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Comments on the papers of Joenniemi and Nagayo

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Prof. Joenniemi's fascinating discussion really promotes our understanding of the problem of Karelian territory ceded by Finland, and Finland's policy toward it. I would like to make a complementary comment on it from a historical point of view, and also raise one question.

Prof. Joenniemi's paper is an interesting attempt to draw general conclusions from Finland's experiences with her territorial dispute. Each country has its own unique experiences, which usually prevent others from drawing easy lessons from it. However, world historical development often brings about conditions or a momentum which contribute to a generalization of those experiences.

Finland has every claim to her lost territories, particularly those on the Karelian Peninsula. It was in 1323 that the Swedish Kingdom and Novgorad Russia divided Karelia into two parts by drawing a border along the Karelian Ithmus. The line continued to exist throughout the centuries up to 1940 except some decades when the whole Karelian Ithmus had been under Russian rule. "Historical reasons" are usually dubious particularly in territorial disputes, because they can soon turn into a chicken and egg debate. But Finland's claim to her former territories is apparently different. Even Mr. Zhirinovsky once admitted that Viborg should go back to Finland.

If there has ever been any reason for Russia to keep control of the Finnish ceced territory, it is purely a military and strategic one. Marshal C. G. Mannerheim, the Finnish Commander in Chief during the interwar period, confesses in his memoirs that the old borderline on the Karelian Ithmus was too close to Leningrad, the "second Capital" of the Soviet Union of that time. At any stage of history after the end of the Winter War (the Finnish-Soviet War of 1939-40 begun by the Soviet Union demanding an exchange of territories), the Soviet leaders never

expressed a will to give the former Finnish territory back to Finland. Instead, they had the idea of compensating to Finland by allowing her to use the Saimaa Canal connecting Finnish inland lakes with the Baltic Sea so that Finns might export timbers abroad, though the idea was only formally proposed by the Soviet Government in 1955.

" The Karelian problem really meant a problem of security for Finland. Toward the end of the Continuation War in 1944,

Yrjo Ruutu, the first Finnish specialist of international politics, came up with the idea of keeping the Finnish territories that had once been ceded to the Soviet Union by concluding a special alliance with the Soviet Union. This idea was not considered in the truce negotiations, and remained unconsidered throughout subsequent years, because both Presudent Mannerheim and his successor J. K. Paasikivi regarded it as dangerous for Finland. The idea of the special alliance itself was used as a counterproposal in the Finnish-Soviet negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assitance (the FCMA Treaty) on 6 April, 1948. In other words, Finland secured her own position as an independent state by sacrificing her former territories.

Behind the above-mentioned Finnish stance toward the Karelian problem lies the Finnish line of foreign policy formed as the result of an agonizing reappraisal of her prewar idanpolitiikka [eastern policy]. Through the bitter experiences of the Second World War, Finland apparently realized that she could not survive only by hoping for a peaceful life, and that she could only ensure her own security by assuring her big neighbor's security. This idea of guaranteeing one's own security by guaranteeing the security of an unfriendly neighbor was generalized later into the concept of common security. However, this idea, which might have reminded one of the Danish-German policy of "friendly neutrality", had hardly been appreciated up to that time. On the contrary, the postwar Finnish eastern policy was so often tapped by the label of "Finlandization" by Western commentators of general world

affairs.

It was only after the beginning of a structual change of international relations leading to the end of the Cold War that there appeared conditions for a new appraisal and, therefore, the generalization of Finland's stance toward the Karelian problem. A harbinger was the principle of the Helsinki process that recognized the political geography of postwar Europe to be the basis for peace and stability, though it never denied the possibility for peaceful change. Finland's entry into the EU, which located Finland at the periphery of an integrated Europe neighboring Russia was another important catalyst, since the European Union, which will most likely include former East European nations carrying grudges and fears derived from their experiences with Stalinist Russia, will need the creation of friendship and cooperation between both sides of the eastern boundary. Finland's borderland policy [lahialuepolitiikka], as the development of her original stance toward the territorial question, will contribute considerably directly or indirectly to this through the presentation of a model.

My question to Prof. Joenniemi is concerned with his own prospect for the coming concept of Karelia. What will happen, if the movement to "unite" develops instead of the movement to "divide"? In books and articles you have written, you have mentioned the interesting fact that old patterns of pre-modern European map with overlapping regions have now been revived in parallel with the borderlines of national states. Karelia had once been an entity consisting of the Karelians born out of Finno-Ugric ethnic groups on the northern coast of the Lake Ladoga, increasingly occupying a broader space around the lake. It was divided into Swedish (Finnish) and East Karelias by the Treaty of Schlusselburg, as mentioned above, and consisted of three different Karelias: East Karelia, ceded Karelia [luovutettu Karjala] and remaining the part of Karelia as Finnish territory. If there is cross-border cooperation between Finland and Russia, particularly between the Finnish and Russian local autonomous bodies, those three Karelias will have increasingly closer

relations. What will happen, then? Do you think, Prof. Joenniemi, that the concept of a Karelian region will again arise in spite of the current political geography?

I wonder if I might also make a comment on Prof. Nagayo's informative paper balancing my above comments, because I am far from being a specialist of former East European countries. He describes in detail how a water control project was born between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, how the design for cooperation came to a standstill and how a glimmer of hope for the future has appeared only recently. Both Slovakia and Hungary are now aware of the need for cooperation, even in order to join the EU, because the EU would not like to be involved in local conflicts through its enlargement towards the East. The EU itself now needs regional cooperations between former East European countries. I would like to know Prof. Nagayo's prospect for subregional cooperation in the Carpathean region, or the Danubean region at most. I am particularly concerned with the question of how to interprete the recent improvements in relations between, in this case, Slovakia and Hungary.

The historical records of former East European countries in regional cooperation reminds me of a Buddhist tradition. One day, Buddha in Paradise was overlooking hell, where a man was struggling to get out. Buddha ordered a spider to hang down a thread to rescue the man. He grasped at the thread, and began to climb up. But, half on the way he looked down to see thousands of sufferers grasping the thread. Shocked at the scene, he cried: "Hands off! you rascals." At that moment, the thread broke, and the man fell headlong back down into Hell. Indeed, the small states in the Danubian Basin rivalled each other for the favors of Western Powers in the interwar period, and the Western Powers would not have been able to laugh at this story. The Industrialized Powers were not Buddha, but they took advantage of Small States' rivalries to fish in troubled waters.

Former East European States' rivalries had historically been conditioned under such circumstances. In the center-periphery relationship in Europe, the industrialized Western Europe has

been destined to take responsibility for that. It is only natural that an institutionalized Western Europe should have given advice and help to East European victims in their struggle to rid themselves of the yokes of their historical legacies. The alternative to rivalry is [sub]regional cooperation. Their road to regional cooperation is very rocky, even if the leaders of former Eastern Europe were aware of the necessity of cooperation. Prof. Nagayo seems to appreciate Slovakian and Hungarian steps to regional cooperation, however weak they may be. While it is understandable that Prof. Nagayo has a high opinion of Slovakian and Hungarian trust in the decisions of the International Court of Justice, the institution is not always persuasive in its decisions, as its recent judgment on the use of nuclear weapons. What is important are bottom-up moves among the indigenous peoples. [Comments to the Chairperson]

I don't think Prof. Joenniemi is a "minority," because I join with him in the discussion on a "Europe of regions." The words a "Europe of regions" was used by German Foreign Minister Genscher at the time when CBSS (the Council of Baltic Sea States) was formed in 1992, and the word "region" in this case means "subregion" working under upper regional cooperation, in this case, the European Union. When we are talking about a "Europe of regions," we should be aware of the stratified structure appearing in contemporary Europe. There are the European Union, the "nation states" and different subregions. A subregional cooperation is a very loose one, but it still plays an intermediate role between the upper region (the EU) and local institutions including states and local autonomous bodies. Subregional cooperations are increasing in importance in contemporary Europe. [On Ito's Comments to Rudka and Hirose]

I think the metaphar of Mt. Fuji (p. 226) is misleading. The name "subregion" is temporary and for convenience. It is difficult to explain the concept of subregion with a Euclidian drawing on the blackboard. The subregion is not fastened to the

upper region. It is a little bit more flexible. The EU itself needs, for instance, Baltic Sea cooperations. The evidence is the fact that the EU has participated in the CBSS.