This paper will
present concerns regarding the potential for serious environmental
impacts to result from offshore oil and gas developments currently
underway off the northeast coast of Sakhalin Island, focusing on the
Sakhalin II project. The environmental impacts expected from normal
operation of the field and the very real threat of catastrophic
accidents will be discussed. To understand and fully appreciate the
potential severity of damage that could be caused by this development,
the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in Alaska is discussed.
The principal intent of this discussion is to
help policy makers, industry, and the public fully appreciate the
potentially disastrous ecological, economic, and social consequences of
a major oil spill off Sakhalin, and to inspire the incorporation of
extraordinary safety precautions in the design and operation of
offshore oil development. This discussion then, is both a warning and a
challenge to improve the safety of the offshore oil projects.
A brief note
regarding the importance of public involvement in Democratic government
seems to be in order here. The very essence of participatory,
democratic forms of governance is that citizens have not just the right
to vote, but also have an obligation to become informed on issues
affecting them and to express those concerns broadly and openly. Even
if public opinion seems critical of particular aspects of society, it
is incumbent upon government and industry to pay attention to it, and
to adjust policies accordingly. Experience has shown that critical
public opinion can have a very positive effect on proposed development
projects. It is widely acknowledged that environmental concern in the
United States in the early 1970s regarding the proposed construction of
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, while vigorously demeaned by government and
the oil industry at the time, ultimately lead to the construction of a
better, safer system.
It is in this context that environmental
activism in Sakhalin should be fully embraced, supported, and listened
to by government, industry, and the public. It is in everyone's
interest to do so. Certainly, a catastrophic spill on the Sakhalin
shelf would not only cause extreme environmental, economic, and social
damage, it would also foreclose further oil and gas development options
now planned in the area. The political and financial repercussions to
future economic development on Sakhalin would be enormous.
That Sakhalin
Energy officials were present at and actively participated in the SRC
Symposium in Sapporo is a hopeful sign. They should be applauded for
their apparent openness and willingness to discuss critical public
review of their operation. Collective problem solving is often a much
more productive approach than the traditional adversarial approach.
Sakhalin Energy
Investment Company states in their EIA for the Sakhalin II project that
phase I of the Piltun-Astokhskoe (PA) Field development will involve
the drilling unit "Molikpaq" positioned on the sea bed in about 30
meters of water, approximately 17 km offshore the northeast coast of
Sakhalin. The Molikpaq measures 111 meters square at its base tapering
to deck dimensions measuring 73 meters square, and has accommodation
for 104 people onboard. The sea level of the platform is reinforced for
ice-resistance with a 8 meter high, 8 mm thick steel plating. Its core
is stabilized with 190,000 cubic meters of locally dredged sand
compacted by about 24 explosive blasts. Scour protection for the rig
consists of a 20 meter wide sand and gravel collar along with a wall of
hundreds of large boulders.
Phase I of the project will include 12
production wells ranging in depth from 2,700 meters - 5,000 meters, and
2 gas injection wells (to maintain reservoir pressure), designed to
produce 90,000 barrels of oil/day and 65 million cubic feet of gas/day
during the ice-free, summer season lasting approximately 6 months. In
early July, 1999, the first oil production began at the site. Produced
oil is transported from the Molikpaq through a 2-km long, 324 mm
diameter pipeline on the sea bed to a Floating Storage and Offloading
(FSO) unit. The FSO, the "Okha," is a newly built 158,000 Dead Weight
Tons (DWT) double-hulled tanker with a low ice-class rating, with a
loaded draft of 14 - 16 meters. The "Okha" is owned by SBM, Inc. based
in Monaco, and it and the SALM are leased to SEIC. The FSO is anchored
to a Single Anchor Leg Mooring (SALM) system, consisting of 4 steel
pilings of 40 meters in length driven through the base of the mooring
into the sea bed, a 250 mm loading hose and a mooring hawser connected
to a swivel apparatus so the FSO can pivot around the mooring with the
wind and current. This complex - the Molikpaq, undersea pipeline, SALM,
and FSO - is collectively referred to as the "Vitiaz' Production
Complex."
Transport tankers
will load from the Okha. The SEIC terminal operation plan states that
transport tankers in the size range of 25,000 - 250,000 DWT will be
accepted at the Vitiaz' marine terminal, with cargo capacity up to
about 2 million barrels. Tankers over 160,000 DWT are known in the
maritime industry as "Very Large Crude Carriers," or VLCCs. Thus, some
of the largest oil tankers in the world will be allowed to load at the
Vitiaz' facility. SEIC states, however, that most transport tankers
they expect to deal with will be in the size range of 80,000 - 90,000
DWT with cargo capacity of approximately 500,000 barrels. These vessels
will load from the FSO approximately every 6 days during the operating
season, and then transit off the east coast of Sakhalin to market,
generally south to Japan, Korea, etc. If sufficient quantities of oil
are found, it is expected that Phase II of the project would remove the
FSO/SALM offshore terminal, and pipe the oil ashore and south to a
marine terminal at the port of Korsakov on the southern tip of Sakhalin
for loading onto transport tankers.
Next