Undoubtedly, this process was also made possible by the mechanisms
of interregional distribution and the redistribution of income. Their
effects are aggregately shown and dimensioned relative to the key
economic aggregate -the GNP. In this way, in addition to the structure,
the total scope of interregional financial relations was also
identified. Both in real and in nominal terms, only Kosovo-Metohia and
Montenegro had a favourable balance. Other units (including the
federation) showed a deficit. A deficit also occurred in the sum of
payments and receipts prescribed by federal regulations. This
widespread deficit financing, however, did not place all the republics
and provinces in the same relative position. Some of the absolute
losers turned out to be relative winners. These include
Bosnia-Herzegovina (whose receipts stipulated by federal regulations,
in relative terms, were one and a half times higher than payments) and
Macedonia. The biggest absolute and relative losers were central Serbia
and Vojvodina, followed by Croatia and Slovenia.
Total payments prescribed by federal regulations compared to GNP
show (with the exception of Kosovo-Metohia and Slovenia) a relative
regional uniformity -from an average of 10% at the beginning to 9% at
the end of the observed period. On the other hand, total receipts
prescribed by federal regulations relative to GNP vary, from between 1%
and 2% in Vojvodina, to between 39.47% and 47.84% in Kosovo-Metohia.
This reveals a considerable interregional redistributive effect. It is
manifested either as a positive or negative balance of a republic or
province and is then calculated as a percentage of GNP. Kosovo-Metohia
had the largest inflow of federally prescribed funds, while Slovenia
and central Serbia had the largest relative outflow. The country's
total deficit, as that of most republics and provinces, tended to
decline slightly up to 1987, but in 1988 it was again on the increase.
By using constant prices, the payments and receipts of republics
and provinces under federal regulations have been aggregated for the
1981-1988 period. Over these eight years the largest outflow in
absolute terms occurred in central Serbia (211,811 million dinars in
1980 prices), while the largest inflow was that into Kosovo-Metohia
(112,501 million dinars). If we compare regional shares in payments and
receipts of federal prescribed funds, Kosovo-Metohia is the biggest
relative winner as well -its receipts are 12.14 times higher than its
payments. Vojvodina is the biggest relative loser -its receipts account
for only 37% of its payments.
Since this highly complicated and more importantly,
conflict-causing process of "robbing-Peter-to-pay-Paul"produced more
losers than winners, the final effect of this confused mixture of
relationships is clear before all in comparison to the objectives that
inspired their establishment.12