

## Comments on the papers of Samson and Šedivý

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I enjoyed Dr. Samson and Mr. Šedivý's papers. These papers are comprehensive and provide information on NATO enlargement by two countries.

First of all, I would like to explain the current stage of enlargement since the NATO issue as a whole is not well-known in Japan. I returned from Europe ten days ago. Among security experts and practitioners including NATO, EU and governmental officials, at this moment, it is commonly understood that, all being well, a concrete step on enlargement will be taken some time next year. One Eurocrat says that the decision will be taken in December. So, whether NATO will enlarge or not is not a question. NATO will enlarge. However, even after the official NATO decision of its enlargement, it will take several years to become a member because of negotiations and the internal procedures of new members as well as the ratification process by the present sixteen member-states.

The experts and practitioners believe that Russia should not be dissociated from the reconstruction of the European security structure and the West is working on building a cooperative security structure for that purpose. Regarding NATO-Russian relations, I will make comments in the following session.

In January 1994, NATO heads of state reaffirmed that the Alliance remained open to the members of other European countries and they envisaged the enlargement of the Alliance. Since then, NATO has been conducting internal preparation including an enlargement study, intensified dialogues with the fifteen interested PFP countries and so on. Irrespective of Russian opposition, NATO will enlarge. In a background briefing, a senior defence official of the US Department of Defence on the NATO Berlin Ministerial Council remarked: "NATO's got a timetable. I think it's clear we're not going to speed it up and we're not going to slow it down. Russians don't have a veto. They can't bargain with NATO

on enlargement... NATO has the right to choose for itself its own members and it will go forward on its own timetable."

Secondly, there is no procedure for application to NATO. Membership is by invitation only. In the case of the EU, it is necessary to make an application. A country can announce its desire to be a member of NATO, but application is not necessary.

I know that Dr. Samson is a well-respected scholar and I also enjoyed his paper which was presented in the Paris ECPR session last autumn. Today's paper implies that Slovakia will not be among the first group of countries which will be invited to join NATO. Among criteria of membership, I think inter-operability is not crucial since military aggression is not realistic. As NATO official papers reiterate, risk is multi-dimensional and multi-faceted. Even during the cold war period, among NATO member countries, especially, land-forces have not been fully inter-operable. They have achieved inter-operability and have constructed infrastructures step-by-step. What matters seems to be democracy-building. Since its birth, NATO has been a community of Western democratic values. In this context, respect for and protection of minorities, and good-neighbourly relations are significant.

On page 124-125 of his paper, in note fifteen, Dr. Samson added that "Slovakia, however, can block the admission of Hungary by its own incapability to become a full-member." What does this mean? When the OSCE tried to appoint its Secretary-General last spring, many countries supported a Hungarian candidate. Central and East European countries blocked it, and now we have an Italian. Traditional rivalry among Central and East European countries is not helpful in their accession to European and trans-Atlantic institutions. The EU countries used a diplomatic exercise called "the Stability Pact" for the preparation of accession by way of promoting good-neighbourly relations and cross-border cooperation. I know all the deficits of this exercise; for example, the border and minority problems in the West were not envisaged. NATO itself attaches importance to this regional cooperation. Do Central and East European countries take this message seriously? In his remarks, he explained that Hungary could block Slovak

membership in NATO. However, NATO's document, which is entitled "Study on NATO Enlargement" states as follows: "In any case, it will be important to make clear that the Alliance remains open to further accessions by countries not among the earliest to be invited to join. A declaration at the time of the first invitation(s) being issued which clearly stated this would both reassure those countries that would not be among the first to be invited and reduce the likelihood of some of those countries submitting unsolicited applications to join the Alliance."

My second question to Dr. Samson is about the Slovak strategy after the announcement of the first invitation. If Slovakia is not allowed in, what measures will be taken in order to enhance its security? I have attended various CSCE / OSCE meetings since the Helsinki summit in 1992. I have the impression that Slovakia is very active in the OSCE. Will Slovakia use the OSCE for that purpose? For example, NATO is examining how to enhance PFP and NACC for stabilization after the announcement of its first enlargement. Poland is launching an idea of security enhancement measures among the Baltic sea states. It includes Russia, and countries that will not be in the first wave.

My third question is about the recent development between Poland and Ukraine. Reportedly, these two countries signed a bilateral agreement on cooperation and security. Does this influence Slovak security policy?

I would now like to move to Mr. Šedivý's paper. About two weeks ago, in Prague, we exchanged views. I have always been impressed by his extensive knowledge of European security issues and his clear explanation and logic. This paper traces the evolution of Czech policy toward NATO in a wider perspective and is a good basis for further discussion. Regarding NATO enlargement, the Czech Republic is one of the happiest nations. His paper seems to reflect this optimism.

He pointed out that immediately after the change, the Czechoslovak idea of an all-European collective security system was shattered by events, such as the Gulf Crisis and so on. From 1990 to 1993, I worked for our Embassy in Brussels and closely

followed NATO transformation and the CSCE. Since then, I have been a frequent flyer to Europe. In addition to his explanation, I would like to point out the US role. From 1989 to 1992, the US was very much concerned about NATO's future because of the idea of strengthening the CSCE towards a collective security organization which would make NATO irrelevant. The US had also been uneasy about the idea of European Security and Defence Identity. The US tried to limit the role of the CSCE and to keep NATO as a collective defence organ. It launched a campaign declaring NATO the only credible cornerstone of stability in Europe. To what extent was this US demarche influential? On page 131, you refer to President Havel's refusal to accept President Mitterand's project, one of whose objectives was to dissociate the US from European security issue.

My second question is about Czech efforts to stabilize the situation after the announcement of its invitation. This is the same question to Dr. Samson. Two weeks ago, you explained that President Havel was preparing a concrete measure for stability.

Finally, as these papers may invite active discussion, I shall now stop my comments. Thank you very much for your kind attention.