It is broadly recognized that wars and conflicts produce negative
images of adversaries and that perceptions distorted by hostile
feelings, in their turn, are not favorable for further friendly
relations between nations. It is exactly this dangerous spiral that
dominated the Russian attitudes towards Japan for a long time in
history.
In analyzing the process of enmification1 scholars have introduced a variety
of constructs: the view of the enemy as "devil," the perception of the
"incorrigibly malevolent" adversary, misrepresentation through "mirror
imaging," and "diabolical images of the enemy." Various psychological
mechanisms involved in this process - perceptual distortions, good-bad
stereotypes, projections, exaggerated fear, anxiety-based
overreactions, frustration-aggression, scapegoating - have also been
studied.2 Though
enmification usually occurs according to the above-mentioned general
pattern, cultural variations exist and historical consequences in
specific cases are different.3
In view of the prospect for the future rapprochement between Japan and
Russia, it would be instructive to know what images of Japan in Russia
underpinned the complicated history of relations between the two
countries in the hope that this understanding could help to sweep away
old hatreds and fears.
Though some articles briefly mention Russian or Soviet perceptions
of Japan,4 with the
exception of a recently published book by a young Russian scholar
Vasilii Molodiakov,5
no substantial research in the field has been undertaken. Molodiakov
examines the attitudes towards Japan of Vladimir Solov'ev, Valerii
Briusov and Andrei Belyi, each of whom was a prominent philosopher or
writer at the end of the 19th through beginning of the 20th century.
Having chosen a geopolitical approach in his analysis, the author
traces how the "myth" about Japan as the "yellow peril" came into being
in Russia and emphasizes that in contrast to Europe or the US where it
circulated mainly on the level of "yellow press," in Russia this myth
became an inspiration for the most outstanding intellectuals of the
time and their prophetic vision of the future.6
However, was this the only image of Japan in the Russian society at
that time? This paper will attempt to shed some light on this subject
and contribute to the study of Japan's image in Russia on the level of
mass consciousness during the Russo-Japanese War and thereafter. The
object of analysis are mainly the so called "popular prints" (lubki)
produced during the war.7
It is assumed that the popular mind is quickly shaped by "symbolic"
items, hence, graphic forms of representation play an especially
important role in reflecting the existing images of Self and Other and
in creating them. Graphic images appeal not only to consciousness, but
to emotions as well, and in case of multiple recurrence easily turn
into identifying icons. "Popular prints" of the Russo-Japanese War were
a part of an officially sponsored propaganda effort. At the same time
they expressed the perception of war and reaction to it not of the
intellectual elite, but of the ordinary people, and thus reveal the
attitudes towards the enemy and Self on the mass level. The paper
argues that because lubki prints were closely connected to
folklore and images which had existed in the mass consciousness for a
long time, they were instrumental in creating and supporting
stereotypes of Japanese in the mind of ordinary Russian people.
The article begins with a historical overview of "popular prints"
in the Russian culture. It then examines images of Japanese and
Russians through the "popular prints" depicting the war and classifies
them into three categories: allegoric, realistic and satirical. A brief
comparison with Japanese war-time woodblock prints follows. Finally, in
way of conclusion, the impact of these "popular prints" on Japan's
image in Russia and the Soviet Union is highlighted.