Table 1
"Guesstimate" of Relative Importance of the Private Sector

	Hungary	Poland	Czech Republic	Russia
Official Share of the				
Private sector (% of GDP)	60	60	70	55
(1)				(2)

⁽¹⁾ Mid-1995, "rough EBRD estimate"

[Source] EBRD Transition Report 1995, pp. 11, 29, 30 and 31.

Table 2
Sectoral Break-down of the Private Sector in Value-added and Employment, 1994

	in value-added		in employment			Services
						(retail
	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Agriculture	Industry	trade)
Hungary ⁽¹⁾	68.1	54.1	59.7	77.0	61.6	51.6
Poland ⁽²⁾	-	38.0	89.0	-	-	-
Czech Republic ⁽³⁾	82.1	59.0	49.5	23.2	45.2	50.9
(including	-	-	-	77.0	48.0	53.0
cooperatives)						
			-			
Russia						
(non-state	80	55	84.6	21.2	-	51.4
sector)						

[Note] Estimates are for the private sector excluding cooperatives, unless otherwise indicated

- (1) Including cooperatives and excluding financial corporations; 1993 estimate.
- (2) Services include retail trade only.
- (3) GDP estimates are for the non-state sector.

[Source] EBRD, op. cit., pp. 29, 31.


^{(2) &}quot;Pure private sector" - 25%

Table 3
Privatization Trajectories Compared


Ownership Forms and Salient Features	Hungary	Poland	Czech Republic	
Interwoven Ownership	Institutional quasi- public cross-ownership Spontaneous Privatiza- tion from 1988 onwards Important role of banks "Corporate satellites" Relative independence between units(networks relations)	not yet developed, be- cause of still limit-	Institutional quasi- private cross-ownership Vouchers Privatization begun in 1992 Dominating role of banks (founders of IPF) Legacy of the Industrial Associations Strong technical and fi- nancial links(hierar- chical relations)	
	Shareholders: SPA, banks, domestic firms(suppli- ers, customers), foreign companies, local autho- rities, employees, mana- gers. Weak management control	·	Shareholders:citizens, State Property Fund, banks, domestic firms(su- ppliers, customers), fo- reign companies, local authorities, employees, managers. Weak management control	
Employees Privatized Ownership	Limited participation of employees(preferen- tial shares) Some ESOP experiments: uncertain results	SMEs bought after leasing of the firms assets by their wor- kers: Workers' Buy- out. Legacy of the Workers Councils	Weak participation of employees	
"Creative Distruction"	Effective Bankrupcy Law, but overburdened courts	Privatization by liquidation	Limited number of bankrupcies	
Possible Lock-in? (Fixation)	Mild State-bank- industry links	Pronounced dualism between large pub- lic enterprises and small private busi- nesses		

Figure 1 Two Inter-enterprise Ownership Networks among Large Hungarian Firms.

Network I.




Network II.



B - Financial Institution (Bank or Insurance) E - Enterprise Source: Corporate files of the largest 200 enterprises and top 25 banks in the Hungarian Courts of Registry.

Figure 2 Corporate Satellites at Heavy Metal




Rt - Shareholding Company Kft - Limited Liability Company

Numerals in italics indicate Heavy Metal's ownership stake in a given satellite.

Source: Internal company documents at Heavy Metal.


Figure 3
A Hungarian Recombinet



Source: Internal company documents; State Property Agency files; Corporate files, Budapest Court of Registry.

Figures 1-3 [Source] Stark, D., 1994.

Figure 4
Biggest Shareholders of Four Largest Czech Commercial Banks




[Source] Mertlik, P., 1995.

FNM - National Property Fund IPF - Privatization Investment Fund CNB - Central Bank

Mesta a obce - Local Community Kupónovi akcionári - Coupon shareholders

Figure 5
Interlocked Ownership Structures (Bank-Based)




_____ ownership

credits

[Source] Klacek, J., 1995

Figure 6
Diagram – Ownership Structure of Czech Economy



[Source] Mertlik,P.,1995.