Equality: The Failure of the Positive Discrimination Model
In principle, the Yugoslav system belonged to an egalitarian model,
because it "generalized equality in production relations into a global
principle of societal organization." In its initial stage, the
state-administrative concept of equality was dominant: economic
equality was seen as an expansion of state property. The introduction
of self-management, of "socialist commodity production"and the growing
importance of the national state were accompanied by shifts in emphasis
regarding the attainment of egalitarian objectives. In addition, there
was a change in the level of operationalization of these objectives,
i.e. in their implementation.
At regional levels this implied a change in the conception of
Yugoslav regional development. Until 1965 there had been several
attempts to formulate Yugoslav regional policy. From 1965 Yugoslav
regional development was seen almost exclusively as "the development of
republics and provinces." Besides, on the federal level only less
developed republics and provinces were the focus of attention. Somewhat
later (after 1970, when more attention was being paid to territorial
evenness within federal units) the same principle was applied on the
intraregional level (as a rule, only underdeveloped municipalities
/"communes"/ were given aid). Since policy was not conducted on the
societal level, strictly speaking there was no socialist model of
interregional equality. In East European countries and USSR all regions
were covered by regional policy. On the contrary, in the developed
countries of the West regional policy is focused on the so called
"critical"(or "problem") regions. Thus, regional policy is only "a
corrective"-it is not comprehensive as is the case with collectivist
societies.
In the case of Yugoslavia, in regard to the regional issue, the
existing model was a hybrid rather than a strictly egalitarian one. In
addition to the case mentioned, its hybrid character is explicit in
another important segment of the policy of regional equality. Namely,
the equality of chances and conditions on the regional level implied an
equalization of the "productive forces"of unevenly developed regions,
i.e. a transfer of capital to underdeveloped regions and above average
growth of (productive) employment there; equal participation in
results, however, implied a reduction of regional disparities in terms
of per capita GNP. The latter, "eclectic"feature of regional
policy combined a "civil"concept of equality (as equality of
conditions) with a Stalinist "naturalist"concept of development as a
quantitative growth of all productive forces. In the USSR, at least
conceptually (and in practice) the socialist concept of equality (as
equal participation in results) was consistently pursued: people should
have equal living standards in whatever region they lived. At the same
time, productive forces could grow at different rates, which meant
that, guided by economic logic, regions should make the best use of
their comparative advantages and thus enable the optimum distribution
of productive forces throughout the country.
Example of inconsistency in the conceptualization and the practice
of Yugoslav regional development may also be illustrated by the
applying of double standards in regional policy. Whereas
interregionally the egalitarian principle was pursued, with constant
requests for resources to help redress regional disparities, within
regions, contrary to proclamations, the more developed parts
(municipalities) were given priority while the less developed were
marginalized.
The principle of evenness at first operationalized as "a rapid
development of all accompanied by a faster development of
underdeveloped regions"subsequently implies a quantification in the
form of concrete (planned) targets. Since there was no institutional
(before all, market) test of regional development efficiency and the
underlying principle was the ("natural") dialectic that quantity
(automatically) brings about quality, i.e. that growth generates
development, the choice of quantitative representation of regional
development objectives was understandable. In principle, the stronger
political pressure there was for quick, direct, and tangible results of
development, the more marked were the preferences for quantitative
representations of development objectives. An illustrative example is
the way in which development objectives of less developed regions were
formulated in medium term federal plans: as a rule, the less developed
a region was, the greater were its development aspirations. Under the
circumstances, quantitative dimensions were the focus of attention
because they were usually more visible. The more visible they were, the
higher was their significance as symbols of development. Yugoslav
regional (and global) development is a striking example of symbolic
modernization. The way in which objectives were formulated also show
that the policy of regional development was to a great extent symbolic
instead of leading to actual (qualitative) changes. First to be
financed were "prestige projects"and an illusion of "exuberant"growth
was created, while behind that facade, in the absence of effective
control, there usually flourished corruption and various sorts of
theft. Elements of parasitism grew stronger, the social climate was
redistributive (the welfare effect of investment came first) rather
than productive (the productivity effect was neglected). Under the
banner of equality pure and simple redistribution in favour of
parasitic social strata took place, usually in the "grey zone,"outside
public control, brokered by the regional nomenklaturas.
Mechanisms for transferring resources from developed to
underdeveloped regions were also inconsistently conceived: the
collection of transfer resources was centralized (through the Federal
Fund), whereas the way in which these resources were used was
decentralized (any control of their use was considered a violation of
republican/provincial sovereignty!). This further reinforced the
autarkic practice which was a logical consequence of the (Stalinist or
Kardeljist) "metaeconomic"theory. Such a transfer mechanism, however,
was the cause for dissatisfaction on both sides: among the donors as
well as among the receivers of funds. The more developed regions
objected to the high priority given to interregional redistribution,
while the less developed regions defied the growing tendency towards
the application of distributive criteria (particularly of
profitability) in investment evaluation and fiercely opposed the very
idea of control over the use of transferred resources.16
The model of "pooling labour and resources"(directly and through
the Federal Fund) is a good illustration of how the illusion of
regional development problem solving was produced. First, the illusion
was created that there was harmony at micro and macro levels, while any
arising conflict was suppressed by overregulation instead of being
openly and clearly articulated and effectively resolved. Behind an
apparent absence of conflicts, the inner conflict escalated to the
extent that it had to be resolved in the Clausevitzian way -by
violence. The violence, in turn, completely delegitimated the system
and its nomenklatura.
Thus, in the end, the much praised quality (a peculiarity bordering
on unparalleled originality, unique authenticity) of Yugoslav regional
and global development proved to be only a fragile illusion which was
dispelled quickly but not painlessly. This was preceded by the
activation of built-in destabilizers so that it could plausibly be
argued that the disintegration was a planned process. Namely, since its
establishment Yugoslavia was constantly plagued, either disguisedly or
openly, by various national strategies for the break-up of the federal
state: for some of its nations Yugoslavia was a final solution, whereas
others considered it only a transitory framework, a waiting-room in
which they stuck to their own, separate solutions. Therefore, the
policy of regional development was to a great extent a policy of
investing in ethnicity and state sovereignty, i.e. in national
independence which was often (naively) believed to be attainable
through economic independence. While opting for economic isolation from
the rest of the country, the separatist republics tended to open up
politically, primarily by "appealing"to an international factor to take
"democratic"control. The "xenofiles"with separatist inclinations tended
to internationalize "their"cause, lacking the power to achieve their
"thousand-year-old dream"of independence. On the other hand, the
xenophobes that remained in the existing state ignored the importance
of the international factor and therefore paid a much higher price in
defending and safeguarding their vital interests.