At the turn of the century the Russian liberal opposition was
enforcing its ideas of individual liberty and the ways of limiting the
dominant role of tsar and the state. The opposition was doing it at
first through zemstvos and dumas and then through
different professional organizations. In the autumn of 1905 the first
congresses of legal liberal parties were taking place, and in April
1906 Russia became a constitutional monarchy.
The two foremost theorists of the twentieth-century Russian
liberalism were Pavel Miliukov (1859-1943) and Petr Struve (1870-1944).
In his first scholarly works Miliukov tried to underline the difference
between Kievan period of Russian history from the Moscow one. Three
major premises connect the vision of Russian history by Miliukov in his
early historical works: the changeability of Russia throughout its
existence, due to its own internal dynamic; in decided contrast to
this, the external nature of the formative influences on the state
order, culture and national ideas; and the fact of the imposition of
borrowed culture from above. Also of great importance was the decision
to exclude Kievan history from the history of state order and of
national ideas, since "in the north-east there were entirely different
conditions of historical development than in the south."66 At the same time
this statement represents a retreat from his bolder assertion, in the
lecture course, that "The ancient Kievan period of our history is
separated from more recent times not only chronologically, but
actually."67
At that time Miliukov considered that existed some separateness in
ethnogenesis reached by Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians as early
as the fourteenth century, because feudalism affected only the
southwestern part of the country, adjacent to Poland and Lithuania,
with which Russia had close contacts.
In his political activity, in contrary to his earlier historical
views, Miliukov, particularly on the nationality questions, was found
under the influence of preconceived ideas of state structure, which
were deeply embedded in him. Therefore he was largely inclined toward
unitary and unionist tendencies in the solution of the nationality
problem and left partly without attention the existing historical
preconditions as well as the movements of national feeling. During his
political activity from 1905 till 1914 Miliukov did not touch directly
the Ukrainian question.68 Only on the very
eve of the war he was quite active in supporting certain aspirations of
the Ukrainians. During the famous "Shevchenko debate" in the Russian
Duma (February-March, 1914), which continued for several sessions,
Miliukov attacked the nationalistic Russian speakers in Kiev, whose
attitude towards the Ukrainian question was, in his opinion, unusually
injurious to the interests of Russia, and also the attempt, on the part
of the Count Kapnists, to show that the Ukrainian movement should be
considered as not a popular movement. "In reality, - said he, - we have
here to do with a national movement the object of which is autonomy,
the rebuilding of Russia on federalistic lines."69
Before delivering his speech Miliukov had made a special trip to
Kiev and gone over the whole Ukrainian problem with a group of
Ukrainian progressivists. He left convinced that he had persuaded them
to give up not only demands for a separate state, but also demands for
a Russian federation, and to be satisfied with cultural autonomy.70
"You can clearly understand the significance of this fact, - Miliukov
continued, - only when you realize what a dangerous undertaking it is
for a Ukrainian village to manifest its national character. The mere
obtaining of a Ukrainian newspaper is construed as a manifestation of a
treacherous disposition. In spite of this Ukrainian books find their
way readily to the villagers while Russian books are rejected... The
(Ukrainian - V.P.) movement exists and you can neither suppress it nor
alter its significance; the sole question is whether you wish to see
this movement as inimical or friendly. That will depend upon whether
the movement will regard you as friends or enemies."71 Miliukov told Duma
that the real separatists were the Russian nationalists, who were
denying the existence of an independent Ukrainian language and
literature and encouraging governmental persecution. It was they who
had forced the Ukrainian movement to establish its center in Austrian
Galicia, where the development of Ukrainian separatism was possible."72
"Shall I mention" - Miliukov wrote again - "those numerous people's
educational societies which were established almost without any support
from the educated classes and are now mercilessly persecuted; shall I
point out the interest in the Ukrainian theater which manifests itself
plainly when in February, in weather of unusual severity, the peasants
march 45 versts to see a Ukrainian play? All sides of life are
penetrated by the national element. The Russian army, the Russian
school, the Russian authorities create a national reaction and inflame
the national feeling of the Ukrainians. At the same time, the Ukrainian
movement is thoroughly democratic; it is, so to say, carried on by the
people itself. For this reason it is impossible to crush it. But it is
very easy to set it on fire and in this way direct it against
ourselves, and our authorities are successful in their work in this
direction."73
Miliukov stated, in particular, that the Ukrainian movement, being
profoundly democratic in its contents, is no longer a priority of
intellectuals alone, but is carried out by the people itself. That is
why, it is impossible to stop, but to turn it against the Russian
state, by taking away the last hope for any improvement of its
situation within the imperial complex, is very easy. Addressing the
parliamentary majority, Miliukov warned that, in case of the
continuation of such a policy, separatists in Ukraine would be counted
not in individuals or dozens, but in hundreds, thousands or millions.74
In May 1917, Miliukov, explaining the Kadet's party programme75 in
the sphere of regional reform connected with the national strivings of
the peoples of the empire, expressed confidence in the party's ability
to find such a decision which, while giving separate areas in Russia
the possibility to create regional autonomy based on local laws, at the
same time would not ruin the state unity of Russia. Preserving the
integrity of the imperial state complex, stressed Miliukov, "is that
limit which determines the party's last decision. Decomposition of the
state into sovereign independent units is regarded by it as completely
impossible."76
Finally, Miliukov protested against the oppression of the Little
Russians in a way that showed the danger of the Ukrainian movement to
the entirety of the Russian empire. Even in 1918, contrary to his new
pro-German orientation, regarding the Ukrainian question, Miliukov
remained in the same position. The main task of the Volunteer Army and
the Allied intervention, as Miliukov interpreted it, was the
"occupation of the Russian South and the elimination of all remnants of
Ukrainian nationalism."77 "Our first task" -
he explained - "is to oppose disintegration in principle, and to put an
end to it."78
The famous Russian "liberal on the right" (former "liberal on the
left") Petr Struve (1870-1944) in his perception of the Ukrainian
problem thought that as a nation Russia was still in statu nascendi.
Unlike Austria-Hungary, which Struve classified as a "multinational
empire," Russia should be viewed as a "genuine national empire,"
because it had the potential to assimilate non Russian cultures.
"National unity" was to be achieved not ethnically (as in
Austria-Hungary), but culturally.
Richard Pipes characterized Peter Struve's attitude toward Ukraine
thus: "The Ukraine was always Struve's blind spot. He would readily
acknowledge the legitimacy of Polish and Finnish national aspirations,
and he was prepared to grant extensive internal autonomy to both these
nationalities... He also abhorred the disabilities imposed by Imperial
Russia on its Jewish population. But he stubbornly refused to recognize
not only the existence of a Ukrainian... nationality with a claim to
political self-determination, but even the very existence of a distinct
Ukrainian culture..."79
Already in March, 1905 in the debates on the program, adopted by
the third congress of the Union of Liberation, Struve marked that
Poland had to be granted the same status as Finland, and such a status
was completely inapplicable to such regions of Russia as the
Transcaucasus, Lithuania and Little Russia.80 As a result of
this, he concluded, the point of the program on regional
self-government had either given too little to Poland or had gone too
far in respect to the other regions of the country besides Finland and
Poland.81
The clue to this uncompromising position is revealed by what Struve
said in 1911: "Should the intelligentsia's 'Ukrainian' idea... strike
the national soil and set it on fire... (the result will be) a gigantic
and unprecedented schism of the Russian nation, which, such is
my deepest conviction, will result in a veritable disaster for the
state and for the people. All our borderland' problems will pale into
mere bagatelles compared to such a prospect of bifurcation and - should
the 'Belorussians' follow the 'Ukrainians' - the 'trifurcation' of
Russian culture."82
At the beginning of 1911 Struve initiated a discussion of the
nationality question by inviting a number of non-Russians to present
their views. These problems were discussed in a series of articles in
the journal of Russian liberal thought Russkaia mysl'. In the first
series of articles Struve began the discussion by calling attention to
the fact that the Russians constituted 43 percent of the population of
the empire, and that while this was a respectable figure, he argued, no
other nationality in the empire possessed a national culture in the
true sense of the word: One can partake in the local cultural life of
Warsaw and Helsingfors without the knowledge of the Russian language,
but without a mastery of Russian, one cannot partake (in the cultural
life - V.P.) of Kiev...83 Furthermore, none
of the nationalities, according to Struve, possessed the potential for
further development without the support of Russian culture. Accepting
this support and depending upon it, the alien cultures were voluntarily
subjugating themselves to Russian hegemony. "Among the alien people" -
noted Struve - "Russian culture reigns supreme, not solely because of
the physical superiority and numerical predominance of Russians. This
hegemony rightfully belongs to Russia because of her spiritual power
and wealth."84
Of course, Struve was willing to agree that the inferior local
cultures, theoretically at least, could develop and even eventually
reach a high level of Russian cultural development, but to him this
endeavor of creating a "multitude of cultures" in Russia would absorb
too many valuable human resources, which could be utilized for the
enrichment of culture in general.
Concerning the Ukrainian question in particular Struve made no
attempt to ascribe its emergence to a foreign intrigue or to the
restrictive policies of the tsarist regime. Neither did he try to
minimize its significance. The success of the struggle for the
preservation and development of Ukrainian culture, which so far had
been exclusively the concern of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, hinged,
in Struve's opinion, on whether the movement would be joined by the
Ukrainian population in general. Struve was confident that this would
not happen, in view of the fact that the socio-economic forces
operating in twentieth century Russia - such as industrialization,
urbanization, the institution of universal conscription, mass education
and mass media - were rapidly drawing the Ukrainian public into the
realm of Russian culture.
"I am convinced" - stressed Struve - "that beside the Russian
civilization and language the Little Russian is only a provincial
branch. The position of the latter is conceivable only as a derivation
from the former; a change in the status quo is possible only in
this matter through a disruption of the political and social body of
Russia."85
Precisely because the members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were
aware of this fact, Struve continued, they were desperately trying to
preserve local particularism. It was primarily due to this
consciousness among the Ukrainian intelligentsia that the Ukrainian
culture was consigned to extinction that, Struve thought, provided the
impetus for the intensity of the Ukrainian cultural revival at the turn
of the century. He called for a merciless ideological struggle against
Ukrainianhood. "Russian progressive public opinion, - insisted Struve,
- must enter into an ideological struggle against 'Ukrainianhood'
without any ambiguity and indulgence as against a tendency to weaken
and even abolish a great acquisition of our history - an All-Russian
Culture."86
In spite of his confidence that the socio-economic forces in Russia
were operating in favor of assimilating the nationalities, Struve
cautiously pointed out that the unity of the Russian empire would be in
danger if local cultures were given an opportunity to evolve into a
higher stage of development. Therefore, he most emphatically insisted
that Russian must remain the language of instruction in high schools
and universities and even in elementary education, unless, for
pedagogical considerations, local languages were considered
indispensable for the education of the children. By Struve, only one
high and dominant Russian culture was to be permitted in the empire,
with the Russian language elevated to the status of the koine,
comparable to the Ancient Greek koine and German Hochdeutsch. For the
Ukrainians, Struve foresaw a modest regional development, a phenomenon
whose culture was to be confined largely to elementary education and
patois literature. The Ukrainian population of the West Ukrainian lands
(Galicia, Bukovina and Trans-Carpathia), according to Struve and the
other Russian liberals, belonged to the ethnographic massif of the
Russian nationality.87
The another well known Russian liberal and member of the Kadet
party, the first President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences,
Vladimir Vernadskii (1863-1945) as the basis of his political views
considered the notion of Russianness (Russkosti) - a certain
supranational phenomenon of the common to all of the people's value,
which is higher than simply national consciousness. Vernadskii wrote,
that the role of world powers must be played by the so-called "big"
peoples (Russians, Germans, Frenchmen), but the "small" peoples
(Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians) must enslave themselves from
the "accumulations (nanosy), which is calling out by the desires
to obtain the world significance."88 Vernadskii, as his
intellectual predecessors, the nineteenth-century Russian Slavophiles,
dreamed about the unification of all the Slavs under the guidance of
Russia. Being Ukrainian by origin, he named himself as a "Russian man" (russkii
chelovek) and differentiated among the three, in his opinion, very
different notions: Ukrainian, Great-Russian (velikoross) and
"Russian" (russkii). "It seemes to me" - he wrote - "that every
educated person must make a difference and clearly distinguish among
Russian, Ukrainian and Great-Russian." And further: "Russian and
Great-Russian - that is the different meanings, and all the people know
and feel this difference."89 His indication
"Russkii" means Russian person, that is identifying himself personally
not by ethnic origin, but by political choice, by the belonging to the
state. Such Russians were Theofan Prokopovich, Bezborodko, Gogol',
Dostoevskii, Chaikovskii, Glinka, Vernadskii himself and very many
others. To him, the Ukrainians were "Germanophiles," the desires to
unite with Galicia - "avstrophil'stvo," Ukrainian literary
language - artificial dialect (shtuchnoe iazychie), the wish to
have a cultural equality-narrow chauvinism, national aspirations -
primitive nationalism. From this point of view Vernadskii evaluated the
policy of Germany and France in attitude to Ukrainian question.90
In his polemics with Hrushevs'kyi91 on the subject of
the necessity to create Ukrainian Academy of Science in Ukraine in
1918,Vladimir Vernadskii perceived the point of view, that Russian
scholars on the territory of Ukraine, when working for the Ukrainian
culture, will be working at the same time for the true and authentic
development (pravil'-nogo razvitiia) of the Russian culture.92 He
underlined the possibility for the Ukrainian language and culture to
grow and obtain equality during the time span of the equal, not
antagonistic development of both cultures in Ukraine.93
The Russian conservative nationalists of that time, whose views
were represented, especially in 1905-1917 by so-called Right Parties,94
always drew a sharp distinction between the "Mazepists," i.e. the
Ukrainian intellectuals, and the Ukrainian masses, considering the
latter to be essentially loyal constituents of the All-Russian nation.
The members of the national monarchist organization - the Union of the
Russian people considered that when a state does exist, it is to be
identified with its dominant nationality. The members of the Union
perceived the point of view, that England by its very name indicated
that it was the state of the English people. Likewise, Russia was the
state of the Russian people, and it was "Russian" everywhere within its
political boundaries. "Russia for Russians" made sense, - were said in
the words of a Russkoe Znamia editorial, - "not just for the
indigenous land of Rus', but for the entire Russian empire, including
all the territory of its allied peoples," that is, all those minority
nationalities that had been incorporated within the borders of the
Russian state. The Russians should predominate over all other
nationalities in the empire.95 Since the Poles did
not have a state, it was meaningless for them to say, "Poland for
Poles." In regard to the Ukrainians and Belorussians they affirmed that
both of these peoples were actually Russian, and accepted them as such
without criticism."96
The member of the Chief Council of the Union of the Russian People and
the founder of the Union of the Archangel Michael, Vladimir
Purishkevich (1870-1920) taking part in the above mentioned "Shevchenko
debate" in the Fourth Duma in 1914, expressed the attitude of Russian
conservative nationalists. The essence of his speech was that in the
current conditions the Duma had no moral right to give a permission for
the poet's commemoration, because the Ukrainians would, for certain,
use the opportunity to form a political movement and would develop
ideas, utopian from the All-Russian point of view. For this reason, any
attempt to encourage the commemoration of Shevchenko, who "was, in the
eyes of the Russian intelligentsia a foreteller of some special theses,
a poet, who was a bearer of ideals that have nothing in common with
Russian state ideals, for me, a Russian, for our faction, are
completely unacceptable."97 Another
representative of Russian monarchist circles, the leader of the state
Council and former Minister of the Interior in Witte's cabinet, Petr
Durnovo (1844-1915) expressed his attitude to the Ukrainian problem in
his opposition to the prospect of an anti-German and anti-Austrian war.
In his memorandum to Nikolai II, he provided a penetrating insight into
the international aspect of the nationalities problem.98 Pointing out that
Ukrainian, Polish, Armenian and other minorities weakened Russia's
positions vis-a-vis the Central Powers, and opposed the annexation of
Eastern Galicia as a Russian foreign policy aim (1912-1914) and
Russia's principal war aim (Sept. 1914), Durnovo insisted: "It is
obviously disadvantageous to us to annex, in the interests of national
sentimentalism, a territory that has lost every vital connection with
our fatherland. For together with a negligible handful of Galicians,
Russian in spirit, how many Poles, Jews, and Ukrainized Uniates we
would receive! The so-called Ukrainian, or Mazeppist, movement is not a
menace to us at present, but we should not enable it to expand by
increasing the number of turbulent Ukrainian elements, for in this
movement there undoubtedly lies the seed of an extremely dangerous
Little Russian separatism which, under favorable conditions, may assume
quite unexpected proportions."99
Within the broad spectrum of Russian conservative nationalists
there also existed the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists - a political
and cultural organization established in Ukraine in 1908 to promote
Russian national consciousness in the western borderlands and to defend
Russian interests against Polish pressure and Ukrainophilism. The club
attempted to raise public awareness concerning the dangers of the
Ukrainian movement, which it viewed as a Polish-Austrian-German-Jewish
intrigue. Russian conservative political leader and leading member of
the Kiev Club Vasilii Shul'gin (1878-1976) named the Ukrainian national
movement as a part of a Jewish-Masonic intrigue (zhido-masonskii
zagovor) and in his general perception of the national question
envisaged Russia divided into autonomous regions with boundaries
determined not on the nationality principle but on economic,
geographical and other factors.100 In 1907
Shul'-gin's definition of Ukrainians was next: "By nationality they
(Ukrainian peasants) were Russian, or as they were called then, Little
Russians, now called Ukrainians."101 In 1915 his views
on Ukrainians obtained a certain evolution and he began to
differentiate among southern Russians (Ukrainians - V.P.) and simply
Russians. "For us, southern Russia, - indicated Shul'gin, - in other
words, Kiev, is what Moscow is to you Russians, the motherland."102
In 1917 he remarked, that the real Ukrainian (nastoiashchii khokhol)
is very cunning, and found even a trend among "Ukrainians" to be
unbelievers, socialists and robbers.103
Another active member of the Kiev Club and its founder Anatolii
Savenko perceived the Ukrainian movement as "Austrian intrigue." He
explained: "Everybody knows that Ukrainian separatism arose and
fortified itself in Galicia... How can we fight Ukrainophilism within
the borders of the Rus' State if we do nothing about the movement in
Subjugated Rus', Rus' irredenta."104 The other
organization of conservative nationalists - the St. Petersburg
Galician-Russian Society (Galitsko-russkoe blagotvoritel'noe
obshchestvo, est. 1902) considered as its main purpose to provide
moral and material support to Russians in Galicia, combat the Ukrainian
movement in Austro-Hungary and to do everything for the active
promotion of an irredentist Russian movement in Austro-Hungary. The
founder of the Galician-Russian Society Anton Budilovich fought against
official recognition of the very idea of a separate Ukrainian language
and people: "This theory" - he wrote - "has greater significance than
all the teaching about the autonomy of the borderlands or federalism
and its relations to the center because it attempts to split the very
nucleus of the Russian state..."105
In 1918 Shul'gin and Savenko again presented their views on the
Ukrainian question in a declaration by which they declined to accept
Ukrainian citizenship. In the declaration addressed to Skoropads'kyi's
government, Shul'gin categorically refused to recognize any historical,
ethnic, socio-economic and political basis for the existence of a
separate Ukrainian state: "...the establishment not only of a Ukrainian
but also a separate South-Russian state, so to speak forever, does not
have any foundation whatsoever... We should not forget that the Russian
people as a whole achieved their real independence and security only
after the unification of the Great Russian and Little Russian people.
And no matter what the plans and intentions of our neighboring states
are, the north and the south of Russia, artificially separated by a
Chinese wall of the twentieth century, will instinctively strive toward
unification, and in the end will unite. But the struggle for the
unification of the Russian people will lead to new bloody clashes, new
tremors of war. Whoever does not wish to contribute to innumerable new
hardships, equally onerous for the south and the north, should not
participate in the formation of the Ukrainian state."106 At that time
Shul'gin argued, that it is possible to solve the Ukrainian question by
the division of the Ukrainian territory into "approximately three
autonomous regions: New Russia with Odessa as its center, Little Russia
with Kiev as its center; and a Khar'kov region with Khar'kov as its
center."107
The official language was to be Russian, the government officials were
to use the Russian language only, others could speak "even Chinese if
they so desired."108
After the civil war, Shul'gin as an émigr-continued to polemicize both
with Ukrainians and the Jews.109