

## EARLY MODERN UKRAINE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST: PROJECTURIES OF AN IDEA

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### 1. UKRAINE AS A CONTACT ZONE IN WESTERN AND ÉMIGRÉ HISTORIOGRAPHY

The territory of present-day Ukraine has for centuries been divided by constantly shifting, internal boundaries, between language and ethnic groups, states and religions, as well as political, cultural, and cardinally different economic systems. Ukraine's territory may be thought of as a sort of "contact zone," possessing a quite differentiated spectrum of social and cultural phenomena.<sup>1</sup> Yet, the historically variegated and contested nature of Ukraine's territory have not been sufficiently studied. This is particularly true for its medieval and early modern periods, even though students of history and culture have long deemed necessary some sort of general model and early attempts have been made to modify the paradigm of "national history," first conceived at the turn of the nineteenth century.<sup>2</sup>

In the national historiography, following romantic conceptualizations of the nation's uniqueness and cultural self-sufficiency, the territory Ukrainians inhabited was imagined as a sort of metaphysical place existing outside of time, where "ethnos and territory - the two great creative forces in the life of every people [...] meet."<sup>3</sup> Thus, everything non-Ukrainian that appeared on the nation's territory was associated with an aggressor who desired to seize "our" land, subordinate "our" faith, and subjugate "our" people. Supposedly, the vitality of the "nation" could be actively expressed only in the natural centre of Ukraine's territory - along the Dnieper river and around Kiev, while the peripheries exposed the Ukrainian people's political fate and national culture to mortal dan-

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1 For more on contact zones, see A. M. Nekrasov et al., eds., *Kontaktnye zony v istorii Vostochnoi Evropy: Perekreski politicheskikh i kul'turnykh vzaimovliyanii* (Moscow, 1995). With regard to the multifaceted features of Kievan Rus' as the foundation for the future Ukraine, see G. Giraud, "Il nome della cosa: Rus'-Ukraina e dintorni," in *Letterature di Frontiera* 2:2 (1992), pp. 31-44.

2 The most exhaustive "national history" of the Ukraine was Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi's nine volume *Istoriya Ukrainy-Rusy* which he wrote between 1898 and 1936. This work was published many times, most recently by "Naukova dumka" in Kyiv, between 1991 and 1998. An English translation of this monumental work has been undertaken by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Canada.

3 M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriya Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1991), p. 8.

ger. The people became exhausted from struggling for centuries against “Asiatic hordes” and then invaders from the west, who proved to be more successful.<sup>4</sup> In the interpretations of the past containing a stronger anti-Russian bias, this bipolar understanding of centre and peripheries was depicted as a kind of metaphysical triangle of peril, inside of which the “the leading ideas of Ukrainian history” intrinsically contrasted: a) in the east, towards the steppe, there was the struggle to reclaim seized lands, b) in the west, towards Poland, there were political clashes, b) to the north, towards Russia, there were racial and cultural struggles.<sup>5</sup>

In the 1920s this understanding of Ukrainian identity, formed under the influence of romantic nationalism and reinforced by historiographical and literary stereotypes, was modified by other ideas: 1) that Ukraine was a border region (“okraina”) of both Europe and Asia, where their respective influences merged; 2) that Ukraine was a civilizational crossroads between “West” and “East,” that is, between Europe, as it is generally understood as a cultural community, and “Asia” in the similarly metaphorical sense. These theses contradicted both the national historiography’s romantic view of the territory of the Ukrainian ethnos as a self-sufficient whole and Eurasian concepts, which held that Rus’ (i.e. Ukraine, Belorussia, and Russia) ought not to be considered the eastern edge of Europe, but rather the western edge of Asia.<sup>6</sup>

The first of these two ideas was most completely formulated in the 1923 publication, *Survey of the National Territory of Ukraine*, by Stepan Rudnyts’kyi,<sup>7</sup> supposedly influenced by the ideas of the German geopolitical school, in particular F. Ratzel.<sup>8</sup> In contrast to the book’s clearly quasi-scientific aim (i.e. to explain why the Ukrainian people failed to establish their own state during the revolutionary events of 1917-1921), the author’s professional training as a geographer prevailed over his ambitions as a publicist. Despite the book’s rather aggressive style, it contains accurate observations on the role of geomorphological, climatic, and territorial factors in Ukrainian history. According to the author, Ukraine’s “borderland” nature is explained in particular by its geographic position, at the border of three worlds: the European, Oriental-Islamic,

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4 Ibid., pp. 12-16.

5 The greatest consequence of this triangular vision was depicted in a book by Stepan Tomashivs’kyi, one of M. Hrushevs’kyi’s disciple: *Ukrains’ka istoriya /I/ Starynny viky i seredni viky* (L’viv, 1919). This book has been published several times, most recently in L’viv in 1993.

6 See: G.V. Vernadskii, “O Dvizhenii russkikh na Vostok,” in *Nauchnyi istoricheskii zhurnal* 1:2 (St. Petersburg, 1914), p. 54.

7 S. Rudnyts’kyi, *Oglyad natsional’noi teritorii Ukrainy* (Berlin, 1923). This book has been included in a collection of works by S. Rudnyts’kyi, *Chomu my khochemo samostiinoi Ukrainy?* (L’viv, 1994).

8 F. Ratzel, *Die politischen Probleme des Weltkrieges* (Leipzig, 1918). Rudnyts’kyi’s views in a broader context may be found in V.A. Potul’nyts’kyi’s *Teoriya ukrains’koi politolohii* (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 73-85.

and Asiatic-nomadic. Ukraine is again the “triangle” in which “races, cultures, and peoples clash; it is not just a territory at the edge, but a land where frontiers meet.”<sup>9</sup> In fact, in summing up his observations, Rudnyts’kyi did not stray far from the national historiography, presenting Ukraine’s unfortunate territorial situation as the “fatal flaw” which explains its people’s many past tribulations.

Vyacheslav Lypyns’kyi held a fundamentally opposing view, clothed in a quite flamboyant formula, like all the other views of this brilliant neo-romantic historian. Lypyns’kyi’s formula was fated not only to survive its creator, but to establish for itself a firm intellectual tradition. In his popular 1923 essay *Religion and the Church in the History of Ukraine* Lypyns’kyi for the first time wrote of Ukraine as a region of synthesis *between the East and the West*.<sup>10</sup> In the author’s opinion, this “was the essence of Ukraine, the spirit with which it had been endowed since it was created by God, its historical destiny, the sign and symbol of its national individuality.”<sup>11</sup> The dual nature of Ukraine’s identity began with its wavering between Rome and Byzantium, attempting to select one Christian rite, and ended with its vacillations between the Polish and Muscovite models of “political, cultural, and philosophical development.”<sup>12</sup> According to Lypyns’kyi, Ukraine’s multi-vectorial character is the inherent basis for its existence. Therefore, the condition *sine qua non* for a successful national life is not to lament its “ill-fated territory” and not to war against either the European or Asian elements, but rather to search for ways to establish harmony between these two sets of religious, philosophical, cultural, and political ideals.<sup>13</sup>

The simultaneous appearance of Rudnyts’kyi’s and Lypyns’kyi’s publications could hardly have been mere coincidence. The emergence of new states from the ruins of the Habsburg empire and in the western borderlands of the Russian empire sparked an outburst of restorative myths from the so-called *geschichtlose Völker* in Eastern Europe, some of whom succeeded in gaining independence while others failed. The demand for self-determination arose (among other reasons) out of the emergence of a new model demanding that each people have their own territory, which challenged the well-entrenched Western understanding of Eastern Europe as the “uncivilized part of Europe.”<sup>14</sup> And so, on the one hand, a reevaluation of the very idea of “Eastern Europe”<sup>15</sup>

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9 S. Rudnyts’kyi, “Ukrains’ka sprava zi stanovyscha politychnoi heohrafii,” in S. Rudnyts’kyi’s *Chomu my khochemo...*, p. 116.

10 V. Lypyns’kyi, *Relihiya i tserkva v istorii Ukrainy* (Philadelphia, 1925). This book has been published many times since, most recently in Kyiv in 1993.

11 Citation taken from the latest publication, p. 58.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 64.

13 *Ibid.*, pp. 65-70.

14 The common western perception of Eastern Europe provoked an intellectual “revolt” in the 1920s and 1930s. For more details see L. Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Calif., 1994).

15 For more details see: J. K. Koczowski, *East Central Europe in the Historiography of the Countries of the Region* (Lublin, 1995).

was proposed, and on the other hand, a transitional, East-West construction was being formulated, in the center of which each people saw themselves - Ukrainians, Poles,<sup>16</sup> Rumanians,<sup>17</sup> etc.

The new academic, as opposed to the journalistic, view of European East is customarily attributed to the papers read by young Polish historians Oskar Halecki and Martselii Handelsman at the 7th International Congress of Historians held in Brussels in 1923.<sup>18</sup> As is known, *Fédération des Sociétés Historique de l'Europe Orientale* was founded in 1927, and from 1928 to 1939 it held congresses and published its *Bulletin*. In Budapest, *Archivum Europae Centro-Orientalis*, a similar journal with parallel views began publishing in 1935.<sup>19</sup> The *Fédération* included two Ukrainian learned associations from outside of Soviet Ukraine: the Shevchenko Learned Society in L'viv, and the Ukrainian Institute at Warsaw University.

The idea of an East-Central Europe (or as it is referred to nowadays, Central Eastern Europe) has some commonality with Tomas Masaryk's idea of New Europe (*Nová Evropa*), which labelled that space metaphorically "between West and East," as Lypyns'kyi had done earlier.<sup>20</sup> One of the main points in these concepts was the importance placed on the region's multiple cultures and ethnic groupings, as well as their sensitive blending, which led to the emergence in this area of some sort of distinct civilization that developed its own cultural physiognomy.

The intellectual biography of this idea in the postwar years strongly reflected its metageographic context; geographic understandings were complemented with cultural meanings. At the same time, academic interest became so entangled with national historical myths, on the one hand, and the refusal to

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16 For example, the notion that reconstituted Poland was a natural pier, whose role between Europe (meaning the Western Europe) and Moscow was to restrain and to europeanize savage Russia, was expressively formulated in 1919 by E. Paszkowski's *Zawierucha ukraińska* (Warszawa, 1919), pp. 71, 85.

17 For a rather peculiar Rumanian variation of national identity located between West and East, see the famous "1927 Generation" among whose authors were Mircea Eliade and Eugene Ionesco. For greater detail see: K. Verdery, "The Production and Defence of 'the Romanian Nation,' 1900 to World War II" in R.G. Fox, ed., *Nationalist Ideologies and the Production of National Cultures, American Ethnological Society Monograph Series 2* (Washington, D.C., 1990), pp. 81-111.

18 O. Halecki, "L'histoire de l'Europe Orientale. Sa division en époques, son milieu géographique et ses problèmes fondamentaux," in *La Pologne au Ve Congrès International des Sciences Historiques, Bruxelles, 1923* (Varsovie, 1924), pp. 73-94; also in the same volume, M. Handelsman, "Féodalité et féodalisation dans l'Europe Occidentale," pp. 95-112.

19 Seven volumes were published, the last one appeared undated, but approximately in late 1943.

20 For more about the genealogy and development of the New Europe idea see: T. Shinohara, "Central European Discourses from Historical Perspective," T. Hayashi, ed., *The Emerging New Regional Order in Central and Eastern Europe* (Sapporo, 1996), pp. 29-46.

submit to the Soviet Union's domination, on the other hand, that it became impossible to deepen our understanding of the question.<sup>21</sup> The idea of Ukraine as a territory "between West and East" has now found a completely independent existence among Ukrainian scholars. For obvious reasons, however, this concept received differing explications from individuals working in isolation and under censorship, and those living outside Soviet Ukraine. Nevertheless, all these persons were united by their decidedly western cast of mind - a desire to discover in Ukrainian history and culture only those elements that proved Ukraine's "kinship with Europe."

Soviet Ukrainian scholars' views on this matter will be discussed later. Among foreign scholars, not subjected to the censors' diktat, this concept echoed the old thesis that Ukraine's geographic situation possessed a "fatal flaw," making it vulnerable to nomadic raids from the steppes; it also reflected the reaction of the first generation of Ukrainian émigré intellectuals in L'viv and Prague during the 1930s and mid-1940s to the Eurasian Orient. In the academic and publicist publications of adherents to the Central-Eastern Europe idea, Ukraine's territory, being the most eastern part of the region, was considered the most vulnerable (not least, because it was partly located in the Soviet Union - a dismal symbol of "Asia"). Moreover, proponents of Ukraine's "Europeanness" had to disprove the opinion, widespread in the 1920s and 1930s, that Ukraine was part of "Turkic civilization."<sup>22</sup> A curious echo of this thesis is the argument that there is a duality in the national character, that all Ukrainians' negative traits may be explained by traces of Turkic blood flowing in their veins, and that this combination has allegedly perverted the "Slavic psyche" by arousing destructive, cruel and anarchic instincts.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, this mournful remnant "is still expressed from time to time by those people who have not yet been raised to a higher intellectual plane."<sup>24</sup> It was precisely this sacred "inclination

21 Just prior to the end of communist censorship, there appeared a polemical work contending the existence of a "third" or new Europe that represented a macroregion "between West and East." This was a samizdat essay written in 1980 by the well-known Hungarian historian and medievalist Jenő Szűcs. J. Szűcs, *Vázlat Európa három történeti régiójáról* (Budapest, 1980). A legal publication appeared in Budapest, in 1983; in French it appeared as *Les trois Europes* (Paris, 1985); in German, *Die drei historischen Regionen Europas* (Frankfurt, 1994); in Polish *Trzy Europy* (Lublin, 1995); in Russian, "Tri istoricheskikh regiona Evropy" in *Tsentral'naya Evropa kak istoricheskii region* (Moscow, 1996), pp. 156-250. The most recent Ukrainian interpretation of this issue is by M. Zubrytska, "Discourse on Europeanness and Its Spatio-Temporal Dimensions in East Central Europe," Karin Junefelt and Martin Peterson, eds., *Cultural Encounters in East Central Europe* (Uppsala, 1998), pp. 99-104.

22 See among other materials, articles and books of the Polish scholar of cultures, Felix Koneczny, e.g. his *O wielości cywilizacji* (Cracow, 1935). Its English translation was published in London in 1962 under the title *On the Plurality of Civilizations*.

23 See W. Tomkiewicz, "Ukraina między Wschodem i Zachodem," in *Sprawy narodowościowe* 12:1-2 (Warszawa, 1938), pp. 9-10 and passim.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 11.

to anarchy," supposedly acquired at the genetic level over many centuries, that doomed to failure any attempts by Ukrainians to found their own state; it was (supposedly) the main cause of the failures during the revolutionary events of 1917-1921.<sup>25</sup> As antipodes to such "anarchic tendencies" these Ukrainian émigrés posed such desirable qualities as discipline, orderliness, obedience to the law and a well-developed civic instinct; these were offered up as traces of western culture that had been flowing into Ukraine prior to its subordination to the Russian imperial authorities.<sup>26</sup>

The pejorative connotation of these "Turkic traces" could not but intensify feelings of autochthonism and isolationism in regard to Ukraine's Asiatic neighbors. Moreover, it provided a convenient opportunity to paint Ukraine as the shield of a Christian Europe.<sup>27</sup> Boris Krupnyts'kyi, a major émigré historian and participant in the late 1940s discussions about civilizations, described Ukraine's place in West-East relations as follows:

"Undoubtedly, Ukraine was the borderland of Europe, a barrier against another, non-European world. Like Spain in the West, so too Ukraine in the East of Europe had protected the last bastions of the European spirit from Turko-Tatar and Arabic dominion. And while struggling against these, Ukraine always remained European. Ukrainian development organically followed the European mode."<sup>28</sup>

Declaring oneself "the last bastion" meant not only estrangement from the fraternity that was actually living on the enemy side (let alone the foolish reference to "Turkic blood"), but logic also dictated that any contact with the East be refused. This notion was expounded in a 1938 book by the nationalist political scientist Yurii Lypa, who asserted that Ukrainian-Turkic contacts were simply impossible because the two races found each other to be repugnant.<sup>29</sup> Essentially the same idea was presented in a slightly more delicate form by Ivan Lysyak-Rudnyts'kyi, one of the most authoritative émigré scholars of Ukrainian culture from the 1960s to the early 1980s. At a Cyril and Methodius Slavic historical congress in 1963, Lysyak-Rudnyts'kyi read a paper entitled "The Ukraine between East and West," describing Ukraine as a classic region of "unionistic traditions," because there the social and political structures of Eu-

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25 The theme of "inclination to anarchy" - alleged to be immanently suited to the Ukrainian character - was a frequent topic in political publications throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In addition to Vyacheslav Lypyns'kyi, the chief proponent of this theory, a like-minded historian and publicist, Ivan Krevets'kyi, also deserves mention; he authored *Iz istorii anarkhii v Ukraini* (L'viv, 1936), and published a series of articles beginning with the 1922 extremely polemical "Oblichitel' anarkhii," *Hromads'kyi Visnyk*, July 11 (L'viv, 1922).

26 V.Lypyns'kyi, *Relihiya i tserkva...*, pp. 58-59. Also see N.D. Czubytyj, "Ukraine and the Western World," in *Ukrainian Quarterly* 3 (1947), pp. 145-158.

27 One of the early books on this subject was by O. Terlets'kyi, *Ukraina zaborolom kul'tury i tsyvilizatsii pered stepovykamy* (L'viv, 1930).

28 B. Krupnyts'kyi, *Osnovni problemy istorii Ukrainy* (Munich, 1955), p. 5.

29 Yu. Lypa, *Pryznachennya Ukrainy* (L'viv, 1938), pp. 140-145.

rope joined with the Eastern Christian (Byzantine) ethos. The author asserted that the "Eurasian Orient," unlike the "Byzantine Orient," always presented a tremendous threat to the ethnoses' development, in defensive reaction to which it was never "internalized."<sup>30</sup>

In order to overcome this "anti-Turkic" syndrome, a new generation and a modification of views on history in general were required. A new wave of oriental studies, impartially examining the Islamic world and the Eurasian, nomadic steppe, as well as their contacts with Ukraine, is closely connected to the first director of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, Omeljan Pritsak, and his students at that university.<sup>31</sup> And jumping ahead slightly, it is noteworthy that Omeljan Pritsak was a student of Agathangel Kryms'kyi, the patriarch of Ukrainian orientalist from Soviet Ukraine. For a brief time, from 1920 until the repressions of 1931-34 several orientalist research centres were established in Soviet Ukraine, all of which worked under the aegis of the All-Ukrainian Association of Oriental Studies, which included 193 active members. The Association published their own *Bulletin* (five issues between 1926 and 1928), and twelve issues of a journal *Skhidnyi Svit* [Eastern World] (1927-31); though the last two issues were forced to be published under the title - *Chervonyi Skhid* [Red East].<sup>32</sup> Much of these Orientalists' scholarly work, already prepared for publication - dictionaries, books, grammars, etc. - was destroyed during the repressions of the 1930s. A large number of scholars perished in the camps, and among the victims was Agathangel Kryms'kyi, who died in the Kustanai prison hospital (Kazakhstan) on 25 January 1942.<sup>33</sup>

The academic atmosphere fostered at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (HURI), especially beginning with the publication of its journal, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (since 1977), and a series of monographs, as well as the estab-

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30 In *Das östliche Mitteleuropa in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Acta Congressus historiae Slavicae Salisburgensis in memoriam SS Cyrilli et Methodii anno 1963 celebrati* (Wiesbaden, 1966), pp.163-169. A complete version of the paper was published several times including the posthumous publication of Lysyak-Rudnyts'kyi's essays: *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1987). The latest publication appeared in Ukrainian translation in I. Lysyak-Rudnyts'kyi, *Istorychni ese* (Kyiv, 1994), vol. 1, pp. 1-9.

31 In addition to work by Pritsak, especially his polemical monograph *Origin of Rus'* (Cambridge: Mass., 1981), works published in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* by his students also deserve mention: students of the Ottoman culture Lyubomir Haida and Victor Ostapchuk, and Ostapchuk's Ph.D. dissertation "The Ottoman Black Sea Frontier and the Relations of the Porte with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, 1622-1628" (Harvard University, 1990).

32 O. Pritsak, " 'Skhidnyi Svit' prodovzhuet'sya (Slovo holovnoho redaktora)" in *Skhidnyi Svit* 1 (Kyiv, 1993), pp.3-4. *Skhidnyi Svit* was revived in 1993 as the journal of the newly founded Institute of Oriental Studies of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences. It is noteworthy that the Institute is headed by Omeljan Pritsak, Professor Emeritus from Harvard University.

33 V. Prystaiko, Yu. Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i GPU-NKVD. Trahichne desyatylyttya 1924-1934* (Kyiv, 1996), p. 84.

lishment (somewhat later) of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS) at the University of Alberta, marked a conclusive departure from the patriotic naivete that led to exclusive focus on the "European" foundations of Ukrainian history. Adopting as a whole the idea of Ukraine as a cultural region "between East and West,"<sup>34</sup> American and Canadian historians in their works of the 1980s and 1990s narrowed the mythical notion of "the West in general" to the problem of translating European cultural traditions through the intermediation of Poland; they have revealed Poland's intermediary role in Ukraine's adoption of concepts and models of political culture, types of education, intellectual priorities, and religious positions.<sup>35</sup> Opening up a Round Table discussion at an international congress dedicated to the millennium of Christianization of Rus' in 1988, Professor Ihor Shevchenko formulated the problem this way:

"When we view things, however, from the vantage point of Eastern Europe, we are entitled to the quip that, to be sure, without Byzantium there would have been no Ukraine and Byelorussia, but that, on the other hand, without Poland there would also have been no Ukraine and Byelorussia."<sup>36</sup>

## 2. UKRAINE AS A CONTACT ZONE IN SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY

Until the end of the 1980s, the notions described above came under the exclusive domain of Ukrainian specialists living abroad. As is known, the brief period of relative academic freedom in Soviet Ukraine was associated with the policy of so-called "Ukrainianization" between 1923 and 1929 - the Ukrainian version of *korenizatsiia* policy proclaimed at the twelfth congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1923. This policy was suspended when re-

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34 That is the title of an essay by Ihor Shevchenko, published first in Polish in a Parisian magazine *Kultura* (1992, grudzień). An English version was published in his book: I. Šhevčenko, *Ukraine between East and West. Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century* (Edmonton-Toronto, 1996).

35 In particular, see: G.H. Williams, "Protestants in the Ukrainian Lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth," in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2:1 (1978), pp. 41-72; 2: 2 (1978), pp. 184-210; G.G. Grabovich, "The History of Polish-Ukrainian Literary Relations: A Literary and Cultural Perspective," in P.J. Potichnyj, ed., *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present* (Edmonton-Toronto, 1980), pp. 107-131; I. Šhevčenko, "The Many Worlds of Peter Mohyla," *Harvard Ukrainina Studies* 8:1-2 (1984), pp. 9-44; F.A. Sysyn, *Between Poland and Ukraine. The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600-1653* (Cambridge: Mass., 1985); M. Frick, *Meletij Smotryckyj* (Cambridge: Mass., 1993), and others.

36 I. Šhevčenko, "Religious Culture of Eastern Christianity in the Territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the XVI-XVII Centuries: Tavola Rotonda," in *Le origini e lo sviluppo della Christianit. Slavo-Bizantina*, a cura di S.W. Swierkosz-Lenart, Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo (Rome, 1992), p. 461. The same idea lay at the base of the future essay by Shevchenko that was published in Polish, "Polska w dziejach Ukrainy," in I. Šhevčenko, *Ukraina między Wschodem a Zachodem* (Warszawa, 1996), pp. 45-65. Its Ukrainian translation in *Ī. Nezalezhnyi Kul'turolohichnyi Chasopys* 10 (L'viv, 1997), pp. 6-24.



search institutes were shut down and their scholars were exposed to physical and psychological terror.<sup>37</sup> It will suffice to recall that among the forty-five persons charged in the spring of 1930 by Soviet prosecutors for belonging to a fabricated organization called the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, twenty-six were scholars, primarily in the humanities. In a closed trial of the so-called Ukrainian National Centre in 1932 fifty persons were condemned. As a result of the so-called “purges” of cultural elites after “Ukrainianization” was officially repealed (1934), about 80 percent of the cultural and scientific intelligentsia were repressed, executed, or perished in the camps.<sup>38</sup>

At the same time, administrative reforms in academic institutions were carried out; certain areas of study in the humanities were eliminated, because they were deemed “counterrevolutionary” or “bourgeois.” Byzantine, Hebraic, and (as mentioned earlier) Oriental studies all disappeared. Concurrently, the study of western Europe and national minorities within Ukraine also ceased. Of course, the proscription of these disciplines, which would have pushed scholarship beyond the narrow confines of Ukrainian studies, was not accidental. In Moscow an ideological shift had occurred, introducing Russian ethnocentric concepts as the basis for a monolithic and totalitarian state in which union republics’ humanistic studies were limited to the study of local history and culture, but with an obligatory emphasis on their ties to the history and culture of Russia. In addition, one should not ignore the fact that after the arrest of renowned academics and their students, the level of Ukrainian scholarship dropped sharply and very quickly began to exhibit the psychological effects of Sovietization - isolationism and xenophobia. As a result, party censorship became intertwined with internal restrictions on freedom, while scholarly discourse narrowed, not only because of Party directives, but because of the conviction that the isolationist paradigm was “true.”

For the adherents of the new order (since the end of the 1930s these were individuals with low qualifications, which was also the quality that saved them physically), there seemed to be no sense in searching for a special place in the geo-cultural context for Ukraine, or in considering the multifaceted landscape of its territory. The abandonment of this search served to revive the paradigm of “national history” in Ukrainian humanities, with the result that a clear dis-

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37 For more about the Ukrainianization policies, see: James D. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933* (Cambridge: Mass., 1983). Concerning the phenomenon of “Sovietization” of the humanities in the Ukraine in an ideological, cultural, psychological, and semiotic aspects, see H. Hrabovych, “Sovetyzatsiia ukrains’koi humanistyky. 1. Istoriiya ta nasyt’stvo,” in *Krytyka* 1 (Kyiv, 1997), pp. 18-22; “Sovetyzatsiia ukrains’koi humanistyky. 2. Ideolohiia ta kul’turnyi styl’,” *Krytyka* 2 (Kyiv, 1997), pp. 10-14.

38 Yu. Lavrinenko, *Rozstrilyane vidrodzhennya. Antolohiia 1917-1933. Poeziya - proza - drama - esei* (Paris, 1959), pp. 12, 965. For more about the tragedy suffered by the Ukrainian intelligentsia during Stalinist repressions, see H. Kas’yanov, *Ukrains’ka intelihentsiia 1920-30-kh rokiv: sotsial’nyi portret ta istorychna dolya* (Kyiv-Edmonton, 1992).

inction between “ours” and “theirs/hostile” reappeared. Yet, the similarities between the former and this “national history” were rather superficial. First, because scholars possessed such a low level of professional knowledge, there could not be any precise conceptualization of the dichotomy between “ours” and “theirs.” Second, the sphere of “ours” - so important to the creation of a “national history” - lost its strict borders, due to the ritualistic (and obligatory!) glorification of Ukraine’s “fraternity and friendship with the Russian people.” Third, the sphere of “the foreign” was transformed from a condition of “the nation’s existence” (i.e. a metaphysical given) to a topical postulate that only mirrored the USSR’s political priorities.

The historiography of Soviet Ukraine (including the historiography of culture, widely understood), from the 1930s until the middle of the 1980s, presents a shining example of ideological manipulations, conditioned by vagueness about Ukraine as a territory “between West and East.” In this case the best materials for comparison are not descriptions of concrete cases, but rather linear outlines of the “whole history,” which, because they were approved by the party’s censors, served as the conceptual canvas for any more specific investigation independent of its theme. Thus, we may compare representations of the territory inhabited by the Ukrainian ethnos as exemplified in three outlines of Ukraine’s history: 1) a 1929 publication that appeared on the eve of the destruction of Ukrainian humanities<sup>39</sup>; 2) five editions that were published between 1937 and 1941,<sup>40</sup> and which were released again in slightly altered variation between 1943 and 1944<sup>41</sup>; 3) an abbreviated version published in 1960<sup>42</sup> of the two volumes of *History of the Ukrainian SSR*, published by the Institute of Ukrainian

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39 M. Yavors’kyi, *Istoriya Ukrainy v styslomu narysi* (Kyiv, 1929, 3rd edition). Matvei Yavors’kyi, a member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, was among the most notable Ukrainian Marxist historians in the 1920s. In 1931 he was charged with being “ideologically harmful” through his national communist tendency. On November 2, 1937 he was shot in the Solovetskii Island Monastery camp. See V. Prystaiko, Yu. Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi i GPU-NKVD...*, pp. 84-86.

40 *Narysy z istorii Ukrainy*, volumes 1-5 (Kyiv, 1937-1941). This was the first “collective work” by the Institute of Ukrainian History of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, founded in 1936 on the ruins of the research institutes abolished during the repression. One can only guess at the identity of the individual authors of articles in the publication.

41 The first volume saw the light of day in Ufa (Bashkiriya) in 1943 to where the Institute had been evacuated. The second volume was published in Kiev in 1944. The authors were partially reshuffled. According to a booklet published in 1996 in commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the Institute, the 1944 publication was written in “the best progressive traditions of Ukrainian historiography,” although in fact, one would find it difficult to discover a more warped representation of the past.

42 O.K. Kasymenko, *Istoriya Ukrain’s’koi RSR. Populyarnyi narys* (Kyiv, 1960). In the post-war years, Kasymenko was the director of the Institute of Ukrainian History. In 1955 he published a monograph focusing on the history of Russo-Ukrainian relations since the beginning of the Cossack uprisings in the mid-seventeenth century, but it was almost a plagiarism, a medley of what had already been studied and argued.

History in 1955 and 1957. These two volumes' basic concepts were expanded into ten volumes in: *History of Ukrainian SSR*, published between 1977-1979 (in Russian, between 1980-1985).

Laying out his conceptual principles in the introduction to his 1929 study, Matvei Yavors'kyi stated that "no society is established, grows, and develops alone on its territory, isolated from the rest of the world and utilizing only what it produces. A society establishes ties with neighbouring communities, it trades in material and cultural commodities either by means of war or peacefully. [...] At no time in history can one find a people who were entirely self-reliant and free from the influence of other peoples. [...] In the history of nations there has never been complete isolation, nor has there been complete assimilation. [...] These same principles apply to Ukraine and its history. Its very geographic situation points to the fact that it could not have developed alone, apart from other peoples. Natural borders did not separate Ukraine from its neighbours; on the contrary, the borders actually facilitated the establishment of broad contacts with all neighbours."<sup>43</sup>

Yavors'kyi then followed this basic principle - the "openness" of Ukraine's borders - in his descriptions of historical events. For example, he frequently stressed that in prehistory the territory of the future Ukraine was peopled by a variety of "races." The story of the role the Varangians played in establishing the Kievan state begins with the nonpartisan statement that "the Varangians appeared in the Dnieper river basin." Concerning other peoples - the Pechenegs, Polovtsy, and Mongols - the writer repeated the same neutral expression verbatim. (Incidentally, in writing about the Mongol period of supremacy, he avoided the traditional epithet used in histories - the Tatar-Mongol Yoke, employing instead the neutral metaphor: "a Tatar snowstorm.")<sup>44</sup> Yavors'kyi's innovative interpretation of the Tatar factor during the Golden Horde period testifies to the achievements of Ukrainian orientalists of the 1920s. Yavors'kyi attributed the development of urban trades to the Tatars, arguing that they "possessed in fact a developed high culture and were renowned as good craftsmen, though our chroniclers portrayed them as savages."<sup>45</sup> On the other hand, relations between western Rus' principalities and their Hungarian and Polish neighbours were described as "close contacts" or "closer and closer ties"; these Rus' principalities' recognition of the suzerainty of the Lithuanian prince and the Polish king in the fourteenth century was construed as the preferred choice of the local elite.<sup>46</sup>

Yavors'kyi employed similar words to describe the compact made with the Muscovite tsar at Pereyaslav in 1654 that established an "autonomous Cossack region" from the lands that had been detached from the Polish-Lithuanian

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43 M. Yavors'kyi, *Istoriya Ukrainy...*, pp. 10-11.

44 Ibid., pp. 22, 28, 32, and 35.

45 Ibid., p. 35.

46 Ibid., pp. 36-37.

Commonwealth and made a part of Russia. Not surprisingly, Yavorskyi, as a Marxist, believed that the Cossack revolution that broke out in 1648 was triggered by the growing economic contradictions among the various social groupings within Ukraine. At the same time, the Cossacks' struggle with Poland for national independence, whose symbolism was of pivotal importance for national history, was not discussed at all.<sup>47</sup> Writing about the eighteenth-century popular uprisings in the Dnepr region of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and about the massive slaughters of Poles and Jews which accompanied them, Yavors'kyi was almost the first scholar in Ukrainian historiography to admit that the main reasons for these bloody excesses had been "anti-semitism" and religious fanaticism. Here it is difficult to overlook the influence of the flourishing Hebraic studies in the Ukraine of the 1920s.<sup>48</sup>

These points are extraordinarily important not only because they testify to the refusal of Ukrainian historical thinkers during the 1920s (though Marxists) to see an "enemy of the nation" in either the West or the East, but because every thesis that Yavors'kyi proposed was soon to be replaced by one diametrically opposed. The authorship of the theses that replaced Yavors'kyi's are difficult to determine, because the collectively-written historical outlines of this new wave, published between 1937 and 1941, did not include introductions in which individual contributors' historical views were identified. (This practiced was continued until the fall of the USSR: Introductions to "collective publications" were written anonymously but with a ritualistic acknowledgment to the "genuinely scientific expositions of history," or else to "the teachings of Comrade Stalin" (in 1937); later introductions claimed that the historical exposition was created "on the basis of Marxism-Leninism." Each introduction contained every kind of invective against "falsifiers" - from "Trotsky-ite-Bukharinist-Fascist agents" (1937) to "bourgeois-nationalist falsifiers.")<sup>49</sup> We will now lay out the essence of these changes, comparing them with Yavors'kyi's outline.

Yavors'kyi's statement that the territory of present-day Ukraine was originally inhabited by a variety of "races" ceased to be stressed and was supplanted by the categorical assertion that "the territory of the Ukrainian SSR has eternally been a Slavic land."<sup>50</sup> By way of proof, it was emphasized that the territory had been "since ancient times populated by eastern Slavs and their ancestors," who comprised "an ethnically uniform population."<sup>51</sup> The contours of this territory were quite symptomatic: bordered on the south, east and west by

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47 Ibid., pp. 54-58.

48 Ibid., pp. 91-92. Obviously, this is not a reference to anti-Semitism in the strict sense, but rather to routine and everyday anti-Jewish feelings.

49 Cited from the "Introduction" to *Narysyz z istorii Ukrainy*, vol.1 (Kyiv, 1937), pp. 3-4. *Istoriya Ukrainskoi SSR*, vol. 1 (Kiev, 1981), pp. 6, 15.

50 O.K. Kasimenko, *Istoriya Ukrainsk'koi RSR...*, p. 5.

51 *Istoriya Ukrainskoi SSR*, vol. 2 (Kiev, 1982), p. 325.

a network of hydrographic systems, but on the north, where the neighbouring people were Belorussians and Russians, there were no clear ethnic boundaries.<sup>52</sup> Concerning other ethnic groupings within Ukraine, there is barely a mention, and faceless alien groups were assumed to have assimilated into the local population during their migration.<sup>53</sup> In such a monolithic society (apparently modelled after the Soviet Union) there could not be even a hint of ethnic conflict. Thus, discussing the bloody slaughters of Poles and Jews in Ukraine in 1768 (which, according to Yavors'kyi, was provoked by "anti-semitism" and religious fanaticism), that the victims were Jews and Poles is simply not mentioned. Since it was impossible to omit altogether the excesses committed during this "people's rebellion," the victims of the slaughter were identified as "szlachta and leaseholders," "szlachta, Catholic priests, and the urban rich men," etc. (Incidentally, the very fact of the slaughter was also omitted, and the surrender of the town to the insurgents was cynically described as its "liberation.")<sup>54</sup>

The triumph of xenophobia and isolationism was yet more conspicuous in the description of relations with the outside world. Thus, the Varangians were changed into "Norman barbarians" invading Rus'; princes' foreign allies in dismantling dynasties became "robber-occupiers"; the neighborly rapprochement of the western principalities of Rus' with Poland and Hungary was depicted as "a primary threat to their existence."<sup>55</sup> Mongolian suzerainty once again became the "Tatar-Mongolian Yoke," and in the post-WWII version this period began to resemble depictions of the recent partisan struggle, i.e. "popular resistance" was stressed, in which the masses "refused to submit to the cruel invaders, whom the masses attacked brazenly and suddenly at every opportunity, destroying them by any means."<sup>56</sup>

The transfer of the western principalities to the sceptre of neighbouring rulers was labelled a "foreign occupation." Henceforth, all Ukrainian lands that were not part of the Russian state were tagged in official publications as "occupied" by Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, etc. Disparaging references to one or another of these "occupiers" was softened with the passage of time, however, the aggressive-publicistic tone remained unaltered until the end of the 1980s. (In fact, this tone can still be detected today, though the younger generation of historians scoff at such references). One of the most obvious examples of this style we can see in the 1943 survey, *Istoriia Ukrainy*, in which the authors (perhaps, involuntarily) follow the rhetoric of wartime propaganda. For example, they paint an almost apocalyptic picture of the 1569 Union of Lublin, which transferred a portion of Ukraine's territory from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Kingdom of Poland - a transfer, one should not forget, that was completely peaceful and legal:

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52 Ibid., pp. 326-327.

53 Ibid., p. 325.

54 *Istoriya Ukrainskoi SSR*, vol. 3 (Kiev, 1983), p. 510-517.

55 *Narysy z istorii Ukrainy*, vol.1, pp. 53, 78, 131-132.

56 O.K. Kasymenko, *Istoriya Ukrainskoi RSR...*, p. 38.

“Armed Polish magnates penetrated deep into Ukrainian territory, taking vast estates with their towns and villages. [...] An epic of violence and bloody brigandage produced a horror that swept across the Ukrainian land, colonizing it as a possession of Polish-szlachta occupiers.”<sup>57</sup>

The anti-pole to the nightmares of this “burdensome, foreign yoke”<sup>58</sup> was the obligatory discussion of the founding, growth, development and expansion of a centralized Russian state, which also possessed “great, progressive significance for the Ukrainian people,” who “in conditions of burdensome, foreign oppression, justifiably saw in the Russian state a dependable support-base. In their struggles for liberation they often appealed to Russia for help and invariably received it.”<sup>59</sup> In 1954, in commemoration of the 300th anniversary of the “unification” of Ukraine with the Russian state, the Central Committee of the CPSU published a thesis adding yet one more nuance to the exegesis on “foreign domination.” Supposedly, the “alien predators were dangerous primarily because they sought to enslave the Ukrainian people spiritually, and to sever their ties with the Russian people.”<sup>60</sup> Consequently, the crowning achievement of Ukrainian history had to be the “reunification” of all of Ukraine’s territorial fragments within the Russian state. This argument was also used to justify the Soviet Union’s territorial expansions, achieved under the terms of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and the Yalta conference.<sup>61</sup> Thus, according to the official interpretation Ukraine’s territory was surrounded on all sides, except from the Russian north, by diabolical menaces. The Ukrainian people as a complete ethnic whole, violently torn from the main Russian mass, struggled over the centuries for “reunification” with it.

In addition to the above-mentioned historical interpretations, one must also consider linguistics, ethnology, and cultural history. In fact, with the beginning of Khrushchev’s “thaw,” cultural history became the first of these disciplines to begin to crack the iceberg of official dogma, by initiating a search for the origins of Ukrainian enlightenment, thought and culture from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, when the region was still bound to the supposedly hostile “Latin West.”<sup>62</sup> This search led some scholars to the heretical assertion

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57 *Istoriya Ukrainy*, vol. 1 (Ufa, 1943), pp. 183, 185.

58 This stylistic invention occurred in the ten-volume “collective work” published in Russian by the Institute of History in 1977-79: *Istoriya Ukrainskoi SSR*, vol. 2, p. 15, passim.

59 O.K. Kasymenko, *Istoriya Ukrainskoi RSR...*, p. 43.

60 *Tezisy o 300-letii vossoedineniya Ukrainy s Rossiei (1654-1954)*. *Odobreny Tsentral’nym Komitetom Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuzu* (Moscow, 1954), p. 6. There are endless variations on this topic with references to the “alien enslavement” by Poles, Hungarians, Swedes, etc. See: O.K. Kasymenko, *Istoriya Ukrainskoi RSR...*, pp. 66, 90; *Istoriya Ukrainskoi SSR*, vol. 2 (Kiev, 1982), p. 14, passim; *Ibid.*, vol. 3 (Kiev, 1983), p. 15, passim.

61 For more on this issue, see my article: N. Yakovenko, “Kil’ka sposterezhen’ nad modifikatsiyami ukrains’koho natsional’noho mifu v istoriohrafii,” in *Dukh i Litera* 3-4 (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 113-124.

62 It is worth noting that among the earliest of such works were Ya. D. Isaevych’s *Bratstvo ta*

that from earlier times Ukraine, as part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, had participated in western Renaissance culture, and if that were so, then indeed Ukraine ought to be considered the periphery not only of the Orthodox Slavic world but also of Latin Europe. Therefore, one needed to explore how much “crossover culture” Ukraine and Poland shared.<sup>63</sup>

The enthusiasm expressed by historians of education, philosophy, literature, music, painting, sculpture, and architecture for this “geo-culture shift” suggests that some sort of scientific basis lay behind it. Characteristically, Soviet scholars had to work with certain “unexpressed opinions” - intellectual sympathies or even not fully conscious inclinations - out of step with the official ideological (in this case, historiographical) doctrine. Similarly, on a conscious level Ukrainian historians seemed to understand that emphasizing the “western-ness” of the region carried a special meaning, because it defined Ukraine as a separate cultural territory - outside Russia - and was thus regarded as a kind of national emancipation. As soon as the “spirit of freedom” of the relatively liberal 1960s allowed some to transgress formerly dangerous (intellectual) borders, reflections on the “western-ness” of Ukrainian culture began to multiply exponentially. Significantly, after the conservative reaction the censors were unable to root out completely this defiant and innovative interpretation: from the second half of the 1970s through the mid-1980s many publications appeared, following this orientation but masking it with the ritual mention of the “fraternal ties” between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples.<sup>64</sup> Even in such a servile work as the ten-volume *History of the Ukrainian SSR* (1977-79) the chapter on Ukrainian culture of the 16th-17th centuries several times mentions Ukraine’s borrowing of the “positive achievements” of west European culture.<sup>65</sup>

This “geo-cultural shift” was stimulated by intellectual contacts with the outside world - contacts which were resumed in the 1960s after decades of isolation, and determined the shift’s direction. It is difficult to rank scholars by their work on this topic, but the fact that literary historians were the first to point to Ukraine’s “kinship with Europe” allows us to attribute much to the renowned émigré Slavist, Dmytro Chyzhevs’kyi. Ridiculing Soviet literary stud-

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*ikh rol' v rozvytku ukrains'koi kul'tury XVI-XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1966); P. Bilets'kyi, *Ukrains'kyi portretnyi zhyvopys XVI-XVII st. Problemy stanovlennya i rozvytku* (Kyiv, 1969). Its Russian translation was published in Leningrad in 1981.

63 Cited from a popular (i.e. less stylized by the censors than academic works) article by D. Nalyvaiko, “Ukraina i evropeis'ke Vidrozhennya,” in *Vitchyzna* 5 (Kyiv, 1972), pp. 183-185, 191-194.

64 As illustration of such publications, see the collection of articles by scholars whose approbation came from the council at the Institute of Literature in the Ukrainian Academy of Science: *Literaturna spadshchyna Kyivs'koi Rusi i ukrains'ka literatura XVI-XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1981). In this collection, five out of twelve articles discuss the European origins of Ukrainian literature of the XVI-XVIII centuries.

65 Citation from the Russian version: *Istoriya Ukrainskoi SSR*, vol. 2, pp. 461, 501, 511, 517, 522, 533.

ies' primitive sociological approach, Chyzhevs'kyi offered a new and fundamentally different periodization of Ukrainian literature of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. Differentiating among various world views and styles, this periodization corresponded to West European cultural eras: the Renaissance, Reformation, Baroque, and Classicism.<sup>66</sup>

Chyzhevs'kyi was introduced to his compatriots by a somewhat paradoxical (even surreptitious) route, because Soviet Ukrainian scholars were separated from their compatriots living abroad by an impenetrable curtain through which no articles or books written by such "bourgeois falsifiers" could pass. Yet, between 1959 and 1963 Chyzhevs'kyi received two "reprimands" from the authoritative literary historian and director of the Institute of Literature at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Oleksandr Bilets'kyi.<sup>67</sup> Of course, in his articles Bilets'kyi declared Chyzhevs'kyi's views to be false, but he also fully and professionally summarized the émigré's reasoning. (Beginning in the 1960s, this method was often used to provide information about foreign scientific ideas). Until the "secret history" of Soviet Ukrainian humanities is written, it will be impossible to determine whether or not illegally obtained "bourgeois nationalist" literature (for example, Chyzhevs'kyi's articles and books published in Prague, Warsaw, Cracow, and Munich in the 1930s and 1940s) were read in the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty whether it was only Bilets'kyi's articles that helped to disseminate Chyzhevs'kyi's views. But judging by Soviet scholars' frequent mention of the importance of periodization in the cultural history of Ukraine, Bilets'kyi's summaries of Chyzhevs'kyi's notions must have played a tremendously important role.

On the other hand, it was also during "Khrushchev's thaw" that Ukrainians first gained free access to scholarship from "fraternal Poland." Since the Polish humanities were fortunate enough to be able to preserve a certain professional level and maintain academic contacts with foreign scholars even under the communist regime, they were destined to provide Ukraine with a pathway to the rest of the world. It is equally significant that in the early 1960s in Poland comparative studies of Polish-Ukrainian cultural history as a border-

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66 D. Chyzhevs'kyi, *Istoriya ukrains'koi literatury vid pochatkiv do doby realizmu* (New York, 1956). In 1994 this book was republished in Ternopil', Ukraine. In English, it was published under the editorship of George S. N. Luckyj: D. Chyzhevs'kyi, *A History of Ukrainian Literature* (Littleton: Colo., 1975). Among other publications by D. Chyzhevs'kyi that still hold our interest is *Comparative History of Slavic Literatures* (Nashville: Tenn., 1971).

67 Apropos, Oleksandr Bilets'kyi is the father of Platon Bilets'kyi, the art historian mentioned in footnote 62. The Bilets'kyi family is notable in Kiev's cultural history since the middle of the nineteenth century. Oleksandr Bilets'kyi was among the few academicians who survived the Stalinist repression. His articles to which reference is made here include: "Stan i problemy vyvchennya davn'oi ukrains'koi literatury," *Materialy do vyvchennya istorii ukrains'koi literatury*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1959), pp. 48-59; and "Do pytannya pro periodyzatsiyu istorii dozhovtnevoi ukrains'koi literatury," *Radians'ke literaturoznavstvo* 3 (Kyiv, 1963), pp. 58-65.



land phenomenon were introduced,<sup>68</sup> which, of course, could not but attract Ukrainian scholars' attention. At the same time, several studies by the Moscow Slavist Il'ya Golenishchev-Kutuzov appeared, in which he postulated the existence between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of a Slavic Renaissance that extended from the shores of the Adriatic to Belorus' and Ukraine. Golenishchev-Kutuzov's books and articles, especially his *Humanism among Eastern Slavs*,<sup>69</sup> were cited in a record number of publications in Ukraine, because timid Ukrainian censors regarded his works as a peculiar sort of "permission" from Moscow to discuss parallels between Ukrainian and west European cultures.

### 3. CONCLUSION

The quasi-scientific function of the idea of Ukrainian culture's "westernness" became especially clear in 1989-1991, when the notion experienced an incredible popularity; on the eve of and during the first days of Ukraine's independence the intelligentsia sincerely believed that Ukraine's "European cultural roots" would ease its "return to Europe," from which "Asiatic Russia" had long ago torn the Ukrainian people. Identification with everything western was encouraged by massive publications of the previously inaccessible works of émigré Ukrainianists, now assumed to be "truthful" accounts of Ukraine's past, by the total westernization of TV programming and by an unquestioning admiration for the European way of life. (For example, consumer goods were made more attractive by attaching the prefix "euro-" to their brand names: from "Euro-vision" to "euro-locks" on "euro-doors"; this practice suggested that anyone who purchased numerous "euro" products would begin to feel European.)

After some similarly-inspired, initial enthusiasm and solidarity, post-soviet humanities have now broken up into three distinct schools, which in the most general terms can be linked to different generations. Leaving aside these schools' other characteristics, I will focus on those that concern Ukraine's geocultural territory. The older generation of scholars, considering the "revival" of Ukrainian scholarship to mean a return to the values of "national history," assume that the nation's territory has always been a complete, unique, and self-sufficient unit. And it seems that exactly here lies the root of today's quite widespread call to find a unique, "third way" for Ukraine, that is neither with

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68 Typically, the titles of such studies concealed the Ukrainian element under the designation "East Slavic," a necessary tribute to the interdiction to study Ukrainian issues when the territory was part of Poland. See Polish publications: R. Łużny, *Pisarze kręgu Akademii Kijowsko-Mohylańskiej a literatura polska: z dziejów związków kulturalnych polsko-wschodniostowiańskich w XVII-XVIII w.* (Cracow, 1966); P. Lewin, *Intermedia wschodniostowiańskie XVI-XVIII w.* (Wroclaw, 1967); W. Witkowski, *Język utworów Joanicjusza Galatowskiego na tle języka piśmiennictwa XVII w.* (Cracow, 1969).

69 I.N. Golenishchev-Kutuzov, *Gumanizm u vostochnykh slavyan (Ukraina i Belorussiya)* (Moscow, 1963).

the West, nor with the East. This viewpoint is often incorrectly associated with Eurasianism.<sup>70</sup> I think it is a simplification to identify the pro-Russian position of some politicians, despite their provincial jabberings about "Eurasian nationalism," with a metaphysical vision of Ukraine's territory as a self-sufficient entity - a vision akin to romantic nationalism.<sup>71</sup> Incidentally, besides historians of the older generation, the advocates of romantic nationalism include mainly literary scholars, i.e. individuals whose professional occupation inclines them toward the romanticization of reality.

Scholars of the middle generation, as a rule, have oriented themselves towards émigré thought from the interwar and postwar periods, because, not knowing foreign languages, they are unable to familiarize themselves with the new wave of Ukrainian studies from abroad. Enthusiastically embracing the 1920s notion of Ukraine, occupying the space "between West and East," they accentuate in fact only the western components. Moreover, they present Ukraine's "European-ness" as resulting from the simple transplantation of European culture without any concrete adaptation; it is only a cliché "from West European countries." They "compensate" for their declarations' weaknesses with a vague, general argument about the Renaissance and Reformation, and with their naive nationalistic megalomania.<sup>72</sup>

Finally, there is a small group of scholars - primarily of the younger generation - who are rather sceptical about both the anachronistic adherents of "national history" and the enthusiasts of the European factors in Ukrainian history. Contemporary American and Canadian scholars of Ukraine, whose works have already been mentioned, set the standard for this group. Contacts with colleagues from Poland, which have begun to take on a massive character in recent years through personal contacts, debates, and exchange of research papers, have also had a tremendous influence.<sup>73</sup> Amongst these scholars, the idea of Ukraine as a space "between the West and East" still predominates, but the western elements in Ukraine's cultural past are now identified with the transfer of a "Latin" cultural tradition through Poland, specifically stressing the multi-ethnic and multi-faith character of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which included Ukraine.<sup>74</sup>

70 See: B. Berdykhovs'ka, "Try ilyustratsii do ukrains'kykh shukan'," *Krytyka* 10 (12), (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 24-27.

71 See: V. Kremin', D. Tabachnyk, V. Tkachenko, *Ukraina: al'ternatyva postupu. Krytyka istorichnoho dosvidu* (Kyiv, 1996).

72 Among many such works, one may cite, Yu.I. Tereshchenko, *Ukraina i evropeis'kyi svit. Narys istorii vid utvorennia Starokyivs'koi derzhavy do kintsya XVI stolittya* (Kyiv, 1996).

73 Specifically, thanks to Polish translation Western academic literature is "penetrating" into Ukraine. Among the books that have greatly accelerated the demolition of an ethnocentric vision of the past was that by Norman Davies on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (what is important here is that Davies is not Polish). Norman Davies, *God's Playground. A History of Poland /1/, The Origins to 1795* (New York, 1982).

74 A good example of this type of argument is the book by P.M. Sas, *Politychna kul'tura ukrains'koho syspil'stva (kinets XVI - persha polovyna XVII st.)* (Kyiv, 1998).

In all of these discussions the East is entirely absent. The space between the West and East, for which Lypyns'kyi sought as early as 1923 a balanced approach, has by the end of the century shifted decidedly towards the West. Identification with the West is so widespread, as evidenced by many publications in the popular press, that representatives of a more sober approach from the recently revived (i.e. not authoritative at present) school of Ukrainian Oriental Studies are practically ignored. For example, Yaroslav Dashkevych's provocative hypothesis that Ukraine's territory represents one of the Great Frontier between western and non-western cultures, where Turkic elements have become an organic part of the Slavic world, has gone "unnoticed."<sup>75</sup> To date no one has responded to Oleksandr Halenko's article (published in 1998), in which he discussed the Turkic origins of the Cossack ethos.<sup>76</sup> Another large collection of articles (911 pages) in honour of Ya. Dashkevych remains "unread" even though half of it is dedicated to the oriental influences on Ukraine's territory.<sup>77</sup>

The continued denial of the Eastern factors in Ukrainian history - not only Byzantine, which has been studied to an extent, and Russian, which is for the moment limited to demonizing the "asiatics,"<sup>78</sup> but also Turkic - is absurd. Each of these eastern influences has left its mark and been fused together with its western equivalent. Here is an obvious example: in the scholastic, intellectual, and political life of the Ukrainian elite of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries western values predominated, while theological thinking continued to adhere uncompromisingly to the Byzantine standard; notions of chivalry among the same elite were adaptations of clearly Turkic traditions. Turkic oriental elements are still more evident in the genetic complexity of the Ukrainian population, priorities in life, and economic-managerial activities; and the standards for what may be considered attractive in dress or language also have a Turkic tinge. In this sense, thanks to its geographic position, Ukraine is indeed a region at the edge of the Eurasian Steppe where two European civilizations, Byzantine and Roman, meet. It will require, however, an enormous amount of historical research to convince Ukrainians, and scholars first of all, that the Turkic element hidden deeply in the history of daily life and mentality of the people needs to be placed alongside the distinct, visible Western and Byzantine influences in Ukrainian intellectual and academic culture. We are obliged then to return to the fact that the Soviet period deprived Ukraine's academics of professionalism. Without this professionalism it is difficult to direct those histori-

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75 Ya. Dashkevych, "Ukraina na mezhi mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom," *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva imeni Shevchenka* CCXXII (L'viv, 1991), pp. 28-44.

76 O. Halenko, "Luk ta rushnytsya v lytsars'kii symvolitsi ukrains'koho kazatstva: paradoksy kozats'koi ideolohii i problema skhidnoho vplyvu," *Mediavalia Ucrainica: mental'nist' ta istoriya idei* 5 (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 93-110.

77 *Mappa Mundi. Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Yaroslava Dashkevycha z nahody ioho 70-richchya* (L'viv, 1996).

78 See the popular essay about Russian-Ukrainian relations from this historical perspective by E. Hutsalo, *Mental'nist' ordy* (Kyiv, 1996).

ans who lack intellectual self-confidence towards a more anthropological approach to history. This is a paradox; but only when historians have regained these lost skills, will the humanities in Ukraine be ready to discuss the aphorism voiced by the only mid-nineteenth century opponent of romanticized Ukrainian national history, Pantheleimon Kulish, who wrote: "Ukrainians lie with their heads in Europe and their feet in Asia."