

Chapter 8

Stalin, Politburo, and Its Commissions in the Soviet Decision-making Process in the 1930s

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More than two and a half years have passed since the Russian archives, especially those of the former CPSU (*RTsKhIDNI* and *TsKhSD*), were opened to the public. Many Russian and foreign scholars have since perused archival documents and published interesting articles and books about Collectivization, the mass deportations of peasants and nationalities, the Great Terror, and other subjects.¹

However, as is well known, these documents contain their own "secrets," namely the descriptions "*Reshenie — osobaia papka* (decision — into the special file)" concerning the affairs of diplomacy, national defense, state security, and other sectors. Thus, even today, we cannot completely follow the Soviet top-level decision-making (and policy implementation) process.²

Here I would like to present a sketch of the general Soviet decision-making process in the 1930s, along with case studies based upon research into the protocols of meetings, part of the protocols of *Sovnarkom* (SNK) meetings, and protocols of meetings of the *Azov-Chernomore kraikom* (North Caucasus regional committee — until January 1934) bureau. The case study is limited to agricultural policy (see the SIPS papers of R.W. Davies' research group on the decision-making process via the Gosplan and the industrial ministries).³

1. The Soviet Decision-making Process in the 1930s

Needless to say, the Politburo of the Central Committee (CC) played a key role in the decision-making process under the conditions of a one-party state and democratic centralism. However, the manner in which the Politburo discussed and decided questions, especially after NEP, has remained almost unknown because of the confidentiality of archival documents.⁴ We have received only fragments of information from the memoirs of Bazhanov (Stalin's personal secretary in the 1920s), Khrushchev, and some Soviet and foreign diplomats.⁶

Table 1: Attendance of principal Politburo and CC members at Politburo meetings

Periods and the number of sessions	33.1.16 i (15 times) 36.7.19	34.2.20 i (25 times) 34.1.20	35.2.22 i (18 times) 35.1.3	35.2.22 i (21 times)
Stalin	18	14	19	13
Molotov	24	15	20	15
Kaganovich, L.	23	16	18	12
Voroshilov	20	14	18	13
Mikoian	22	16	20	11
Andreev	20	13	15	8
Ordzhonikidze	18	11	14	3
Kirov	5	4		
Zhdanov	2	12	12	9
Yezhov	-	7	17	15
Krupskaia	18	12	17	11
Litvinov		7	10	8
Mekhlis		16	15	9
Poskrebyshev	-	14	17	9
Piatakov	21	12	12	
Khrushchev		14	20	7
lagoda	19	14	16	1

*Kirov died in December 1934, and Ordzhonikidze in February 1937. Piatakov was arrested and lagoda was discharged from people's commissar of internal affairs in September 1936.

According to Khrushchev's memoirs, Politburo meetings were held at fixed times on set days (he did not list these, but noted their length: 1-2 or more hours). In these participated, but only listening quietly, members of the CC and the Central Inspection Commission, according to a custom which originated during the Lenin period. There also were closed meetings, which only Politburo members could attend. Decisions were recorded in a special file; CC members could read them with special permission in the secret department of the CC. Molotov presided over Politburo meetings (Stalin himself presided after the War ended) and L. Kaganovich served as the *de facto* second secretary. The attendees discussed some questions still furiously, despite the monolithic image of Politburo in the 1930s. There even occurred such an extreme case that Ordzhonikidze nearly hit Rozengol'ts.⁶ Khrushchev, elected a full member of the CC at the 17th Party Congress, participated in Politburo meetings as often as the principal Politburo members, until he was dispatched to Ukraine (cf. Table I).⁷

The protocols of Politburo meetings prove the accuracy of Khrushchev's memoirs. Meetings were to be held regularly three times a month (on the 5th, 15th, and 25th), but in fact they were held irregularly and less often (24 times in 1933, 17 in 1934, 16 in 1935, 9 in 1936, 7 in 1937, 4 in 1938, 2 in 1939, and 2 in 1940). Participants in these meetings were full and candidate members of the Politburo (10 and 5, respectively, after the 17th Congress), some full and candidate members of the CC, and members of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, for a grand total of 60-70 persons. They discussed questions of diplomacy, defense, security, trade and economy, labor and social insurance, education and culture, and other subjects. They also discussed party activities (management of the party itself, leadership of the Soviets, trade unions, and the like) and cadre problems (recruitment, distribution, training, etc.). The agendas usually contained 20-40 points for discussion.⁸


Commissions were established to prepare the proposals for Politburo meetings, which were rarely held but attended by many persons. Commissions usually consisted of 5-15 members, including a full or candidate Politburo member (who served chairman) and some chiefs or deputies of government ministries (*narodnye komissariaty*) concerned.⁹ Unfortunately, protocols of their meetings remain classified even at present, except for a few. However, there is no doubt that the commissions, especially the standing ones, played important roles in the Politburo discussions and decisions. Among the standing commissions were those on foreign affairs and foreign trade (both chaired by Molotov), defense (by Voroshilov), and legal affairs (by Kaganovich).¹⁰ For example, the Politburo discussed and decided such an important question as the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USA only four times and interrogatorily (*oprosom* on 14, 17, 20, and 25 October 1933 / *Reshenie — osobaia papka*).¹¹ The commission on foreign affairs doubtlessly was held beforehand and *de facto* made the decision. In addition, the departments of the CC, except that of agriculture, did not have such a function of preparing proposals as they later did.¹²

In addition to having the commissions prepare proposals, the Politburo entrusted the SNK with leadership in some sectors of the national economy. It only ratified or amended proposals by the SNK concerning routine matters such as drafting the plan of national economy and the state budget each year. The SNK consisted of fewer members (no more than 20) and its meetings were held about once a week.¹³ Moreover, it had already established bureaucracies of the ministries and the standing subordinate organs (Gosplan and STO).

However, the Politburo led agricultural policy via the local party organs (*obkom, kraikom*, and the CC of each republic CP) rather than via the organs of agricultural ministries. It controlled the military, the transport sector, and the *sovkhoz* sector through *politotdely*. The Politburo committed itself to deciding the construction and management of important

projects (mining and industrial *kombinaty*, main railway lines, giant canals, etc.) and even important mines and factories (the Moscow Automobile Factory, the Stalingrad Tractor Factory, etc.). Last but not least, the Politburo was engaged in deciding policies in spheres where there were no union-level ministries (education, internal affairs until July 1934, and legal affairs and health until July 1936).¹⁴

**Chart 1:
Organizational Structure (after the 17th Congress)**



The Politburo administered larger policy spheres than the SNK and placed its members in leading posts of the SNK (Molotov: chairman of the SNK and STO; Kuibyshev: chairman of Gosplan and deputy chairman of the SNK; Ordzhonikidze: people's commissar of heavy industry; Andreev, succeeded by Kaganovich: people's commissar of transport; Voroshilov: people's commissar of national defense). Therefore, the Politburo was superior to the SNK in decision-making power. The relationship between the Politburo and the SNK involved a kind of division of labor as well as an overlap of membership and functions. For example, the commission for rail transport was a standing one of the SNK and the CC (*de facto* the Politburo).¹⁵ Some decrees were promulgated in the name of the SNK and the CC. This was the logical consequence of the one-party state, but we can find therein a certain balance which ensured both double-checking and efficiency (cf. Chart 1).

Here I refer to individual roles of the principal Politburo and CC members to some extent, by showing the record of their attendance at Politburo meetings (cf. Table 1). Molotov attended almost all meetings as chairman of both the Politburo and SNK. Kaganovich was the second best in attendance as *ex officio* second secretary. General Secretary Stalin took a long holiday each summer, but controlled the meetings through the second secretary and his personal secretary (Poskrebyshv). Such principal ministers as Mikoian (supply, then food industry), Ordzhonikidze, Voroshilov, lagoda and Yezhov (internal affairs) naturally attended Politburo meetings. lagoda was only a candidate member of the CC until the 17th Congress. Piatakov, a full member of the CC and deputy people's commissar of heavy industry, attended more often than infirm Ordzhonikidze until the Great Terror, despite his Trotskyist past. Stalin's favorite *apparatchiki*, i.e. Khrushchev, Mekhlis, and Poskrebyshv, came to be invited to Politburo meetings after the 17th Congress.

However, the forementioned balance under the suzerainty of the Politburo seemed to be destroyed during the Great Terror. D. Volkogonov pointed out in his recent book that decisions were made within a limited circle — Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and later with Zhdanov or Beria; then Stalin established various Politburo commissions, so-called 'the five,' 'the six,' etc.¹⁶ According to archival documents, two standing commissions of the Politburo took the place of the Politburo itself after April 1937: that for "urgent problems of confidential nature" consisted of Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, and Yezhov; another for "the urgent problems of economic nature" consisted of Molotov, Stalin, Chubar', Mikoian, and Kaganovich.¹⁷ Immediately afterward, the Committee of Defense was founded as the 'inner cabinet' of the SNK in accordance with the perception of an increasing threat to the USSR. Its full members were Molotov (chairman), Stalin, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Chubar' (deputy chairman of the SNK), Rukhimovich (people's commissar of defense industry), and Mezhlauk (chairman of Gosplan); the candidate members were Gamarnik (head of the Political Administration of the Red Army), Mikoian, Zhdanov (secretary of the CC), and Yezhov.¹⁸

Both protocols of the meetings of Politburo standing commissions and the Committee of Defense, regrettably, remain confidential even at present. The party, which had many core cadres liquidated during the Great Terror, restricted its role to leading the state and economic organs, the social organizations ideologically and through cadre policies, giving up taking the place of them. The Committee of Defense became a more important decision-making entity as the danger of war increased (Stalin officially replaced Molotov as chairman of the SNK in May 1941). Immediately after the outbreak of the "Great Patriotic War," the Committee of Defense was reorganized into the State Committee of Defense as the supreme organ (its members were Stalin, Molotov,

Voroshilov, Malenkov, and Beria; Kaganovich and Voznesenskii were soon added).¹⁹

2. Decision-making in the Critical Period of 1932-1933

As is well known, the Great Famine occurred in the winter of 1932-1933 due to the severe grain procurement policy and the peasants' resistance to it. The period from the beginning of November 1932, when the Politburo dispatched a special commission headed by Kaganovich to the North Caucasus region, until the beginning of May 1933, when Stalin and Molotov issued a secret instruction banning mass repression against the peasants, was one of the most critical periods of the Stalinist regime. The CC plenum in January 1933, though taking a more flexible line in industrial policy (a slow-down of the high-tempo production of the First Five-Year Plan), approved harsher policies towards peasants and *kolkhozy*, i.e. the establishment of *politotdely* attached to MTS and *sovkhozy*, prohibition of peasant migration into the cities (the introduction of a domestic passport system), and others. The Stalinist leadership not only permitted local party organs to take whatever measures necessary to enforce grain procurement, but also intervened directly in local affairs by promulgating special decisions. At the same time, such direct interventions provided the Stalinist leadership with much local information and allowed them to reconsider their policies. The Veshenskii affair, revealed by Khrushchev exclusively as a typical case of Stalin's repression of peasants,²⁰ is such a case.

Here the decision-making process via *ad hoc* commissions and Stalin's personal initiative will be analyzed in two sections. The first concerns repression directed by the Kaganovich Commission, and the second concerns the Veshenskii affair (The Veshenskii district belonged to the North Caucasus region).

(1) The Kaganovich Commission

Grain procurement in 1932 proceeded with more difficulty than in 1930 and 1931. The fulfillment level of the year plan was only 52.7% at the end of October (as compared with 64.8% in 1930, and 55.3% in 1931). In particular, the level in the North Caucasus region was only 37.8% on 25 October.²¹ The *kraikom* secretary Sheboldaev fell into difficulties, being under pressure from both above and below. On 22 October, the Politburo decided to dispatch two commissions, one led by Molotov to Ukraine (the largest grain region) and another led by Kaganovich to North Caucasus.²² On the same day, Stalin invited Sheboldaev to Moscow and persuaded him to resort to repression against the "sabotage" of grain procurement, while rejecting his request for a seed loan.²³

On 1 November 1932, a meeting of the *kraikom* bureau together with the Kaganovich Commission was held and adopted a decision on the basis of the latter's proposal (*Reshenie — osobaia papfea*).²⁴ The next day the commission, confronted with resistance at a meeting of rural *raikom* secretaries, had to reduce the year plan amount of grain procurement, while at the same time declaring war against "sabotage."²⁶ Then the *kraikom* bureau adopted three decisions: on grain procurement in the whole region, in the Kuban districts, and on the purge (*chistkd*) of rural party organizations. Repressive measures taken in order to hasten grain procurement and punish "saboteurs" were called the "black list" (*chornaia doskd*). To villages (*stanitsy*) listed on the "black list" commodities and credits were not to be offered, *kolkhozy*, cooperatives, and state apparatuses were to be purged, and inhabitants were to be deported to northern regions if they continued "sabotage."²⁶ These measures were essentially a revival of the emergency measures previously taken in the midst of Collectivization.

The commission apparently remained in the region for three weeks. In fact, Kaganovich made a report at the meeting of the *kraikom* bureau on 23-24 November, which decided to add two villages to the "black list" (five in total).²⁷

The Stalinist leadership, apparently dissatisfied with the results of these measures, took a more drastic step. Stalin began to revise the official view of *kolkhozy* at the joint meeting of the Politburo and the Presidium of the CCC on 27 November, saying that the party must not idealize *kolkhozy* and must not hesitate to resort to repression against sabotaging *kolkhozy*.²⁶ On 10 December, the Politburo heard reports by S. Kosior and Sheboldaev on the grain procurement and entrusted a commission (Molotov, Stalin, Kaganovich, Kosior, Sheboldaev, and others) to prepare a draft of the decision.²⁹ The Politburo on 14 December adopted (*oprosom*) the secret decision of the CC and the SNK on grain procurement in Ukraine, North Caucasus, and the Western region. It specified each time-limit for grain procurement and mandated repressive measures against "the worst counter-revolutionary elements" which included arrest, long-term imprisonment in *lager'* (concentration camp), and shooting. It also provided for wholesale deportation of a village (Poltavskaia *stanitsa*) population to northern regions.³⁰

The *kraikom* bureau on 16-17 December approved the deportation of Poltavskaja *stanitsa*, though removing two other villages from the "black list."³¹ On 19 December, the Politburo decided (*oprosom*) to dispatch Kaganovich (the new head of the CC agricultural department just established on 15 December) to Ukraine, the second most troubled region for grain procurement.³²

The joint plenum of the *Kraikom* and the *KraiKK* (Control Commission) on 26-29 January 1933 sent a telegram to Stalin, reporting complete fulfillment of the year plan of grain procurement.³³ But the toll of victims was enormous — 15 villages "blacklisted", 2 villages deported, more than 63,500 inhabitants deported, and 16,000 peasants arrested by OGPU in Kuban alone.³⁴

In this way, the Politburo initiated a breakthrough in the crisis and took emergency measures through *ad hoc* commissions. The commissions put Politburo decisions into effect on the spot, imposing them upon the local party organs,

while partly taking their conditions into account. Assumably, two *ad hoc* commissions were reorganized into the CC agricultural department on one hand, and into the *politotdely* on the other. The latter was a revival of the plenipotentiaries dispatched to the fronts of Collectivization. In this sense, there were two inconsistent tendencies of leadership in the agricultural policy sphere: normalization on the basis of traditional party rule and institutionalization of emergency measures.

(2) The Veshenskii Affair

Mikhail Sholokhov, one of the most famous and influential Soviet writers, sent a letter to the editorial board of *Pravda*. The letter, which pointed out that seed transfer from Veshenskii district (where he lived) to neighboring Millerovskii district had been delayed, was published on it on 23 March 1933.³⁵ Then Sholokhov, dissatisfied with the decision of the *kraikom* bureau (*oprosom*, on 27 March),³⁶ sent a letter to Stalin on 4 April. He pointed out the very fact of famine and criticized the *kraikom* leadership for imposing too heavy a burden of grain procurement and overlooking its plenipotentiary's repressive measures for grain procurement (fines, expulsions from *kolkhozy*, evictions from households, arrests, etc.).³⁷ Stalin, in his reply of 16 April, promised to help the Veshenskii district and asked how many poods of grain should be sent.³⁸ Sholokhov, receiving the reply, immediately sent a follow-up letter to Stalin on the same day. He set out the necessary quantities of grain and once again criticized the *kraikom* bureau for ascribing the delay to the unwillingness of the districts. He pointed out that the *kraikom* had kept silent, though it had collected through its instructors evidence of repressive measures.³⁹

As for the relationship between the Politburo and the *kraikom* bureau, I could find only the following information in the protocols of Politburo meetings. The Politburo made one decision concerning the *kraikom* (*oprosom*, *Reshenie — osobaia papka*, on 1 April) and another demanding that the *kraikom*

bureau should reconsider its decision on the norm of grain procurement from individual peasants (on 2 April).⁴⁰ In any case, the *kraikom* bureau adopted a decision admitting its own mistake on 21 April.⁴¹ Two days later the Politburo adopted a decision, on the basis of Stalin's proposal, to dispatch Shkiriakov to the district in order to investigate the "excesses" in grain procurement.⁴² Stalin seemed to be consistently supporting Sholokhov after his letter to *Pravda*, in his proposal for supplementary grain (on 22 April), but he pointed out in his letter to Sholokhov (on 6 May) that the Veshenskii peasants had to be accused of sabotage ("Italian strike"), and their "quiet" war against the soviet authorities.⁴³

It is not accidental that the same Politburo meeting (on 23 April) decided to convene a meeting of OGPU plenipotentiaries on 3 May; following that, on 7 May, the Politburo decided (*oprosom*) to stop mass repression against peasants taken since the beginning of wholesale collectivization, i.e. since the end of 1929.⁴⁴ The secret instruction signed by Stalin and Molotov was issued on 8 May.⁴⁵ The Politburo, perhaps hearing about Shkiriakov's report, decided on 4 July (*oprosom*) to discharge Zimin (second secretary of the *kraikom*) and Ovchinnikov (secretary of Rostov *gorkom*, former plenipotentiary of Veshenskii district), saying that "the completely correct and absolutely necessary policy of pressure against *kolkhozniki* who sabotaged grain procurement was distorted in Veshenskii district because of insufficient control by the *kraikom*".⁴⁶ The *kraikom* bureau approved the Politburo decision, and additionally discharged the secretary of Veshenskii *raikom* and the chairman of the *raiKK* (*oprosom*, on 10 July).⁴⁷ Then the *kraikom* bureau took steps for relief of the repressed peasants, setting up a commission in order to examine their appeals (on 22 July).⁴⁸

Thus the Politburo directly controlled agricultural policies, i.e. not through the agricultural-administrative organs (People's Commissariat of Agriculture, *Komzag*, *Zagotzerno*), and not even through the CC agricultural department. The more critical the situation became, the more deeply the

Politburo, and first of all Stalin, intervened in local affairs. Stalin, who caught the signals from correspondents or contributors to the central or local newspapers, dispatched his plenipotentiaries to investigate the facts and restrain the "excesses" of agricultural policies (collectivization, grain procurement, and others), ascribing them to local officials. In this Veshenskii case, Sholokhov played the role of correspondent, and Zimin and Ovchinnikov that of scapegoats.

These case studies show important roles of the Politburo, particularly decisive roles of Stalin in decision-making. However it does not mean that the Politburo was a decorative organ and Stalin could dictate everything without an approval of the Politburo. The legitimatizing function of the Politburo was very important for a party of ideology and democratic centralism, at least until the Great Terror. As for the relationship between the Politburo and local party organs (here the *kraikom* bureau), the former seems absolutely superior in power to the latter, but I found in the protocols evidence that the *kraikom* often insisted on its claims. For example, the *kraikom*, dissatisfied with the draft of the 1933 state budget, demanded an increase in its share from the Commissariat of Finance (7 December 1932).⁴⁹ The *kraikom*, against the plan of the Commissariat of Supply to decrease the grain supply in February, appealed to the CC (*de facto* the Politburo) to preserve the former level of supply (25 January 1933).⁶⁰ These both happened at the very time the *kraikom* had fallen into its weakest position vis-a-vis the Politburo due to the failure of grain procurement.

Notes

- 1 V. N. Zemskov, "Kulatskaia ssylka' v 30-e gody," *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, No. 10 (1991); V. N. Zemskov, "Sud'ba 'kulatskoi ssylki' (1930-1954 gg.)," *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, No. 1 (1994); N. F. Bugai, "K voprosu o deportatsii narodov SSSR v 30-40-kh godakh," *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 6 (1989); N. F. Bugai, "Vyselenie sovetsskikh koreitsev s Dal'nego Vostoka," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 5 (1994); O. V.

- Khlevniuk, *Stalin i Ordzhonikidze, Konflikty v Politbiuro v 30-egody* (M., 1993); R. Davis, O. V. Khlevniuk, "Vtoraia piatiletka: mekhanizm smeny ekonomicheskoi politiki," *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, No. 3 (1994); J. Arch Getty, Roberta T. Manning (eds.), *Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives* (Cambridge University Press, 1993); Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants. Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization* (Oxford University Press, 1994); Edwin Bacon, *The Gulag at War. Stalin's Forced Labour System in the Light of the Archives* (Macmillan, 1994); E. A. Rees, *Stalinism and Soviet Rail Transport, 1928-41* (Macmillan, 1995).
- 2 The special file has been kept in the so-called Kremlin or Presidential Archiv. It is nearly impossible to obtain access to the Archiv. Only D. Volkogonov (as a supervisor) and a few other people — e.g. S. Shakhrai as one of the prosecutors in the so-called GK.CHP trial — could use those documents. However, some articles based on those documents have recently appeared.
 - 3 R. W. Davies, O. V. Khlevnyuk, "The Role of Gosplan in Economic Decision-making in the 1930s," *CREES D. P., SIPS*, No. 36 (University of Birmingham, 1993).
 - 4 G. Gill provided much useful information about the central organs (including the Politburo) on the basis of the published data — e.g. at the 12th Congress it was reported that the Politburo had met on 60 occasions in the 12 months since the previous Congress and, together with 19 meetings of the CC, had dealt with 1,322 questions. Graeme Gill, *The Origins of the Stalinist Political System* (Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 156.
 - 5 Boris Bazhanov, *Vospominaniia byvshego sekretaria Stalina* (Paris-New York, 1983; St.Petersburg, 1992); "Memuary Nikita Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2, 3, 4 (1990); Evgenii Gnedin, *Katastrofa i vtoroe rozhdenie* (Amsterdam, 1977), etc.
 - 6 "Memuary...", *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2, pp. 105-108; No. 3, pp. 63, 72-73. Kaganovich, in his last interview, acknowledged his role as the second secretary. Feliks Chuev, *Tak govorit Kaganovich* (Moscow, 1992), p. 73.
 - 7 Khrushchev was elected a candidate member of the Politburo as well as first secretary of the CC of the Ukrainian CP in January 1938.
 - 8 *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 3, d. 901-1028. These cover the period from October 1932 to October 1940.
 - 9 *Ibid*,
 - 10 *Ibid*.
 - 11 *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 3, d. 933,1. 6, 12, 20. Diplomatic relations between the USSR and USA were established on 16 November 1933. For an aspect of the process of policy-making towards the USA, see G. N. Sevost'ianov, "Posly vruchaiut veritel'nye gramoty.

- Ustanovlenie sovetsko-amerikanskikh diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii v svete novykh dokumentov," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, No. 6 (1993), pp. 16-35.
- 12 The CC had 8 departments and 2 sections after the 17th Congress: (1) plan-finance-commerce, (2) industry, (3) transport, (4) agriculture, (5) political-administrative, (6) ORPO (department of the leading party organs), (7) culture-propaganda, (8) IMEL (Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin) (9) special section, and (10) Chancellory. These fell under the supervision of the Orgburo and the Secretariat; (1)-(6) were mainly engaged in organizational and cadre questions; (5) controlled the military, security, and judicial organs.
 - 13 *RTsKhlDNI*, f. 17, op. 3, d. 901-1028. *GARF*, f. 5446, op. 1, d. 82-87 (These cover the period from January to June 1934).
 - 14 *RTsKhlDNI*, f. 17, op. 3, d. 901-1028.
 - 15 The commission was established by a Politburo decision (oprosom, on 18 August 1933) as "a type of commission of national defense." It seems to mean the commission of both the Politburo and SNK. *RTsKhlDNI*, f. 17, op. 3, d. 929,1.11.
 - 16 D. A. Volkogonov, *Triumf i tragediia. Politicheskii portret I. V. Stalina*, kn. 1, ch. 2, p. 109.
 - 17 *RTsKhlDNI*, f. 17, op. 3, d. 986,1.16-17.
 - 18 *GARF*, f. 5446, op. 1, d. 130,1.235.
 - 19 The documents of the State Committee of Defense (GKO) have been preserved in *RTsKhlDNI* and remain closed to historians at present, but some articles based on some of those documents have recently appeared.
 - 20 *Pravda*, 10 March 1963.
 - 21 T. Tomita, "Kokumotuchoutatu to koluhozu [Grain procurement and kolkhozy in 1932-1933]," *Rekishi-gaku Kenkyu [Historical Studies]*, No. 505 (June 1982), p. 1,9.
 - 22 *RTsKhlDNI*, f. 17, op. 3, d. 904,1.11.
 - 23 E. N. Oskolkov, *Golod 1932/1933. Khlebozagotovki i golod 1932/1933 goda v Severo-Kavkazkom krae* (Rostov-na-Donu, 1991), pp. 37-38.
 - 24 *RTsKhlDNI*, f. 17, op. 21, d. 3377,1.82.
 - 25 Oskolkov, pp. 31-35.
 - 26 *RTsKhlDNI*, f. 17, op. 21, d. 3377,1.83-87.
 - 27 *RTsKhlDNI*, f. 17, op. 21, d. 3377,1.93,104.
 - 28 *Bolshevik*, No. 1-2 (1933), p. 19.
 - 29 *RTsKhlDNI*, f. 17, op. 3, d. 910,1.3.
 - 30 *RTsKhlDNI*, f. 17, op. 3, d. 911,1.42.
 - 31 *RTsKhlDNI*, f. 17, op. 21, d. 3377,1.115-116.
 - 32 *RTsKhlDNI*, f. 17, op. 3, d. 912,1.11; d. 911,1.12.
 - 33 *Partrabotnik*, No. 4 (1933), p. 29.
 - 34 Oskolkov, pp. 52,55,56,50.
 - 35 *Pravda*, 20 March 1933.

- 36 *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 21, d. 3378,1.63.
- 37 "Sholokhov i Stalin. Perepiska nachala 30-kh godov," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 3 (1993), pp. 7-18.
- 38 *Ibid.*, p. 18.
- 39 *Ibid.*, p. 18-21.
- 40 *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 3, d. 919,1.25,27.
- 41 *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 21, d. 3378,1. 79.
- 42 *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 3, d. 921,1.4.
- 43 "Sholokhov i Stalin...", p. 22.
- 44 *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 3, d. 922,1.16.
- 45 The secret instruction was addressed to all party and soviet activists, all the OGPU, judicial, and prosecutor organs. *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 3, d. 922,1. 58-59. This has been known to Western historians who investigated the so-called Smolensk Archiv (S.A., WKP 231).
- 46 *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 3, d. 926,1.5.
- 47 *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 21, d. 3379,1.4.
- 48 *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 21, d. 3379,1.24.
- 49 *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 21, d. 3377,1.105.
- 50 *RTsKhIDNI*, f. 17, op. 21, d. 3378,1.21.