing this sector of the nobility was serious from a conservative point of view; strengthening its social stature was seen as essential for the stability of the countryside. The objective of the counter-reforms of Alexander III's reign (introduction of land captains and the creation of the new zemstvo) was in effect to re-establish the estate system and the paternalistic authority of the noble estate in the countryside for administrative purposes. This was not being requested by the local nobility, but was motivated by bureaucratic considerations. This strategy entailed mobilization of the landed nobility to supervise peasant administration, along with the revitalization of stagnant zemstvos. The latter step it

was hoped, would diminish the influence of the small number of political activists who might divert the zemstvos from their assigned tasks.<sup>18</sup> Politically, wealthy nobles were expected to form a faithful conservative bloc in the zemstvo institutions and lead them in the directions the government wanted. Even consistent supporters of bureaucratic control over zemstvos (such as D.A. Tolstoi) never believed that they could do without the zemstvo institutions as an instrument for obtaining the general cooperation of society.<sup>19</sup> From his point of view, this cooperation was not inconsistent with strict control by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In the 1880s, there appeared another program, put forth by V.P. Meshchersky and M.N. Katkov, which attempted to merge the two categories of nobles and landowners in an artificial way by keeping noble lands in noble hands, but this plan was not very realistic. Even the Noble Land Bank (established in 1885 to provide financial assistance to the landed nobility towards this end) was allotted a much more limited role than Meshchersky and Katkov had expected.<sup>20</sup>

The nobility was expected to be a rural estate from a liberal point of view as well. One popular idea regarding the future of the nobility in the early post-reform period was for it to become involved in leadership at the local level. Officials were not considered qualified for the demanding task of adjusting local society to the new conditions of the post-reform era. It was thus thought that this role should be exercised out by influential nobles who were public-spirited and wealthy enough to devote themselves to public affairs.<sup>21</sup> Indeed, in England the existence of such a thick social stratum comprised by an independent political class (the gentry) is thought to have been an important factor in modern English political development. Assignment of such a role to the nobility, it was expected, would erode the rigid estate system in the future.

B.N. Chicherin (the famous liberal professor) firmly insisted that the noble estate should be maintained. He did not expect the nobility to form a social class with particular economic interests, but rather to be an able and cultivated

estate which could be responsible for local administration.<sup>22</sup> In his view, the well-educated, public-spirited, and politically moderate people in society would be powerless to check the arbitrary use of authority if they were dispersed. The estate system was thus convenient because it provided a structure for bringing such people together into coherent groups, even if in an artificial way. Chicherin believed that established institutions could serve liberal purposes, even though these had been invented by the government. In his views on the future of the country, he was not very far from the mainstream of reasoning current at that time.

To be public-spirited local leaders, however, proved to be a much heavier burden for the Russian nobles than had been anticipated. A number of necessary conditions had to be fulfilled in order for the nobles to be successful as social leaders. Among the most fundamental of these was that the nobility had to have social prestige and be politically active on the one hand, while retaining harmonious economic relations with various social groups on the other. As for social prestige, the Russian nobility was originally an estate for state service, and it had no other resource or means of generating social prestige. The increasingly urbanized lifestyle and consciousness of a large portion of the nobility, along with the subsequent decline in their interest in agrarian management and rural welfare (all brought about by the new economic conditions) more and more tended to undermine their sources of social prestige in the countryside.<sup>23</sup>

The nobles were not accustomed to political life, either. We should not overestimate the historical significance of the noble constitutional movement that took place after the abolishment of serfdom. Although most nobles were dissatisfied with the legislation of 1861, they did not know how to oppose it through political activity. Appeals for greater constitutional and political rights were too roundabout to save them from the immediate difficulty which was their real concern, and most nobles could not afford to seriously engage in politics.<sup>24</sup>

It was the zemstvo assemblies that might have served as the institutional base for the nobles' social leadership. In most provinces and districts, however, zemstvo assemblies were inactive until the 1890s.<sup>25</sup> Zemstvos were managed not by assemblies of estate representatives but by executive boards in close contact with the state bureaucracy. With the exception of a small number of political activists, most ordinary nobles tended to be indifferent to zemstvo activities and indeed to most political questions.<sup>26</sup> As a result, whether "zemstvo liberalism" was real or illusory is a question of secondary significance when taken in the context of this basic trend or situation. Each social group did not always have a clear-cut ideology, and the estate system itself was not a serious issue either, as long as the economic interests of the various groups were not threatened.

Most nobles were also indifferent to aristocratic ideologies in the post-reform era. Periodicals sympathetic to the privileged nobility, such as *Nashe Vremia* and *Vest'*, could not even obtain the support of ordinary nobles, these publications suffered financially and were short-lived.<sup>27</sup> This reflects the fact that aristocratic ideals did not resound beyond the small circle of aristocrats, so their influence on society at large was also limited. The last half of the nineteenth century was a period in which nationalism and populism were the dominant ideologies. The tension between and fusion of these two ideologies ultimately brought about what may be seen as uniquely Russian ideological dynamics. These dynamics, however, operated to the disadvantage of aristocratic ideals<sup>28</sup> because such ideals directly conflicted with populism, and were difficult to combine with nationalism given the cosmopolitan character of Russia's nobility and its responsibility for the long history of Westernization.<sup>29</sup>

In regard to harmonious economic relations with other social groups, the land problem (which framed the landed nobility-peasantry conflict and ultimately the fate of the noble estate itself) was still somewhat latent in the early post-reform period. Though there are different views about how firmly the

landed nobility resisted the abolishment of serfdom, it is unquestionable that this reform created difficulties for most middle-ranking nobles. These difficulties were primarily due to a reduction in the labor force and the shortage of funds which resulted from the abolition. The land question was still secondary.

Nevertheless, land ownership did comprise the core of the nobles economic interests and this isolated them from the peasantry, who comprised the overwhelming majority of the rural population. Owing to the seriousness of the land question, the economic interests of peasants and land-owning nobles became more difficult to reconcile towards the end of the nineteenth century. Once that question became politicized in the late Imperial period, differences in political opinion lost their significance within the political activity of the landed nobility. They realized that they had to defend their economic interests by with all possible means. Both the corporate and zemstvo institutions should serve them.<sup>30</sup> The government had already abandoned any intention of maintaining their local hegemony at all costs. Nevertheless, confronted with the wave of democratization and land reform, the landed nobility could not depart from the old order based on autocracy and the estate system.

### **Comparisons of Russia and Japan**

The Russian government attempted to use landed nobles to improve the poor situation of local administration and in peasant-control mechanisms, though the nobles proved incapable of performing such roles. The corporate institutions of the noble estate and zemstvo institutions were useful instruments for the government in its efforts to garner the support and cooperation of society in times of social mobilization. For the landed nobility, those institutions functioned as instruments for expressing their cohesiveness and power when their vital interests seemed endangered. These institutions did not, however, have the power to create a

new stratum of independent social leaders in the countryside. The government did not wish to see formation of independent social forces in the early phase of modernization. Neither did landed nobles themselves appear willing or able to form a new political class; as they became increasingly preoccupied with their own narrow interests, their historical role deteriorated, and finally became completely submerged in the October Revolution.

Russia's nobility was too weak to emerge as a political class and coordinate conflicting interests in the countryside. They were really no less estranged from the peasantry than were state officials — too estranged to influence the peasantry for common local interests. To a considerable extent, this helps to explain some of the difficulties that Russian society experienced in the process of political development in this period.<sup>31</sup> And interestingly, this weakness and thinness of the rural elite class was a feature common to both Russia and Japan in the early phase of modernization. Neither had a strong land-owning class which could control rural society and assist the state bureaucracy. This is one area in which these two countries differed remarkably from England, and from Prussia, whose self-government of *Honoratioren* (notables) they took as their model.

This difficulty was, however, less serious in Japan than in Russia. A stratum of wealthy farmers had taken shape below the traditional ruling warrior class before the process of modernization really got underway in Japan. Land ownership by members of the warrior class had been so nominal that it was easily abolished by the government after the Meiji Restoration. There was not such a serious land question in Japan as that which Russian society had to confront, though it did become increasingly serious in the Taisho era (1912-1926). Furthermore, Japanese landowners had a more robust agrarian spirit than their Russian counterparts; in short, there were more reliable *Honoratioren* in Japan.<sup>32</sup> If this had not been the case, the government would not have established a parliamentary system on the basis of restricted suffrage as

early as 1889, the year after local reforms had been carried out, and well before large-scale industrial development began (around the turn of the century). Japan was fortunate in that it completed its political reform well before industrialization got under way, and prior to the deep social changes brought about by the Russo-Japanese War.

Russian society experienced a rather different process of historical development. It was after the rapid industrialization and the First Revolution that Russia began a new phase of political life with the establishment of the Duma. This new political entity had to manage the abrasive conflicts of a society in great flux, a problem which Japan had only tackled after somewhat more practice and experience with representative government.

Of course, we cannot merely ascribe the different experiences of Japan and Russia to the differences between the latter's nobility and the former's land-owning class in economic, social, and political terms. It seems certain, however, that the study of the Russian nobility is useful in elucidating various aspects which have not been sufficiently treated in the history of Imperial Russia. It might be that we, Japanese historians, could use our knowledge of the Japanese modern period towards deepening the understanding of the Russian nobility and its role in political development.

The political development of Russia and Japan presents a variety of possibilities for comparative studies that have not yet been attempted. If we were to become more interested in considering the political and administrative aspects of Russia's modernization, we might contribute more to a deeper understanding of the history of Imperial Russia. Our past work in Russian history might also be seen in a new perspective and lead us towards a more fruitful historical interpretation of that period of Russia's development.

## Notes

1 Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, 17 (1965), pp. 411-412.

- 2 Eiichi Hizen et al, "Japanische Forschungen zur russischen Geschichte in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart," *Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas*, 33 (1985), p. 552.
- 3 Views of the "police state" are closely connected with the question of state-society relations in Imperial Russia — see Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1977), chap. 11; and Marc Raeff, *The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600-1880* (New Haven and London, 1983), pp. 251-257 (epilogue).
- 4 George L. Yaney, *The Systematization of Russian Government: Social Evolution in the Domestic Administration of Imperial Russia, 1711-1905* (Urbana, Illinois, 1973), chap. 5.
- 5 Walter M. Pintner, "The Russian Higher Civil Service on the Eve of the Great Reforms," *Journal of Social History*, 8 (1975), pp. 63-64; V. a., "The Social Characteristics of the Early Nineteenth Century Russian Bureaucracy," *Slavic Review*, 29 (1979), pp. 438-443; v. a., "Civil officialdom and the Nobility in the 1850s," in: Walter M. Pintner & Don K. Rowney (eds.), *Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century* (Chapel Hill, 1980), pp. 245-249.
- 6 Hans J. Torke, "Continuity and Change in the Relations between Bureaucracy and Society in Russia, 1613-1861," *Canadian Slavic Studies*, 5 (1971), pp. 474-475; Richard G. Robbins, Jr., "Choosing the Russian Governors: The Professionalization of the Gubernatorial Corps," *Slavonic and East European Review*, 58 (1980), pp. 554-560.
- 7 Marc Raeff, "Russian Autocracy and Its Officials," *Harvard Slavic Studies*, 4 (1957), pp. 77-91; John P. LeDonne, *Absolutism and Ruling Class: The Formation of the Russian Political Order 1700-1825* (Oxford, 1991), pp. 42-60.
- 8 Some publicists of Russia were under the strong influence of Gneist's anglophilism when they considered the problem of self-government and took a great interest in the English model of self-government. See V.A. Kitaev, *Ot frondy k okhranitel'stvu: Iz istorii russkoi liberal'noi mysli 50-60-kh godov XIX veka* (Moscow, 1972), pp. 113-116, 141-145.
- 9 Yaney, *op. cit.*, p. 346; Thomas S. Pearson, *Russian Officialdom in Crisis: Autocracy and Local Self-Government, 1861-1900* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 246.
- 10 One effect of the zemstvo institutions upon Russia's estate-based society was the evolution of a new stratum of professional persons of differing social origins: teachers, physicians, agrarian experts, and statisticians. The zemstvo institutions developed human resources and provided public-spirited young people a place where they could do something useful for the people.



- 11 Roberta Thompson Manning, "The Zemstvo and Politics, 1864-1914," in: Terence Emmons and Wayne S. Vucinich (eds.), *The Zemstvo in Russia: An Experiment in Local Self-Government* (Cambridge, 1982), p. 138; Richard G. Robbins, Jr., *The Tsar's Viceroy: Russian Provincial Governors in the Last Years of the Empire* (Ithaca, New York, 1987), p. 35.
- 12 For example, see I.P. Belokonskii, *Zemstvo i konstitutsiia* (Moscow, 1910), pp. 5-38.
- 13 The situation changed remarkably in the mid-1890s. See Richard G. Robbins, Jr., *Famine in Russia 1891-1892: The Imperial Government Responds to a Crisis* (New York and London, 1975), pp. 180-183; Manning, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-145. My understanding of the relations between the state bureaucracy and the zemstvos is generally based on Prof. Matsuzato's theory on Russian local government. See Kimitaka Matsuzato, "Typological Analysis of Tsarist Local Government: Governors and Zemstvos," in Osamu Ieda (ed.), *New Order in Post-Communist Eurasia* (Sapporo, 1993), pp. 68-74.
- 14 Gregory L. Freeze, "The *Soslovie* (Estate) Paradigm and Russian Social History," *American Historical Review*, 91 (1986), pp. 25-35.
- 15 Francis William Weislo, *Reforming Rural Russia: State, Local Society, and National Politics, 1855-1914* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1990), pp. 306-309.
- 16 Daniel Field, *The End of Serfdom: Nobility and Bureaucracy in Russia, 1855-1861* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), p. xi.
- 17 Earlier Soviet historiography has tended to overlook this difference and has not paid enough attention to diversity among the nobility or to the 'new breed' of nobles who embraced new political ideas and attitudes. The noble estate has often been simply identified with the land-owning class. The problem of defining the nobility is, however, more complicated because it involves not only economic interests, but also class consciousness, political inclinations, cultural preferences, and so forth.
- 18 James I. Mandel, "Paternalistic Authority in the Russian Countryside, 1856-1906," Ph.D. dissertation (Columbia University, 1978), pp. 5-6; George Yaney, *The Urge to Mobilize: Agrarian Reform in Russia, 1861-1930* (Urbana, 1982), pp. 70-75.
- 19 Pearson, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-212, 227-229.
- 20 G.M. Hamburg, *Politics of the Russian Nobility, 1881-1905* (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1984), pp. 116-117.
- 21 K.D. Ravelin, "Dvorianstvo i osvobozhdenie krest'ian," in: *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. II (Moscow, 1898), pp. 134-135; A.I. Koshelev, *GoZos izzemstva* (Moscow, 1869), pp. 44-47; Kitaev, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-163.
- 22 B.N. Chicherin, *Neskol'ko sovremennykh voprosov* (Moscow, 1862), pp. 257-258.

- 23 Dominic Lieven, *The Aristocracy in Europe, 1815-1914* (Houndmills and London, 1992), pp. 95-96.
- 24 N.I. Iordanskii, *Konstitutsionnoe dvizhenie 60-kh godov* (St. Petersburg, 1906), pp. 108-110.
- 25 B.B. Veselovskii, *K voprosu o klassovykh interesakh v zemstve* (St. Petersburg, 1905), pp. 1-4; Yaney, *The Systematization...*, pp. 349-351.
- 26 Manning, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140.
- 27 V.G. Chernukha, *Pravitel'stvennaia politika v otnoshenii pechati. 60-70-egody XIX veka* (Leningrad, 1989), pp. 105-106, 123-125.
- 28 Most advocates of aristocratic ideals justified the nobility's privileges on the grounds of legalism and its close relationship to the autocratic monarchy. See N.A. Bezobrazov, *Predlozheniia dvorianstvu* (Berlin, 1862), p. vi and *Sliianie soslovii i dvorianstvo, drugie sostoiianiia i zemstvo* (St. Petersburg, 1870), pp. 127-134. For an attempt to unite aristocratic ideals and nationalism, see R.A. Fadeev, *Russkoe obshchestvo v nastoiashchem i budushchem (Chem nam byt'?)* (St. Petersburg, 1874).
- 29 Alfred J. Rieber, "Interest-Group Politics in the Era of the Great Reforms," in: Ben Eklof et al. (eds.), *Russia's Great Reforms, 1855-1881* (Bloomington & Indianapolis, 1994), pp. 76-77.
- 30 Manning, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-168. But zemstvo institutions never became a simple instrument of the landed nobility. See Kimitaka Matsuzato, "Teisei Rosia no Tihou Seido (Local Government in Late Imperial Russia): 1889-1917," *Suravu Kenkyu (Slavic Studies)*, 40(1993), pp. 175-177.
- 31 Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1977), pp. 459-460; Lieven, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-228.
- 32 Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 280-285.