

## Comments on the papers of Zhurkin and Iwama

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Firstly, I would like to comment on Prof. Zhurkin's paper, which reflects the Russian position vis-a-vis NATO enlargement. My experience in Brussels and in the OSCE has made me familiar with NATO transformation, its enlargement and Russian attitudes. When I attended the CSCE Stockholm Foreign Ministerial Council in December 1992, Foreign Minister Kozylev made his famous "Shock therapy" speech. Then, in December 1994 in the CSCE Budapest Summit, I listened to carefully President Yeltsin's "Cold Peace" speech.

Despite NATO's information activities, it seems that Russia has not yet changed its view on NATO and sticks to the image of the Cold-War NATO. Even during the Cold War period, NATO was a defensive alliance and never launched an attack against the Warsaw Pact countries. In nature, a collective defence institution does not need a clearly identified enemy. Risk is multi-dimensional and multi-faceted. On the Continent of Europe, due to its unique history of war and peace for centuries, Europeans have been keen on their security interests. Without an enemy, it is legitimate to organize a collective defence.

I wonder when the Russian military will change its zero-sum game thinking which is firmly based on balance of power theory. For them, NATO enlargement to the East probably means Russia's loss. NATO's approach is not based on this thinking. From the outset, enlargement was not encouraged by NATO member countries. NATO member states have been reactive. NATO member countries pressed former Warsaw Pact countries not to raise the membership issue. NATO refused to put it in its official agenda until autumn 1993 mainly due to a lack of internal consensus and Russian reaction. However, NATO could not postpone it forever in view of the interests which had been shown by Central and East European countries.

The starting point of NATO enlargement is to include

Russia in a wider Euro-Atlantic security structure. For that purpose, NATO has undertaken various cooperative measures for Russia. A recent CFE review conference showed that the West took Russian security interests into account. It will be amended in the case of NATO enlargement. The real issue seems to be whether Russia would respond to NATO's offer or not.

Prof. Zhurkin wrote that NATO was rather lazy so far as practical proposals of compromises were concerned. Officially, NATO is not in a position to work out compromises of its enlargement. However, in the framework of the PFP, NATO has launched various proposals in order to enhance cooperation with Russia. However, as recent as last week, Russia continues to withhold most military cooperation from NATO and this has lasted for more than two years. Besides participating in selected military exercises and sending officers to NATO military courses, Russia has not really implemented the PFP individual programme. NATO has been waiting for the Russian revised IPP since the end of 1994. The NATO Berlin document last June reiterated its proposal which is to achieve a political framework for NATO-Russia relations, elaborating basic principles for security cooperation as well as for the development of permanent mechanisms for political consultations, which were proposed by NATO last September. NATO still awaits word from Moscow. In this regard, Mrs. Iwama's paper did not refer to the Russian reaction, which is misleading to the discussion. Only, 16+1 consultations between NATO and Russia on an ad-hoc basis have been held.

I will move on to the second point. Russia proposed the "security model for the 21st century" in Budapest OSCE summit and the West accepted this diplomatic exercise. Since then, the West has been looking forward to listening to a new concrete Russian proposal and ideas. The security model proposal in December 1994 was believed to be launched by Russia in order to counter NATO enlargement. Relative to that, except for a proposal on an economic component, Russia has reiterated its long-standing idea of enhancing and strengthening OSCE, for

example, the treaty-based OSCE, the OSCE executive council and so on, which has not gained support by other participants.

The Russian presidential election is over. Russian diplomacy is expected to be activated in the coming months. In building a new Euro-Atlantic security structure, constructive Russian participation is crucial. My last question to Prof. Zhurkin concerns the influence of NATO enlargement on Russian policy toward China. Will Russia play a China card in order to counter-balance the pressure in the Western part of its territory?

I will now move on to Mrs. Iwama's paper. NATO is a complex issue. When a scholar conducts research, it is necessary to cover the national positions of at least the major NATO countries. I find that NATO documents are the most difficult diplomatic documents since they always reflect heavy compromise among member-states. Furthermore, European security issues are far more complex than NATO. It is necessary to take into account all of the actors, including the major powers, and European and trans-Atlantic institutions since these institutions are highly inter-locked. In the case of NATO enlargement, the OSCE should be taken into careful consideration. If you are interested in the European Security and Defence Identity(ESDI), the evolution of the EU and the WEU and the current IGC should be examined carefully.

Mrs. Iwama's paper failed to do so. The UK's role in NATO is significant since among NATO European countries, France and the UK can conduct significant military operations, for example, the UNPROFOR and the IFOR. In her paper, an emotional criticism against the UK is found only in the context of the EU and no analysis was done in the context of NATO. This paper also failed to explain some basic concepts, for example the ESDI, the CJTF(Combined Joint Task Forces), and the NATO "out of area," which is misleading to readers who are not familiar with NATO. Furthermore, it offers an insufficient description of NATO-Russian relations. NATO documents, including the Berlin Ministerial communique, have repeated that NATO preserve the capability for collective defence. "Politically, the mission of

collective defence co-exists uneasily with NATO's intention to expand to the east." (CRS Issue Brief. Paul E.Gallis, "NATO: Congress Addresses Expansion of the Alliance," June 7, 1996, Washington, D.C, p. 13.) For this reason, NATO member-states have sought to reassure Russia.

Since the end of the East-West military confrontation, NATO has tried to adapt itself to the new security environment. The purpose of this adaptation effort is to ensure the Alliance's military effectiveness. The US-made concept, the CJTF, is a part of this whole adaptation effort. Since the Brussels NATO summit, NATO member-states have worked without interruption for the implementation of the CJTF. As the Alliance priority has been enlargement and there has been disagreement between the US and France on the CJTF, the Alliance has not been able to reach an agreement. Experts find nothing new in the Berlin communique since it was a "framework agreement" and it needed to be implemented.

In the Berlin communique of the NATO ministerial Council, there is no mention of the word "pillar." Pillar thinking represents "European pillar" and "North American pillar." This communique avoided using the word "pillar" and repeated the idea of building "a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO." The CJTF framework agreement in Berlin resulted in consolidation of the WEU as an inter-governmental institution which highly reflects the UK positions. This outcome is also closely linked to the negotiation in the framework of the Inter-Governmental Conference of the EU. In Berlin, the UK immediately supported the French position on the CJTF. For practical reasons, the UK attaches importance to a military effective solution.

When one deals with NATO, it is also necessary to pay attention to the trans-Atlantic link. Regrettably, this paper did not explain how German security policy has attached importance to the trans-Atlantic link as well as to the "Bonn-Paris Axis." No European NATO countries, including France, want to see US disengagement. France wants to keep the US military presence

as long as possible. For Americans, in the case of military contingency, they want to be involved and be informed from the outset. In their view, it is difficult to imagine any CJTF operation which involves no Americans. US Under-Secretary of Defence for policy, Mr. Slocombe, explained the concept of the CJTF in his speech at the Atlantic Council on June 14: "CJTF is by no means only a device for distinctively European-led operations. The US would expect to be fully involved in such CJTF operations - and these may well include non-members of NATO." A possible exception would be a WEU-led peace-keeping mission in Africa or a WEU rescue operation for their nationals who are involved in civil war outside Europe. The CJTF is not only designed for crisis management, but also for collective defence which is exclusively assigned to NATO.

Finally, I do not understand Mrs. Iwama's argument about prompt implementation of the CJTF concept in the context of NATO enlargement. If she were a Russian, I would fully understand this political message, since the development of the ESDI might decouple the US from Europe. However, in reality, NATO countries will make every effort to avoid disengagement. No Central and East European countries are interested in US withdrawal from Europe. France attaches importance to the implementation of the CJTF, which is one condition for France to return to the integrated NATO military structure, and it is not very much in favour of enlargement. However, other countries are to separate the CJTF from enlargement since they do not want to see enlargement taken as hostage. A military expert explains that the full implementation of the CJTF concept will take place after at least a few years of intense work in NATO. The CJTF implementation means that this idea is translated into military structures and procedures which are under review. What he expects is an intermediate report in December. This is why the final communique of the North Atlantic Council Defence Minister meeting, issued June 13 requested the Council to report on progress in December. It is not necessary to implement the CJTF before the end of the IFOR mandate. Post-IFOR operation

can be done without it as IFOR operation is done without the CJTF. If the CJTF defence planning is decided in advance, it is better, and it enables swift military operations. However, in the case of post-IFOR, they have time for military planning.

There are many articles and studies on European security issues which are written by well-informed experts and practitioners. In order to write a scholarly paper, it is necessary to cover these works.